On the Notions of Community and Humanity

The Alleged Correlation between Duties and Rights

Are There Acts of Supererogation?

Natural Duty and Morality

Conclusion

On some widely accepted views, morality makes human well-being the basic or ultimate standard of the moral worth of human action; there is, on this showing, a moral dimension to any situation that affects human well-being.1 And anything—any human action or behavior—that upholds or conforms to this ultimate standard is considered morally right, while that which violates it is considered morally wrong. This implies that whenever human well-being is at stake, whenever a situation arises that puts basic human needs or interests at risk—that involves good or harm—a moral issue arises. In other words, moral vocabulary is related, ultimately, to the basic desires and needs of human beings. There may be other characterizations or conceptions of morality besides those I have delineated here; but these, to be sure, are all oriented, directly or indirectly, toward human well-being or human good, the good or well-being of the human individual.2 There is, thus, a consequentialist thrust to the institution of morality: morality is instituted for a purpose—a telos—which fundamentally is human well-being. It is, thus, appropriate to advocate a humanistic ethics, as I do in this lecture.

As I have been using the expressions "community" and "humanity." It is now appropriate to give some analytic attention to the concepts denoted by these expressions. First, community can be distinguished into three senses: one moral, one spatial, and the other sharing features of both. The spatial sense of community, which happens to be what most people generally have in mind when they use the term, denotes a geographic (or spatial) entity and seems to be used frequently to refer to a neighborhood, village, small town, or specific locality. Deriving from, or rather affiliated to, this spatial sense, community has also acquired a demographic sense that confines its use to small populations. I will refer to this spatial meaning of community to refer to narrow geographic settings as community2. But the spatial sense of the term also appears in such expressions as "the international community," "the world community," and "the global community," even though the latter set of expressions seems to have ideological overtones, as I will point out before long. I will refer to this comprehensive, all-encompassing use of the term as community3. (I am yet to delineate the primary sense of community, that is, community1.) Members of community2 may share some interpersonal bonds which may or may not be biological, as in a village or small town. It is to be assumed that members of community in the secondary and tertiary sense (community2 and community3) share some common values, interests, and goals. This assumption brings me to another, a third, sense of community.

The notion of the common good is, to my mind, intrinsically linked to the notion of a community. The notion of the common good was developed in detail in the first lecture. Here I would but note that the notion of the common good can be equated with a notion of a set of goods that is essentially good for human beings as such. Access to these goods assists the fulfillment of human life, and thus these goods ought to be available to every individual if one is to function satisfactorily in a human community. The common good, in short, can be equated with the human good. A fundamental meaning of community is the sharing of an overall way of life, which can be said to be inspired by the understanding of the notion of the common good. It expresses itself in each member’s acknowledging the existence of common values, obligations, and understandings as well as demonstrating a loyalty and commitment to the interests of the community. Sharing an overall way of life involves demonstrating a concern not only for the social good, but also for the well-being of one another, bearing each other up. Thus, it enjoins certain obligations and responsibilities on each member of the community with respect to the interests and welfare of others. While not in any way implying a disregard for one’s own personal interests and goals, it nevertheless insists on paying regard and attention to the interests of other persons as well. I regard this moral or normative sense of community as primary, thus, as community1. It is, in my opinion, the fundamental meaning of the concept of community. On this showing, community1 represents a moral value that is opposed to a social organization characterized by the individualist ethos that stresses self-interest, with little concern, if at all, for others. It is thus a moral value that ought to be cherished and practiced in all human societies irrespective of their sizes and their stages of development.

When people talk of a society as having no sense of community or as having no community life, it is clearly community1—this normative sense of community—that they certainly have in mind. It is thus possible to have a community in the spatial sense (i.e., community2 or community 3), without community in the moral or normative sense (i.e., community1). Such condition would reduce that community to a mere association of individual persons, without meaningful interaction and a sense of responsibility and concern for each other. If a village or a neighborhood fails to evolve social relationships based on moral sensibilities or positive moral responses, mutual sympathies, and shared understanding of common interests and goals, it cannot, despite its small size, claim to be a community in this primary, fundamental sense of community (community1). This fundamental sense of community will seem to prescribe a morality that manifestly and appropriately recognizes the worth of every human being, a moral perception that therefore speaks to the essence of humanity.

Now, given that there surely are fundamental value and disvalue experiences that can be said to be common to all human beings, it would be appropriate to speak of a common or shared humanity. The concept of a shared humanity is clearly involved in, and inspires, references to "the international community", "the world community", "the global community" (community in the above categorization). An outstanding idea or proposition implicit in these references is that they speak to the various cultures to which different peoples belong; that is, they are over and above the particular cultures evolved by the different societies of the world, suggesting the conviction that all human beings, irrespective of their local cultures, share some fundamental values and that they are not just members of a single large human community3. In other words, these references are not particularly spatial, but essentially normative: they point up the unity of all people, strongly suggesting that all human beings belong to one species, one universal human family with shared basic values, hopes, and desires.

This perception of the unity or brotherhood of all human beings is emphatically expressed in the Akan proverb: honam mu nni nhanoa, translated literally by K.A. Busia as, "In human flesh there is no edge of cultivation—no boundary", but interpreted by him as meaning that "all humankind is one species."4 The proverb can thus be rendered as "Humanity has no boundary." Its meaning is that, while there is a limit—a boundary—to the area of cultivation of land, there is no such boundary (or limit) in the cultivation of the friendship and fellowship of human beings; the boundaries of that form of cultivation are limitless. Humanity is here perceived as embracing all other peoples beyond the narrow geographic confines of particular cultures or societies, as constituting all human beings into one universal family of humankind. Even though this family is fragmented into a multiplicity of peoples and cultures, nevertheless it is a shared family—a shared humanity—the relationships between whose members ought to feature a certain kind of morality.

What kind of morality should a shared humanity evolve? If sociality or community life is natural to humans—which means that human beings do not have a choice not to live in a human society; if there is a core of values and disvalues that can be considered common to human beings and, being core, are most essential for the fulfillment of their lives as human beings; then how should they, as members of an extensive human community3, respond to one another morally? And, how will or should their moral thought and action be influenced or guided by the normative sense of community (i.e., community1)? We will explore these questions at some length.

The kind of morality that is to be evolved by a shared humanity is not only implicit in much of what I have said in the foregoing but must be inspired by it. On that basis, it would be correct to assert at once that our shared humanity constitutes the foundation for a morality that stresses responsibilities and obligations toward others, whether as members of our own particular community2 or as members of the extensive community3. This morality that stresses sensitivity to the needs and well-being of others; it is an other-regarding and capacious morality. The crucial point of this altruistic morality is that, by underlining the notion of responsibilities, it elevates our responsibilities (or duties) toward others to a status equal to that of rights and urges that the former be taken as seriously as the latter. A shared humanity, conceived as a universal family of humankind, mandates, not a rights-based morality as the quintessence of the ethical life—the kind of moral outlook obsessed with concern for individual rights. It mandates rather a kind of moral outlook animated by the awareness of the needs and interests of others and the demonstration of sensitivity to those needs. To say this, though, is not by any means to denigrate the notion of individual rights, which can sometimes be exercised in favor of others as well; thus, rights are not necessarily opposed to responsibilities. However, an obsessive and belligerent preoccupation with our individual rights can lead to egoism and the concern for our own individual welfare, to the disregard of the needs and interests of others. Such a moral outlook subverts the notion of community1 and, consequently, of a shared humanity. In the final analysis it could self-destruct, as it could deprive the individual of the goodwill and assistance of others at a time when these are badly needed for that individual’s own welfare.

It is often maintained that our duties (responsibilities) are based on the rights of others. This means that to fulfill our responsibilities to others is to fulfill a requirement imposed by the rights of these others; that it is in the attempt to uphold the rights of others that we carry out certain responsibilities toward them. This position derives from the alleged correlation between rights and responsibilities, the position that if there are rights, then there must be corresponding duties or responsibilities, and vice-versa. Joseph Raz, for instance, says that "[s]ince a right is a ground for duties there is a good deal of truth in this kind of correlativity thesis."5 He says also that "[r]ights are the grounds of duties in the sense that one way of justifying holding a person to be subject to a duty is that this serves the interest on which another’s right is based."6 The position maintained by Raz is not wholly true. It is true in respect of two categories of duties: duties enjoined upon the state or society, which would have to be performed specifically by public institutions and agencies such as the government or upon individuals who occupy specific roles in the society or state, and duties prescribed by negative moral imperatives, such as we should not harm or kill others. Negative moral imperatives are related to what are regarded as negative rights, rights that require other people to refrain from acting in ways that will result in their subversion. The performance of these two categories of duties will be required by corresponding rights: thus they are duties that are correlated with rights.

Based on the foregoing arguments, I think that Raz is wrong in asserting that "all duties derive from rights,"7 that "rights justify duties,"8 and that "[t]he duty’s purpose is to protect the interest of the right-holder."9 The reason is that in many situations when we want to do things for others, such as helping those in distress, the desire to do so comes quite spontaneously, without being engendered by the consciousness of rights of others we are required to help protect or realize. In such situations we are impelled rather, and invariably, by the consciousness of their interests and needs. I agree, however, with Raz that "we all owe a duty to protect and promote the well-being of all people" and that there are "duties of well-being we owe each other."10 From the perspective of the concerns of the morality of a shared humanity, Raz’s statements just quoted are relevant and acceptable, even though one may not be too sure how the duties of well-being can be given adequate concrete expression if one advocated or emphasized the correlation between duties and rights. Are the duties of well-being we owe each other imposed by their rights? Raz may say yes. In the limited sense where negative rights are involved he may be right. It is my view, however, that the duties of well-being that we, as ordinary people—not as people occupying certain public roles or statuses—owe each other and all people do not derive from, nor are they justified by, the positive rights of each person. They are rather duties we owe people because we feel it our moral responsibility simply to do that which will enhance the well-being of fellow human beings. Raz is also right in saying that "duties are fetters and restrict people’s ability to do as they wish."11 Duties are, indeed, fetters or restrictions, but like a two-edged sword. They constrain us, on one hand, to avoid doing that which will do violence to the well-being of people and, on the other hand, to do that which will promote their well-being. The fetters are a feature of the sacrifice involved in any altruistic moral conduct, in the pursuit of an act that conduces to the well-being of the other or of others.

Thus, a shared humanity should prescribe a morality that grounds the decision to perform duties to fellow human beings, not on their rights, but on the raw and spontaneous desire to help fulfill their needs and well-being. This is the moral mandate or a moral desideratum—of a shared humanity. Such duties or responsibilities to fellow human beings, whatever they are, need not be regarded as special or saintly or heroic, and hence as strictly not a moral requirement. This brings me, finally, to a discussion of a class of duties or actions regarded by some—perhaps many—moral philosophers as supererogatory. Before I embark on that discussion, however, I would like to make further observations on the grounds of our duties or responsibilities to others.

It is often supposed that duties are linked to only specific roles or positions that people occupy in the society or state. Thus, Bernard Williams asserts that "duties have characteristically been connected with a role, position, or relationship" and that, for this reason, duties in general "are not acquired voluntarily."12 They are not acquired voluntarily because they are enjoined or imposed by one’s social or public role or position: one is compelled to undertake certain duties by virtue of a role or position one occupies. So understood, duty "looks backwards, or at least sideways," as Williams puts it; this is because the reasons for undertaking a duty lie in the past or present, that is, in "the position I am already in."13 Even though our intuitions lead to such an understanding of duty, I do not find such a view of duty acceptable for at least two reasons. One is that it takes too narrow an approach to the notion of duty in a society or world of human beings, the demonstration of whose moral concerns for many others can hardly be said to be connected with one’s role or position, or relationship. It is surely not impossible or inappropriate to have a conception of duty outside the various roles people occupy in society. It would be correct to say that the roles and positions people occupy are generally local, provincial, or national; relationships also are nearly all matters of place. It would follow that our duties to others will also be local or provincial or national. And, yet it can hardly be denied, I think, that the moral pursuits of many individuals in the various societies of our world, including the moral obligations they may feel toward others, do not derive from, nor are they connected with, any specific roles or positions they hold in the world or any well-defined relationships they have with other people in the world.

There are moral philosophers who seek to narrow the scope of the moral duties (responsibilities) human beings owe to each other by making a distinction between a set of acts that is clearly perceived by them as ‘proper’ moral duties and another set of acts described as supererogatory or acts of supererogation, which, in their view, are not strictly moral duties.14 From its Latin root, super erogatio (which means performing more than is required), a supererogatory act is defined as an act that is ‘beyond the call of duty’, an act that is over and above what a person is required to do as a moral agent. It can be inferred from this definition that an act of supererogation is neither morally obligatory nor forbidden, that it is not wrong to omit or neglect doing it, even though it is a good and commendable act by virtue of its intrinsic value and its consequences. Even though it is considered a meritorious act, nevertheless it is supposed to be an optional act, one that may be performed if the spirit moves you, but need not be performed. In being considered good, or morally commendable, or pursued for the well-being of another person, the act of supererogation is clearly a moral act, which, like all moral acts, it is right to perform. Yet, in the view of many moral philosophers, the (supposed) optional, nonobligatory character of the supererogatory act makes it a different sort of moral requirement, one that may or may not be performed, one that is at once devoid of the impartial or impersonal character of a strictly moral duty. We would normally think that a morally good or right act ought to be performed, that there is an equation between goodness and oughtness. Theories of supererogation would consider that equation correct but applicable only to moral duty "proper", not to an act that is considered beyond the call of duty. There is some kind of tension, something odd, to regard an act as morally good and commendable and yet as belonging to a different category of moral duty, one that does not strictly exact obligation or compel performance.

James Griffin, for instance, is of the opinion that "Commonsense morality permits partiality to particular persons, groups, and causes; it tailors moral duties to our capacities."15 He asserts, further, that "There are no moral norms outside the boundary set by our capacities. A moral standard that ignores human capacities is not an ‘ideal’ standard; it is no standard at all."16 The view that morality permits partiality to particular persons or groups palpably flies in the face of the fundamental principle of the categorical imperative enunciated by Kant, a principle that rather mandates impartiality and, thus universality, in our moral conduct. This principle, rooted in the golden rule, is conceivably common to the moral codes of all human societies. A morality that advocates partiality, that thus urges us, for instance, to demonstrate love or compassion for some people and not for others will be at fundamental odds with what social and humanistic ethic requires of us; within the context of a shared humanity, it is inappropriate to urge partiality as a principle of moral conduct. Morality must essentially be social and humanistic, if it is to be meaningful and important for human beings. For this reason, the demonstration of moral sensitivity cannot be confined to particular persons or groups, such as our relatives, compatriots, co-ethnics, or people who share the same culture, language, religion, or political views with us.

Another criterion relates to actions or rules the pursuit of which makes social life possible or tolerable. In a well-known and influential paper titled "Saints and Heroes", the British philosopher, J. O. Urmson, maintains that we should be concerned to prohibit "behavior that is intolerable if men are to live together in society," and to demand "the minimum of cooperation toward the same end."17 For Urmson, all that is required to achieve a tolerable basis of social life is a set of what he refers to as "basic rules" or "basic duties."18 Urmson’s concern about social life, about human beings living together in society and cooperating in achieving their collective welfare is, of course, commendable. But his notion of basic duties as a prop to, or condition for, tolerable social life seems to deflate the seriousness of that concern. This is because basic duties, being basic, must be severely limited in scope and would circumscribe the responsibilities that people who live together in society ought to carry out with respect to others. A moral society—as well as a shared humanity—ought to prescribe much more than ‘basic’ duties. It is precisely because of its limited character that Urmson’s notion of basic duties cannot function adequately for a human society. If social arrangement is to maximize the good for all, then that arrangement will have to include rules and duties the pursuit of which will lead to the attainment of collective welfare and, within the normative framework of a shared humanity, of the well-being of all people.The third criterion that may be established to set limits to moral duties derives from conceptions of the autonomy of the individual and of individual rights. Thus, David Heyd asserts that "supererogation is justified by showing that some supererogatory acts must exist because society cannot require of the individual every act that would promote the general good, and because the individual has the right to satisfy his wants and to achieve his ends and ideals regardless of their social utility (with some obvious limitations, of course)."19 In Heyd’s view, then, the existence and exercise of the individual’s autonomy and rights justify supererogationism, for they set limits to what the individual, concerned with the fulfillment of his own needs and welfare, can be expected to do in meeting the needs of others. The rejection of supererogationism, Heyd would say, implies an inappropriate extension of the individual’s moral responsibility and the consequent sacrifice or subversion of his autonomy and personal needs. And, for John Rawls, if moral duty is allowed to contain supererogatory acts, it would involve risk and loss to the agent. Thus Rawls: "It is good to do these [supererogatory] actions but it is not one’s duty or obligation. Supererogatory acts are not required, though normally they would be were it not for the loss or risk involved for the agent himself." According to Rawls, "While we have a natural duty to bring about a great good, say, if we can do so relatively easily, we are released from this duty when the cost to ourselves is considerable."20

The views of Heyd and Rawls just quoted, which are the common views of the advocates of supererogationism, reflect a certain conception of the nature of morality or moral responsibility, which is that moral responsibility is to be confined to acts that human beings can or want conveniently—"relatively easily" (in Rawls’ terms)—to perform and that will promote their own individual welfare. It is not that supererogationists necessarily think morality is self-regarding and that all self-sacrifice should be expunged from morality. It is, rather, that they think some form of self-sacrifice cannot be required of any and every moral agent. But the question is: which form of self-sacrifice can or should be required of the moral agent, and how do we determine that? Some people would consider providing the slightest assistance to someone in distress a self-sacrifice—and a great one at that; others, however, will not consider such acts as sending huge amounts of money to help people in famine-stricken areas within their nation or outside it, or helping to get someone out of real danger, or providing money to help someone undergo a surgical operation, as involving great sacrifice and, hence, as heroic or saintly. What all this means is that the scope of our moral responsibilities or duties should not be circumscribed. The moral life, which essentially involves paying regard to the needs, interests, and well-being of others—adjusting to the interests of others, already implies self-sacrifice and loss, that is, loss of something: one’s time, interests, money, strength, and so on. There is no need, therefore, to place limits on the form of the self-sacrifice and, hence, the extent of our moral responsibilities. The field of our moral duties or responsibilities should be left open. An adequate morality for a shared humanity should therefore seek to collapse what are considered our ‘proper’ moral duties and what are considered acts beyond the call of duty (supererogatory acts).In the light of the foregoing position, there is no justification for Heyd to think that "a doctor who goes to a remote tribe to cure a rare disease is doing a supererogatory act." In Heyd’s view, the doctor who acts in this way "goes beyond his natural duty, which in that case is confined to the fulfillment of his social duty as a doctor in his community."21 In opposition to Heyd’s view, I wish to say that morality requires us to pay some attention to the interests and needs of people not only in our immediate environs, such as our local communities or nations, but that, given the beliefs in our common humanity—with all that this concept implies for the fundamental needs, feelings, and interests of all human beings irrespective of their specific communities and cultures—our moral sensitivities should extend to people beyond our immediate communities (communities in the spatial sense, i.e., community2). That is to say, the moral sense of community (community1 ) ought to characterize the moral ideas, sentiments, and actions of community in the sense both of community2 and community3. And, contrary to Heyd’s view, the world-wide medical activities of the French medical group called "Medicine sans Frontieres" ("Doctors without Borders") in sending medical relief to people in various places of the world, outside their own communities, indicate clearly that, in the view of the members of the group, to send medical relief to other people besides one’s own is a legitimate moral duty, not an act beyond the call of duty. The same is true of the activities of doctors from several Rotary Clubs in the world who go to various countries of the world to bring medical relief to people. These doctors do not think that they are going beyond their "natural duty" (whatever this means) as Heyd and Rawls suppose, that their actions are beyond the call of duty. The same thing can be said of the moral perspective of the members of numerous national and international charitable organizations.

One interesting and remarkable thing about the altruistic moral reasoning that lay behind Dr. Schweitzer’s decision to study medicine in order to practice it in Africa was that he had "no thought of heroism, but just recognized a duty undertaken with sober enthusiasm."23 In other words, he himself never regarded his decision or act as heroic or saintly. This fact needs to be pointed out, because those who advocate supererogationism think that the acts performed by some people which are described as beyond the call of duty are heroic and saintly. According to those among (sections of) humankind convinced of the existence of a sense of responsibility for the well-being of others, however, such acts are ordinary, not extraordinary or heroic or saintly; they are required by the morality of a shared humanity. Altruistic considerations were at the base of Dr. Schweitzer’s moral motivation; and that is significant for my argument. As I will indicate before I come to the end of this lecture, the moral convictions and outlook of Dr. Schweitzer exemplify the perceptions of people who are deeply concerned about the well-being of their fellow human beings, even though advocates of supererogation would regard his moral convictions and actions not as part of his "natural duty."

It is not very clear what the term "natural duty" (used by both Heyd and Rawls) means or refers to. Perhaps it refers to duties that we are naturally inclined to perform, duties that our intuitions lead us to fulfill. It may be pointed out, however, that morality is instituted generally to countervail or "straighten up" our natural inclinations. In most instances our "natural duty" would have been duty to ourselves, members of our immediate and extended families, and perhaps neighbors and friends. But this is not all that morality really or essentially requires of us. More often than not, morality requires us to go against the grain. J. O. Urmson says that as part of the notion of duty, "I may demand that you keep your promises to me . . . and I may reproach you if you transgress. But however admirable the tending of strangers in sickness may be, it is not a basic duty, and we are not entitled to reproach those to whom we are strangers if they do not tend us in sickness."24 It seems surprising that Urmson should say that tending strangers in sickness is not a basic duty (or responsibility) the transgression of which should attract censure, when he holds that "morality . . . is something that should serve human needs."25 Most people, I think, will agree that to tend a stranger in sickness is to serve a human need and hence ought to be considered a basic moral duty. It can be said for a fact that strangers in different societies or nations seek, expect, require, and demand that they be tended to in sickness by their hosts, whether as individuals or groups. The expectation and demand on the part of strangers suggest that they believe, surely, that it is the moral duty of their hosts to tend them in sickness. They are right. They would have the expectation and make the demand simply because they are human beings and happen to be among human beings. We would be demeaning ourselves as moral agents, we would in fact be throwing overboard important ideals of our humanity, if we considered "human needs" to be the needs only of people in our own family or neighborhood or local community (community2) or of our friends, if, that is, we so severely restricted our moral duties or responsibilities as Griffin by his morality of partiality would have us do.

It seems that those who define certain acts as not natural and thus beyond the call of duty think that only a few human beings have the capacity and the desire to practice basic moral virtues such as love, charity, benevolence, and sensitivity to the needs of others, and hence only a few people—those consumed with moral ideals or, in the words of Urmson, "the higher flights of morality"26—can perform a certain category of acts, namely, supererogatory acts. Consequently, they advocate a dual nature of morality: basic duty and ideal moral duty (or responsibility). Thus, Heyd: "Many ethical theorists believe in the dual nature of morality: on the one hand, there is the morality of duty, obligation, and justice, which is essentially social and formulated in universal principles. . . . On the other hand, there is ideal morality, the morality of love, virtue, and aspiration, which is not formulated in universalizable principles."27

I wish to refer, if briefly, to the views expressed by some individuals who performed altruistic acts, including rescuing Jews during second World War and thus braving the wrath of Hitler and the Nazis. Their views are based on extended interviews conducted by a professor of political psychology.28 The responses of those interviewed are revealing and instructive. It must be borne in mind that the reference to the responses of individual agents is not to be construed as a conflation of an objective basis for classifying actions with the self-assessment of the agents. It is to be noted, instead, that an objective analysis can be borne out by empirical inquiries or statements made by moral agents, an objective conclusion of moral philosophy that can be confirmed also by exploiting facts of moral psychology. For good reason that Aristotle places ethics (or moral philosophy) in the category of the ‘practical sciences.’ In its arguments, philosophy never detaches itself entirely from empirical matters, though neither does it base its conclusions wholly and purely on empirical matters either. Hence, I regard as important and relevant the views expressed in the responses of moral agents to some questions of the moral life raised in the extended interviews. From the elaborate responses provided by those altruistic individuals, we may delineate three main features of their perceptions of themselves in relation to others and of the character of their actions.

The first is that those individuals do not see themselves as extraordinary people and that they, instead, consider their demonstration of concern for the well-being of others as only normal and ordinary, neither extraordinary nor remarkable, neither heroic nor saintly. There is no real reason why others should think that those acts were extraordinary, even if they were admirable. An elderly woman who succeeded in freeing a young woman who was being raped on a street corner by attacking the rapist, later said: "I don’t think I’m so unusual. I know I am someone who’s willing to take on a lot of responsibility in the world. But I don’t think I ‘m anything special."29 Asked whether he considered himself a hero, a rescuer of Jews during the last world war said "No". He was asked the following question, "Well, most people would say that what you did was an extraordinarily good deed and that you should be rewarded for it; do you think you did anything unusual?" He responded: "I don’t think that I did anything that special. I think what I did is what everybody normally should be doing. We all should help each other. It’s common sense and common caring for people."30 Those rescuers or helpers did not regard their moral actions as supererogatory—as beyond the call of duty—or as idealistic or extraordinary. The normative or prescriptive overtones of their statements are remarkable.

The second category of responses also indicates that some people are sensitive to the needs of others and act out of concern for them. They consider their actions as duties. Asked the question, "How important is duty in all of this? Do you have a duty to help people who are in distress?", a philanthropist responded thus: "Yes. I think so. I think we all do. I think we all should. . . . I think it’s very definitely a duty."31 After a lengthy answer to a question, one of the many rescuers of Jews in Europe made the following observation to conclude his answer: "So I do think people have a social responsibility to help people in need."32 In answer to a further question, he said: "You do things because you are human, and because there is need."33 It is worth noting that duty, in the perceptions of these altruists, is not related to a person’s specific role, position, or relationship at all; nor is it to be performed in response simply, and invariably, to the demands for the fulfillment of the rights of those in different kinds of difficult situations.

The third category of the responses clearly reveals the perceptions of humanity held by people who concern themselves with the needs and well-being of other people. They do have perceptions of a shared humanity, believe in this concept, see themselves as linked to others through a common humanity, and, indeed, perceive all humankind as connected through a common humanity. "We all belong to one human family,"34 said a Polish rescuer of many Jews, a view that resonates with that expressed in an already-quoted Akan proverb, "Humanity has no boundary."

The idea that all human beings are related and that all are dependent on each other was articulated by those altruists who participated in the interview. "You should always be aware that every other person is basically you. You should always treat people as though it is you, and that goes for evil Nazis as well as for Jewish friends who are in trouble. You should always . . . see yourself in those people."35 It need not be emphasized that a conception of a universalist ethic is at the base of altruistic behavior; it is the ethic that makes all people, irrespective of their cultures or societies, objects of moral concern. Also, it is worth noting that those altruists interviewed talked seriously about duty to others, social responsibility, need, helping each other, and common humanity as the grounds of their actions; none of them claimed to have grounded their actions on the rights of the people they were rescuing or helping out of distress.