THE
PRIVATISATION PROCESS IN AFRICA:
ETHICAL
IMPLICATIONS
In
the last 20 years, a majority of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries have
implemented comprehensive economic reforms and restructuring programmes dictated
by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other multilateral
agencies. For countries like Uganda
and Ghana, these reforms and structural adjustments programmes (SAPs) are so
successful that their economies have been hailed by the World Bank, IMF, and
other multilateral agencies as the most liberal economies in Sub-Sahara Africa.[i]
These comprehensive economic reforms have involved the liberalization of the
exchange and trade regimes, the abolition of the Industries Licensing Act, the
promulgation of new Investment Codes, the liberalization of pricing and
marketing agricultural products, and above all, the privatization of state-owned
enterprises ranging from small-scale commercial to large—scale industrial
establishments.[ii]
In
all these programmes, the input of the people is conspicuously absent. Even in
those governments which came to power singing the power of the people, when it
came to the implementation of these economic reforms they followed Aidan
Southall’s advice that Africa must pursue capitalism under duress because it
is powerless to implement any other option,[iii]
even when supported by the people. The
case of Uganda clearly illustrates this argument.
Prior to 1986, before the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to
power, the Obote II government had implemented these economic reforms.
The NRM had fought the Obote II government, to a large extent for the
latter’s economic policies, which the NRM had labelled “contortions of
people like Obote with the advice from the top brass of the IMF.”[iv]
To most of the NRM
radicals, the IMF/World Bank programmes were simply imperialistic.
Point No. 5 of the NRM’s Ten-Point Programme was categorical in its
definition of what “an independent, integrated and self-sustaining national
economy” was. It involved the structural reconstruction of the asymmetrical
economy, and turning it away from dependence on one or two exports (coffee or
cotton) and the import largely of luxurious and expensive manufactured goods.[v]
Point No. 5, then concludes:
Without
an independent, integrated and self-sustaining national economy, Uganda will
never stabilise. Much of the
present turmoil is as much due to political mismanagement as it is to a narrow
economy that cannot accommodate the aspiration of the many groups within our
society.[vi]
What
obtains from the above arguments is the central argument we want to defend in
this paper, that many African governments after taking leadership roles soon
shade their revolutionary appearances and embrace capitalism en-masse seeing it
as inevitable. The problem is that
the people of the continent or country are hardly given the right freely to
choose their economic and social system without outside interference or
constraint of any kind, and to determine, with equal freedom, their model of
development.
This
is true of the privatization process in Africa. This process which did not pose
fundamental ethical questions such as: What and who is defining privatization?
Who participates in the privatization process?
Who benefits from it? What
are the actual effects on the poor Africans and the environment?
The
paper addresses these contradictory trends in the privatization process. It attempts to locate the ethical implications that may have
propelled the trend toward comprehensive privatization programme and a private
investment strategy. Given the
emphasis of many African governments on providing conditions to facilitate a
reasonable standard of living for all people as a condition for the enjoyment of
the social benefits accruing from a democratic and just society, to what extent
has the privatization strategy laid the foundation for such a system of
production, distribution and consumption?
The
purpose of this discussion is not to condemn or credit the privatization process
in Africa. Rather, it is an attempt
at presenting the realities both of the few rich and of the poor majority
Africans in the context of this process. If
by so doing criticism is extended to the process of privatization, this will
provide a way of opening up closed composite of challenges that sometimes is
felt through the weight it can impose on those who are holding it in their
hands, namely, the majority of poor Africans.
It will be to their benefit and, hopefully, to the benefit of the few
rich who are contracting the process. Either
they will make a U-turn and initiate programmes that are ethical, i.e,
pro-people, less profit-driven and inevitably anti-imprerialist, or at least
they will initiate the reforms necessary to save the poor Africans from the evil
of market-driven economic programmes.
The
privatization process in Africa is not peculiarly African.
To a large extent, it is part of the globlisation process. Yash Tandon defines globalisation as “The final conquest of
capital over the rest of the world.”[vii]
However, he credits globlisation with “the spread of cultural pluralism, the
development of technology and productive forces, the global awareness of the
underlying unity of humankind, and more recently the (partial) return to nature
as an inherent part of life in all its many forms.”[viii]
Despite the positive impact of globalization at the economic level,
Africa remains a source of raw materials for the West; hence, the privatization
process in Africa remains largely exploitative.
Such a process, in our view, creates a fertile ground for foreign and
capitalist alliances aimed at maximizing profits through the exploitative
relationship between Third World countries and developed capitalist countries.
Thus, it is undesirable.
The
growing inequality in the world is linked to the effects of liberalization,
deregulation and privatization, in a word, to globalisation.[ix]
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its annual Human Development
Reports has urged action to monitor and control the globalization process.
In 1996, UNDP’s Human Development Report showed that “the gap in per
capita income between the industrial and developing worlds tripled, from US
$5,700 in 1960 to $15,400 in 1993”.[x]
The report continues to say:
The
world has become polarized, and the gulf between the poor and the rich of the
world has widened even further. Of
the $23 trillion global GDP in 1993, $18 trillion is in the industrial
countries—only $5 trillion in the developing countries, even though they have
nearly 80 percent of the World’s people.
The poorest 20 percent of the world’s people saw their share of global
income decline from 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent in the past 30 years.
Meanwhile, the share of the richest 20 percent rose from 70 percent to 85
percent that doubled the ratio of the shares of the richest and the poorest –
from 30:1 to 61:1.[xi]
In
the same report, it is indicated that Africa is the hardest hit with 20
countries having a lesser per-capita income today than 20 years ago.
The continent is the home of two-thirds of the least developed countries,
and the more painful fact is that a continent that had a food-surplus 20 years
ago is now in food-deficit.
What
these statistics show is that capitalist globalisation, of which the
privatization process in Africa is but a part, has been a disaster for Africa
both in human terms and in terms of damage to Africa’s natural environment.
The multilateral agencies (IMF and World Bank) who propel the
globlisation process and accuse the policies of Africa governments forget that
they wrote various documents on which these policies were based—from import
substitution to export promotion. It
is paradoxical that whereas capital—led globalisation has led to Africa’s
poverty and development crisis as we have endeavoured to show above, it is also
miraculously suggested as its solution.
Korten
has argued convincingly that the globalisation process not only burdens the
developing countries. In the
developed countries, he identified six myths behind globalisation, namely:
The
myth that growth in Gross National Product (GNP) is a vital measure of human
well-being and progress.
The
myth that free unregulated markets efficiently allocate a society’s resources.
The
myth that growth in trade benefits ordinary people.
The
myth that economic globalisation is inevitable.
The
myth that global corporations are benevolent institutions that if freed from
government interference will provide a clean environment for all and good jobs
for the poor.
The
myth that absentee investors create local prosperity.[xii]
The
six myths behind globalisation have singly or in combination led: to the
declining quality of life of ordinary people; to increase human burden on the
earth’s regenerative systems—air, water, fisheries and forestry
systems—beyond what the planet can sustain; to transferring wealth from the
many to the few; to the so-called trade-agreements guaranteeing the rights of
global corporations to move both goods and investments where ever they wish; to
global corporations investing millions of dollars in advancing the globalisation
policy agenda; and to creating a global financial system that is less
accountable to any human interest or institution.[xiii]
The
annual meeting of the World Economic Forum which met in Davos, Switzerland, in
1996, agreed with Korten that the globalisation process is producing disastrous
consequences that threaten the political stability of the developed countries’
democracies. They observed that:
Economic
globalisation is causing several economic dislocation and social instability.
The
technological changes of the past few years have eliminated more jobs than they
have created.
The
global competition “that is part and parcel of globalisation leads to
winner—take all situations; those who come out on top win big while the losers
lose even more.
Higher
profits no longer mean more job security and better wages. “Globalisation tends to de-link the fate of the corporation
from the fate of its employees.”
Unless
serious corrective action is taken soon, the backlash could turn into open
political revolt that could destabilize Western democracies.[xiv]
The
danger of the globalisation process was also echoed by the President of the
Society for International Development (SID), the former UN Secretary General,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, when he said:
We
find ourselves on the verge of being overwhelmed by forces that we have created
and over which we are losing control. . . .
The market and science were considered during the European Enlightenment
as tools of human liberation. But
they have generated new forces which now threaten the livelihoods and even
existence of millions of men, women and children worldwide. If the present trend continues, we may expect that the rich
and the powerful will use ever more of their power and wealth to protect
themselves against the social disruptions that are bound to occur.
The North will close itself to the South bringing about a new iron-curtain.[xv]
The
dangers posed by the globalisation process entail two questions of fundamental
importance to the topic we are discussing:
Will
people and communities control resources and economies and be able to set their
own goals and priorities based on their own values and aspiration? Or will these
decisions be left to global financial markets and corporations that are blind to
all values save one—instant financial returns?
Will
the life-sustaining resources produced by the regenerative capacities of our
planet’s eco-systems be equitably shared to provide for the material needs of
all of us who inhabit this bountiful planet as well as our children and their
children unto the nth generation? Or
will we allow a global economic system that is now functioning on auto-pilot
beyond conscious human control to consume and destroy the ecosystem and our
social fabric in its insatiable quest for money?
These
questions and the challenges they offer are to be discussed by elaborating the
process of privatization in Africa. As
we have said earlier there is a myth that free unregulated markets efficiently
allocate a society’s resources and that global corporations, in private hands,
are benevolent institutions that provide a clean environment for all and good
jobs for the poor. State intervention in Africa has been subjected to a massive
assault, by companies spearheaded by Western governments, global corporations
and international multilateral financial agencies. State-owned enterprises, in particular, have been portrayed
as extremely inefficient, heavy financial losers and real burdens on the budgets
and the banking systems, as they absorb resources in the form of transfers and
sudsidies. Above all, they have
been accused of creating conditions unfavorable to private sector growth as
governments have intervened to protect them against competition for ideological,
rather than economic reasons.[xvi]
The
attack on state-owned enterprises initially took the form of exposing them to
domestic and external competition: eliminating state subsidies, increasing the
autonomy of the enterprises from government interference and noncommercial
goals, and developing institutional market mechanisms to drive performance and
increase profitability. The
reasoning was that, to a large extent, the more enterprises are diverted from
social goals, the more they become commercially successful.[xvii]
However, the forces for total privatization as a means to create a more diverse
market economy, to encourage private enterprises and expand the private sector
in general, to promote macro-economic or sectoral efficiency and competitiveness
and to eliminate inflexibility and rigidities, have temporarily won the day. In
a word, globalisation has taken the driver’s seat.
Other
arguments in favour of privatization, at the global level, include:
The
need to establish or develop efficient capital markets,
allowing
better capturing and mobilization of domestic products,
promotion
of domestic and foreign investments, thereby, promoting the integration of the
domestic economy into the world economy,
creating
and maintaining employment,
promoting
new technologies and innovation through the employment of modern methods of
production,
increasing
the quality of goods and services produced, and
Allowing
enterprises to enter global alliances seen as essential for survival.[xviii]
The
range of benefits from privatization is always extended to the realm of
budgeting and financial readjustment. It
is argued that privatization leads to maximum returns that enable the government
to tax more, to fund government expenditure, trim the public sector deficit or
pay off public debt,[xix]
to mobilize private investments to finance investments that the government
cannot afford to finance, and to reduce future risks of demands on the budget
inherent in state-ownership of business which often are in financial trouble due
to mismanagement and corruption.[xx]
Other
defences of privatization extend to the sphere of income distribution and
redistribution. Private ownership is seen as a means to foster broader capital
ownership and the promotion of popular or mass capitalism, the development of
the middle class, and the fostering of economic “development” of particular
ethnic or racial groups long marginalized by social structures. Privatisation is also seen as a means to encourage employee
ownership, and, therefore, increasing efficiency and, in some cases, providing a
fertile ground for those involved in management and implementation of the
privatization process to enrich themselves.[xxi]
This, however, is rarely admitted by policy formulators, though it has
been real as the examples of privatization of state-owned enterprises in Africa,
have shown.
Lastly,
the privatisation of state-owned enterprises carries various targets. These
include:
The
reduction of the size and scope of the public sector or its share in economic
activity,
turning
the government to the tasks of creating an environment conducive to the private
economic activity,
guaranteeing
that future governments will not reverse the trend towards the dominance of the
private sector,
reducing
the sphere through which corruption and other malpractices favour state
bureaucracy at the expense of the private capitalists, and
in
some cases, creating conditions favourable to a particular class or group in
control of the state.[xxii]
Clearly,
there are numerous social policies that can better meet these social needs than
pure privatization, except that at the moment capital-led globalisation does not
favour them. The race to
privatize defines the parameters of progress. The latter is itself defined in
the context of globalisation, as we saw earlier in the economic myths behind
globalisation it is seen as the only means of reducing African countries from
misery. Beyond the images of
progress that African countries should become carbon copies of the West because
capital-led globalisation is taken as the only solution to poverty.
As the editors of New People correctly point out:
Our
thirst for justice is equated with a thirst for liberal democracy, our desire
for human development is likened to the possession of Western products.[xxiii]
To give more meaning to what we are discussing, the privatization process in Uganda is more revealing. A team of economic consultants attached to the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) was hired in 1986 to study the options available to address the problem of rehabilitating and reconstructing the economy, as if the NRM had not studied the same issue in the bush with the people. In its Ten Point Programme, the NRM and the people agreed on the steps to be taken to build an independent, integrated and self-sustaining economy. They were spelled out as:
Diversification
in agriculture away from the present narrow cash crop base,
an
extensive process of import – substitution in order to reduce the import bill,
especially of basic consumer goods,
processing
of raw-materials so that more value is added, and
building
of basic industries like iron, steel and chemicals.
The
IDRC team argued, diverting from the wishes of the people:
Clearly,
there must be an adjustment policy. Breaking the inflationary expectations
psychology will be essential for general macro-economic stability. Likewise,
sound domestic growth and recovery will be impeded unless external balance is
achieved quickly.[xxiv]
The
IDRC report rejected any alternative strategy, except capital-led globalisation.
The report argued:
.
. . the control model failed as a strategy for balancing either the balance of
payment, or the budget—the two key problems which need to be addressed . . .
the most implausible assumption was the rate of inflation fell to—25 percent
per year and stayed there for three years. . . . Even then the balance of
payments remains at their current, inadequate levels.
The budget is also grossly out of balance each year. [xxv]
The
economic strategy proposed by the IDRC team won the day because as early as 1986
the ideological diversity within the NRM had come to the fore.
While commander Katirima was stressing the need for socialist
reconstruction and the “need to be vigilant against implerialism and
capitalists,” Dr Samson Kisekka, then Prime Minister, was calling for
self-reliance on the basis of national
capitalism in collaboration with foreign investors. The latter position
triumphed, standing as it did for “national capitalists and all potential
capitalists” being taken on board along with the poor, ignorant and diseased
peasants.[xxvi]
In
short, an adjustment policy, in which the so-called inefficient state-owned
enterprises were to be eliminated as a force in the economy in favour of private
capitalists, was to be pursued. This is contrary to Tumusiime-Mutebile and
others who view SAPs, including privatization, as “exclusively a Government of
Uganda reform.” [xxvii].
The
truth of the programme being externally driven is further reinforced by Tim
Lamont, an economic planning advisor in the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning, when he notes:
Given
the shattered state of the economy in 1986, Uganda has had to rely heavily on
donor support. The Economic Recovery Programme launched in 1987 was assisted by
a structural Adjustment Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Economic Recovery Credits,
plus assistance from other multilateral and bilateral donors. Substantial IMF
and IDA support continued over the years through an Enhanced structural
Adjustment Credit from the IMF and two Structural Adjustment Credits for IDA,
and such funds do not come without
conditions. Hence, there is no denying that donors have had a large part to play
in helping to shape policy in Uganda(emphasis added).[xxviii]
Add
numerous World Bank, IMF and other donor policy instruments, and
Tumusiime-Mutebile’s claim that the government’s SAPs, and above all
privatization are “Government of Uganda-owned” is disapproved.[xxix]
Privatisation
and private investment promotion have indeed gone hand in hand and are slowly
extending into the social sector, including health and education, and even
administrative activities such as tax and garbage collection. It needs to be
noted that the programmes are not homogenous. In Africa alone, a variety of
privatization programmes are undertaken, including total transfer of state-owned
enterprises, joint ventures and share ownership, capitalization programmes, and offering financial incentives to employees
and small-holders.[xxx]
In the sections that follow, we shall see whether the privatization
process has facilitated the achievement of a reasonable standard of living of
the people in Africa or not. Only when this evaluation is made can we do justice
to the debate over the achievements and challenges of the privatization
programmes in Africa, as well as their ethnical implications.
One
could not appreciate the impact of the privatization process in Africa if one
does not initially look at the meaning of development, because the reasonable
standard of living of the people which privatization wants to achieve is a
function of development. The meaning of the term “development” has been
offered by E. Roy Ramirez, who claims that we need to forge a new concept of
development, in order not to confuse the latter with modernization, and because
it is preferable to decide things for ourselves rather than to have others
decide things for us.[xxxi]
Ramirez would evaluate any policy or project intended to cause development or
improve the standard of living of people by an ethnical standard. This should:
.
. . not let forms of oppression pass for
liberty, commercial pseudo—culture and the consumption of fantasies for
superior culture, diverse manifestation of plunder for progress. Superstition
should not pass for nationality, economic inequalities for justice or fear for
peace. [xxxii]
This
approach to development proposes a new and expanded concept of development,
which “does justice to the
problem of the relations between advanced countries and other world countries,
including the treatment of the problem of individual development within
social-economic development.”[xxxiii]
In addition, Kanyandago proposes the principle of endogeneity,
which is a constant search to develop from within by building onto what people
are and have. He agrees that the
principle does not rule out borrowing from one another, but we should not
suppress or underrate the values of a person in need.[xxxiv]
What these arguments boil down to is that the people, particularly the
poor majority are often rich in knowledge, and this resource must be tapped to
their advantage. We have to ensure that the knowledge-rich, but economically
poor people are not robbed of the only resource in which they are rich, i.e.,
their knowledge, by transforming our ethical and institutional norms, including
those dealing with the intellectual property rights of individuals as well as
communities. As already seen, we
know that capital-led globalisation denies this right to the poor. Our
definition of development must recognize that the poor are obviously not so poor
that they cannot think, create or transform the world around them.
The challenge is to recognize the poverty of our imagination and those
conceptual tools that recognize, respect and reward grass-roots innovations. We
need to encourage the revival of “traditional” knowledge systems and to
strengthen local market systems that directly confront global corporations and
stress direct democratic action against globalisation and its child,
privatization.
Goulet
and Steidlmier give criteria, which can be used to evaluate any policy that
encourage development. Goulet
argues, for example, that questions for evaluation include whether a policy of
privatization favours economic equity or not, whether it consolidates fragile
local cultures or not. [xxxv]
Furthermore, Steidlmeir gives us other criteria, namely:
Do
the societal members have the freedom and opportunity in their society’s
development dialogue?
Do
the societal members make proposals concerning the nature of good growth, fair
distribution, citizen responsibility, and just incentives and sanctions?[xxxvi]
Given
the relevance of SteidImeir’s arguments to our discussion, we quote him in
detail:
When
it gets down to the concrete, then I advocate a certain qualitative orientation
in development policy based on the following priorities: the liberty of the
oppressed over the freedom of the more powerful, the social opportunity of the
marginalized over the exclusion by certain elites, the needs of the poor over
the mere wants of the wealthy, the duty to contribute to the common good
according to ability rather than to be apathetic or merely seek narrow interest,
and the reinforcement of patterns of social justice through incentives and
sanctions rather than surrendering the determination of due process to mere
group egoism or vindictiveness. Each of these goals is a value statement in the sense that it
indicates priorities regarding what should happen. I am well aware that others may disagree. Nonetheless, the
positions that any society takes with respect to any of these questions will
directly determine the overall orientation of development as well as the policy
instruments and strategies.[xxxvii]
The privatization strategy—as indeed all economic reforms—implemented in Africa do not meet the criteria discussed above. As the case of Uganda illustrates, the design and implementation of the policy of privatization did not involve societal members, even if the institutional political structure established by the ruling NRM government that would have allowed their participation, were in place. The present day political institutions of local councils (LCs), with their emphasis on their popular, participatory grassroots approach to public policy would have resulted in a politically rational policy. Unlike the military victories in which the poor peasants in the liberated areas played a decisive role in the political system they shaped and participated in, through the LCs, the economic sphere remains defined for them. In short, the economic measures of privatization in Africa were not just imposed from the above (that is from politicians, policy-makers down to the victims/policy consumers), they were actually imposed from abroad by the IMF and the World Bank. The privatization policy in Africa, therefore, did not take into account people’s input and concerns.
The
IMF-World Bank driven privatization programmes are mechanisms to perpetuate the
rule of imperialism in Africa, and the multilateral financial institutions are
helped by the “local reactionaries”— the elite.
The latter do not pose the question that Robert Chambers asked about five
years ago: “Whose reality counts?
The reality of the few in centres of power, or the reality of the many poor at
periphery?”[xxxviii]
Thus, “privatization” means simply the selling of state properties to
private owners who are rich enough to take over the giant companies.
Privatisation is also known as “divestment or divestiture,” words that
connote dispossession and deprivation and, to that extent, imply loss of
valuable property on the part of the state to the few rich. The economy thus
created is in the hands of the few rich, which contradicts what the second
Vatican Council, in its most influential pastoral constitution: “On the Church
in the Modern World”, said:
The
basic purpose of economic production does not consist merely in the increase of
goods produced, nor profit nor prestige; it is directed to the service of man
(and women), that is, in his (her) totality, taking into account his (her)
material needs and the requirements of his (and her) intellectual, moral,
spiritual and religious life.[xxxix]
Vatican
Council II deplored a system that ignores social justice, equality and
environmental production. Such a
system, characterized by Markhijani as a “war system” has merely
“limitless consumption and acquisition” as the “overriding goals,”
rather than human, spiritual and environmental concerns. In the words of the
Vatican II Council:
In
the sphere of economics and social life, too, the almighty and entire vocation
of human person as well as the welfare of society as a whole have to be
respected and fostered; for man (woman) is (and has to be) the source, the focus
and the end of all economic and social life.[xl]
We,
therefore, call for human-centred development rather massive privatization,
which we have seen plundering the poor majority’s resources to enrich the few
rich. What we gather from these arguments point to many important lessons. One
such lesson is that economies should be local, rooting power in the people and
that communities who realize well-being depend on the health and the vitality of
their local ecosystem.
If
it is protectionist to favour local firms and workers who pay local taxes, live
by local rules, respect and nurture the local ecosystem, compete fairly in local
markets, and contribute to community life then let us all proudly proclaim
ourselves to be protectionist.[xli]
We
need to note that these choices are not isolationist. On the contrary, they
create a foundation for creative cooperation with our neighbors whether they are
developed countries or other countries or not. Their goals are: to share
experience, ideas and technology; to join in international solidarity in
rewriting the rules of the global economy; to favour local over global
businesses; and to encourage cooperative relations among people and communities.
It is our consciousness—our ways of thinking and our sense of membership in a
large community—not our economies that should be global.[xlii]
Our
discussion so far points to the fact that we should not indulge in the debate
about the merits and demerits of privatization in Africa because such a debate
is misdirected. We need to remember
that the privatization process in Africa is under the management of global
imperialism, the World Bank, IMF and other multilateral agencies.
Is it, therefore, wise to debate what is irrelevant to Africa’s
independent, self-sustaining and continentally integrated economy?
If, however, such debate would produce a lively discussion about how the
impact of the privatization process fails to penetrate the reality of the poor
majority and the alienating experiences they face when confronted with the
privatization programmes aimed at profit maximization, then the task would be
worth undertaking. The discussion
now follows attempts to penetrate the inner operations of the privatization
process as related to the majority of the people of Africa.
Many
African countries that embraced the policy of privatization have had the
structure of their economies changed, at least in comparison with what they were
two decades ago. In the Ugandan
case, in 1996-1997, GDP growth averaged 7.5 percent compared with the average of
5.7 percent per annum in the 1989-1991 period. The balance of payments also
improved putting foreign exchange reserves at US$450 million in 1994-1995
equivalent to 4 months of imports.[xliii]
Overall on the African continent, Uganda’s economic performance ranked ninth
in 1996-1997.
Despite
the rosy growth statistics in many African countries, the debt burden remains
real and continually forces upon governments more IMF-World Bank conditions.
Extended debt service has continuously siphoned off the few resources that would
otherwise have been used to finance human development through the provision of
basic social services.
Many
of the privatized enterprises have improved their levels of efficiency, achieved
high productivity levels, and contributed substantially to exports and
government revenue. In addition, expansion, refurbishment, installation of new
machinery, increase of capacity and storage facilities have all been carried out
by privatized enterprises. However, “bad” aspects of the investments need to
be noted. Tororo Cement Works in Uganda, for example, is reported to have begun
the production of asbestos pipes using a raw material condemned for causing
asbestosis. Such investments are banned in many developed countries.
Secondly, incidences of underpayment, physical abuse, and racist
treatment have been reported, while the very products produced are mostly
luxury-oriented—beer, soft drinks, tobacco, perfumed soap, steel products
mainly for high-rise buildings, and security fences that are geared to the
middle class market rather than the necessities of the ordinary people.
In
African economies where privatization has been implemented, some marked growth
has been recorded in the fields of education, health and sanitation, food
production, and political participation, all seen as vital for private
investment. Secondly, a number of poverty eradication schemes have been
launched. The sales of enterprises and taxes accruing from the private sector
have played a major part in the running of projects aimed at enhancing the local
people’s potential and contribution to better living conditions.[xliv]
Finally, the proceeds have facilitated the establishment of the private sector.
While these achievements are applauded, the fact is feared that states
have almost totally relinquished the task of mobilizing the local populations
for their own development to the people and a diversity of community-based
organizations (CBOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the local
councils. Substituting with foreign charities for the poses a new threat.
Privatization
has facilitated a transfer of technology as well as managerial skills that have
brought about value-added output, which has led to increased capacity
utilization, quality output, and production diversity.[xlv]
Yet there are negative consequences of the technology transferred which, in most
cases, is not environment-friendly.
There
is an increasing trend towards privatized social services as reflected in
decreasing government expenditure on education, health, water, sanitation and
nutrition. This has resulted in the reduced quality of public administration and
services at a time when workers are being retrenched the military demobilized
and real salaries lowered. The constant outcries over-delayed payments to the
retrenched workers have been often heard, and the loss of jobs in privatized
industry is now too common to be a temporary phenomenon.[xlvi]
Privatization,
it is argued, has made ordinary goods and services available, but has also it
made them necessarily accessible and affordable. The programme has been
urban-oriented, urban based, and a middle-class phenomenon. Consequently, most
of the privatized enterprises, just as most of the new private investments,
crowd around Africa’s capital cities. Rural Africa remains stuck in the
scarcities of the basics of life and are denied vital monetary, financial and
industrial services.
It
has been indicated throughout this discussion that for any development policy to
be ethical, it must have the input of the people for which the policy is
intended, as well as guarantee equality and the protection of local cultures.
We saw, also, that privatization policy in Africa did not meet ethical standards, i.e., the people were
never involved in its design and implementation, and resources were transferred
from the people to a few rich, thereby negating examples of
local innovations and entrepreneurial
activities which make communities self-reliant. This, therefore, means we have
to think seriously of alternatives of a more humane system to be born in Africa.
We need to direct our thinking by not doing what imperialism demands us to do.
It is time to assume responsibility for creating a new human future of just and
sustainable communities freed from the myth that agreed competition, and
mindless consumption, are paths to individual and collective fulfillment. It
will take millions of people—linked together into a powerful political
coalition aimed at political reform—to win the war that global capital is
waging against us.
At
the national level, we need to embark on a successful national democratic
revolution (in which the majority of the workers, “peasants,” intelligentsia
and the petite-bourgeoisie and “national” bourgeoisie (all of which are
dominated by finance-capital are involved), to initiate a process of economic
development, rather than economic growth, in which the people benefit.
Only on the basis of this type of revolution can there be achieved an
actual privatization of the means of production through democratization of the
production and the exchange processes and an
equitable sharing of the national resources.
At
the continental level, we need to recognize Africa’s total inability and
incapacity to carry out a “revolution.” We discussed Balkanization above.
Our stand should be to reject the continued Balkanization of the continent,
which merely turns nation-states into small unviable economic units with small
markets and a narrow resource base. There is need for continental and, at the
very minimum, regional unity. The need to diversify and intensify intra-African
trade and cooperation as a means of overcoming the problem of small markets,
inefficiency, and lack of productivity is
recognized. There is need also for the removal of trade barriers, rationalized
production and specialization, to reduce competition among African countries and
to avoid unnecessary duplication, especially in respect to large-scale
industries and joint use of resources on research and development.[xlvii]
Finally,
the role of the state in the development of its people must be clearly defined.
The Asian Tigers were able to facilitate finance capital’s accumulation
through the use of repressive military regimes and other undemocratic means in
1960s and 1970s. They provided extensive protection for regimes of
import-substitution before achieving export-led growth. State intervention was,
therefore, a major factor.[xlviii]
Yet in Africa, global capitalism calls for democratization and the withdrawal of
the state from active management of economic and social relations, except to
guarantee that wages remain low, that the reserve army of unemployment be
swelled by retrenchment, and that a market of luxury goods (beer, soft drinks,
cigarettes, etc.,) be created through the culture and economics of private
enterprises and NGOs.[xlix]
The failure of privatization experiments on other continents, particularly in
Asia and Latin America, are barely highlighted, lest people have data to
compare.
[i]
See World Bank, 1993, Structural Adjustment Credit (Washington DC: World Bank, 1993); Uganda:
Growing out of Poverty, World Bank Country Study (Washington, D.C.:
World bank, 1994), Uganda: Social Sectors, World Bank Country Study, World Bank
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996), Uganda: The Challenge of Growth and Poverty Reduction, World Bank Country
Study, World Bank (Washington, D.C.: Recent Magazine, 1993), “Selected
Reminiscences of President Yoweri Museveni,” Kampala, p. 66
[ii]
For detailed discussion of economic reforms see L.K. Sarwar, “Structural
Adjustment in Uganda: The Initial Experience,” in Hansen and Twaddle
(eds.), Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas
of Structural Adjustment and Revolutionary Change (London: James Curry,
1991), pp. 20-41. J.B. Mugyenyi, “IMF Conditionality and Structural
Adjustment Under the National Resistance
Movement”, in Hansen and Twaddle (eds.), op. cit.
[iii]
Aidan Southall, “The Recent Political Economy of Uganda,” in Hansen and
Twaddle (eds.), Uganda Now: Between
Decay and Development (London: James Curry, 1998), pp. 54-69.
[iv]
Sarwar, op.
cit., pp. 20-41
[v] Y.K. Museveni, What is Africa’s Problem? (Kampala: NRM Publication, 1992), p. 280.
[vi] Idem.
[vii] Tandon Yash, “Globalization and Africa’s Options, International South Group Network, Monograph No. 2, 1999, p. 3.
[viii]
Ibid., p. 2.
[ix] See Brauer Dieter, “Global NGO Challenges Globalization” (Spain: SID World Conference, 1997), p. 25.
[x] UNDP, Human Development Report, 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 2.
[xi] Idem.
[xii] Korten, D.C. “The Truth about Global Competition: The Economic Myths Behind Globalization,” Development and Cooperation, No. 3, 1996, pp. 4-5.
[xiii]
Ibid. p. 5.
[xiv]
Quoted in D.C. Korten., op. cit., p. 4.
[xv] Quoted in D. Brauer, op. cit., p. 25.
[xvi] For these and other reasons in support of the privatization process in Africa, see Kekiri, et. al, Privatization: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992), P. Guislain, The Privatization Challenge: Strategic Legal and Institutional Analysis of International Experience(Washington D.C.: World Bank).
[xvii] See Galal and M. Shirley, M, (eds.) Does Privatization Deliver? Highlights from a World Bank Conference (Washington, D.C.: EDI, 1994); W.F. Himmelstrand, “Perspectives, Controversies and Dilemmas in the Study of African Development” in Himmalstrand, et. al. (eds), African Perspectives on Development (Nairobi: E.A.E.P, 1994), pp. 29-30.
[xviii] Battat, et. al., “Suppliers to Multinationals: Linkage Programmes to Strengthen Local Companies in Development Countries,” FIAS Occasional Paper No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: 1996).
[xix] See R. Swedbert, “The Impact of an Exogenous Event: The Oil Shocks, The Private Banks and the Origin of the Debt Crisis,” International Social Sciences Journal, 113, 1987, pp. 323-26; Akuete, et. al., Privatisation Strategies in Africa (Centre for Economic Research on Africa, 1992); J.E. Kwoka, “Privatisation, Deregulation and Competition: A Survey of Effects on Economic Performance,” PSD Occasional Paper 27 (Washington, D.C.: Private Sector Development Department, 1996).
[xx] See World Bank, Reform of Public Sector Management: The Lessons of Experience, Country Economics Department, Policy Research Paper 18 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank , 1991).
[xxi]
Guislain, op. cit., p. 19.
[xxii] Idem.
[xxiii]
“The New People”, September Issue, 1994, p. 1.
[xxiv] Quoted in Tumusiime-Mutebile, “Management of the Economic Reform Programme” in Langseth, et. al., (eds.), Uganda: Landmarks in Re-building a Nation (Kampala: Fountain, 1995), p. 5.
[xxv] Idem.
[xxvi]
See M. Twadde, “Museveni’s Uganda: Notes Towards an Analysis,” in
Twaddle and Hausen (eds.), Ugandan
Now, 1998, p. 319.
[xxvii]
Tumusiime-Mutebile, op. cit., p. 7.
[xxviii] Lamont, Tim “Economic Planning and Policy Formulation in Uganda,” in Langseth, et. al. (eds.), op. cit., pp. 17-18.
[xxix]
See Kekiri, et. al., op. cit., pp. 32-38; World Bank, Uganda: Progress Towards Reconvert and Prospects of Development (Washington,
D.C.: World Bank, 1982); Commonwealth
Secretariat, The Rehabilitation of the
Economy of Uganda: A Report by
a Commonwealth Team of Experts, 2 Vols. (London, 1979).
[xxx]
P. Guislain, The Privatisation
Challenge, 1997.
[xxxi] Quoted in D.A. Crocker, “Towards Development Ethics”, World Development, Vol. 19, No. 5, 1991, p. 459.
[xxxii]
Idem.
[xxxiii]
“Quoted in D.A. Croker, op. cit., p. 459.
[xxxiv]
For this and other arguments about endogenous development, see P. Kanyandago,
“The Role of Culture in Poverty Eradication,” in D. Carabine and M.
O.’Reilly, (eds.) The Challenge of
Eradicating Poverty in the World: An African Response (Nkozi; UMU Press,
1998), p. 143.
[xxxv]
Adapted from D.A. Crocker, op. cit., p. 464.
[xxxvi] For the detailed discussion of Steidlmeir’s arguments, see D.A. Crocker, op. cit., p. 465.
[xxxvii]
Quoted in D.A. Crocker, op. cit., p. 465.
[xxxviii] Quoted in Munyonyo, R. “Nationalisation and Privatisation Under Imperialism Are Both Unprogressive: Evidence from Uganda,” a public lecture delivered at Uganda Martyrs University, unpublished: April, 1999, p. 3.
[xxxix]
Ibid., p. 2.
[xl]
Ibid., p. 3.
[xli] More of these arguments, see D.C. Korten, “The Truth About Global Competition,” 1996, p. 23.
[xlii] Idem.
[xliii]
For these statistics, see Tumusiime-Mutebile, op.
cit., pp. 1-10.
[xliv]
I. Musoke, “LCs key to crime-free World, says British Report”, The
Sunday Monitor, January, 20, 1998, p. 9.
[xlv]
See World Bank, Private Capital Flows
to Developing Economies: The Road to Financial Integration (Washington,
D.C.: World Bank, 1997).
[xlvi]
For the arguments we are raising, see A. O’Connor, “Uganda: The Spatial
Dimension” in Hansen and Twaddle (eds.),
Uganda Now, pp. 83-94.
[xlvii]
Y.K. Museveni, What Is Africa’s
Problem? p. 282.
[xlviii]
For the detailed analysis of the factor of state intervention in
development, see J. Bhawatti, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Anatomy and Consequences
of Exchange Control Regimes (London: Longman, 1978); A. Young,
“Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the
East-Asian Growth Experience,” NBER working paper, No. 4680, 1994.
[xlix]
World Bank, Governance and Development
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992).