FREEDOM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE
DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
We open up our discussion of Freedom and Development with a quotation
from the Human Development Report 1992 which stated that:
Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. In
principle, these choices can be infinite and can change over time. But at all
levels of development, the three essential ones are for people to lead a long
and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to the resources
needed for a decent standard of living. If these essential choices are not
available, many other opportunities remain inaccessible.[i]
This
paper seeks to explore the issue of how and to what extent personal freedoms
enjoyed by individuals and social freedoms enjoyed by communities can be
tempered for the sake of development and modernization.
This issue is particularly pertinent at this point in time because we are
witnessing two major social movements, somewhat intersecting. Some shrill voices
argue that communities must develop and modernize, while equally shrill voices
from individuals and communities argue for more freedoms and rights to act in a
manner deemed fit by different actors.
These
kinds of movements are not entirely new in society, nor are they unique to
Sub-Saharan Africa, they have been experienced elsewhere in the world since
early historical times. But whereas
such movements, for example, were experienced in the Western world slow by and
in sequence, these same movements appeared in sub-Saharan Africa as a
thunder-bolt and simultaneously, raising serious social questions of the
internalization of values and realignment of priorities.
We
note for example that whereas developed Western societies conclusively secured
the economic foundations of their societies long before they had to contend with
demands of their citizens for personal and social rights and freedoms,
developing communities are in a somewhat different, if more complex, position,
trying to secure their economic and development foundations at the same time as
their populations clamour for their social and personal rights and freedoms.
The
theoretical problem in the circumstances is whether it is possible to lay
foundations for social/economic development at the same time that we lay the
foundations for the realisations of social and personal rights and freedoms?
At
first, the question appears pointless because from a common, everyday standpoint
the relationship between freedom and development seems clear enough to warrant
no serious critical discourse. Politically,
free people are those who can enthusiastically and effectively participate at
all levels of their society and in so doing release their creative energies and
entrepreneurial talents, which can be harnessed for the development of society. It is also true that a prospering and dynamic economy would
require a spirited population, courageous, not fearful of self-expression, and
open to debate and discourse. A
population in which a people were allowed free reign and competition for their
ideas would, following this same argument, be the kind of population where the
competition of ideas in areas of economic and development realms would be
possible and would engender the advancement of society.
From
these two considerations it would appear that freedom in all its generic
meanings is a necessary prerequisite for development as pointed out by the world
report quoted in the introduction of this paper. However, an
historical-empirical study of the relationship between freedom and development
reveals that in the name of development, personal as well societal freedoms have
been curtailed—not only in the historical past, but even in the contemporary
period—all in the name of socio-economic development.
For
our historical-empirical study, we shall go to Great Britain in the early days
of its industrial development. Historically,
at the time Britain was at the threshold of her glory as an industrial as well
as a colonial power. There was an internal burst of technological and industrial
advance. Rural folks migrated to
towns to take part in the technological advancements, leaving the rural areas
empty and ready for land consolidation. Merchants
moved far and wide looking for raw materials for their industries and markets
for their finished products, giving rise to the period’s colonial expansion.
This historical period was known as the Mercantilist period.
One
key aspect of Mercantilist ideology of great importance to the issue under
discussion here was the theory of nationalism, a theory which was in many
respects against what we would today call the spirit of individual freedom and
human rights.
Whereas
the spirit of individualism frees the individual from the shackles of social and
central government and whereas public institutions are simply aids or means to
the attainment of individual ends; in contrast, the spirit of nationalism
posited the nation as the major point of consideration. Individual persons were
only constituent parts and were treated as subordinate to it in every aspect.
Individual human beings could be compared to the limbs of the body in
their relation to the whole person. These
limbs had their being and meaning only in relation to the whole body.
The
subordination of personal rights and individual freedoms had no better
expression than the one we find in the Mercantilist theory of wages.
We are informed that:
Low wages were thought desirable because they diminished costs of
production, made possible underselling of foreigners in their own markets, and
this contributed towards the enlargement of the volume of exports. The fact that they would lower the well being of the masses,
thwart their like purposes, and prevent their making the most of themselves did
not seem to be a matter of great concern. To
be sure it was recognised that there was a limit below which wages should not be
pushed, namely that which was essential to healthy, vigorous animal life, but
this limitation was recommended not in the interest of individuals but because a
healthy vigorous population was necessary for the maintenance of armies and
navies.[ii]
But
some thinkers were even more cynical. John
Carry is quoted to have said that “while a good diet was essential to health,
health was not specifically described as being a source of increased
productivity.”[iii]
In
Mercantilist philosophy, we encounter not only what we would ordinarily consider
abuse of individual worker’s rights, but also wanton disregard of individual
property rights especially, as enshrined in what we may call the Mercantilist
entrepreneurial theory. According
to that theory, the sovereign (the King or Emperor) was seen as a great landlord
or today’s chief executive of a corporation.
The sovereign saw it as his duty to develop resources to “to the extent
required by the needs of the state.”[iv]
Accordingly, there was nothing that the sovereign could not undertake
directly for or on behalf of the state. Interference
with private property was justified if the realisation of state policy was at
stake. Men and property were simply
tools to be used as needed by the larger demands of the state.
Infringement
an personal rights was not confined only to economic matters.
Even educational theory was similarly tailored not to advance the
well-being of the individual learner, but the demands of society.
We note for example that while poor labourers who lived on bare
subsistence had “charity schools” built for them, these were challenged by
mainstream Mercantilist Ideologues who argued that “the education provided
might make the lower order dissatisfied with their station in life and deplete
their ranks.”[v]
Mercantilist
Europe was not unique in its repressive tendencies.
Japan, under the Tokugawa reign (17th century) had developed
equally repressive practices which overflowed into the subsequent Meiji period.
We note for example that in the period under discussion here, Japan developed a
repressive exclusive policy (1616) intended to insulate the Japanese from
external, notably from Christian, influences. The anti-foreign legislation
(1636) and the overall Tokugawa ruling class philosophy was basically designed
to “keep people steeped in ignorance.”[vi]
The
subsequent Maiji dynasty, although purportedly enlightened, was in many ways a
continuation of the Tokugawa philosophy. The
Meiji rulers, very much like the Mercantilist thinkers of Europe, also attempted
to “expand national power as the end of state policy, while keeping a firm
grip themselves on the levers of
control.” [vii]
Although the Tokugawa rulers before them had tried to control education
by denying it to the majority of labourers lest it makes them dissatisfied with
their lot in life, the Meiji rulers by allowed many people access to education,
but even then, “subservience to the state was to be made part of the
curriculum.”[viii]
Alluding to the long tradition of using education as a way to control society,
Marion J. Levy has observed:
The Japanese are not the only people to use state education to enforce
social discipline within the established order but they were pioneers in the
more modern techniques of this form of regimentation.[ix]
Over
all we note that whether in Europe or Japan, the builders of today’s
‘developed’ countries regarded the pursuit of wealth and centralised power
as coordinate objectives each reenforcing the other.
There was the feeling that a strong economy, characterised by
manufacturing and internal and foreign trade would reinforce the state; but a
strong state was itself conceived as a sine qua non for a strong economy.
Given
those state objectives vis-a-vis the rights and freedoms of the individual, for
an overall evaluation of Mercantilist ideology in respect to those values. We
refer to the apt and insightful assessment of Arnold Scot:
Criticism of the Mercantile system . . . would be easy but useless. Its
defects as an economic policy of universal application or as a body of doctrine
to guide statesmen and economists are obvious to present day students. When
considered with reference to the problems of the time in which it flourished,
however, it is difficult if not impossible to find fault with the system.
It certainly played an important role in the history of European
civilisation. It helped to build up
the great states of England, France and Germany and was a most efficient means
of economic progress in the sixteenth and seventeenth century.[x]
The
point is well made. Mercantilism
both as a theory and practice might have been repugnant, but that repugnancy is
only visible if seen from a historical perspective.
When the theory and practice was applied, it was a positive ideology that
achieved the economic development of what later in the 20th century were to be
considered developed countries.
Mercantilist
thinkers must have had at the back of their minds the question Jesus asked his
followers at Emmaus: “Was it not necessary that the Messiah should suffer
these things to enter into his glory?”[xi]
The
physiocratic reaction to Mercantilism, the economic ideas of Adam Smith, the
socio-political ideas of J. S. Mill, John Lock and other libertarian thinkers
all swayed thinking away from the Mercantilist “ideals” of state control and
supplanted them with the ideals of individual freedom and human rights.
The
physiocrats who were the first to react to Mercantilism, opined that “commerce
should be entirely freed and untrammeled by obstruction of any kind on the
grounds that free competition between free merchants was essential to the
maintenance of proper prices.”[xii]
The state, according to these thinkers, was assigned the more modest duty
of educating the public so that they could understand the working of the natural
order of things and also of providing and maintaining public such works as
roads, bridges, harbours, etc.
Adam
Smith, a close follower of the physiocrats, would normally have agreed with the
mercantilist ideology concerning human nature.
Considering that man was by nature selfish and egoistic, it would make
perfectly good sense for him to be under the strict tutelage of state control
for the proper harmonisation of his selfish impulses with the needs and
interests of society. Smith’s
libertarian impulse, however, led him to develop an entirely different thesis.
Instead of seeing selfish men as something evil and therefore to be suppressed,
he rationalised selfishness in his theory of the invisible hand. He argued that
by pursuing one’s own personal (and often selfish motives), individuals
unwittingly promoted social well-being. “By
pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”[xiii]
Following that line of argument, society needs to allow individual social
actors maximum freedoms to do what they like, with a view to ultimately and
maximally benefiting society.
J.
S. Mill similarly saw in libertarian philosophy the key to human advancement.
He was for the removal of all sorts of impediments that stand in the way
of people’s attempts at self-advancement.
He was particularly irked by self-imposed customs which he saw as
hindrances to advancement.
For
J. S. Mill, economic progress depended, as did the augmentation of human
welfare, “upon two types of improvements—upon the extension of man’s
knowledge of the laws of nature and his capacity to remove both barriers imposed
by an unbeneficient nature and barriers imposed by men on themselves in the form
of beliefs, customs, opinions and habits of thought.”[xiv]
Anticipating
what was later to be known as human resources management, J.S. Mill was of the
view that “successful production . . . depends more on the qualities of the
human agents than in the circumstances in which they work. There is hardly any
source from which a more definite amount of improvement may be looked for in
productive power, than by endowing with brains those who now only have hands.”[xv]
Note that whereas Mill was at the forefront popularising education, at
the same, he minimised the role of government in economic affairs in part
because the concentration of many economic functions in the hands of government
would destroy person’s individuality and liberty.[xvi]
Developed
countries received libertarian ideas concerning personal freedoms and human
rights at a time when their economic foundations had been secured.
The ideas of Adam Smith, J.S. Mill and John Locke all emerged in a
society which regrettably or thankfully had passed through the Mercantilist
period and had experienced certain concrete economic achievements, which the
subsequent libertarian ideas could not undo.
It was one thing to look back regrettably at what had happened during the
period of economic ascending; it was another to realise that history could not
be undone. Moreover, it could be
argued that the libertarian ideals themselves had been conceptualised against a
background by provided mercantilism—however painfully—and that without it,
possibly, those ideals would not have been concretised, let alone been
conceived.
Third
world economic development is in a somewhat different situation.
No sooner had Africa entered her “Mercantile period” than we started
to hear clarion calls for respect for personal freedoms and human rights. Whereas Western Europe passed through clearly differentiated
historical epochs with each epoch narrowly focused on a certain ideological
preoccupation, we are witnessing a Third World grappling with laying foundations
for economic benefits, but at the same time contending with voices clamour for
respect of personal freedoms and human rights.
Note
for example, that in its efforts to resuscitate its ailing economies,
sub-Saharan Africa has been advised to undertake structural adjustment
programmes. These programmes have
come with whole packages of conditions that entail, among other things, a
reduction of the labour force (thereby forcing many otherwise able-bodied people
into unemployment or unwanted and often degrading forms of employment), then
cutting down on educational and medical subsidies thereby denying many brilliant
but poor students chances to access higher education and denying many poor
people badly needed medical care. All these are advanced in the name of economic
development.
The
same quarters recommending structural adjustment programmes at the same time
call upon African countries to speedily democratise, to open political space and
the put human rights issues high on the political agenda.
Among the human rights that must speedly be attended to are the right to
work, the right to medical care, the right to food, etc .
The
challenge facing African theorists and political actors is: How to reconcile the
demands of mercantilist-like structural adjustment programmes with libertarian
ideals that uncompromisingly call for respect for human rights and personal
freedoms? How, for example, reconcile the libertarian demand for the
right to work or the right to medical care with the demands of a mercantilist
ideology that preaches restructuring economies and tightening individual and
social expenditures?
Before
we reflect further on these questions, we need to revisit the two ideologies
under discussion here to look at the philosophical underpinnings that informed
them. Mercantilism, we recall, was
informed by the philosophy that economic development requires discipline and
that discipline can be ensured only when and where there is control and
restriction. Curtailing freedom, so
this line of thinking goes, ensures stability which in turn enables government
to plan and execute agreed upon plans.
At
the other end of the scale are the libertarians whose central thesis is that
development can take place only when and where free individuals participate in
the different kinds of endeavour in their society.
By freely participating in matters affecting their communities,
individuals release their creative potential not only for their own benefit but
also, and ultimately, for the larger society to which they belong.
According to this school of thought, only individuals who are free (as
opposed to slaves) can meaningfully and productively take part in the
development of their communities.
Given
the diametrically opposed rationalies for the two ideological positions, the
challenge facing theorists in the circumstances is: what new paradigms to
develop that will make sense of the now contemporaneous mercantilist and
libertarian realities? What new
paradigms do we evolve that will take cognizance of the fact that the realities
of mercantilism and libertarianism are real and contemporaneous, not following
one upon the other successively as happened in Europe or Japan.
The
challenge facing African theorists is to develop theoretical paradigms that can
focus and ultimately illuminate the ideological constellation obtaining in the
region. This time round, Africa may not have to appropriate foreign-conceived
theoretical frameworks as has traditionally been done because the realities here
are peculiarly African.[xvii]
In
this matter we shall have to look for typically African solutions. Hence we turn
to African traditional sources to explore how individual and social interests
were mediated.
The
conflictual ideological situation raised in our discussion ought to be
appreciated against a background where external actors have wittingly or
unwittingly tried to impose externally conceived theoretical and conceptual
frameworks upon African reality. We note as our starting point that the kind of cleavages
between man and society that informed mercantilist and libertaranian philosophy
were not only unknown in Africa, but were also incongruous with the African
psyche. People in Africa saw themselves in a symbiotic relationship with
society, a point well made by a renown African scholar, J. S. Mbiti, “I am
because we are, and since we are therefore I am.”[xviii]
In
that conception of man and society, we have a relationship such that whatever is
injurious to society is injurious to the individual; similarly whatever is
injurious to an individual is injurious to society.
Accordingly, suppression of individual rights and personal freedoms as
experienced during the mercantile period, ostensibly for economic development,
was not only injurious to the individual but to society as well.
Similarly the libertarian elevation of the individual at the expense of
society, ostensibly to highlight and concretise man’s freedom and rights, was
not only likely to compromise society but would in the short and long run also
compromise the individual who would end up with no rights after all.
The
traditional African perspective sketched here has been incorporated in
international development philosophy. For
example, according to the Cocoyac declaration adopted in October 1974 by a
symposium convened by UNEP and UNCTAD on patterns of resource environment and
development strategies, it was explicitly stated hat “the goal of development
should be not to develop things, but to develop man.”[xix]
That same declaration goes on to state that “Development must be aimed
at the spiritual, moral and material advancement of the whole human being, both
as a member of society and from the point of view of individual fulfillment.”[xx]
The point is well made: people should not be seen or conceived as the
Kierkegardian solitary individual, rather they should be seen in the sense
elucidated by Mbiti.
Already
we can see that both mercantilist and libertarian conceptions of peoplen
vis-a-vis the state missed some very important insights about people in society.
New paradigms of the individual and society need to show that for the
well-being of the individual in society, we need a new conceptualisation that
emphasizes that happy, healthy individuals, enjoying personal freedoms and human
rights can exist only in happy and healthy societies where the ethos of the
community is conducive to the protection of rights and freedoms.
In
a nutshell, we can already see that our new paradigm calls for mechanisms that
strengthen not only the well-being of individuals but of society as well.
Both ideologies were individually lop-sided because they failed to see
the continuum between individual and society and vice versa—a point aptly made
by Arthur Koestler:
No man is an island; he is a “holon.”
Like Janus, the two faced Roman god, holons have a dual tendency to
behave as quasi-independent wholes, asserting their individuality, but at the
same time as integrated parts of longer wholes in the multileveled hierarchies
of existence. Thus a man is both a
unique individual and a part of a social group, which itself is a part of a
larger group, and so on . . . thus polarity between the self assertive and
integrative tendencies is a universal characteristic of life. Order and stability can prevail only when the two tendencies
are in equilibrium. If one of them
dominates the other, this delicate balance is disturbed and pathological
conditions of various types make their appearance.[xxi]
Applying
these reflections to contemporary African realities, we note that while
cleavages could have been sharp in the course of European civilisation, on the
one hand, a firm foundation for economic development, while on the other hand,
it buttressed individual human rights and personal freedom. Though these
cleavages overflowed to Africa, nevertheless, the overall tendency in Africa has
been more towards social integration than towards the assertion of
individuality—for whatever reasons.
If
one person is because we are, and if we are because one person is, and if we
deeply believe in the value of an integrating African philosophy, then neither
the individualism associated with libertarianism nor the nationalism espoused in
the name of economic development à la marcantilism is an appropriate paradigm
for Africa. The paradigm workable
here would be one that recognises that the well-being of the individual
overflows to the well-being of society and, conversely, the well-being of
society can be meaningful only if experienced in individual people’s lives.
If
we grant that the quest for freedom and the enjoyment of human rights means no
more than the gradual and progressive removal of all restrictions on the
unfolding of human potentialities, this unfolding of human potentialities, in
addition to being conceived in individual terms, should be seen in terms of the
family, the village, the tribe, the nation and the entire world.
Removing restrictions, therefore, will be removing those restrictions
that impinge not only on the individual, but on entire societies.
As
we reflect on impediments that stand in the way of the unfolding of society we
can begin to gain some insights into the kind of programme envisaged here.
Sub-Saharan Africa has repeatedly complained about unfair trading
practices, where we, for example, buy indiscriminately from the developed world,
but where our products never access fully the markets of the developed markets
world. What if Africa accessed developed markets for her agro-products where she
has a comparative advantage? Then sub-Saharan Africa would address: (1) The
problem of economic underdevelopment that has bedeviled the continent for millennia; (2) the problem of human rights and personal
freedoms, because greater numbers of people would be employed, in turn meeting
many of their basic requirements for access to jobs, and, generally the
reduction of many problems caused by poverty?
In
the same vein, if we grant that a strong nation is necessary for economic
well-being, our conception of a strong nation should start and should ultimately
consist of strong individuals. Indeed
today, we see the emergence of a new image of the individual who is cosmopolitan
in outlook and increasingly, for example, speaking an international lingua
franca, interested in exploiting whatever opportunities there may be anywhere in
the world, even if exploiting those opportunities could occasionally lead to a
compromise of personal freedoms and human rights.
We are witnessing a new type of individual,
geared to living in a borderless world where the former borders along
rivers and mountain ridges are dissolved thanks to new information technologies.
People are attempting to impose their individuality, and doing so in a
society that is itself highly democratic and appreciative of this individual
efforts.
In
Africa we experience enormous problems of underdevelopment, illiteracy, massive
internal and external debts, population explosion, high mortality rates, etc.
All these and similar problems have been known for a long time and need no
restatement. What needs to be
stated is that while the larger society to which one belongs is wreathing under
the afore mentioned problems. There is no way enjoyment of individual freedom
and human rights will lead to self-fulfillment, to full self-realisation, to a
life of dignity and self-respect, in short, to economic development.
It will be no value to
anyone in a society to get a Ph.D. in heart surgery when neighbours cannot
control diarrhoea. There will be no point in individual families practising
family planning when the larger society is untouched by similar concerns.
There will be no way a libertarian will realise his cherished values in a
deprived society. Similarly, there
will be no way nationalist tendencies can succeed when individual men and women
are disenfranchised and weakened. Development
in Africa will have to be based on a collective effort, David Kaulem has very
aptly gotten the point, “The only thing that can further true development in
Africa is unity, true common spirit; Africa will not be able to base their
struggle on individual effort”.[xxii]
[iii].
Bert F. Hoselitz (ed.), Theories of
Economic Growth (Glence, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 49.
[vi].
Marion J. Levy, “Contrasting Factors in Modernization of China and
Japan.” In Sunion Kuznets, Wilbert Moore and Joseph J. Spengler, Economic Growth: Brazil, India and Japan (Durham, N.C., Duke
University Press, 1955), p. 544.
[xvii].
These matters are peculiarly African because as we have argued above,
Sub-Saharan Africa finds herself in a situation where her population is
subjected to mercantilist-like treatment under structural adjustment
programmes. But at the same time, she is being bombarded by human rights
advocates calling for ever more freedoms in an ever-increasing number of
areas. Many developed countries
have not faced a similar problem having attended to their economic matters
long before they had to contend with the libertarian ideals of human rights
and personal freedoms.
[xviii].
J.S. Mbiti, African Religion and
Philosophy (London: Heineman Educational Books, 1969), p. 24.