A.T. DALFOVO
PART ONE: THE GENERAL APPROACH
THE
BACKGROUND TO THIS PUBLICATION
The collection of papers published in this book is part of an endeavour
initiated some ten years ago. At that time, the staff of the philosophy department of Makerere
University embarked on a series of seminars on “Cultural Heritage and
Contemporary Life.”* The project had been launched worldwide by the Council
for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP), initiated and coordinated by
Professor George F. McLean of the Catholic
University of America in Washington, DC, founder and Director of the RVP. The
Philosophy Department of Makerere University has succeeded in realizing three of
these seminars in the past ten years.
The first
seminar went through four stages. It
began with the staff of the department choosing the general theme for
discussion. Then each member picking, in agreement with the rest of the staff,
picked a specific topic related to the general theme and, at the same time, to
African thought and life within the context of Uganda. The African and Ugandan
reference was naturally felt to be the essential contribution of any seminar in
the department. Each staff member had about 6 weeks to prepare his paper, which
was then circulated to the other colleagues for a critical analysis. Three
months later, a series of staff seminars was scheduled at which each paper was
presented by the author and extensively discussed by the participants. Following
these encounters, each author revised his paper in the light of what had emerged
from the seminar discussions. The papers were then assembled, edited, and
finally submitted to Professor G. McLean who proceeded to their publication
under the auspices of the RVP. The resulting volumes were The
Foundations of Social Life in 1992 from the first seminar and Social
Reconstruction in Africa in 1999 from the second seminar. The collection of
papers being presented is from the third seminar.
The
papers in this volume continue the tradition of the previous seminars but with a
difference in scope. The previous seminars were
held among the members of the Philosophy Department of Makerere University, and
the nature of the seminars was purely philosophical. However, the third seminar
was opened to the input from other disciplines, although it was agreed that this
third seminar was to remain basically philosophical. The contributors from other
disciplines were made aware of this philosophical distinctiveness, and they were
actually interested to offer their contribution in view of a final philosophical
appraisal of the issues presented. This philosophical expectation on their part
posed a challenge to the philosophy department to offer its specific
contribution to the problems presented. Participants felt that the seminar
succeeded to a considerable degree. Whether the final papers in this publication
have attained this expectation, it will be for the reader to judge.
The
choice of the general topic for this last seminar took quite sometime to be
decided. It was finally agreed to have a topic combining three issues considered
very crucial at the present moment for the life of the individual and of society
in this part of the world. The topic was Ethics,
Human Right and Development.
The
issue of ethics was considered to be clearly emerging above any other
philosophical challenge in Uganda and, in all probability, in the rest of Africa
as well. Ethics continues to stand out as the basic and pervasive component
among the multifaceted challenges that the Ugandan society and individuals are
facing. The Ugandan government has instituted a Ministry of Ethics and
Integrity. The department of philosophy in Makerere University has introduced a
postgraduate programme on “Ethics and Public Management.” At the moment of
independence 40 years ago, the general agreement among Ugandans was that the
political issue was paramount. As the nation developed, it became clear that in
practice the economic problem underlay all others. Over the past few years, the
general opinion seems to be that ethics is actually at the root of any problem,
whether political, economic or otherwise.
An
element that is becoming ever more associated with ethics is human rights. Human
rights are seen practically as “applied ethics”. Some thinkers see in human
rights that core of basic principles and values around which there could grow
the widely desired “world ethics” that should interest humanity beyond
particular ethics. People increasingly perceive human rights as associated with
every aspect of thought and life, to the point that such association is
automatically extended to any problematic issue even when, upon a more
considerate examination, such association may not be so relevant. This tendency
nevertheless testifies to the importance attributed to human rights.
The
third component of the seminar topic is development. Although some people are
weary of the ubiquitous term “development,” the concept of development
cannot be sidelined in a country like Uganda which is so characterized. A
thoughtful consideration of the issue of development cannot but lead any person
“of good will” to be “convinced—as the Preamble of the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights states—that it is, henceforth, essential to pay
particular attention to the right of development and that civil and political
rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social,- and cultural rights in
their conception and universality. The satisfaction of economic, social, and
cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political
rights.”
The
participants contemplated the topic of the seminar from different perspectives.
Some issues were typical of each paper while others occurred as significant
themes in most of the papers. These latter issues can confidently be interpreted
to represent characteristic aspects of African philosophy, like the
contextualization of philosophy, applied philosophy and ethics, the holistic
approach to issues, testing theory vis-a-vis practice. The following survey of
the papers could probably help to discover what is common and what is specific
in each contribution.
The
paper of A.T. Dalfovo considers, first of all, applied ethics, a theme that
occurs in most of the papers, highlighting a constant concern in African
philosophy. Philosophy in Sub-Saharan Africa has many organisational paradigms
inherited from colonial time namely from Western tradition. The legitimate
reaction of African thinkers has been to engage African contours to their
philosophy, which has meant applying philosophy to the African context. Such
application has been not merely theoretical. Namely, it did not only consider
the possible particularities in African mental paradigms vis-à-vis the claimed
universality of Western paradigms. The application has been brought to bear also
on African life in its practical dimension. In other words, the holistic
approach has characteristically marked African philosophising. Reality has been
viewed and analysed comprehensively, namely in its totality. Dichotomising
between mind and body, thinking and doing, spiritual and material, substantial
and accidental, inner and outer, spiritual and material, has not been generally
effected to the detriment of a comprehensive vision. A.T. Dalfovo notes this
perspective in the second part of his paper dealing with the experiential
dimension in African philosophy.
J.K.
Kigongo goes to the core of applied and experiential philosophy in Africa
highlighting the need to contextualize philosophical issues when such
contextualization may appear to lead to contradictory situations. J.K. Kigongo
points realistically to the fact that such contradictions, though obviously
problematic, are nevertheless there to be faced and solved. Focussing on ethics,
the topic of his paper, the author explains how such enigmatic challenges have
arisen from the encounter of the African and the European traditions in ethics.
The problematic outcome of such an encounter is presently compounded by the fact
that it has to be managed within a context of intense change affecting cultures
and societies. Such change is often interpreted as implying that the traditional
is being phased out, supplanted by the modern. This interpretation leads, in
most cases, to a depreciation of African traditional ethics. Such an outcome,
the author cautions, should not be allowed to take its course because a neglect
of traditional ethics would inevitably cause a vacuum resulting in the inability
of contemporary society to manage the ethical challenges posed today. African
educationalists should consider this dangerous possibility.
J.
Kisekka picks up the above challenges in so far as they bear on the African
individual faced with a life “below average world standards,” yet having
still “a ray of hope.” This individual lives his/her daily life as
“survival,” while he/she should actually live it as a culturally fulfilling
existence in which “Ethics, Human Rights and Development” make sense. To
attain such existence, the African individual needs to break out of the
enslaving mentality of necessary dependence. The individual must turn to
himself/herself and free himself/herself of a culture of silence and
self-censorship, recognising and asserting his/her selfhood and that of others
as well. A necessary and effective instrument for the recognition and assertion
of oneself is the culture and practice of narrative, which must be rediscovered.
Narrative will allow symbolism to play its full role in one’s existence.
“Failure to symbolise—J. Kisekka underlines—means failure to synthesise,
which in turn implies failure to sympathise with oneself and others.” In all
this, the author concludes, the individual needs to develop a critical mind. For
this the help of philosophy is imperative as one moves from being dominated to
dominating one’s existence.
The
contribution of G. Tusabe moves beyond the challenges faced by the individual as
considered by the previous paper. G. Tusabe focuses on the social dimension of
existence and specifically on social belonging. For several people, this
belonging remains practically ethnic, prevailing over any other in their social
life. Hence, ethnic belonging for them prevails over their national belonging,
which in many cases, in Africa and elsewhere, extends beyond one’s ethnicity.
Consequently, when such people are faced with alternatives between ethnic or
national allegiance, they obviously choose the former. Such choice undermines
social cohesion which today generally refers to and tallies with the national
community. G. Tusabe argues that the solution to the inevitable tension and
serious danger that arise from the ethnic and national polarity lies in a more
broad vision of social belonging. It is the vision of human belonging or the
concept of humanity. The author links this concept of humanity to three ethical
principles, namely respect for the person, solidarity and justice. Such an
ethical perspective or reference, the author concludes, is probably the only way
to ensure the social cohesion capable of resisting the danger of ethnic
particularity and of developing instead a sense and the vision of a more vast
belonging that finds its ultimate motivation in universality or humanity.
E.
Wamala tackles an enduring dilemma related to what appears to be the contrasting
demands of development and human rights. The imperative of development,
especially in its economic dimension, permeates individual and community life in
Africa. At the same time, communities and individuals are now highly sensitised
to the issue of human rights. The author analyses the dilemma that emerges from
the dual imperative of human or, specifically, economic development and human
rights, namely respecting human rights while pursuing economic interests. There
are cases when genuine economic interests clash with equally genuine human
rights. E. Wamala refers the present African experience to the historical
Western experience on this contrasting issue, pointedly explaining how the two
experiences differ and how the present African experience should not be assessed
with reference to the European experience. The African condition is
unprecedented and has to be considered as typical of the present time. A genuine
solution to this African dilemma needs to be sought within the historical and
geographical setting of the continent. This suggestion reiterates what has
emerged in most contributions to the seminar, namely the need for contextuality.
R.
Munyono focuses on a change of strategy that has set in nationally and
internationally in recent years marking a major developmental turn since the
early 1960s, since the time of political independence in most of Africa. The
prevailing policies and the political movements of the 1960s generally were
inspired by socialism. The independent nations and governments of that time
needed to assert their national identity and solidarity, their social cohesion
and unity. That assertion needed, it was thought, a strongly centralised
government to coordinate development and to foster social services, particularly
for the needier population. All that required the support of an appropriate way
of thinking or clear ideology that had to be, it was believed, prevailingly
socialist. Today that has changed. Socialism is seen by many peoples and
governments as curtailing personal and private creativity and as encouraging
parasitic reliance on the state and on others. Prompted by a global economic
policy that past governments would have rejected as capitalist, present
governments are bent on privatising almost any organism that finds a private
person or institution ready to take it. For instance, while at independence
parastatals were considered the economic pillars of the nation, today they are
hurriedly shed as noneconomic. But here R. Munyonyo sounds a note of caution
suggesting that privatisation needs demystification. Privatisation is not only
failing to yield the benefits that it promises, but is actually causing the
opposite. It is worsening the condition of the population at large, particularly
of the poorer people. R. Munyono explains this point with compelling arguments
supported by recent data. The author emphasises above all the ethical challenges
posed by privatisation measures. The privatisation policy in Africa has failed
to meet the required ethical standard, particularly vis-a-vis respect for the
people. One must seriously think of alternatives to this unethical course that
need addressing at all
levels—local, continental, and global.
The
paper of A.B. Rukooko develops a philosophical analysis of human rights in
general. Human rights, also taken singly, are considered by the author as
forming a kind of constellation, a unified set of various elements. For this
reason, several disciplines or aspects of knowledge have a stake in all human
rights. At the same time, the author tries to find the point of unity in this
variety of elements suggesting that this unifying element needs to be sought
within the concept of values. Such values need in turn to be referred to the
field of epistemology. The author continues along this line developing it within
the African perspective. This links up with the underlying trend in African
philosophy of contextualizing the philosophical exercise and of making it
comprehensive of the whole reality in which one philosophises. Human rights need
to be perceived, described, applied and lived within such a context as are the
values that are presupposed by such rights. The present global trend
highlighting what is homogeneous in humanity should not be allowed to overshadow
the heterogeneity that enriches it and that characterises the various cultural
aspects of humanity, including human rights.
A.B.T. Byaruhanga Akiiki highlights the contemporary paradox of so much
concern for human rights and yet of so much disregard for them. The author has
in mind Charles Dickens’s remark about
both the struggle and the disregard of the French Revolution for the rights of
citizen. “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age
of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the
epoch of incredibility, it was the season of light, it was the season of
darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.” (C.
Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities). These
words may be applied to the present paradox as well: in the past 20 years human
rights have been inscribed in 30 democratic constitutions. Over the same period
of time, 30 civil wars have erupted. According to A.B.T. Byaruhanga
Akiiki, such a paradox could be avoided by a
holistic approach to human rights. He specifically selects the religious
dimension of African life to illustrate this. The African perspective of
existence and life is holistic and the disregard for any aspect of it nullifies
attempts at understanding the related problems, thus offers any valid solutions.
The author places the issue of human rights within such a context insisting that
Africans should not be misguided out of such an endogenous context while
non-African should respect it on the same level as any other right.
The
contribution of M. Mawa relates to a theme dear to any developing country,
namely the right to development. Such right, in the case of Uganda, is enshrined
in her constitution together with several other rights. The author turns to a
critical analysis of what such constitutional sanctioning of human rights and,
specifically, of the right to development means for the citizens. He concludes
that the country’s history testifies more to a disrespect than a respect of
human rights. M. Mawa proposes ways and means for a culture that promotes the
authentic development of the human person advocating that the human person be
placed at the heart of the exercise related to human rights. There is a need to
go beyond a mere enshrining of human rights in the constitution or their mere
economic consideration. The entire dimension of the human existence needs
consideration as does the cultural and the moral. It is once again the holistic
and human-centred approach to issues related to development and human rights, an
approach that has to be ethical.
The following pages include a synopsis of each paper or chapter that
should create a better understanding of the full paper and a grasp of the themes
that run throughout the seminar.
The
chapter sets out from what appears to be a diffused uneasiness over the gradual
loss of the ethical or moral fibre in contemporary society. Beyond the various
instances given to illustrate this point, a double issue seems to emerge,
namely, the weakening of the communal (trends of individualism) and of the
practical (difficulty in applied ethics) dimensions of ethics.
The answer to this ethical weakness seems to be in the
code of ethics understood in its original and general sense as a set of ethical
principles and rules that a society or culture has developed during its history.
Every society and culture develops its conventional code of ethics, in the case
of an ethical crisis like the one being experienced now, a society needs to pass
from the conventional to the intentional code. An intentional code facilitates
the recovery of both the communal and the practical dimensions of ethics.
The chapter tries
to go beyond the present challenge to ethics ensuing from contemporary society,
arguing that the need of making ethics practical and applicable is not merely an
occasional or temporary issue of this present moment. It is actually a need
ensuing from African philosophy itself. This statement is explained by reference
to two African philosophers, namely, the Kenyan Odera Oruka and the Togolese
N’sougan Agblemagnon.
Twenty-seven years ago, the first issue of Thought
and Practice (the first philosophical journal in East Africa) was published
in Nairobi. Its editor was Henry Odera Oruka. In his first editorial, Odera
Oruka delineated the policy of the new periodical “on philosophy in Africa,”
as he defined it. The editorial policy was condensed in the very title of the
journal itself, namely Thought and
Practice. Having specified authentic philosophy as a second order vis-à-vis
first order activity, Odera Oruka proceeded to deal with the dualism of thought
and practice. The second order activity of reflecting on African reality was not
to be a mere “reflection on reflections.” It was to be an activity mostly
concerned “with life as it is lived in this part of the world and, of course,
in other parts of the world.” This explained the second component in the title
of the journal, Practice. Practice
was life as actually lived by human beings in this world, while thought
(the first component in the title) was a reflection, a return to this same life.
The Togolese
philosopher N'sougan Agblemagnon elaborates on the issue of theory and practice
explaining that it is an essential aspect of the methodological approach to the
study and understanding of African philosophy. “In Africa, more than anywhere
else, philosophy cannot be restricted to theory alone; it is simultaneously
theory and act.” Accordingly, the problem of philosophy in Africa must be
tackled with an open mind and with an intense eagerness to discover the
characteristic approach of African experience on both a theoretical and a
practical level. In Africa, Agblemagnon continues, being is linked to
experience. From the moment of its inception, the African experience, even the
simplest one, appears in all its complexity manifesting both its intensity and
its global dimensions. This dimension of cosmic and total existential experience
is the starting point that must be accepted and analysed. This approach does not
envisage breaking away from the world or distancing oneself from it. On the
contrary, it implies adhering to it, penetrating it and throbbing with it.
There is an
intermingling of theoretical and practical levels; there is a unity between
theory and practice. In the past, such theories were at the level of myth. They
revealed limits but they provided, nevertheless, an encompassing theory of the
world, a unitary vision of reality.
The present time questions this
traditional approach. The traditional models have no longer the same stability
as in the past. The time of stability
has been followed by the time of discontinuity. Today is a time of change and
rupture. The great difference between the
traditional approach and the present-day approach is that, while the former gave
access to a unified world where models of harmony were dominant, the latter
opens on a deeply generalised crisis, on insecurity, rupture and anxiety.
The
answer would seem to be in developing a culture of comprehensiveness that
implies acquiring the facility to combine the multiplicity of existence into
wholeness. The sequence of different and intensive changes call for a
comprehensive view of life in order to find one's bearings in this fleeting
situation. Lamenting the contemporary absence of a total concept of the world,
Y. Tandon points out that even philosophy—that mother of sciences which in
earlier epochs brought all learning into a totality and attempted to answer some
basic questions of being, of the relationship between mind and matter, etc.—is
now relegated to the realm of a “particular” discipline whose concerns are
limited either to “positivism,” to “linguistic analysis” or to solving
specific problems of “logic.” This
position must influence not only philosophy in general, but African philosophy
and ethics in particular.
As one grapples with issues of development, one needs to place them in the appropriate historical and social context. In the case of Africa, this context has been determined by the encounter of two cultural and ethical paradigms that to many observers and critics are inherently contradictory. The position of the chapter is that whereas one may perceive a contradiction in the conceptualisation of the paradigms, the social reality is that they do co-exist. This contradiction and co-existence calls for a critical inquiry out of which one discerns fundamental elements vital for development.
Anytime one analyses the human and social reality within the African
context, one is challenged by the dual dimension of development, the ideal one
that is ever attractive and imperative and the real one that is sometimes
frustrating and doubtful. The ever pervasive and multifaceted issue of
development continuously grapples with calls for its historical and social
contextualisation. In the specific case of Africa, this context has been
determined by the encounter of two cultural and ethical paradigms which, to many
observers and critics, are inherently contradictory. The position of the author
is that whereas one may perceive a contradiction in the conceptualisation of the
paradigms, the social reality is that they do co-exist. This contradiction and
co-existence calls for a critical inquiry out of which the fundamental elements
vital for development eventually can be drawn.
J.K. Kigongo
develops his argument in five points. The first point, The
Reality of a Synthesis, focuses on the persistence of a strong ethical
tradition inherited from the African traditional milieu existing together with
the European ethical tradition historically related mostly to colonialism. The
perceptual contradiction and the subsequent empirical experience manifesting the
two is a reality that should not prevent the analyst drawing from both strands
to enrich contemporary life, and its development.
The second point,
The Concept of ‘African’ in the
Process of Change, explains how “African” is a problematic notion to the
point that, for some people, the idea of “African.” let alone Africa, as a
single entity is an illusion. If,
however, the persistence of the traditional ethical strand into the contemporary
milieu is accepted, then the concept of what is African becomes real rather than
an illusion. As African identity
continues to be cherished, it is clear that this identity cannot be given
another cultural tag. In talking
about the ethics of specific ethnic groups in Africa, one becomes aware that the
different groups are described as African, namely they share commonalities
(among them the ethical perspective) that allows giving them the collective
identity of African.
In the third
point, Human Relationship in African
Ethics, the author presents briefly the substance of traditional African
ethics. While the sense of
relationship and community underlines these ethics, in contrast to the European
sense of autonomy, the individual in Africa is not perceived as a mere presence
in the community. As an individual,
he or she is perceived both as the centre of the relationship and also as a
contributor to its sustenance. He or she possesses an ethical status and plays a
role in the ethical and entire social spectrum.
The next point in the chapter, The
Problematic of Social and Moral Change, envisages the social paradigm that
emerged subsequent to the cultural encounter. Such an encounter was the
source of a dual social orientation which, though causing a destabilising
social pluralism, was at the same time an enriching experience for African
society. The new social and moral context of Africa consequent to the intrusion
of external cultures not only began the alienation of Africa from the
traditional ethical orientation, but caused a destabilising social pluralism.
Because the two trends were motivated by external coercion, they did not
enable the internal dynamism in the African society to evolve an appropriate
ethical consciousness. The personal
morality that was the dominant strand of the external culture and, to a large
extent, in its perverted form,
became the dominant moral trend, perpetuated the perversion of the African
ethical sense.
The final point, The
Problematic of the Old Moral Order, focuses on a tendency that fails to
appreciate the relevance of African traditional ethics in the contemporary
African society. While Africans are conscious of the continuity of the African
ethical tradition into the contemporary society, the significance of this old
moral order to the contemporary society is not adequately appreciated. This creates an intellectual and moral vacuum in which the
sense of individualism flourishes. One
sees the vacuum emerging in the present discourse and pursuit of development and
manifesting itself in the inability to harmonise the material and the moral
interests of development. If the
need for this harmony is appreciated, then the best place to root its underlying
concepts and problematic would be the education system.
The individual being discussed by J. Kisekka in this chapter is typified
by the “lived experience” of Kayo Nesmo. The place of such “lived
experience” is contemporary Africa, which is made up of many “Africas”
that are extremely difficult to describe with a mere “catchword”. Africa
could perhaps be described as having almost everything below-average-world
standards. Even then the individual who lives in such conditions can still
influence his or her future simply because the contemporary gods the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, the United Nations (UN), the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the like, offer a ray
of hope to him or her, contrary to the ancient Greco-Roman goddesses Clotho,
Lachesis, and Atropos that fatalistically controlled human destiny. The crucial
question is whether such an individual can find meaning and value in respect to
“Ethics, Human Rights and Development” in such a place, condition ,and
mentality called “contemporary Africa”.
The challenging demand here is for a synthesis. The survival of the
individual will actually depend, to a great extent, on how quickly and
effectively such a synthesis is found. The challenge derives mainly from the
lack of personal identity, which reduces the individual to simply “living”
instead of “existing” historically, culturally, and socially. The
effect of such condition is the creation of a mentality that someone else cares
for you more than you care for yourself, the mentality of the chronic
hierarchical dependence and of the unilateralization of life.
The
cause or reason of such mentality is connected with the power of domination that
is at the root of most evils in contemporary Africa.
Most of the misery experienced in contemporary Africa like bad
leadership, lacking the basics of life, and ecological degradation, J. Kisekka
writes, is not God-sent but humanly invented.
Mass poverty is as a result of the individual's lack of recognition of
self-hood, both in oneself and others. Such a mentality ends up corrupting the
whole fabric of society and fails to uphold human rights as a prerequisite for
development.
Liberation
here begins by breaking the culture of silence and self-censorship and by
critically evolving a discourse upon the world that will remake the world. This
entails consistent critical thinking that guides him or her, albeit with
difficulties, to critical action. To arrive at the level of engagement, the
individual needs to be aware of the fact that thinking is thanking for what is
above, below and equal to the one who thinks and that it involves remembering
pleasant and unpleasant elements. If the individual in contemporary Africa wants
to move beyond the hand-to-mouth stage, he or she needs to recreate the role of
the hearth, namely of the narrative, because a narrative-less, written-less,
memory-less culture ends up forgetting to employ the fireplace as the locus
for symbolising, namely for putting the two faces of the coin together, like
human rights violations vis-à-vis their ideal conditions, what divides the
people vis-à-vis what unites them, genuine vis-à-vis sham leadership, mass
poverty vis-à-vis mass abundance. Failure to symbolise means
failure to synthesise which leads to failure to sympathise with oneself and with
others, specifically on such issues as human rights violations and mass poverty.
Narrative is a critical key to our identity for we all need a story to
live by in order to make sense of the otherwise unrelated events of life to find
sense of dignity. It is only by
enabling alternative stories to be heard that an “elitist history” may be
prised open to offer an entry point for the oppressed who have otherwise been
excluded from public history (Sheldrake Philipp).
It
will be the individual, assisted by a genuine philosopher who knows that “only
for the sake of those without hope have we been given hope,” and who practices
philosophy not only as love of wisdom but also as wisdom of love, who will
emerge from the ranks of the poor, and give voice to those alternative
narratives.
The
author concludes by recalling how Kayo's episode typifies the lives of many
individuals in the villages of contemporary Africa.
They are entangled in a vicious circle of poverty.
To Kayos, ethics can no longer be a question of right or wrong but what
sort of people they become as a result of their actions in the course of their
struggle for survival. There is a
need to go beyond the rhetoric of human rights and development as the weapon of
a clientele-like politics characterising contemporary Africa and to safeguard
the supreme value of the individual. The individual must be brought to
understand that while life may depend ultimately on God, he or she has the power
to influence destiny by the using his or her reason.
In this chapter,
G. Tusabe notes that one of the major challenges disturbing social cohesion in
the world today in general, and in Africa in particular, are conflicts
apparently deriving from ethnic differences.
In many African countries there is a multiplicity of ethnic groupings
where the different peoples find themselves having vast differences that
sometimes stand in the way of inter-ethnic dialogue and understanding. With such
experience, it has been difficult for multi-thnic societies to realise a
nationwide cohesion. And without
such cohesion on the national level, it has sometimes been difficult to realise
the social stability and harmony essential if people are effectively to
cooperate in realising the common good.
The chapter begins by giving a brief normative explanation
of what is meant by social cohesion. It then highlights some of the mythical
elements that are found in some ethnicities, which elements seem to be standing
in the way to realising cohesion on the national level. The chapter goes on to
explain the shortcomings of some normative recommendations that have been
suggested as a help to promoting cohesion in multi-ethnic societies. Finally,
the author suggests (tentatively) that people should socialise themselves to the
stoic social ethical ideal of world citizenship. This ideal demands
acknowledging that everyone is a member of two communities: one that is truly
great and truly common in which people look neither to this corner nor to that
but measure the boundaries of their nation by the sun; and another to which
everyone has been assigned by birth.
The chapter goes on to elaborate that
such a philosophical position is a call to everyone (especially to those who
live in multicultural environments) to appreciate that the accident of where one
is born is just that, an accident. Any human being might have been born in any
ethnic group. Following this, differences of nationality or class or ethnic
membership should never be allowed to erect barriers between fellow human
beings. People should recognise
humanity wherever it occurs, and they should give to that community of humanity
their allegiance if they are to effectively live in peace and have a better
capacity to realise their existential requirements.
The idea of world citizenship is
significant also because it promotes and cultivates three vital social ethical
principles, namely, the principle of respect of persons, the principle of
solidarity and the principle of justice.
Concerning the respect of persons, G. Tusabe explains
that, once people appreciate the fact of their sharing a common humanity through
the idea of world citizenship, it becomes imperative for them to hold a moral
respect for the human person because such a person is the basic constituent of
humanity. The principle of the respect of persons demands that one does not look
down on another simply because the other is a member of another group to which
one does not belong. The same
principle cautions those who unite against others in pursuit of their egoistic
group interests for others may also group against them with the inevitable
result of conflict and discord.
Regarding solidarity, the chapter highlights that
since the idea of world citizenship points to sharing a common humanity it
bespeaks solidarity. It promotes
moral sensibility that all human beings have human bonds not only with members
of one’s groups, but also with the “others.” If the principle of
solidarity is effectively lived up to, it can promote both creative
transcultural and intercultural exchange.
On the principle of justice, the author argues that,
as the idea of World Citizenship promotes the principle of respect for persons,
it consequently points to the normative ideal that one ought to relate with
others in the spirit of justice. Moreover,
it leads also to designing structures motivated by the principle of justice free
from all forms of unethical ethnic discriminations and from social-political and
economic marginalizations.
Having highlighted the social and ethical worth of
the principles that are promoted by the idea of World Citizenship, the paper
concludes that the state system and, specifically, its educational dimension,
needs to be tempered by such principles in order to realize a nationwide
cohesion and to minimize interethnic conflicts.
While on the one hand voices are heard urging Africa
to develop and to modernize her economies, on the other equally loud voices urge
the continent seriously to address the issues of human rights and personal
freedoms.
These
requests are not unique to Africa. They have been made in other countries now
described as “developed.” But whereas in the case of the now developed
countries these demands were not made simultaneously, they are instead being
made so at present in the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Developed countries devoted long periods of time to developing their
economies long before human rights issues emerged. The development of mercantilism and the related expansion
policies and practices of colonialism, whatever their other objectives, helped
tremendously in the building and consolidation of the Western world's economic
might. The negative side of
mercantilism and colonialism is acknowledged now only when their positive
economic effects are safely in hand.
The
developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa face a different and challenging
situation: They have to develop their economies and, at the same time, develop
their capacities and their records of human rights observance. The specific
nature of the challenge consists in the fact that laying economic foundations
very often compromises and conflicts with the theory and practice of human
rights observance and protection.
Getting
people to save and to build strong financial resource bases by—among other
things heavy labour often endangering the lives of workers work under austere
conditions unfit for humans—may be necessary steps in the initial stages of
economic takeoff. Yet, these steps
o against the observance and respect of basic human rights like the right to
work in safe and healthy conditions, the right to leisure and the right to food
(many people may not buy sufficient and proper food in their struggle to save).
A vivid illustration of what is meant here comes from the international
organizations that are helping the development of Sub-Saharan countries. These
organizations have come up with structural adjustment programmes that imply
downsizing the labour force in public enterprises, reducing subsidies for
universities and hospitals and reducing the security forces—all in the name of
economic development. Carrying out
these recommended actions will impinge markedly on people’s right to
employment, to education and medical care, to security and protection of
property.
The
question for Sub-Saharan Africa in the present circumstances is: which way
should it go? Should it go with
development programmes designed to improve the continent’s economic
conditions, even though they may, at least in the short term, harm peoples’
rights? Or should Africa reject
such development programmes even if such programmes that would eventually make
people economically better off? This
Sub-Saharan dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that the choice (if there is one)
is not between “something good” or “something bad.” The choice is
between two values, namely human development and human rights, attention to
which all civilized nations have come to value passionately.
E.
Wamala underlines that one needs solutions that are typically African in order
to address the kind of challenges posed, not least because these challenges are
themselves typically African and unprecedented. Specifically, there is need to
draw on the African notion of balance where individual and social interests are
not in a hostile relationship, as mercantilism and libertarianism unwittingly
posed them. Rather, the need is for individual and social interests to form a
continuum, in which individual well-being is only possible in a well-ordered
society but at the same time where a well-ordered society can be made up only of
happy and healthy individuals.
The majority of African countries, including Uganda, are implementing
economic reforms and restructuring programmes dictated by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other multilateral agencies. These
reforms have involved the liberalisation of the exchange rate and trade regimes,
the liberalisation of pricing, of marketing agricultural products and the
privatisation of state-owned enterprises. As these programmes are imposed from
above, it comes as no surprise that what is conspicuously absent in them is the
input of the people who are supposed to be the intended beneficiaries. The
ethical implications of such reforms and, specifically, of the privatisation
process in Africa, are the issues R. Munyonyo discusses in this chapter.
Privatisation is considered here vis-à-vis globalisation and development and in
its effective impact.
Concerning
globalisation, the author points out that privatisation is not uniquely African;
it is largely part of the globalisation process. Although this is not entirely
negative, nevertheless, as Africa remains mainly a source of raw materials for
the West, the privatisation process in Africa remains largely exploitative. The
United Nations Development Programme, in its annual Human Development Reports,
has linked the growing inequality in the world to the effects of liberalisation,
deregulation and privatisation, showing that globalisation, of which
privatisation is a part, has proved a disaster for Africa both in human and
natural environmental terms. The paradox here is that whereas globalisation has
led Africa to more poverty and less development, it is at the same time
suggested that globalisation is the miraculous solution to Africa’s plight.
The challenges posed by globalisation and privatisation unveil two important
problems. The first relates to whether the people and communities can control
their local resources and economies and are able to set their goals and
priorities derived from their own values and aspirations. The second problem is
whether the life-sustaining resources produced by the regenerative capacities of
the earth’s ecosystems can be equitably shared by everybody to provide for the
material needs of all, both in the present and in the future.
With
regard to development, it is widely recognised that any development policy that
does not give to all the freedom and the opportunity to share in their society's
development dialogue cannot fit into the current meaning of development and
cannot be accepted as ethical. The example of Uganda proves that the
implementation of privatisation did not meet the above standard. It did not
involve the Ugandan people even when the political structures intended to allow
their participation were established by the ruling National Resistance Movement
(NRM) government. The present
institutions of local councils (LCs), with their emphasis on a grass-roots
approach to public policy did not result in a pro-people rational policy. The
economic measures of privatisation were imposed from the above, namely by
political policy makers on policy consumers.
In
relation to the impact of privatisation, because the people of Africa were never
involved in the strategy, it is not surprising to discover that privatisation
has failed to affect the reality of the majority of Africans. The statistics
presented by IMF, World Bank and similar bodies on the countries that embraced
privatisation reforms give rosy results. But the hard facts are that, in African
countries, the debt burden remains and continues to force governments to
confront to IMF-World Bank conditions. Extended debt service has continued to
siphon off the little resources that otherwise would have been used to finance
human development through the provision of basic social services. What is being
actually produced is generally luxury oriented, like beer, soft drinks, tobacco,
perfumed soap and steel products mainly geared to the middle class market,
rather than the necessities of the ordinary people. While privatisation has
facilitated the private sector and growth in the fields of education and health,
there has been no mobilising of the local population for its own development.
The trend towards privatised social services, particularly in education, health,
water, sanitation and nutrition, has resulted in reduced quality of public
administration and services at a time when workers are being retrenched, the
military demobilised and the real salaries are much lower. The constant outcries
over delayed payments of retrenched workers are often heard and the loss of jobs
in the privatised industry is now too common to be taken as a temporary
phenomenon. On the surface, it seems that ordinary goods and services are
available because of privatisation. Despite their availability, are these goods
and services accessible and affordable to the rural poor? The privatisation
programmes have been urban-oriented, urban-based and a middle-class phenomenon.
In
concluding his chapter, the author underlines once again that the major ethical
challenge any development policy must face is that it must recognise the input
of the people for which the policy is intended as well as guaranteeing the
equality and protection of local cultures. Thus, one must think seriously of
alternatives at the global, continental and national levels. Globally, the
people of the world need to link together into a powerful political coalition
aimed at political and economic reform to win the war that global capital is
waging against them. Continentally, people must reject the continued
Balkanisation of the African continent, and call for a continental, or at the
very minimum a regional unity. Nationally, the people need a successful national
democratic revolution to initiate a process of economic development in which the
people benefit rather than economic growth.
The disciplinary locale of this chapter spans
epistemology, ethics and human rights. It would seem that there has been
complacency in tracing the development of knowledge on human rights to
ethics, A.B. Rukooko tries instead to trace its source to epistemology.
Accordingly, this chapter develops three assumptions.
First, that the knowledge of human rights assumes unity, but has
different aspects and emphases that allow it to be interdisciplinarity.
This means that human rights are implied and, in turn ,imply other
sciences. This view appears to be
more appealing because it treats the pursuit of human rights as interconnected.
It is thus argued that nearly all academic endeavours including social
sciences, humanities, law, and exact sciences have value attached to their
pursuits. The end of these pursuits is not neutral because such
knowledge itself is already valued depending upon human choices.
Following from the above, it is claimed also that the
field of human rights is basically drawn from human values which, in turn, find
their ultimate justification in the epistemological realm.
Such a claim, however, does not exclude other manifestations of human
rights. The meaning of “human
values” here is generic: It includes not only the worth accorded to a human
being, but also those things that people hold dear to themselves.
This is a more effective category because, in the contemporary
understanding of human rights, human needs (which relate closely to values) like
food, shelter, housing, etc., form part of human rights.
Once this link to human values is demonstrated, an
attempt is made to identify the source of these values, namely whether human or
not. From Socrates and using the
rationalist, empiricist, pragmatist, existentialist and African approaches, the
origin of values is discussed. It
is conceded that no single approach is sufficient to explain the source of
values. Instead, all these
approaches contribute to the explanation of the origin of values, which implies
the need for a holistic approach in order to understand and confront human
rights issues, even though they are part of human values.
The African society could have been organized on a
communal basis, precisely to mobilize everybody in support of every member
within the community. Nobody was excluded, whether children, elders or
strangers. Every member was
respected, welcomed and valued for the simple reason that he or she was a human
being, which forms a wider basis for understanding and appreciating humanity.
The African conception of a human being is that he or she is a sacred
being whose needs ought to be respected, protected and fulfilled.
Such a concept forms the basis of international human rights. What
matters is not whether the concept ‘human rights’ was articulated in Africa,
but that it was present. In spite of its shortcomings, African society
emphasized social responsibility (or duty) if only it would support the
individual. Consequently, therefore, African traditional values are relevant in
the contemporary understanding and practice of human rights.
These positive values need to be harnessed for the greater service of
mankind.
Ultimately then, human rights form part of the values
cherished by all humankind, but these values derive from a knowledge of people
and their destiny in a particular context. The various dimensions of knowledge
accounts for the interdisciplinarity of human rights knowledge. This knowledge
is explained not by one or two theories, but by every epistemological aspect
asserting that human values find their origin in people’s habitual way of
acquiring knowledge. This serves to
demonstrate that human rights knowledge is not only unfolding all the time, but
that it also needs to be presented from various viewpoints and should be
synthetically reconciled with people’s infinite positive possibilities.
Finally, all societies, including African ones, have a wealth of knowledge
including human rights. All this knowledge should contribute to the world's
stock of knowledge and development.
HOLISTIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS BY A.B.T.
BYARUHANGA AKIIKI
The chapter refers to the need of a holistic approach to human rights.
With reference to some languages in Uganda, the author points out that the
concept of human rights is neither alien nor borrowed in the country. At the
same time, he distinguishes the African and the Western way of understanding
such rights. While the Western legacy seems to have a prevailingly “secular”
vision of human rights, the African vision extends to the religious dimension.
The religious worldview in Africa points to a kind of mystery—that of the
relationships between laws that govern people and all of creation morally,
physically and spiritually. Hence, many people in Uganda continue to believe
that their way of living needs to be in keeping with how the entire reality or
world functions. They regard the
world of nature as one of moral and spiritual value.
Their ethical concerns extend to the entire creation.
This chapter employs a holistic approach to human rights in order to
address both the philosophical and theological challenge related to human rights
in Africa. The challenge to philosophy needs to evolve through right thinking,
strategies towards the attainment of the necessary balance between all the
different clusters of human rights, such as those which have to do with
survival, participation and protection. The
theological challenge lies in giving people holistic guidance towards the
attainment of rights that promote holistic survival both in this and the other
world. Hence the need to instil in people spiritual values that are essential
for the individual and societal character.
The
symbiotic relationships that human beings maintain with the whole of creation is
what makes them human beings capable of practising, among other things, human
rights.
In such relationships, one's actions affect the rest of the members of
society like when a cell in the body feels pain and the rest of the body feels
the same. Human rights violations occur in society and disrupt or distort the
peaceful coexistence of human beings and the whole creation as a universal
community. Human dignity ultimately can be found only in relationships with
fellow human beings, living and dead, and with the whole creation.
Although
the African worldview has been depicted as differing in interpretation from the
Western one, a good number of Western scientists are presently proposing to
rebuild the bridge between the sacred and the secular dimensions of human
existence. For example Professor
Edward O. Wilson, an evolutionary biologist from Harvard University, maintains
that science and the humanities should come together and overcome the separation
presently existing between the spiritual and the secular. His proposal is that
people should develop ethical and social laws for society on the basis of what
natural scientists like him have.
In
concluding, the chapter indicates how the Ugandan and the African legacy have
for centuries been teaching a dual perception of human rights. First, human
rights are understood in relation to the rights of the whole of creation, and
secondly in the context of human relationships.
There is an essential interrelation that involves God, human beings
living and dead, and the world at large. Consequently, in African history human
rights cannot be understood apart from the rights of the whole of creation
involving the physical and spiritual worlds.
Africans are also convinced that also the dead have their own rights that
have to be respected. The dignity of a son or daughter of the soil (mutaka)
cannot be understood apart from the dignity of the whole of creation.
THE RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT BY M. MAWA
In
this chapter, M. Mawa argues that, although Uganda is signatory to a number of
international human rights documents, it seems to have related to them more by
violation than by respect and promotion. Ugandan history has been characterised
mostly by brutality and deprivation of human life and property. One cannot
ignore this history in the search for a culture that respects human dignity,
value and worth and that promotes the authentic development of the human person.
Development
has no doubt become an issue of great concern in the present world.
In an attempt to address development issues, the Ugandan government has
adopted Constitutional provisions declaring the right to development for all
Ugandans. Moreover, the Constitution states clearly the role of the people and
of the government in the development of the country.
The
author reflects on the constitutional provisions of the right to development and
some of the development programs so far adopted in the struggle to realize such
a right. In so doing, attention is
drawn to the principles contained in the United Nations Declaration on the Right
to Development which takes a complete turn towards a new approach, namely, the
holistic or integral approach. One
of the strongholds and the real force of this declaration is the novel
realization that the human person should be at the center of development.
This conception of development is solely encompassed in the fact that
development is only to be achieved with the human person as the central subject,
active participant and beneficiary of the right to development.
Inspired
by the vision and principles of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to
Development and the constitutional provisions of this right, Uganda has embarked
on a number of development programs such as the liberalisation of the economy,
primary health care, universal primary education, decentralisation, agricultural
modernisation, regional integration, and other projects. Notwithstanding these
noble development programs, the right to development in Uganda is not yet
reflected in the well-being of the majority of the ordinary people, many of whom
are still excluded from the development process.
While
it is true that the Uganda government, since the enactment of the 1995
Constitution, has encouraged different groups of people (women, youth, workers,
elders, the army, etc.) to participate actively in the affairs of the country,
it has nevertheless been reluctant to allow broad-based political participation.
For instance, the people cannot organise and mobilise themselves under different
political organisations.
The
author also argues that international cooperation is vital in the realisation of
the right to development and that Uganda's military involvement in the internal
affairs of its neighbours (Sudan and Congo) has created conditions unfavourable
for development. Moreover, the lack of peace in some northern and western parts
of the country has prevented development there. The need for a peaceful
resolution of international as well as national conflicts through dialogue is
not only urgent but also an imperative for development.
The
author goes on to assert that at the heart of international cooperation is the
need for a balanced international economic order. With the huge amount of debt
accumulated by many African states it is almost impossible to think of a
balanced economic order based on the principles of equity between partners. The
continued involvement of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (and
their founding countries) in the social, economic and political policies of
Uganda is a clear indication of this imbalance.
The
existence of different forms of social injustices in Africa arising mainly from
unequal treatment of people on the basis of their sex, religion, tribe,
political affiliation, region, etc., has often denied people full enjoyment of
their right to development. In Uganda, the gap between the rural and urban
areas, northern and southern regions, and between women and men is still wide.
Unfortunately, there has been limited intervention to redress these imbalances.
In
conclusion therefore, Uganda needs to go beyond the constitutional provisions by
translating these guidelines and the vision of development offered by the United
Nation Declaration on the Right to Development into concrete human well-being.
The approach most suitable for this process is the holistic and integral one
that considers not only the economic well-being of the people but which also
takes into account the social, political, cultural and moral dimensions of their
lives. It needs to be an approach that considers the human person as the central
subject, active participant and beneficiary of the right to development.
This
holistic approach requires therefore, that the principles of a human-centred
development, participation, democracy, self-determination, social justice and
international cooperation be upheld. Hence, human rights and development must be
supported by good governance.