In the United States Christian groups who decide to retire from society in order to live the abstemious community life of the first Christians, with the intent of returning to original Christianity, are characterized as fundamentalist. Under the influence of this Anglo-Saxon terminology, certain Arab authors have characterized as Islamic fundamentalism (usuliyya) the extremist currents of thought which fix upon certain formal and marginal aspects of Islam and seek to impose them by force.

Such a direct transfer into an Arab-Islamic context of an expression borrowed from the North American intellectual and social context loses sight of the important differences between original Christianity and Islam as lived by the first Moslems. As can be seen from the Gospels and especially from "The Acts of the Apostles", Christians in the first three centuries lived a simple communitarian life. This was separate from Roman civilization, which they considered pagan and impure. It was separate also from Jewish society which they criticized for its literalist application of the Mosaic law at the expense of its spiritual dimension. For a long time these first Christians acted simply as a new Jewish sect, not doing anything to develop their own religious Law, to found a new state, or to resist oppression by the Romans who were throwing them to the lions. That situation prevailed till 325 when Constantine declared Christianity the religion of the Empire.

In Islam the situation was very different. Since the time of Medina under the government of the Prophet, the first Moslems, far from submitting to the polytheists, fought them and worked to spread the new faith and to reshape their world. As a result, before the end of the first century when they were centered in Damascus, and even more during their following period in Baghdad,14 they constructed a new Islamic civilization. Hence if, as with the North American Christians, fundamentalism means seeking to revive the life of the first Christians, then this expression cannot be applied to Moslem extremists who today impose by violence ways of thinking and acting which have nothing to do with those of the first Moslems.

If, nonetheless, one wishes to continue to speak of Islamic fundamentalism, one must clearly distinguish its two forms in contemporary Islam. On the one hand, there is activist political fundamentalism. Far from proposing an authentic renewal of religious thought, this battles only on the political terrain and with its arms, thereby lowering Islam and Islamic Law (shari’a) to the level of common politics. On the other hand, there is rationalist spiritualist fundamentalism. This can be traced back to Islam as understood by the first Moslems according to the teachings of the Koran and the normative behavior of the tradition regarding the Prophet (sunna). It uses these to renew the spiritual life of Moslems, to restore the values of work and of independent opinion (ijtihad), to rediscover an active role in world civilization and, finally, to shape the political and juridical institutions of society in a way that avoids both excessive sacralization and destructive nihilism.

Let us compare these two fundamentalisms on five levels.

The meaning of words is not fixed once and for all. Like living beings, words evolve and change in the course of history to the point of acquiring at times a sense completely different from the original one. Thus, "democracy" signified in early Greek thought government by the uncultured masses, before coming to designate government by the majority of citizens. When today one characterizes as a "police" state a country which depends more on its security apparatus than upon legal authority one is far from the original sense of polis as city-state.

Similarly in Islam, with time such terms as shari’a, hukm and Umma have acquired meanings radically different from their origins. Thus, the term shari’a (Islamic Law), which in the Koran meant the way or the route laid out by God, came to designate also the ensemble of practical juridical directives in the Koran, to which was later added the sunna or tradition regarding the prophet, and finally also the opinion of the jurists and the unanimous consensus of the community (ijma), in other words, Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). There is, however, an essential difference between the two senses: whereas the first points to the way that God, through the Koran, invited believers to follow, the second refers only to the opinions of jurists. In other words, to confuse the two senses is to confuse what is of divine origin with that derived from human sources. Such confusion loses touch with Islam and approaches polytheism.

Finally, to protect itself against this confusion and to avoid a deformed or adulterated interpretation of Revelation, rationalist Islamic fundamentalism thinks it important to rediscover the meaning which the Koranic terms had at the time of Revelation and to hold to that sense. On the contrary, activist fundamentalism takes those terms in a derived or conventional sense which is totally absent in the Koran, thereby generating confusion and deformation.

When ‘Umar asked Ibn ‘Abbâs why divergence of opinion arose within the Islamic community, he responded:

Rationalist fundamentalism seeks to rediscover the foundations laid by the Koran and followed by the first Moslems in their interpretation of the revealed Word. It does this by following Ibn ‘Abbas in situating each verse in the circumstances in which it was revealed. In contrast, activist fundamentalism neglects the context in which particular verses were revealed and interprets them solely on the basis of their literal sense and in virtue of the principle that "the general sense of a Koranic term should prevail over its circumstantial sense." However, the principle is merely a rule of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) created by jurists; it is not a provision of Islamic Law (shari’a) coming from the Koran or the sunna. Hence, its application weakens the coherence of the Koranic message. As the Koran constitutes a whole, each part needs to be interpreted in the light of the others; this is in conformity with the fundamentalist method of the first Moslems. As Ibn ‘Abbas predicted, the faulty method of the activists led to differences and quarrels about the sense of the Koranic verses. One example concerns the interpretation of the verse: "The unbelievers are those who do not judge (yahkum) men according to what God has revealed" (V. 44); this was revealed when the Jews of Medina turned to the Prophet to judge a case of adultery committed by two members of their own community, but hid the rule prescribed by the Torah for that case, namely, stoning. That is why the best exegetes think, on the authority of Ibn ‘Abbas and the Prophet, that this verse concerns only the people of the Book. It signifies only that those among them who do not decide their cases in conformity with their own law are deniers of their books. Activist fundamentalism, on the basis of the principle cited above, ignores the circumstances of Revelation and departs from the interpretation of the Prophet and recognized exegetes and uses this verse like a slogan. In their faulty interpretation the term yahkum is taken to mean "to govern", whereas in the Koran it signifies "to judge", and as a result, they accuse all governments of infidelity.

An essential characteristic of Islam is its rejection of all forms of excess and extremism in fulfilling religious prescriptions: "People of the Book, do not exaggerate in your religion" (IV, 171). In that sense, it is said of the Prophet that each time that he could choose between two possibilities he chose the one which was easiest on people. It is reported that ‘Umar b. al-Khattâb, seeing in a market a man holding in his hand a lost fruit and looking for its owner, said to him: "You do this not out of piety but affectation." The following are but some examples of the tolerance and spirit of equilibrium in authentic Islamic fundamentalism.

When Muhammad was traveling with the Moslem army from Medina to Mecca during the month of Ramadan in the eighth year of the Hegira, one part of the believers, including the Prophet, did not fast. This was in conformity with the Koran which authorized breaking the fast during a voyage. Others, more exigent than Muhammad himself, strictly observed the fast. That situation lasted several days without either group reproaching the other in the least.

Another example: it is reported that a Bedouin came to find the Prophet and said to him: Envoy of God, I always have some affairs that occupy me during the hours of prayer; could you suggest some way of replacing them? The Prophet responded: Pray the dawn prayer and the sunset one but not that of the noon, afternoon and night. This story shows how muhammad himself practiced independent opinion (ijtihád) and creative thinking, even in what concerned ritual obligations in order to make them easily practicable for believers.

A last anecdote: One very cold morning after ‘Amr b. al-’As said the dawn prayer without his ritual ablutions, Muhammad asked him: "Have you not read the verses devoted to ablutions?"—"Yes, Envoy of God," he responded, "but I also read: ‘Don’t expose yourself, by your own hands, to destruction"’ (II, 195). The Prophet laughed heartily and willingly recognized the excuse.

Rationalist Islamic fundamentalism thinks it necessary to return to these essential traits of Islam, namely, mercy, tolerance, the attenuation of human suffering and the rejection of all excesses and forms of extremism. This is the precise opposite of activist fundamentalism.

At the heart of Islam there is continued movement toward the future, the will to march forward toward the establishment of a humanist civilization. The phenomenon of abrogation (naskh) in the Koran, that is the substitution of one verse by another in the face of new developments, is the surest index of this constant movement of adaptation to realities and an active will to change life. The first Moslems understood perfectly that they had a religion of action thanks to which they were able to build a great civilization of universal scope.

"God does not change anything in a people, until they change what is in themselves" (XIII, 11): the first Moslems understood the true sense of this verse, so that authentic change begins to operate within each person and is followed by constructive action and creative work. In order to be efficacious this must not stop at the surface of things but must effect their essence. That is why the early Moslems opened to all the civilizations of their time, studied all the sciences and worked in all fields. A generation after the death of the Prophet they had abandoned the life of the Bedouin and, through their faith in Islam, had become the agents of their history.

At the end of the IVth-Xth centuries, the Brethren of Purity defined the perfect Moslem as one who is: "Arab in religion, Iraqi in taste for life, Hebrew in experience, Christian in method, Syrian in asceticism, Greek in science, Hindu in vision, Sufi in conduct, angelic in morality, sovereign in reflection, and divine in his knowledge." In other words, the true Moslem was both humanist and universalist. Open to all cultures and all forms of knowledge, he is tolerant with regard to all Divine Laws, and knows how to choose what is best from each approach. But in the Vth-Xth centuries a change took place: Moslems ceased to progress and for the following nine centuries entered into a state of stagnation in which they too often lost the capacity to act with a clear and conscious vision. Rationalist Islamic fundamentalism, holding to the essence of Islam, wanted to be humanist and universalist; they valued movement toward the future. In contrast, activist fundamentalism, turning toward memories of the past and shriveling to positions it neither could nor wished to surpass, became hostile to all progress.

For the first Moslems, political power was not a religious emanation from God, but a civil work of human will. For them the governor was an individual like other men. They designated him as governor through some agreed upon process; and in theory at least they could review his work and dismiss him from his functions. His acts, orders and opinions were not from celestial revelations, but were solely his judgments and those of his counselors. Upon his investiture, Abu Bakr gave this speech to the believers; "I have been designated as your head, but I am no better than you: if I act well, help me, and if I act badly, correct me". In the same circumstances his successor, ‘Umar b. al-Khattâb, declared: "If you note in me any deviation whatever, correct."

In all of Islamic history no jurist, ulama or exegete has claimed to have particular authority, to be inspired by God in his judgment or to be gifted by infallibility or sanctity. All knew that Islam rejected all these forms of domination of man over man and likened them to polytheism. In contrast, despotic political power too often has claimed an aura of infallibility and holiness. Though some may find this judgment excessive, it remains true that, although unjust rulers have always pretended the contrary, in practice everything happens as if God the Highest made them Caliphs in order to express His will and act in conformity with it. It is as if they were not simply the "Commanders of the believers," designated by them and responsible to them. Thus after the first four Caliphs and against the teachings of original Islam, political authority in Islam became de facto a theocracy in which rulers exercised personal inherited power. In the absence of all controls they were able to transgress the religious Law as they saw fit. Moreover, though in principle hostile to Shiism, they were influenced by Shiite conceptions which made the sovereign an infallible being elected by God, for these ideas served their interests.

Rationalist Islamic fundamentalism considers it necessary to return to the Koran and the traditions of the first Moslems in order to purify Islamic political though from its errors. On this basis it would establish political authority as coming from the will of men who have the right to participate in it, control it and remove it if it contravenes the relevant laws. Activist fundamentalism believes something other than it professes and acts contrary to what it says. For in affirming political authority to be an integral part of Islam it confers upon it a de facto infallibility in such wise as to transform it into a religious authority. Furthermore, for rationalist Islamic fundamentalism every person versed in the sciences relating to religion remains nonetheless a simple individual and his opinions, words and judgments bind only himself. In contrast, the activist fundamentalist acts as if the opinion, word or judgment of the one he takes as chief, guide or imam is an inspired vision from God. On this basis he makes his chief into a lord, imitating thereby the people of the book who are stigmatized by the Koran: "They have taken their doctors and their monks as well as the Messiah, Mary’s son, as lord in the place of God" (IX, 31).

There are then two radically opposed Islamic fundamentalisms: the one, rationalist and spiritualist, proposes a rediscovery of the original thought processes and spiritual life. In this it attaches itself once again to the essence of Islam and to the spirit of modern civilization. The other fundamentalism, activist and political, is an aggregate of confused and irrational tendencies. Under cover of a return to the holy ancestors, it preaches a facade of rigorism and a return to by-gone modes of life. In this there is neither a rational direction, spiritual renewal, nor authentic teaching. The past is quite dead, and the present is in permanent movement: though the river may be the same, one never enters twice into the same water.