CHAPTER IV

ETHNICITIES AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL COHESION

IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

G. TUSABE

INTRODUCTION

            Some of the major disturbing challenges to social cohesion in the world today are the conflicts deriving from ethnic differences.  When it comes to Africa one cannot fail to observe that the continent is multi-ethnic with a plurality of ethnic groups, each with its own distinct cultural identity. In almost every African country, it is not difficult to identify a complex presence of a multitude of ethnic communities.

            In a place like Uganda, Ladefoged and Cripper list of 63 languages and dialects, an ethnicity generally is identified with each of these languages. The presence of such a multiplicity of ethnicities in the same countries means that Africans from the same country inevitably find themselves with vast differences in languages, customs and cultures.  Indeed, as Waruta observes, these differences

                        concern not merely tribal matters of life, but some have to do with moral [codes] considered central in the cultural fabric of various peoples.  Some practice circumcision, while others consider the custom barbaric. . . . Some of the things eaten by certain people are considered taboo to others.  [And] what is most significant in the variation of the African people is the fact that some of the languages they speak, even when at times they happen to be neighbours, have no affinity whatsoever.[i]

            Some scholars such as Mary Getui conceive of this ethnic diversity to be a blessing because each ethnic group can benefit from the unique endowments of other ethnic groups.  We need to note, however, that the facts on the ground do not reflect Getui’s  optimism.  In many African countries, it has been very difficult to develop nationwide social cohesion, as opposed to ethnic cohesion.  Such development has, to a large extent, been circumscribed by cultural boundaries because many people in the same countries have apparently failed effectively to communicate/dialogue with each other due to their marked differences.  Without social cohesion on the national level, it has been difficult to realize the social ideals of stability and harmony, social ideals which are essential to a people if they are effectively to realize their existential needs.

            The purpose of this paper is first to give a brief normative explanation of what is meant by social cohesion; second, to identify the elements in the various ethnicities that have stood in the way of realizing such social cohesion on the national level; third, to expose and highlight the shortcomings of what some social scholars have advanced as the appropriate means to social cohesion; and finally, to suggest, though tentatively, the social and ethical ideals and principles that ought to temper our cultural situations and consequently lead to a lively atmosphere of social cohesion on the national level.

THE NORMATIVE MEANING OF SOCIAL COHESION

            In the context of this paper, social cohesion is conceived as group solidarity.  It is the tendency of the persons of a given society to identify with their society, that is, to feel that they are to society as parts to the whole.  “Social cohesion,” as Robert Olson observes, “is closely related to patriotism.”[ii] Sometimes on the national level social cohesion, as the tendency of persons to identify with their nation as parts to the whole, is referred to as nationhood. It is the communitarian-like spirit that animates the people of a given country to appreciate the need for mutual togetherness.  It is the consciousness (though most often unconscious) of a desire by a particular people to belong together and affirm their condition of mutual dependence.  Social cohesion, as manifest in the spirit of nationhood, promotes solidarity and subsidiary relations among the peoples who have it and has the merit of promoting creative harmony even in complex areas of social differentiations.  Social cohesion, as manifest in the spirit of nationhood, neutralizes negative divisions and carries with it the bridging idea which echoes in the hearts of men and women: “we belong together,” or “they are like us.” When realized, it endows the individual person with the ability to see beyond differences, not only of ethnicity, but even of religion and political thought.  One of the most desirable fruits of a people who live by the spirit of group solidarity or nationhood is that they identify that which is human in others, hence, giving them the capacity to dialogue with the others and to be enriched by their good qualities. With the spirit of cohesion, the people feel implicitly bound together to cooperate realizing common ends by the use of common means, each person guaranteeing his or her cooperation so that all can depend on each other.

            Having highlighted what is meant by social cohesion, it is likely that any social ethicist would desire that all multi-ethnic countries socialize their people to developing and living by that spirit of national group solidarity to secure greater social harmony on the national level.  But desirable as this may be, many parts of the world, and many African countries in particular, lack social cohesion, as is manifest in the internal conflicts most often deriving from ethnic clashes, misunderstandings and hatreds. What is it about with these ethnicities that has stood in the way of realizing cohesion on the national level?

ETHNICITY AND ITS PROBLEMATIC

Meaning of Ethnicity

            According to J.M. Thompson, ethnicity is a subjective conviction of commonality. An ethnic group is a psychological community whose members share a persisting sense of common interest and identity based on some combination of shared valued cultural traits.  Its members distinguish themselves from other groups by such characteristics as language, social customs, physical appearance, and region of residence, or by a combination of these features.[iii]

            Perhaps A.R. Byaruhanga highlights it better when he tells us that an ethnic group is the initial psycho-social network we enter and acquire at birth; and that it is “so fundamental that it later determines our values and goal priorities, our beliefs, perceptions, conduct and consciousness.”[iv]

The Problem with Ethnicities

            In his article, “Ethnicity, Culture and Social Reconstruction”, Byaruhanga observes that ethnic groups have a belief in the intrinsic superiority of their own groups over others.

                        It is assumed by the members that their values, achievements, goals or even their physical features are better, while at the same time holding others’ ethnic qualities including their beliefs, values and organisation to be inferior and not to be preferred.  This involves dislike and contempt for other groups.[v]

            With the above observation made by Byaruhanga, one cannot fail to deduce that in ethnic groups are found beliefs that can act as bases for conflict and ethnic hostilities which are never conducive to promoting cohesion in multi-ethnic African nation-states. Indeed, if one examines the various ethnic groups, one cannot fail to identify some core narratives held by each of the different ethnic groups which have contributed to sustaining inter-ethnic conflicts and ethnic marginalizations, and have often culminate in violent ethnic clashes.  For instance, Mary Getui presents us with a Maasai narrative which if not dropped by them can never allow meaningful co-existence between them and the Dorobo.

            Getui writes:

                        [Among] the Maasai there is a legend on the origin of cattle which indicates that when God gave cattle to Maasinta the first Maasai, all was going on well, and cattle were descending from heaven because Maasinta obeyed God’s instruction not to make any move or sound.  The Dorobo who was Maasinta’s housemate, however, disobeyed and exclaimed.  This upset Maasinta who in turn cursed the Dorobo: ‘. . . you are the one who cut God’s thong.  May you remain as poor as you have always been.  You and your offsprings will forever remain my servants.  Let it be that you will live off animals in the wild.  May the milk of my cattle be poison if you ever taste it. ‘This is why up to this day the Dorobo . . . are never given milk.’[vi]

            Another example is sited from Rwanda (a country composed of three ethnic groups—the Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa), where before colonialism there was a narrative which held that the King (who was always a Mututsi) is

                        the father and the patriarch of his people, given to them by God.  He is the providence of Rwanda. . . .When he exercises his authority, he is impeccable, infallible. His decisions cannot be questioned.  The parents of a victim he has unjustly struck [should] bring him presents so that he does not resent them for having been forced to cause them affliction. They still [should] trust him because his judgements are always just. Whatever happens, he remains . . . the only Lord.[vii]

            The above examples serve to testify to the fact that there are some inter-ethnic marginalizations in many parts of Africa, which inter-ethnic marginalizations derive their formal causes from the very core narratives that act as the nonmaterial structure that distinguishes each ethnic group from the others.  Such narratives have for many years sustained ethnic prejudices, hatreds and ethnocentrism which have stood in the way to realizing social cohesion on the level of nation-states in contemporary Africa.

            European colonization made matters worse.  Through their policy of divide and rule to fight one ethnic group against the other, the colonialists exploited the differences that existed between the ethnic groups. Albert de Jong, observes

                        During the colonial rule the well known principle of divide et impera was used by the colonists to play off one ethnic group against another [a feature which was to result] in innumerable conflicts and strifes which still haunt many independent African nations.[viii]

            Perhaps Uganda’s and Rwanda’s experience of colonial education can help illustrate Jong’s observation.  By 1920 in Uganda, following the British colonial education policy, the region of Buganda, which by then was 25 percent of the population, had 368 schools. The eastern, western and northern regions with 75 percent of the population had 19 schools all in the eastern and western regions; indeed the northern region virtually possessed none. To make matters worse:

                        Baganda over-representation at Makerere University College, the only university in East Africa during the colonial period [was to cause social problems that were to hinge on ethnicity].  Considering that university degrees were the gate way to the most powerful opportunities and the fact that 40 percent of the 1,698 persons who entered Makerere before 1954 from all parts of East Africa were Baganda [the Baganda came to be looked upon with envy by the other ethnic groups].[ix]

            The Baganda continued all throughout the colonial period to get the higher paying jobs in the colonial setting because they were better educated by colonial standards.  Their ethnic neighbours resented the fact that the Baganda consolidated their population advantage by becoming the educational and economic elites.  By demanding an equal share of the benefits of development—which was not forthcoming—the marginalized ethnic groups developed an antagonistic dislike for the Baganda.

            But there was something more in Uganda’s colonial education stood in the way of promoting cohesion among Uganda’s various ethnic groups than just the disproportionate distribution of formal educational facilities.  The content of colonial education in the field of the humanities contributed to strengthening and even widening ethnic cleavages.  Colonial education was designed in such a way that students developed a mentality that some ethnic groups are superior to others.  The Northern Uganda ethnic groups were portrayed as inferior and the southern groups, under the lead of the Baganda, were portrayed as superior.  As Gingyera Pinchwa observes

                        One of the contributions towards differentiation between the North and South came from the spate of scholarship in the field of social anthropology that swept through the country particularly after World War II.  This development served to categorize the people of the country into various ethnic racial/linguistic groups.  Terms like Bantu, Nilotics, Nilo-Hamites, Sudanics . . . began to crop up in school classrooms.  People were systematically made aware of their differences. . . . On the basis of political organization, social anthropologists pumped into these categories notions of cultural superiority and inferiority.  Those with large state organisations were seen as culturally superior, and those without were culturally inferior.  Thus, here was another important line of [negative] differentiation between the people of the North and the South.[x]

            On the part of Rwanda, colonial educationists and writers perpetrated and strengthened the myth that the Batutsi are by nature superior to the Bahutu and Batwa.  In the words of Jean-Paul Harroy, the myth went like this:

                        The Mututsi . . . has nothing of the negro [Muhutu and Mutwa] apart from his colour. . . . Gifted with a vivacious intelligence, the Mututsi displays a refinement of feelings which is rare among primitive people.  He is a natural-born leader.[xi]

            Or in the words of Pierre Ryckmans:

                        The Batutsi were meant to reign.  Their fine presence is in itself enough to give them a great prestige vis-a-vis the inferior races which surround them. . . . It is not surprising then that the . . .  Bahutu, less intelligent, more simple, more spontaneous, . . . have to let themselves be enslaved without ever daring to revolt.[xii]

            Now, such education as illustrated above could hardly promote cohesion at the level of the nation-state.  In terms of ethics, such education could be described as evil because it deliberately cultivated the belief that some people were by nature of inferior status, with slow-footed intelligence and abilities, or downright stupidity.

            With the above illustrations, it is not difficult to note that some of the multi-ethnic nation-states in Africa can claim little, if any, loyalty and nation-wide solidarity from its many ethnic communities because their historical colonial experiences impressed on them more or less indelible distortions in the way some ethnic groups conceive of themselves in relation to the “others.”  Matters have even been worsened when political power in some of these countries is concentrated in the hands of one or two ethnic groups.[xiii]  Such experience has contributed, in some areas, to serious ethnic marginalizations because some communities hold the belief that it is they who are “human” and other ethnic groups are less “human,” a feature that has led to the abuse of the humane principles of human dignity, human equality and the mutual respect of persons. This stands out as one of the major sources of the most gross violations of human rights, and may be the most serious barrier to peace in contemporary Africa.

            Africa has witnessed many ethnic conflicts and violent clashes deriving from such situations.  One vivid outstanding example is the Rwandese and Burundian experiences.

                        In 1994, Rwanda’s Hutu government unleashed the bloodiest 100 days in the second half of the twentieth century.  At least 500,000 Tutsi (and their sympathizers) were slaughtered, mostly with machetes.  The world was aghast when a river of their bloated bodies emptied into Lake Victoria.  [Also] nearly 100,000 Hutu and Tutsi have been killed in neighbouring Burundi.  [And] there are well over 1 million refugees from this ethnic conflict in central Africa, who spilled over into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) late in 1996.[xiv]

            We should also not overlook the experience in the Sudan of the divide between the Islamic Arab north who disrespect the person of the Christian and animistic black people of the south, who have been subjected to the evil of slavery. Nor should we forget those in Somalia who are divided along clan lines and have ferociously fought each other since the late 1980s.

            Whenever and wherever ethnic conflicts have become violent, struggles have often been protracted and brutal. The ethnic groups in control of power have never easily acceded to the demands of the oppressed groups.  Fighting has often continued for decades as has been the case in Sudan and Somalia.  And the greatest problem in all such experiences is that atrocities by one group provoke atrocities by the other group, thereby unleashing a spiral of violence.

THE QUEST FOR A BASE ON WHICH TO FOUND SOCIAL COHESION ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL

            Although ethnic conflicts are more or less common in Africa, they are not biologically determined.  We need to appreciate that such ethnic conflicts are not inevitable.  Human beings have the capacity to go beyond the social psychology of in-group/out-group violence. Belonging to a community of like-minded persons is important for healthy human development (that is, for purposes of identity and relationships), but it does not follow that the other communities must be hated, discriminated against or marginalised. In this realization, we need to resolve the challenges posed by ethnicity before it is too late. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual social disorder and abuse of our own humanity.

            Among the most popular suggestions for cultivating social cohesion are the materialistic prescriptions. The main ingredient of such prescriptions is the imperative to promote economic growth and progress.  Such growth, the argument goes, will make the people of the concerned nation-state cooperate in order to ensure their material well-being.  We need to observe, however, that the economistic prescription has some fatal weaknesses in relation to promoting social cohesion.  As Olson notes, economic interests, often times divide people along class and regional lines with conflicting economic interests.  And besides, economic transactions are always cold and impersonal[xv] because founded on the principle of competition that engenders in individuals and groups the spirit of mutual struggle rather than of mutual aid, of aggressiveness instead of love.  Indeed, economic transactions have the capacity to pit individual against individual and group against group.[xvi] Thus, we need to avoid any dogmatic stress on the economic argument as fundamental in promoting cohesion because an economic life lacks the emotional quality of our involvement with our country.

            The other generally held belief is that religion, more than the economistic prescription, can act as the foundation of social cohesion in society.  For instance, in accord with the universal commandment of love (which is the core of the Christian religion), hatred, antagonism and injustice should be eliminated and abiding harmony and group solidarity should prevail throughout the entire human universe.[xvii] It is, however, naive to assume that religion can act as the fundamental instrument in promoting social cohesion.

            Our contemporary societies have many religions, each providing a moral code for its members.  The moral codes they propound differ from group to group and if we remained on the religious level, there is no way to determine which one is right or best, or proper for the whole society.

            On the other hand, many of the religious practices and rituals performed in the various religions are claimed to have been prescribed by God or the gods.  There is a general belief that since these practices were prescribed by God or the gods, then they are ethically acceptable. But a critical assessment of these practices reveals that some of these practices can hardly promote a sense of fellow-feeling with those of the other religions.  For instance, a claim that God commanded that a people of one religious group should eliminate the people of a particular region and then occupy their land can hardly promote the desired social cohesion.

            A religion that makes its adherents to believe that they are the “holy ones” who ought not to distort their “holiness” by coming into touch with the “unholy,” or with a religion that commands the “holy ones” to force the “unholy” into becoming “holy” can hardly promote cohesion in our multicultural societies.

            It is significant to note, however, that the above critique of religion does not imply that cohesion cannot be founded on religion.  It is indeed an obvious fact that religions are essential in ensuring cohesion, but in their own groups.  What we need to appreciate is that social cohesion on the national level cannot easily be founded on religion, most especially in our contemporary and pluralistic societies.  It is indeed too narrow to assume that religion can act as the foundation for social cohesion in a world that has both a plethora of religions and a great many people who hold no religious beliefs at all.

THE IDEA OF WORLD CITIZENSHIP: THE PREREQUISITE TO COHESION

            If we wish to minimize or even neutralize ethnic conflicts and cultivate group solidarity on the national level, we must reconstruct our cultural narratives and revisit our socialization processes.  We must socialize ourselves and transform our entire cultures (in all their main compartments, including religion, ethics and politics) toward a creatively altruistic direction manifest through relations of solidarity and subsidiary. This task calls us to weed out of our cultural situations those elements that breed ethnic hatred, war, and all those forms of ethnic marginalizations that often culminate in suicidal tendencies.  Because we have found flaws in economic and religious foundations on which to build cohesion on the national level, we should move on to the philosophical position. This paper contends that this position can neutralize ethnic conflicts and cultivate a group solidarity that can cut across ethnicity, religion and any other types of human differences.  However, what is suggested here is not a new philosophy but one that has been in place for over 2000 years, but which unfortunately seems to have eluded the minds of many social ethical theorists. This philosophy is the Stoic social, ethical philosophy of “World Citizenship,” as voiced by Seneca, and revealed to us by Martha Nussbaum. It states:

                        each of us is a member of two communities: one that is truly great and truly common . . . in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun; and the other is the one to which we have been assigned by birth.[xviii]

            As Nussbaum points out, Seneca’s philosophical belief is a call to all humanity and, most especially, to those in multicultural environments, to acknowledge that:

                        The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might have been born in any [ethnic group] . . . we should thus not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership . . . (to) erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings.  We should recognize humanity . . . wherever it occurs and give that community of humanity our first allegiance.[xix]

            This idea of world citizenship should not be confused by associating it with something like a temporal form of world government.  Stoic World Citizenship is a normative projection, it is more like the Kantian idea of the “Kingdom of ends”—a moral community that calls upon all of us to treat with respect the humanity of all human beings.

            One major fascinating and desirable element about the idea of World Citizenship is that being a citizen of the world does not require one to give up local affiliations whether national, ethnic or religious. Rather we should work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, showing respect for the humans wherever they appear.[xx] This idea empowers us to scrutinize our cultural narratives, to discard all that is in our cultural traditions which, if not eliminated, stands in our way to creative dialogue with the others.  This idea endows us with the capability of “recognizing that there is something more fundamental about us than the [ethnicities] where we happen to find ourselves, and that this more fundamental basis of citizenship is shared across all divisions.”[xxi]  It is the idea which invites us to appreciate and acknowledge that we all share a common humanity—a common denominator that constitutes the inner cohesion of any human society, and upon which we can found a moral consensus at ever wider levels of human co-existence because each one of us is human before being a member of this or the other ethnic group.[xxii]

WORLD CITIZENSHIP AND THE PRINCIPLES OF RESPECT OF PERSONS, SOLIDARITY, AND JUSTICE

            The idea of World Citizenship acts as an idea that can promote at least three interpenetrating principles, which, if lived, have the capacity of promoting and nurturing mutual co-existence not only between individuals but even more between the diverse groupings that find themselves living together.

            The first principle is that of respect of persons.  This is a principle born out of the fact that since the idea of World Citizenship points to our sharing in a common humanity then it is imperative for all of us to have a moral respect for the human person since he/she is the basic constituent of humanity.  Respect for the human person is that act of regarding and treating each human person fully as a person in his/her own right.  It demands not looking down on his/her being simply because he/she is a member of this or the other group to which you do not belong.  Such respect of person shuns chauvinism that regards oneself as superior to others.  It is one that makes one appreciate that even though X is a member of community A, Y a member of community B, and Z a member of community C, such does not make any of them less a person to merit maltreatment or disrespect from the others.

                        As person each human being deserves to be respected as fully a person.  [And] those who clique against others in pursuance of their egoistic group interests should understand that if others also group up against them there will be nothing but war, conflicts and discord in society.[xxiii]

            The second principle is that of solidarity.  World Citizenship and its pointer to our sharing in a common humanity bespeaks solidarity.  It promotes the moral sensibility that each one of us possesses human bonds not only with members of one’s group but also with persons of other ethnicities, religions etc.  Such bonds, if properly appreciated, can be extended to encompass all of humanity.  A lived experience of solidarity founded on the idea of World Citizenship has, thus, the capacity of promoting creative transcultural and intercultural interchange in which values are lived not only with others who share them, but with others whose value pattern differs.  Such solidary interchange between groups promotes not only the spirit of tolerance but also the caring practice manifest through subsidiary relations in which the divergent groups find themselves living lives of mutual supplementation other than suicidal conflicts.

            The third is the principle of justice. We have already observed that the idea of World Citizenship calls upon us to treat with respect the human wherever it occurs. This is a normative ideal states that we should relate with others in the spirit of justice and that we should create social structures that are responsive to the principle of justice.  Living with others and designing social structures governed by the principle of justice demands that we guard against all forms of unethical discriminations of the others, which often manifest themselves in ethnic discriminations and social-political and economic marginalizations. The sense of justice, founded in the idea of world citizenship in a multi-ethnic and multicultural society, emphasizes two major aspects of justice, that is, distributive and social justice.

            In the context of this paper, distributive justice is that type of justice that regulates the administration of goods and common services in a country.  It is the justice of the whole to the parts, the justice of the society to individuals and groups.  While social justice is one that calls upon all persons to exercise their obligations as active and productive participants in the life of society, but only after society has fulfilled its duty to enable these persons to participate in this way. 

                        When the social distribution machinery is unfairly balanced, when it favours some while excluding or giving others a minimal place . . . [such social order inevitably] leads to upheavals, wars and revolutions.[xxiv]

            If justice is to be done, and if we are to minimize suicidal conflicts that stand in our way to realizing peace and mutual co-existence, it is imperative that we take heed of the idea of World Citizenship that demands that we socialize ourselves into recognizing humanity wherever it occurs and giving that community of humanity our first allegiance.

SOCIAL ETHICAL EDUCATION: THE CORE OF THE SOCIALIZATION PROCESS FOR NATIONAL COHESION

            Having identified the significance of the Stoic social ethical philosophy of World Citizenship as essential to cultivating inter-ethnic solidarity, there is a need then for us to socialize our people and ourselves to appreciate and acknowledge its relevance and to live our lives under its guidance. Such socialization ought to manifest itself in a critical social-ethical education, a type of liberal education that can equip the person with a critical disposition, one that can liberate the mind from the bondage of custom and tradition, to produce a people who can function with sensitivity as citizens of the world.  Such a liberal education is important because as Edward Wamala observes

                        [engaging in such] critical and intellectual examination is in effect to discard the negative cultural trait of slavish acceptance of whatever is offered [in our ethnic narratives][xxv]

            This type of critical social-ethical education advocated here is more in line with what Nussbaum expounds.  It opens a person to recognise the worth of human life wherever it occurs.  It is an education that allows the person to acknowledge oneself as bound to the “others.”  Such education helps develop in human persons three major, but interrelated capabilities:

            1. The capacity for critical examination of oneself and one’s traditions, i.e., living the examined life.  Such a capacity liberates one from accepting no belief as authoritative simply because it has been handed down by tradition—it is the capacity that questions all beliefs and accepts only those that survive moral reason’s demand for humane co-existence with others.[xxvi]  It is the capacity that liberate the person from what Francis Bacon did identified as idols of the theatre.[xxvii]

            2. The capacity is to rationally and emotionally conceive of oneself not only as a member of some local ethnic community, but also and above all as a human being bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern. Such capacity is important because it helps the individual person develop moral sensibilities that venture beyond narrow group or ethnic loyalties and to consider the reality of the lives of others.  Being socialized to develop such a capacity can liberate us from thinking of ourselves in parochial group terms. It liberates us by opening us to linking ourselves to fellow human beings whom are different from ourselves. It enlightens us to appreciating fellowship with the “others” and to the moral responsibilities we have to them.

            3. The third capacity is what Nussbaum calls narrative imagination.  This is the ability for one to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself—to try to understand the emotions, wishes and desires that someone so placed might have. This capacity also calls one to think twice about the decisions one makes that affect the other. This takes into consideration the Kantian categorical imperative that calls upon us to act only after having wished that our action would become a universal law.

THE ETHIC OF WORLD CITIZENSHIP AND THE NORMATIVE DEMANDS IT PUTS ON THE STATE

            In most multi-ethnic African countries ridden with inter-ethnic conflicts, one finds that their state machines often function in such a way that they offer privileges to specific ethnic groups.  These states seem to be designed first of all for defensive and offensive warfare with the ethnic groups that have been marginalized.  States in some of these countries have proved cruel and tyrannical, sometimes ordering thousands or even millions to kill or be killed, in consequence generating inter-ethnic clashes in their bloodiest and most inhumane forms. Perhaps the best example of where the state motivated ethnic massacres on a large scale is that of Rwanda in the 1990s.  Gerard Prunier tells us that:

                        A common feature of all the massacres [carried out in Rwanda in the 1990s] is that they were preceded by political meetings during which a ‘sensibilisation’ process was carried out.  These were designed to put the local peasant Bahutus in the mood, to drum into them that the people they were soon to kill were . . . (the) arch-enemy.  These meetings were always presided over and attended by the local authorities with whom the local peasants were familiar; but they also usually featured the presence of an ‘important person’ who would come from Kigali to lend the event an aura of added respectability and of official sanction.  After the ‘sensibilisation’ process had been carried out, the order would come sooner or later . . . directly from the Ministry of the Interior in Kigali. . . .

            With the above example from Rwanda, it is no surprise then that some African states have probably slain more people in engineered inter-ethnic clashes than in any inter-state wars.  Following such observation, it is hardly possible that inter-ethnic harmony shall ever be realized in such environments unless the concerned governments choose to run their countries motivated by the ethical principles we have already seen that derive their meaning from the idea of World Citizenship. Any governments that claim to be cultivating peace and promoting cohesion must avowedly come to terms with the ethical principles of respect for all persons and justice. Only thus can governments cease being the principal efficient causes that generate forces of strife and enmity.  If inter-ethnic solidarity and co-existence are to be realized and maintained in multi-ethnic countries, governments must focus their attention on questions of the equitable distribution of resources and equal treatment and fair representation of the various ethnic groups that they are morally obliged to serve.  In order to counteract ethnic-related inequalities more or less created by historical distortions, it may be justifiable to exercise a modest notion of affirmative action in favour of the hitherto underprivileged ethnic groups.  The question of equal treatment and fair representation of the various ethnic groups also demands a strong and living commitment to securing and safeguarding civil and political rights.  This commitment  is necessary because if a minority or formerly marginalized people truly participate in government and society, their grievances are much more likely to be addressed without violence and strife.

CONCLUSION

            We need to appreciate that many African nation-states are such more in theory than in fact.  Their citizens maintain much stronger cohesion with their ethnicities than with the nation. This fact has often generated ethnic conflicts that seem to derive their roots from the very core narratives that motivate their cultural behaviour. To resolve many such elements that may stand in our way to cohesion on the national level, this paper has suggested the Stoic social , ethical philosophy of World Citizenship. We ought to be socialized by this with a view to imbuing moral notions that can cultivate, or strengthen in us respect for human personality, love of peace, hatred of narrow parochialism and of disrespect for the person of others. In conclusion, for any multicultural and multiethnic society (as are many African countries), the most reliable path to peaceful, co-existence and creative cooperation must start from the people’s appreciation of the idea of World Citizenship. This idea points to our common humanity as a common denominator that lies infinitely deeper than our ethnic differences, convictions, antipathies, or sympathies. This common denominator invites us to exercise a horizontal self-transcendence, that is, a hand of caring concern and consideration stretched out not only to those in our own group, but also to the “others”; a deeply and joyously experienced need to be in harmony even with what we ourselves are not; and a deeply lived respect for the person of every human being wherever he or he appears. 

NOTES