APPENDIX I
PREFACES TO BOOKS I-III
Thomas Aquinas
BOOK I. GOD
CHAPTER 7. THAT THE TRUTH OF REASON IS NOT OPPOSED TO THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH
[1] Now, although the truth of the Christian faith which we have discussed surpasses the capacity of the reason, nevertheless that truth that the human reason is naturally endowed to know cannot be opposed to the truth of the Christian faith. For that with which the human reason is naturally endowed is clearly most true; so much so, that it is impossible for us to think of such truths as false. Nor is it permissible to believe as false that which we hold by faith, since this is confirmed in a way that is so clearly divine. Since, therefore, only the false is opposed to the true, as is clearly evident from an examination of their definitions, it is impossible that the truth of faith should be opposed to those principles that the human reason knows naturally.
[2] Furthermore, that which is introduced into the soul of the student by the teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher-unless his teaching is fictitious, which it is improper to say of God. Now, the knowledge of the principles that are known to us naturally has been implanted in us by God; for God is the Author of our nature. These principles, therefore, are also contained by the divine Wisdom. Hence, whatever is opposed to them is opposed to the divine Wisdom, and, therefore, cannot come from God. That which we hold by faith as divinely revealed, therefore, cannot be contrary to our natural knowledge.
[3] Again. In the presence of contrary arguments our intellect is chained, so that it cannot proceed to the knowledge of the truth. If, therefore, contrary knowledge were implanted in us by God, our intellect would be hindered from knowing truth by this very fact. Now, such an effect cannot come from God.
[4] And again. What is natural cannot change as long as nature does not. Now, it is impossible that contrary opinions should exist in the same knowing subject at the same time. No opinion or belief, therefore, is implanted in man by God which is contrary to man’s natural knowledge.
[5] Therefore, the Apostle says: "The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart. This is the word of faith, which we preach" (Rom. 10:8). But because it overcomes reason, there are some who think that it is opposed to it: which is impossible.
[6] The authority of St. Augustine also agrees with this. He writes as follows: "That which truth will reveal cannot in any way be opposed to the sacred books of the Old and the New Testament." (de genesi ad litteram, II, c. 18 [PL. 34. col. 280]).
[7] From this we evidently gather the following conclusion: whatever arguments are brought forward against the doctrines of faith are conclusions incorrectly derived from the first and self-evident principles imbedded in nature. Such conclusions do not have the force of demonstration; they are arguments that are either probable or sophistical. And so, there exists the possibility to answer them.
CHAPTER 8. HOW THE HUMAN REASON IS RELATED TO
THE TRUTH OF FAITH
[I] There is also a further consideration. Sensible things, from which the human reason takes the origin of its knowledge, retain within themselves some sort of trace of a likeness to God. This is so imperfect, however, that it is absolutely inadequate to manifest the substance of God. For effects bear within themselves, in their own way, the likeness of their causes, since an agent produces its like; yet an effect does not always reach to the full likeness of its cause. Now, the human reason is related to the knowledge of the truth of faith (a truth which can be most evident only to those who see the divine substance) in such a way that it can gather certain likenesses of it, which are yet not sufficient so that the truth of faith may be comprehended as being understood demonstratively or through itself. Yet it is useful for the human reason to exercise itself in such arguments, however weak they may be, provided only that there be present no presumption to comprehend or to demonstrate. For to be able to see something of the loftiest realities, however thin and weak the sight may be, is, as our previous remarks indicates, a cause of the greatest joy.
[2] The testimony of Hilary agrees with this. Speaking of this same truth, he writes as follows in his De Trinitate: "Enter these truths by believing, press forward, persevere. And though I may know that you will not arrive at an end, yet I will congratulate you in your progress. For, though he who pursues the infinite with reverence will never finally reach the end, yet he will always progress by pressing onward. But do not intrude yourself into the divine secret, do not, presuming to comprehend the sum total of intelligence, plunge yourself into the mystery of the unending nativity; rather, understand that these things are incomprehensible." (St. Hilary, De Trinitate, II, 10, ii [PL. coll. 58-59].)
CHAPTER 9. THE ORDER AND MANNER OF PROCEDURE
IN THE PRESENT WORK
[1] It is clearly apparent, from what has been said, that the intention of the wise man ought to be directed toward the twofold truth of divine things, and toward the destruction of the errors that are contrary to this truth. One kind of divine truth the investigation of the reason is competent to reach, whereas the other surpasses every effort of the reason. I am speaking of a "twofold truth of divine things", not on the part of God Himself, Who is truth one and simple, but from the point of view of our knowledge, which is variously related to the knowledge of divine things.
[2] Now, to make the first kind of divine truth known, we must proceed through demonstrative arguments, by which our adversary may become convinced. However, since such arguments are not available for the second kind of divine truth, our intention should not be to convince our adversary by arguments: it should not be to answer his arguments against the truth; for, as we have shown (SCG, I, 7), the natural reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith. The sole way to overcome an adversary of divine truth is from the authority of Scripture — an authority divinely confirmed by miracles. For that which is above the human reason we believe only because God has revealed it. Nevertheless, there are certain likely arguments that should be brought forth in order to make divine truth known. This should be done for the training and consolation of the faithful, and not with any idea of refuting those who are adversaries. For the very inadequacy of the arguments would rather strengthen in their error, since they would imagine that our acceptance of the truth of faith was based on such weak arguments.
[3] This, then, is the manner of procedure we intend to follow. We shall first seek to make known that truth which faith professes and reason investigates (SCG, I-III). This we shall do by bringing forward both demonstrative and probable arguments, some of which were drawn from the books of the philosophers and of the saints, through which truth is strengthened and its adversary overcome. Then, in order to follow a development from the more manifest to the less manifest, we shall proceed to make known that truth which surpasses reason, answering the objections of its adversaries and setting forth the truth of faith by probably arguments and by authorities, to the best of our ability (SCG, IV).
[4] We are aiming, then, to set out following the way of the reason and to inquire into what the human reason can investigate about God. In this aim the first consideration that confronts us is of that which belongs to God in Himself (SCG, I). The second consideration concerns the coming forth of creatures from God (SCG, II). The third concerns the ordering of creatures to God as to their end (SCG, III).
[5] Now, among the inquires that we must undertake concerning God in Himself, we must set down in the beginning that whereby His Existence is demonstrated, as the necessary foundation of the whole work. For, if we do not demonstrate that God exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily suppressed.
BOOK II. CREATION
CHAPTER 1. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS AND THE PRECEDING ONES
"I meditated upon all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy hands."
(Ps. 142.5)
[1] Of no thing whatever can a perfect knowledge be obtained unless its operation is known, because the measure and quality of a thing’s power is judged from the manner and type of its operation, and its power, in turn, manifests its nature; for a thing’s natural aptitude for operation follows upon its actual possession of a certain kind of nature.
[2] There are, however, two sorts of operation, as Aristotle teaches in Metaphysics IX, 8 (1050a 25): one that remains in the agent and is a perfection of it, as the act of sensing, understanding, and willing; another that passes over into an external thing, and is a perfection of the thing made as a result of that operation, the acts of beating, cutting and building, for example.
[3] Now, both kinds of operation belong to God: the former, in that He understands, wills, rejoices, and loves; the latter, in that He brings things into being, preserves them, and governs them. But, since the former operation is a perfection of the operator, the latter a perfection of the thing made, and since the agent is naturally prior to the thing made and is the cause of it, it follows that the first of these types of operation is the ground of the second, and naturally precedes it, as a cause precedes its effect. Clear evidence of this fact, indeed, is found in human affairs; for in the thought and will of the craftsman lie the principle and plan of the work of building.
[4] Therefore, as a simple perfection of the operator, the first type of operation claims for itself the name of operation, or, again, of action; the second, as being a perfection of the thing made, is called making so that the things which a craftsman produces by action of this kind are said to be his handiwork.
[5] Of the first type of operation in God we have already spoken in the preceding Book of this work, where we treated of the divine knowledge and Will (SCG, I. ch. 44-102). Hence, for a complete study of the divine truth, the second operation, whereby things are made and governed by God, remains to be dealt with.
[6] In fact, this order we can gather from the words quoted above. For the Psalmist first speaks of meditation upon the first type of operation, when he says: "I have meditated on all Thy operations"; thus, operation is here referred to the divine act of understanding and will. Then be refers to meditation on God’s works: "and I meditated on the works of Thy hands"; so that by "the works of Thy hands" we understand heaven and earth, and all that is brought into being by God, as the handiwork produced by a craftsman.
CHAPTER 2. THAT THE CONSIDERATION OF CREATURES IS USEFUL FOR INSTRUCTION OF FAITH
[1] This sort of meditation on the divine works is indeed necessary for instruction of faith in God.
[2] First, because meditation on His works enables us in some measure to admire and reflect upon His wisdom, For things made by art are representative of the art itself, being made in likeness to the art. Now, God brought things into being by His wisdom; wherefore the Psalm (103: 24) declares: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Hence, from reflection upon God’s works we are able to infer His wisdom, since, by a certain communication of His likeness, it is spread abroad in the things He has made. For it is written: "He poured her out," namely, wisdom, "upon all His works" (Eccli. 1:10). Therefore, the Psalmist, after saying: "Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me: it is high, and I cannot reach it," and after referring to the aid of the divine illumination, when be says: "Night shall be my light," etc., confesses that he was aided in knowing the divine wisdom by reflection upon God’s works, saying: "Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well" (Ps. 138:6, 11, 14).
[3] Secondly, this consideration [of God’s works] leads to admiration of God’s sublime power, and consequently inspires in men’s hearts reverence for God. For the power of the worker is necessarily understood to transcend the things made. And so it is said: "If they," namely, the philosophers, "admired their power and effects," namely of the heavens, stars, and elements of the world, "let them understand that He that made them is mightier than they" (Wisd. 13:4). Also it is written: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: His eternal power also and divinity" (Rom. 1:20). Now, the fear and reverence of God result from this admiration. Hence, it is said: "Great is Thy name in might. Who shall not fear Thee, O King of Nations?" (Jer. 10:6-7).
[4] Thirdly, this consideration incites the souls of men to the love of God’s goodness. For whatever goodness and perfection is distributed to the various creatures, in partial or particular measure, is united together in Him universally, as in the source of all goodness, as we proved in Book I, ch. 28 and 40. If, therefore, the goodness, beauty, and delightfulness of creatures are so alluring to the minds of men, the fountainhead of God’s own goodness, compared with the rivulets of goodness found in creatures, will draw the enkindled minds of men wholly to Itself. Hence it is said in the Psalm (91:5): "Thou hast given me, O Lord, a delight in Thy doings, and in the works of Thy hands I shall rejoice." And elsewhere it is written concerning the children of men: "They shall be inebriated with the plenty of Thy house," that is, of all creatures, "and Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure: for with The is the fountain of life" (Ps. 35:9-10). And, against certain men, it is said: "By these good things that are seen," namely, creatures, which are good by a kind of participation, "they could not understand Him that is" (Wis. 13:1) namely, truly good; indeed, is goodness itself, as was shown in Book I, ch.38.
[5] Fourthly, this consideration endows men with a certain likeness to God’s perfection. For it was shown in Book I that, by knowing Himself, God beholds all other things in Himself. (SCG, i, ch. 49-55) Since, then, the Christian faith teaches man principally about God, and makes him know creatures by the light of divine revelation, there arises in man a certain likeness of God’s wisdom. So it is said: "But we all beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image" (II Cor. 3:18).
[6] It is therefore evident that the consideration of creatures has its part to play in building the Christian faith. And for this reason it is said: "I will remember the works of the Lord, and I will declare the things I have seen: by the words of the Lord are His works" (Ecclus. 42:15)
CHAPTER 3. THAT KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF CREATURES SERVES TO DESTROY
ERRORS CONCERNING GOD
[1] The consideration of creatures is further necessary, not only for the building up of truth, but also for the destruction of errors. For errors about creatures sometimes lead one astray from the truth of faith, so far as the errors are inconsistent with true knowledge of God. Now, this happens in many ways.
[2] First, because through ignorance of the nature of creatures men are sometimes so far perverted as to set up as the first cause and as God that which can only receive its being from something else; for they think that nothing exists beyond the realm of visible creatures. Such were those who identified God with this, that, and the other kind of body; and of these it is said: "Who have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon to be the gods" (Wis. 13:2).
[3] Secondly, because they attribute to certain creatures that which belongs only to God. This also results from error concerning creatures. For what is incompatible with a thing’s nature is not ascribed to it except through ignorance of its nature — as if man were said to have three feet. Now, what belongs solely to God is incompatible with the nature of a created thing, just as that which is exclusively man’s is incompatible with another thing’s nature. Thus, it is from ignorance of the creature’s nature that the aforesaid error arises. And against this error it is said: "They gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:23). Into this error fell those who attribute the creation of things, or knowledge of the future, or the working of miracles to causes other than God.
[4] Thirdly, because through ignorance of the creature’s nature something is subtracted from God’s power in its working upon creatures. This is evidenced in the case of those who set up two principles of reality; in those who assert that things proceed from God, not by the divine will, but by natural necessity; and again, in those who withdraw either all or some things from the divine providence, or who deny that it can work outside the ordinary course of things. For all these notions are derogatory to God’s power. Against such persons it is said: "Who looked upon the Almighty as if He could do nothing" (Job 22:17), and: "Thou showest Thy power, when men will not believe Thee to be absolute in power" (Wis. 12:17).
[5] Fourthly, through ignorance of the nature of things, and, consequently, of his own place in the order of the universe, this rational creature, man, who by faith is led to God as his last end, believes that be is subject to other creatures to which he is in fact superior. Such is evidently the case with those who subject human wills to the stars, and against these it is said: "Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear" (Jer. 10:2); and this is likewise true of those who think that angels are the creators of souls, that human souls are mortal, and, generally, of persons who hold any similar views derogatory to the dignity of man.
[6] It is, therefore, evident that the opinion is false of those who asserted that it made no difference to the truth of the faith what anyone holds about creatures, so long as one thinks rightly about God, as Augustine tells us in his book On the Origin of the Soul (IV, 4 [PL, 44, col. 527]). For error concerning creatures, by subjecting them to causes other than God, spills over into false opinion about God, and takes men’s minds away from Him, to whom faith seeks to lead them.
[7] For this reason Scripture threatens punishment to those who err about creatures, as to unbelievers, in the words of the Psalm (27:5): "Because they have not understood the works of the Lord and the operations of His hands, Thou shalt destroy them, and shalt not build them up"; and: "These things they thought and were deceived," and further on: "They esteemed not the honor of holy souls" (Wis. 2.21-22).
CHAPTER 4. THAT THE PHILOSOPHER AND
THE THEOLOGIAN CONSIDER CREATURES
IN DIFFERENT WAYS
[1] Now, from what has been said it is evident that the teaching of the Christian faith deals with creatures so far as they reflect a certain likeness of God, and so far as error concerning them leads to error about God. And so they are viewed in a different light by that doctrine and by human philosophy. For human philosophy considers them as they are, so that the different parts of philosophy are found to correspond to the different genera of things. The Christian faith, however, does not consider them as such; thus, it regards fire not as fire, but as representing the sublimity of God, and as being directed to Him in any way at all. For as it is said: "Full of the glory of the Lord is His work. Hath not the Lord made the saints to declare all His wonderful works?" (Ecclus- 42:16-17).
[2] For this reason, also, the philosopher and the believer consider different matters about creatures. The philosopher considers such things as belong to them by nature — the upward tendency of fire, for example; the believer, only such things as belong to them according as they are related to God-the fact, for instance, that they are created by God, are subject to Him, and so on.
[3] Hence, imperfection is not to be imputed to the teaching of the faith if it omits many properties of things, such as the figure of the heaven and the quality of its motion. For neither does the natural philosopher consider the same characters of a line as the geometrician, but only those that accrue to it as terminus of a natural body.
[4] But any things concerning creatures that are considered in common by the philosopher and the believer are conveyed through different principles in each case. For the philosopher takes his argument from the proper causes of things; the believer, from the first cause — for such reasons as that a thing has been handed down in this manner by God, or that this conduces to God’s glory, or that God’s power is infinite. Hence, also, [the doctrine of the faith] ought to be called the highest wisdom, since it treats of the highest cause; as we read in Deuteronomy (4:6): "For this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." And, therefore, human philosophy serves her as the first wisdom. Accordingly, divine wisdom sometimes argues from principles of human philosophy. For among philosophers, too, the first philosophy utilizes the teachings of all the sciences in order to realize its objectives.
[5] Hence again, the two kinds of teaching do not follow the same order. For in the teaching of philosophy, which considers creatures in themselves and leads us from them to the knowledge of God, the first consideration is about creatures; the last, of God. But in the teaching of faith, which considers creatures only in their relation to God, the consideration of God comes first, that of creatures afterwards. And thus the doctrine of faith is more perfect, as being more like the knowledge possessed by God, who, in knowing Himself, immediately knows other things.
[6] And so, following this order, after what has been said in Book I about God in Himself, it remains for us to treat of the things which derive from Him.
CHAPTER 5. ORDER OF PROCEDURE
[1] We shall treat of these matters in the following order: first, the bringing forth of things into being (ch. 6-38), second, their distinction (ch. 39-45), third, the nature of these same things, brought forth and distinct from one another, so far as it is relevant to the truth of the faith (ch. 46-101).
BOOK III. PROVIDENCE
CHAPTER 1. PROLOGUE
"The Lord is a great God and a great King above all gods" (Ps. 94:3). "For the Lord will not cast off His people" (Ps. 93:14)"For in His hand are all the ends of the earth, and the heights of the mountains are His. For the sea is His and He made it, and His hands formed dry land."
(Ps. 94:4-5)
[1] That there is one First Being, possessing the full perfection of the whole of being, and that we call Him God, has been shown in the preceding Books. From the abundance of His perfection, He endows all existing things with being, so that He is fully established not only as the First Being but also as the original source of all existing things. Moreover, He has granted being to other things, not by a necessity of His nature but according to the choice of His Will, as has been made clear in our earlier explanations (SCG, II. ch. 23). From this it follows that He is the Lord of the things that He has made, for we are masters of the things that are subject to our will. In fact, He holds perfect dominion over things produced by Himself, since to produce them He is in need neither of the assistance of an external agent nor of the underlying presence of matter, for He is the universal maker of the whole of being.
[2] Now, each of the things produced through the will of an agent is directed to an end by the agent. For the proper object of the will is the good and the end. As a result, things which proceed from will must be directed to some end. Moreover, each thing achieves its ultimate end through its own action which must be directed to the end by Him Who gives things the principles through which they act.
[3] So, it must be that God, Who is in all ways perfect in Himself, and Who endows all things with being from His own power, exists as the Ruler of all beings, and is ruled by none other. Nor is there anything that escapes His rule, just as there is nothing that does not receive its being from Him. As He is perfect in being and causing, so also is He perfect in ruling.
[4] Of course, the result of this rule is manifested differently in different beings, depending on the diversity of their natures. For some beings so exist as God’s products that, possessing understanding, they bear His likeness and reflect His image. Consequently, they are not only ruled but are also rulers of themselves, inasmuch as their own actions are directed to a fitting end. If these beings submit to the divine rule in their own ruling, then by virtue of the divine rule they are admitted to the achievement of their ultimate end; but, if they proceed otherwise in their own ruling, they are rejected.
[5] Still other beings, devoid of understanding, do not direct themselves to their end, but are directed by another being. Some of these are incorruptible and, as they can suffer no defect in their natural being, so in their own actions they never fail to follow the order to the end which is prearranged for them. They are unfailingly subject to the rule of the First Ruler. Such are the celestial bodies whose motions occur in ever the same way.
[6] Other beings, however, are corruptible. They can suffer a defect in their natural being, yet such a defect works to the advantage of another being. For, when one thing is corrupted, another comes into being. Likewise, in their proper actions they may fall short of the natural order, yet such a failure is balanced by the good which comes from it. Thus, it is evident that not even those things which appear to depart from the order of the primary rule do actually escape the power of the First Ruler. Even these corruptible bodies are perfectly subject to His power, just as they are created by God Himself.
[7] Contemplating this fact, the Psalmist, being filled with the Holy Spirit, first describes for us the perfection of the First Ruler, in order to point out the divine rule to us: as a perfection of nature, by the use of the term "God"; as a perfection of power, by the use of the words, "great Lord" (suggesting that He has need of no other being for His power to produce His effect); and as a perfection of authority, by the use of the phrase, "a great King above all gods" (for even if there be many rulers, they are all nonetheless subject to His rule).
[8] In the second place, He describes for us the manner of this rule. First, as regards those intellectual beings who are led by Him to their ultimate end, which is Himself, he uses this expression: "For the Lord will not cast off His people." Next, in regard to corruptible beings which are not removed from the power of the First Ruler, even if they go astray sometimes in their own actions, He says: "For in His bands are all the ends of the earth." Then, in regard to celestial bodies which exist above all the highest parts of the earth (that is, of corruptible bodies) and which always observe the right order of the divine rule, he says: "and the heights of the mountains are His."
[9] In the third place, be indicates the reason for this universal rule: the things created by God must also be ruled by Him. Thus it is that he says: "For the sea is His," and so on.
[10] Therefore, since we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature in Book One, and of the perfection of His power inasmuch as He is the Maker and Lord of all things in Book Two, there remains to be treated in this third Book His perfect authority or dignity, inasmuch as He is the End and Ruler of all things. So, this will be our order of procedure: first, we shall treat of Himself, according as He is the end of all things; second, of His universal rule, according as He governs every creatUre (ch. 64-110); third, of His particular rule, according as He governs creatures possessed of understanding (ch. 111-163).