1. References to this work in the present essay are to Truth and Method, 2nd revised edition, translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1989) and to the original German, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1965). (Henceforth TM and WM, respectively.)

2. Gadamer, "Selbstdarstellung," Gesammelte Werke, 10 vol. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1986-1995), II, p. 497. (Henceforth GW).

3. TM, 258/WM, 244.

4. Gadamer, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness," trans. by J. L. Close, in Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look, ed. Paul Rabinow and William Sullivan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 110; first printed in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 5, no. 1 (Fall 1975): 1-51. (Henceforth, PHC).

5. TM, 262/WM, 248.

6. Gadamer, "Selbstdarstellung, GW, II, p. 481. Gadamer reports how the second part of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or "evoked" in him "sympathy for . . . historical continuity." See Philosophical Apprenticeships, trans. Robert R. Sullivan (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), p. 5.

7. TM, 258/WM, 244; Gadamer maintains that "overcoming the aporias of historicism" was not one of the aims of Heidegger’s "hermeneutic phenomenology." TM, 258/WM, 244. Gadamer reminds us that the significance of "Heidegger’s fundamental ontology was not that it was the solution to the problem of historicism." TM, 256/WM, 242.

8. Nietzsche refers to historicism as the "malady of history." He states that the "excess of history has attacked the plastic power of life that no more understands how to use the past as a means of strength and nourishment." See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, trans. Adrian Collins (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), p. 69.

9. For Gadamer’s evaluation of Nietzsche’s skepticism concerning the value of historical knowledge, see his "Wahrheit in den Geisteswissenschaften," in GW, II, pp. 37-53; English translation "Truth in the Human Sciences," trans. Brice R. Wachterhauser, in Hermeneutics and Truth, ed. by Brice R. Wachterhauser (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994), p. 27; "Was ist Wahrheit?" GW, II, p. 45; English translation "What is Truth?" trans. Brice R. Wachterhauser, in Hermeneutics and Truth, p. 34; and, TM, 304/WM, 287.

10. Gadamer, "Wahrheit in den Geisteswissenschaften," in GW, II, pp. 37-43; "Truth in the Human Sciences," pp. 25-32.

11. PHC, 110.

12. TM, xxiii, 290/WM, xxvii, 275; Also see Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 125. (Henceforth referred to as PH).

13. TM, 265-307/WM, 250-290.

14. TM, 266/WM, 251.

15. TM, 277-284/WM, 261-269.

16. TM, 268/WM, 253-254.

17. TM, 284/WM, 269.

18. TM, 283/WM, 267.

19. TM, 280/WM, 264-265.

20. Gadamer uses Überlieferung and Tradition, (TM, xxi, xxii, 264ff./WM, xv, xxvii, 250ff.) both of which are translated as "tradition." He uses the former term more often. Überlieferung refers to contents of a distinction made by Droysen between written and documentary sources [Quellen] and other historical vestiges [Überresten]. For Droysen sources belong to a linguistic world, which help to constitute the linguistically interpreted world, while remnants are only fragments of the past that helps us to reconstruct the past world. Gadamer treats both under the concept of tradition. Gadamer asks: "where does an archaic image of a god belong, for instance? Is it a vestige like a tool? Or is it a piece of world-interpretation, like everything that is handed dawn linguistically?" Gadamer, "Aesthetics and Hermeneutics," PH, 99.

21. TM, 279/WM, 263.

22. TM, 301/WM, 285.

23. TM, 302/WM, 286.

24. TM, 304/WM, 288.

25. Gadamer, "Truth in the Human Sciences," p. 26.

26. TM, 294/WM, 278.

27. TM, 298/WM, 282.

28. TM, 364/WM, 346.

29. Gadamer, "Truth in the Human Sciences," p. 26.

30. TM, 475/WM, 451.

31. TM, 282-283/WM, 267.

32. TM, 284/WM, 268.

33. TM, 285/WM, 269.

34. TM, 294/WM, 278.

35. TM, 284/WM, 269.

36. TM, 300/WM, 284.

37. Gadamer writes: "Not just occasionally but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author." TM, 296/WM, 280.

38. TM, 296/WM, 280.

39. TM, 373/WM, 355.

40. TM, 474/WM, 450.

41. Frithjof Rodi, "Hermeneutics and the Meaning of Life: A Critique of Gadamer’s Interpretation of Dilthey," trans. K. H. Heiges, in Hermeneutics and Deconstruction, eds. Hugh J. Silverman and Don Idhe (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), p. 84.

42. TM, 552; Cf. "Nachwort zur 3. Auflage," GW, II, p. 450.

43. TM, xxiii/WM, xxvii.

44. TM, xxi/WM, xv.

45. Jürgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jerry A. Stark (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 143-170; E. D. Hirsch Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 245-264; Emilio Betti, Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1962); English translation, "Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften," trans. Josef Bleicher, in The Hermeneutic Tradition From Ast To Ricoeur, ed. Gayle Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 177-188; Karl-Otto Apel, Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). For Gadamer’s response, see "Hermeneutik und Historismus," Philososphische Rundschau 9 (1962), pp. 241-276; English translation as "Supplement I" in Truth and Method, pp. 505-541; "Replik" in Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik, ed. Karl-Otto Apel, et. al. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), p. 283-317; reprinted in GW, II; English translation "Reply to my Critics," trans. George H. Lenier, in The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur, eds. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990).

46. Betti, for instance, argues against Gadamer: "it can be agreed that any view of history depends on the historian’s perspective and that each historical phenomenon can be looked at from different points of view; but it is impossible to derive a conclusive objection to the objectivity of historical interpretation from the historicity of the standpoint of the historian. " See, Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 172.

47. Charles Larmore argues that because Gadamer wrongly follows Hegel "in assuming that the important differences among beliefs . . . lie always between different historical epochs rather than within them, the kind of relativism he embraces is a historical relativism." See his "Tradition, Objectivity and Hermeneutics," in Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy, ed. Brice R. Wachterhauser (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 154.

48. Maurice Mandelbaum, Problems of Historical Knowledge, (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 20.

49. TM, 280/WM, 265.

50. TM, 280-281/WM, 264-265.

51. Richard Bernstein, "From Hermeneutics to Praxis," in Hermeneutics and Praxis, ed. Robert Hollinger (Notre Dame; Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), p. 287; first printed in The Review of Metaphysics 35, no. 4 (1982), pp. 823-45. Also see his, "What is the Difference That Makes a Difference," in Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy, ed. Brice R. Wachterhauser (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 350.

52. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutic Reflection," PH, 36.

53. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 215.

54. TM, 513/WM, 484-485.

55. TM, 329/WM, 312.

56. TM, 302-306/WM, 286-290.

57. TM, 341/WM, 324.

58. E. D. Hirsch Jr., Aims of Interpretation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 49.

59. TM, 361/WM, 343-344.

60. TM, 361-362/WM, 344.

61. TM, 373/WM, 355; cf. TM, 183/WM, 171.

62. The term "historical consciousness," is a translation of Gadamer’s term "historisches Bewusstsein" (WM, 162ff.) and the term "historically effected consciousness" translates "wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein" (WM, 324-360).

63. TM, 197, 204/WM, 85, 205.

64. Karl Mannheim, "Historismus," Archive für Sozialwissenschaft und Socialpolitik 52, no. 1 (1924); translated and reprinted in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Paul Kesckemeti (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 84-133; see especially p. 86.

65. TM, 200/WM, 188.

66. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 26-34; Also see Leo Strauss and Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Correspondence concerning Wahrheit und Methode," The Independent Journal of Philosophy 2 (1978), pp. 5-12; cf. TM, 533/WM, 504.

67. TM, 285/WM, 269.

68. TM, 341/WM, 324.

69. TM, 344/WM, 327.

70. TM, 344-345/WM, 327-328.

71. David Couzens Hoy, Critical Circle: Literature, History, and Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 69.

72. Hoy, Critical Circle, 69.

73. Hoy, Critical Circle, 69.

74. Jean Grondin, "Hermeneutics and Relativism," in Festival of Interpretations: Essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Work, ed. Kathleen Wright (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 42-62.

75. TM, 534/WM, 505.

76. Gadamer, "The Nature of the Things and the Language of Things," PH, 80.

77. TM, 477/WM, 452.

78. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutic reflection," PH, 36.

79. Gadamer, "On the Natural Inclination of Human Beings Toward Philosophy," in Reason in the Age Science, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), p. 144. (Henceforth RAS).

80. TM, 238/WM, 238.

81. "Natural Inclination Toward Philosophy," RAS, 146.

82. TM, 265-379/WM, 250-360.

83. Dilthey, GS, V (2nd ed.; Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1957); quoted by George Misch in his introduction to this volume, " Vorbericht des Herausgebers," p. Liii; also see GS, I, p. 116; VII, pp. 117, 191, 358; cf. Gadamer, PHC, 119.

84. TM, 186/WM, 174.

85. TM, 182-183/WM, 170-171.

86. TM, 182/WM, 170.

87. TM, 182/WM, 171.

88. TM, 183/WM, 171.

89. TM, 184/WM, 173.

90. TM, 185/WM, 173. Cf. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: Hand Written Manuscripts, trans. J. Duke and J. Forstmann (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1977); partially reprinted in The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from Enlightenment to the Present, ed. and trans. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer (New York: Continuum, 1988), p. 81.

91. According to Gadamer, explication and application are not different functions of interpretation but rather they constitute a unity. See, TM, 308/WM, 291.

92. TM, 183/WM, 172.

93. TM, 184/WM, 172; cf. TM, 269/WM, 253.

94. TM, 186/WM, 174.

95. TM, 185/WM, 174.

96. TM, 191/WM, 179; Habermas too starts from a similar position when he writes: "The task of universal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding." See his "What is Universal Pragmatics?" in Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976), p. 1

97. TM, 185/WM, 173.

98. Compare Betti’s statement: "Whenever something from the mind of an Other approaches us there is a call on our ability to understand." Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 160.

99. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, p. 78.

100. Ibid.,, p. 83.

101. TM, 185/WM, 173.

102. TM, 192/WM, 180.

103. TM, 189/WM, 177.

104. TM, 192/WM, 180.

105. TM, 192/WM, 180; cf. Joel C. Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 141.

106. TM, 193/WM, 181.

107. TM, 194/WM, 182.

108. TM, 187/WM, 175.

109. TM, 188/WM, 176.

110. TM, 190/WM, 178.

111. TM, 191/WM, 179.

112. TM, 191/WM, 179.

113. TM, 191/WM, 179.

114. TM, 197/WM, 195.

115. "Because myths cannot be traced to a single person as author there is no technical interpretation for myths." Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, p. 79.

116. TM, 197/WM, 185.

117. TM, 198/WM, 185.

118. TM, 197/WM, 185.

119. TM, 198/WM, 186.

120. TM, 199/WM, 187.

121. TM, 199/WM, 186.

122. TM, 201/WM, 189.

123. TM, 256/WM, 242.

124. TM, 201/WM, 189.

125. TM, 201/WM, 189.

126. TM, 202/WM, 189.

127. TM, 202/WM, 190.

128. Gadamer makes a similar presentation of aesthetic consciousness leading to aesthetic differentiation in which the uniqueness and individual value of the work of art is flattened in the very search for this as an instance of artistic creative genius. See TM, 42-80/WM, 39-77.

129. TM, 202/WM, 190.

130. TM, 207/WM, 195.

131. TM, 208/WM, 195-196.

132. TM, 209/WM, 197.

133. TM, 209/WM, 197.

134. TM, 165/WM, 158.

135. TM, 198/WM, 186.

136. TM, 199/WM, 187.

137. TM, 224/WM, 210. (Italics in the original).

138. TM, 222/WM, 209.

139. TM, 223/WM, 210.

140. Ibid.

141. TM, 225/WM, 212.

142. TM, 225/WM, 212.

143. TM, 234/WM, 221.

144. TM, 236/WM, 222; Dilthey GS, VII, p. 347.

145. TM, 199/WM, 187.

146. TM, 235/WM, 222.

147. TM, 237/WM, 223-224.

148. TM, 237/WM, 224.

149. TM, 237/WM, 225.

150. TM, 237/WM, 224.

151. TM, 198/WM, 185.

152. TM, 238/WM, 225.

153. TM, 239/WM, 225-226.

154. TM, 238-239/WM, 225.

155. TM, 238-239/WM, 225.

156. TM, 242/WM, 229.

157. TM, 242/WM, 229.

158. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 72. (Henceforth BT.) All subsequent references will be to the translation (BT) and to the original German (SZ).

159. BT, 25/SZ, 5.

160. Gadamer writes: "this burst asunder the whole subjectivism of modern philosophy" and the traditional metaphysical account of being as "what is present." TM, 257/WM, 243.

161. BT, 182/SZ, 143.

162. BT, 188/ SZ, 148.

163. BT, 201/SZ, 158. For a more comprehensive analysis of Heidegger’s concept of the "as-structure of understanding" in terms of propositional truth and its implications for logic, see Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Das Logische Vorurteil: Untersuchungen zur Wahrheitstheorie des frühen Heidegger (Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 1994), especially, pp. 129-163.

164. Although Heidegger does not use "Vor-verständnis," Vorverstehen appears once in Being and Time (BT, 344/SZ, 297). Emerich Coreth traces the use of the term "Vor-verständnis" to Bultmann’s discussion about hermeneutics. See his Grundfragen der Hermeneutik: ein philosophischer Beitrag (Freiburg: Herder, 1969), p. 99.

165. BT, 191-192/SZ, 150-151.

166. BT, 195/SZ, 153.

167. BT, 195/SZ, 153.

168. BT, 195/SZ, 153.

169. BT, 434/SZ, 382. "Historicity" here translates Heidegger’s Gesichichtlichkeit in preference to the later commentators’ usage. Macquarrie and Robinson render it as "historicality." They translate Historizität as historicity. See BT, p. 31, note 2.

170. BT, 425-427/SZ, 373-375.

171. BT, 427/SZ, 375.

172. BT, 378/SZ, 329.

173. BT, 429/SZ, 377; See also Otto Pöggeler, Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1983), p. 102.

174. BT, 429/SZ, 377.

175. BT, 449/SZ, 397.

176. BT, 41/SZ, 20.

177. Gadamer, "Selbstdarstellung," GW, II, p. 487.

178. Gadamer, "Selbstdarstellung," GW, II, p. 492.

179. TM, 275/WM, 259.

180. TM, 273/WM, 258.

181. TM, 275/WM, 259.

182. TM, 275/WM, 260.

183. TM, 290/WM, 274.

184. Wahrheit und Methode, 5th ed., 1. vol. of Gesammelte Werke (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1986), p. 316, note 240, Gadamer has inserted a footnote indicating that historical distance is not the only problem, he discusses distance and otherness in the third Part in the light of language. Cf. TM, 311, note 240.

185. TM, 292/WM, 276.

186. TM, 293/WM, 277.

187. TM, 293/WM, 277.

188. TM, 293/WM, 277.

189. TM, 472-473/WM, 447-448.

190. TM, 473/WM, 449.

191. TM, 297/WM, 280.

192. TM, 341/WM, 324. We prefer to use "consciousness of the history of effects" for Gadamer’s phrase wirkungsgeschichtliche Bewußtsein. It must be pointed out that none of the English translations of this phrase is universally accepted. In the English translation of Truth and Method it is rendered as "historically effected consciousness" which gives the impression that consciousness is historically effected, or is consciousness of the effects of history. Another suggestion is to use consciousness of "the history of influences" which draws attention to the history of influences of a text. See John M. Conolly and Thomas Keutner, introduction to Hermeneutics versus Sciences? Three German Views: Essays by H.-G. Gadamer, E. K. Specht, W. Stegmüller, ed. and trans. John M. Connolly and Thomas Keutner (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 33. It seems that Gadamer’s purpose is to draw attention to the fact that the interpretations of a text belong to its meaning, and the necessity of the consciousness that we take a text to mean would become part of it. Therefore Gadamer gives a critical role to this term.

193. TM, 272/WM, 257.

194. Gadamer, "Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy," RAS, 98.

195. Gadamer, "Zur Zirkel der Verstehens," GW II, p. 60; English translation, "On the Circle of Understanding," in Hermeneutics versus Sciences? Three German Views: Essays by H.-G. Gadamer, E. K. Specht, W. Stegmüller, ed. and trans. John M. Connolly and Thomas Keutner (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 72.

196. Gadamer, "Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy," RAS, 98.

197. TM, 294/WM, 278.

198. TM, 291, 311/WM, 275, 295.

199. "Zur Zirkel der Verstehens", GW II, p. 62; "On the Circle of Understanding," p. 75; Cf. TM, 260/ WM, 246: "all such understanding is ultimately self-understanding." (Italics in the original).

200. TM, 180, 260/WM, 168, 246.

201. Gadamer, "On the Circle of Understanding," p. 74.

202. TM, 293-294/ WM, 277-278.

203. Gadamer, "On the Circle of Understanding," p. 75.

204. "On the Circle of Understanding," p. 77; Also see TM, 374-375/WM, 356-357.

205. "On the Circle of Understanding," p. 78.

206. Ibid.

207. TM, 300-307/WM, 284-290.

208. TM, 275/WM, 260.

209. TM, 211/WM, 198.

210. TM, 306/WM, 289.

211. TM, 306/WM, 290.

212. TM, xxxi/WM, xvii.

213. TM, 307-312/WM, 290-295.

214. TM, 324-341/WM, 307-323

215. TM, 308/WM, 291.

216. TM, 328/WM, 311.

217. TM, 309/WM, 292.

218. Gadamer mentions experiences of alienation in aesthetic and historical consciousness. He explains why he has chosen these forms of experience of alienation in the Truth and Method. See "The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem," PH, 3-17.

219. TM, 295/WM, 279.

220. Fred Lawrence, review of "Truth and Method, Hegel’s Dialectic and Philosophical Hermeneutics" by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Religious Studies Review 3 (Jan. 1977), p. 36.

221. Ibid. This phrase is not in Gadamer’s text, but Lawrence is not wrong in using it, because it is implied there. See TM, xxxvi/WM, xxi.

  222. TM, xxiv/WM, xxvii.

223. Gadamer, "Die Universalität des hermeneutischen Problems," GW, II, p. 120; "The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem," PH, 4.

224. Gadamer, "On the Philosophic Element in the Sciences and the Scientific Character of Philosophy," RAS, 3.

225. Gadamer, "Die Stellung der Philosophie in der heutigen Gesellschaft," in Das Problem der Sprache, ed. Hans-Georg Gadamer (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1967), p. 12.

226. TM, 350/WM, 333.

227. TM, 350/WM, 333. Gadamer is describing Aristotle’s analysis of induction in Posterior Analytics, II, 19.

228. TM, 352/WM, 334; see also Gadamer, "Man and Language," PH, 63-64.

229. TM, 352/WM, 334-335.

230. TM, 352/WM, 335.

231. Ibid.

232. TM, 353/WM, 335.

233. TM, 353/WM, 336.

234. TM, 350/WM, 332-333.

235. TM, 354/WM, 337.

236. TM, 355/WM, 338.

237. TM, 353/WM, 336.

238. Martin Heidegger, Hegel’s Concept of Experience (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 73

239. TM, 354-355/WM, 337-338.

240. TM, 355/WM, 338.

241. TM, xxix/WM, xv.

242. PHC, 112.

243. PHC, 111.

244. Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation," trans. Dennis J. Schmidt and Richard Palmer, in Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, eds. Richard Palmer and Diane P. Michelfelder (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 25

245. Gadamer, "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion," in Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects, ed. Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), p. 58.

246. Ibid.

247. Gadamer, "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion," p. 59.

248. Ibid., p. 62

249. Ibid., p. 64.

250. TM, 112/WM, 107.

251. TM, 113/WM, 108.

252. TM, 97/WM, 92.

253. Gadamer, "Theory, Technology, Practice: The Task of the Science of Man," trans. H. Brotz, Social Research 44, no. 3 (1977), p. 540.

254. Gadamer, "The Task of the Science," p. 540.

255. PHC, 111.

256. PHC, 111.

257. PHC, 112.

258. PHC, 112.

259. Gadamer, "Selbstdarstellung," GW, II, p. 497.

260. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gessamelte Schriften (Stuttgart: G. B. Teubner; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1957), vol. 5, p. 437. (Henceforth GS).

261. Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem," PH, 15.

262. Ibid.

263. TM, xxiv/WM, xxvii.

264. TM, 475-476/WM, 451.

265. TM, 457/WM, 433.

266. TM, 347/WM, 329.

267. TM, xxix/WM, xiv.

268. TM, xxix/WM, xiv.

269. Gadamer, "Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik," GW, II, 232; "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutic Reflection," PH, 19.

270. Gadamer, "Rhetorik, Hermeneutik," GW, II, 233.

271. TM, xxii/ WM, xxvii.

272. TM, xxii1/WM, xxvii.

273. TM, 59/WM, 56.

274. The title of Part I is: "Freilegung der Wahrheitsfrage an der Erfahrung der Kunst," WM, 1-161; TM, 1-169.

275. TM, 85/WM, 81.

276. TM, 92/WM, 87. Meaning as a priori is the central premise of Gadamer’s theory. As Apel comments: "hermeneutic analysis commences from the fact that intelligible human behavioral reactions as linguistically-related intentional forms, themselves possess the quality of understanding." Apel, Transformation of Philosophy, p. 55.

277. TM, 91/WM, 87.

278. Gadamer recognizes it as Heidegger’s insight to have shown that pure perception is an abstraction from the concreteness of life as it is lived, and is the fundamental presupposition of the "objectivity" of scientific research and the "ontological prejudice" behind it. See Gadamer, "Philosophie und Literatur" in Was ist Literatur? Phänomenologische Forschungen II, ed. E. W. Ort (Freiburg: Alber, 1981), p. 19; English translation, "Philosophy and Literature," trans. Anthony J. Steinbeck, Man and World 18 (1985), p. 242.

279. TM, 92/WM, 88.

280. TM, 94/WM, 90.

281. TM, 95/WM, 90. The discussion of aesthetic nihilism here anticipates the similar discussion of historicism in Part II of Truth and Method. Of historicism Gadamer writes that its "epistemological culmination is relativism and its consequent nihilism." Gadamer, "Wahrheit in den Geisteswissenschaften" GW, II, p. 38; "Truth in the Human Sciences," p. 27.

282. Concerning the self-identity and difference involved in being expressed and understood, Gadamer’s analysis of the concepts in their relation to what is expressed is an example: ". . . the logos is of such a nature that whenever anything is meant by it, that thing is meant as identical to itself and, at the same time, is different from other things. Thus Selfsameness and Difference are always present in anything which is and is recognized as what it is. Only the interweaving of Selfsameness and Difference makes an assertion (logos) possible. In any assertion something which, in being what it is, is identical to itself, is linked to something different from itself. But it does not thereby lose its selfsameness." Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Heaven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 143.

283. TM, 95/WM, 90.

284. TM, 96/WM, 91.

285. TM, 97/WM, 92.

286. TM, xxii-xxiii/WM, xxvi.

287. TM, 3/WM, 1.

288. TM, 5/WM, 3.

289. TM, 5/WM, 3.

290. TM, 9/WM, 7.

291. TM, 18/WM, 15.

292. TM, 10/WM, 7.

293. TM, 11/WM, 9.

294. Ibid.

295. TM, 12/WM, 9.

296. TM, 12/WM, 9.

297. TM, 12/WM, 10.

298. TM, 108/WM, 103.

299. Ibid.

300. TM, 113/WM, 108.

301. TM, 159/WM, 152.

302. Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row 1977), p. 178

303. TM, 162/WM, 155.

304. TM, 160/WM, 153.

305. TM, 161/WM, 153.

306. TM, 164/WM, 157.

307. Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Evanston; Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 167.

308. Daniel O Dahlstrom, "The Religion of Art," in Philosophy of Art, ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom, vol. 23 of Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991), p. 253.

309. TM, 69/WM, 65.

310. TM, 90-91/WM, 86.

311. TM, xxxi/WM, xvii.

312. TM, 285-300/WM, 269-284.

313. TM, 287/WM, 271.

314. Gadamer, "A Classical Text—A Hermeneutic Challenge," trans. Fred Lawrence, University of Ottawa Quarterly 50 (1980), p. 637.

315. Ibid.

316. Gadamer’s analysis of the classical here has led to the critique that Gadamer makes a normative requirement for a text to be considered classical, therefore proposes a normative criterion for the correct understanding of what those classical texts express. From this, it was easy to draw the conclusion that because every tradition contains such normative texts, for Gadamer tradition has a normative value for understanding the past. For such an approach to Gadamer’s concept of the classical, see Apel, Transformation der Philosophie, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Shurkamp, 1973), pp. 385ff.

317. TM, 290/WM, 274.

318. TM, 287/WM, 271.

319. Ibid.

320. TM, 288/WM, 272.

321. Paul Riceour, "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology," Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 94.

322. TM, 295/WM, 279.

323. For an analysis of Gadamer’s concept of application as the mediation of universal with individual, see Francis J. Ambrosio, "Gadamer and Aristotle: Hermeneutics as Participation in Tradition," in Hermeneutics and the Tradition, ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Vol. 72 of Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (Washington, D. C.: The American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1988), pp. 174-182.

324. PHC, 107.

325. Gadamer, "Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences," Cultural Hermeneutics 2 (1975), p. 316.

326. TM, 4/WM, 1.

327. TM, 26-27/WM, 23-24.

328. TM, 27/WM, 24.

329. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 117, 151.

330. TM, 32/WM, 29.

331. TM, 33/WM, 30.

332. TM, 22/WM, 19.

333. TM, 23-24/WM, 21.

334. TM, 24/WM, 21.

335. Gadamer, "The Task of the Science," pp. 544-545.

336. TM, 346/WM, 329.

337. Ibid.

338. TM, xxxv/WM, xxi.

339. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutic Reflection," PH, 38; Kleine Schriften (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1967) I, p. 127.

340. TM, 341/WM, 324.

341. Gadamer, "On the Problem of Self-Understanding," PH, 49.

342. TM, 341/WM, 324.

343. TM, 465/WM, 441.

344. TM, 466/WM, 441-42; See Hegel on speculative thinking: Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 36

345. G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädeie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), 6th ed., edited by Friedhelm Nicolin and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1959), Parag. 60.

346. TM, 342/WM, 325.

347. TM, 342/WM, 325.

348. TM, xxxvi/WM, xxii.

349. TM, 475/WM, 451.

350. PHC, 108.

351. PHC, 108.

352. Emilio Betti, Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1962); English translation, "Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften," trans. Josef Bleicher, in The Hermeneutic Tradition From Ast To Ricoeur, ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 164.

353. For Betti, the hermeneutic circle applies only to the internal relation of the text, not to the relation between the interpreter and the texts. "The meaning of the whole has to be derived from its individual elements, and an individual element has to be understood by reference to the comprehensive, penetrating whole of which it is a part." Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 165.

354. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 188.

355. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 187.

356. Betti argues that "the texts which are approached with a meaning-inferring ‘pre-understanding’ [Vorverständis] are not to be used to confirm already held opinions. . . . It is here that the questionable character of the subjectivist position comes to light." "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 177.

357. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," pp. 177-178.

358. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," pp. 182-183.

359. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 180.

360. Betti, Die Hermeneutik als Allgemeine Methodik des Geisteswissenschaften, p. 34; "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 177.

361. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 172.

362. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 168.

363. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 181.

364. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," pp. 177-178.

365. "...die historische Bedingtheit jedes Auslegungsprozesses." Die Hermeneutik als Allgemeine Methodik des Geisteswissenschaften, p. 39; "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 180.

366. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 181.

367. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 183.

368. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," pp. 173, 180.

369. Emilio Betti, Allgemeine Auslegungslehre als Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1967), p. 731.

370. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 186.

371. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 187.

372. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 177.

373. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 187. Cf. TM, 512/WM, 484.

374. Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 59.

375. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 162.

376. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 168.

377. Betti, "The Epistemological Problem of Understanding As an Aspect of the General Problem of Knowing," trans. Susan Noakes, in Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects, eds. Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994), p. 36.

378. Betti, "The Epistemological Problem of Understanding," p. 32

379. Betti, "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 173.

380. Ibid.

381. E. D. Hirsch Jr., Validity In Interpretation (New Haven, Con.: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 8. For Betti’s distinction, see "Hermeneutics as Methodology," pp. 173-174.

382. E. D. Hirsch, "Truth and Method in Interpretation," The Review of Metaphysics 18, no. 3 (1965), pp. 488-507; reprinted as "Appendix II" to Validity in Interpretation, p. 251.

383. Paul Riceour, Hermeneutics and Human Sciences, trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambidge University Press, 1981), p. 47.

384. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, p. 147. See also, Betti, Die Hermeneutik als Allgemeine Methodik des Geisteswissenschaften, p. 41; "Hermeneutics as Methodology," p. 187.

385. E. D. Hirsch Jr., Aims of Interpretation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 49.

386. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, p. 250.

387. Betti makes the same distinction between meaning and significance, Bedeutung and Bedeutsamkeit, Relevanz. See Betti, Die Hermeneutik als Allgemeine Methodik des Geisteswissenschaften, pp. 28-29; "Hermeneutics as Methodology," pp. 173-174.

388. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, p. 44.

389. Ibid., p. 68.

390. Ibid., p. 66.

391. Ibid., p. 254.

392. Ibid., p. 251.

393. Ibid., p. 39.

394. Ibid., p. 39.

395. Ibid., p. 40.

396. Ibid.

397. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

398. Ibid., p. 41.

399. Ibid.

400. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

401. Ibid., p. 75.

402. Ibid., p. 75; cf. p. 40.

403. Ibid., p. 75.

404. Ibid., p. 76.

405. F. D. E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Heidelberg: Karl Winter Universitätverlag, 1959), p. 90; quoted in Hirsch, Aims of Interpretation, p. 76.

406. Hirsch, Aims of Interpretation, pp. 45-46.

407. Ibid., pp. 46-47.

408. Ibid., p. 49.

409. Ibid., p. 48.

410. Ibid., p. 49.

411. Ibid., p. 32.

412. Ibid.

413. BT, 195/SZ 153; See TM, 266/WM, 251; Gadamer, "On the Circle of Understanding," pp. 71-72; and also PHC, 148-149.

414. TM, 267/WM, 252.

415. Hirsch, Aims of Interpretation, p. 33.

416. Hirsch admits that certain points in his early critique were incorrect. "In 1967, I went almost that far when I suggested that we need to put the focus of hermeneutics on the process of validation, since we do not really understand the process of verbal understanding.

I have come to think that such caution is misplaced. The process of validation is not easily separated from the process of understanding in either theory or in practice. The universality of making-matching process and of corrigible schemata in all domains of language and thought suggest that the process of understanding is itself a process of validation." Hirsch, Aims of Interpretation, p. 33 (Italics in the original). Later in his article "Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted," Critical Inquiry 11 (Dec. 1984), pp. 202-225, Hirsch seems to withdraw from his position that the application of the meaning of a text to different situations belongs to the sphere of significance. Instead, he now considers some applications as belonging to the meaning of the text. By acknowledging this he realizes that this shift in his approach brings him closer to Gadamer.

417. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift, introduction to Hermeneutic Tradition ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 21.

418. Jürgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jerry A. Stark (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), p. 172.

419. Dieter Misgeld, "Critical Theory and Hermeneutics: The Debate Between Habermas and Gadamer," in On Critical Theory, ed. J. O’Neill (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), p. 169.

420. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 176.

421. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," trans. Josef Bleicher, in Hermeneutic Tradition, p. 256; Logic of the Social Sciences, p. 174.

422. Habermas, Logic of the Social Sciences, p. 168; Cf. Gadamer, " Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik: Metakritische Erörterungen zu ‘Wahrheit und Methode,’" GW, II, p. 244; "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutic Reflection," PH, 34.

423. Habermas, Logic of the Social Sciences, p. 174.

424. Ibid., p. 174.

425. Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. 135.

426. Ibid., p. 134.

427. Habermas, Logic of the Social Sciences, p. 174.

428. Ibid., p. 167.

429. Ibid., p. 167.

430. TM, Introduction, xxii; the Second English edition of Truth and Method omits the word ‘control’ that appears in the first edition of 1975. The word also appears in the German original: WM, xxv.

431. Habermas, Logic of the Social Sciences, p. 167.

432. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 162-163.

433. Ibid., p. 163.

434. Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," p. 251.

435. Habermas, Logic of the Social Sciences, p. 174.

436. Ibid., p. 174.

437. Habermas, "Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," p. 257.

438. Ibid., p. 263.

439. Habermas, Logic of the Social Sciences, p. 172.

440. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action I, pp. 95-96.

441. Habermas also has the intention of developing a critique of Gadamer’s ontology. His project, he assumes, can be established on such a critique. "The insight that the truth of statements is linked in the last analysis to the intention of the good and true life can be preserved today only on the ruins of ontology." Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 317.

442. Habermas, "Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," p. 268.

443. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, I, p. 138.

444. Habermas, " Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," pp. 186-88; Also see Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 195.

445. Karl-Otto Apel, "Regulative Ideas or Sense-Event? An Attempt to Determine the Logos of Hermeneutics," trans. Dale Snow, in The Question of Hermeneutics: Essays in Honor of Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed. Timothy J. Stapleton (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), p. 54.

446. Apel, "Regulative Ideas," p. 44.

447. Apel, "Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften," in Selected Essays, vol. 1, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1994), p. 2.

448. Apel, Selected Essays, p. xiv.

449. Eduardo Mendieta, intorducton to Selected Essays by Karl-Otto Apel, p. xiv

450. Mendieta, intorducton to Selected Essays, p. xiv; cf. Apel, "Regulative Ideas," pp. 45, 57.

451. Apel, Selected Essays, Preface, p. ix

452. Karl-Otto Apel, Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. Glyn Adey and Davis Frisby (London: Routlegde and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 62.

453. Ibid., pp. 62-63.

454. Apel, Transformation of Philosophy, p. 63.

455. Ibid.

456. Ibid.

457. Apel, Transformation of Philosophy, p. 62

458. Apel, "Regulative Ideas," p. 38.

459. Ibid., p. 38.

460. Ibid., p. 38.

461. Ibid., p. 41.

462. Apel, Transformation of Philosophy, p. 63.

463. Apel, Selected Essays, p. 65.

464. Apel, "Regulative Ideas," p. 47.

465. Apel, Selected Essays, p. 56; the original translation is "melting of horizon."

466. Apel, Selected Essays, p. 56.

467. Ibid.

468. Ibid.

469. Apel, "Regulative Ideas," p. 41.

470. Ibid.

471. Ibid., p. 42.

472. Apel, "Regulative Ideas," p. 42; cf. Gail Soffer, "Gadamer, Hermeneutics and Objectivity in Interpretation," Praxis International 12, no. 3 (1992), p. 235.

473. Apel, "Regulative Ideas," pp. 42-43.

474. Ibid., p. 43.

475. Apel quotes Gadamer’s argument that skepticism and relativism can be raised against his position only as formal arguments in Truth and Method (TM, 344/WM, 327). Cf. "Regulative Ideas," p. 43.

476. Apel, "Regulative Ideas," p. 43.

477. Ibid., p. 43.

478. Ibid., p. 44.

479. Ibid., p. 45.

480. Apel, Selected Essays, p. 60.

481. Apel, Transformation of Philosophy, p. 134, note 79.

482. Ibid., p. 124.

483. Ibid., p. 116.

484. Apel, Selected Essays, p. 60.

485. Ibid., p. 61.

486. Apel, Transformation of Philosophy, p. 63

487. Apel, "Regulative Ideas," p. 47.

488. Jean Grondin, Hermeneutische Wahrheit? Zum Wahrheitsbegriff Hans-Georg Gadamers (Königstein: Forum Academicum, 1982), p. 176. Cf. also Grondin, "Hermeneutic Truth and its Historical Presuppositions: A Possible Bridge between Analysis and Hermeneutics," in Anti-Foundationalism and Practical Reasoning, ed. Evan Simpson (Edmonton, Alberta: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1987), pp. 45-58.

489. Grondin, Hermeneutische Wahrheit, 176

490. Ibid., p. 178

491. Ibid., p. 179.

492. Ibid.,, Hermeneutische Wahrheit, p. 192.

493. David Hoy, Critical Circle, pp. 69-70.

494. Hoy, Critical Circle, p. 115.

495. Rüdiger Bubner, "On the Role of Hermeneutics in Philosophy of Science: A Contribution to a Discussion," in Essays in Hermeneutics and Critical Theory, trans. Eric Matthews (New York: Colombia University Press, 1988), p. 111.

496. Bubner, "Hermeneutics in Philosophy of Science?" p. 100.

497. Ibid.

498. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action I, p. 135.

499. Bubner, "Hermeneutics in Philosophy of Science?" p. 100.

500. Emerich Coreth, "From Metaphysics to Hermeneutics," International Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1971), p. 250.

501. Coreth, "From Metaphysics to Hermeneutics," p. 254.

502. Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem," PH, 11.

503. TM, xxxi/WM, xvii.

504. TM, 512/WM, 483-484.

505. Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 34-35.

506. Theodore Kisiel, "Happening of Tradition: The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Heidegger," in Hermeneutics and Praxis, ed. Robert Hollinger (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1985), p. 4.

507. TM, 511/WM, 482.

508. TM, 511-512/WM, 483.

509. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 1, Hermeneutic I: Wahrheit und Methode (5th ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1986), p. 304, note 228; cf. TM, 298, note 228.

510. PHC, 105.

511. Gadamer, "Replik," in Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik, ed. Karl-Otto Apel et. al. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), p. 299; reprinted in GW, II; English translation "Reply to my Critics," trans. George H. Lenier in The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur, eds. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 283

512. Gadamer, "Replik," p. 300: "Die hermeneutische Reflexion ist darauf beschränkt, Erkenntnischancen offenzulegen, die ohne sie nicht wahrgenommen würden. Sie vermittelt nicht selbst ein Wahrheitskriterium." Cf. "Reply to my Critics," p. 284

513. Gadamer, "Replik," p. 299; "Reply to my Critics," p. 283.

514. Gadamer, "Replik," p. 311; "Reply to My Critics," p. 293.

515. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of the Hermeneutic Reflection," PH, 25.

516. Ibid., PH, 35.

517. Gadamer, "Hermeneutics and Social Sciences," Cultural Hermeneutics 2 ( 1975), p. 315.

518. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of the Hermeneutic Reflection," PH, 34.

519. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of the Hermeneutic Reflection," PH, 36.

520. PHC, 106.

521. PHC, 107.

522. PHC, 108.

523. PHC, 108.

524. PHC, 109.

525. Gadamer, "Replik," p. 300; "Reply to my Critics," p. 284.

526. TM, 279/WM, 263-264.

527. Gadamer, "Reply to My Critics," p. 290.

528. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of the Hermeneutic Reflection," PH, 19.

529. TM, 530/WM, 501.

530. TM, 533-534/WM, 504-505.

531. TM, 535/WM, 505.

532. TM, 530/WM, 501.

533. TM, xxiii/WM, xxvii.

534. TM, 250-254/WM, 236-240.

535. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of the Hermeneutic Reflection," PH, 26.

536. Ibid., PH, 36.

537. Gadamer, "Phenomenological Movement," PH, 172.

538. Gadamer, "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, 93.

539. Gadamer, "The Heritage of Hegel," RAS, 52.

540. Ibid., RAS, 52.

541. Ibid., RAS, 48.

542. Ibid., RAS, 49.

543. Ibid.

544. Ibid., RAS, 51.

545. Apel, "Regulative Ideas," p. 55.

546. Apel, Transformation of Philosophy, p. 64.

547. TM, 448/WM, 424.

548. TM, xxxiv/WM, xx.

549. Gadamer, "The Heritage of Hegel," RAS, 49.

550. TM, 389/WM, 366-367.

551. TM, 443/WM, 419.

552. Apel, "Regulative Ideas," p. 56-57; Transformation of Philosophy, p. 110.

553. TM, 442-443/WM, 419.

554. TM, 443/WM, 419.

555. TM, 443/WM, 419.

556. BT, 194/SZ, 153ff.

557. TM, 467/WM, 442.

558. TM, 389/WM, 367.

559. TM, 457/WM, 433.

560. James Bradley, "Gadamer’s ‘Truth and Method’: Some Questions and English Applications," The Heytrop Journal 18, no. (1977), p. 443.

561. Gadamer, "To What Extend Does Language Perform Thought," in TM, 547.

562. Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History," in Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy, p. 131. Cf. Bradley, " Gadamer’s ‘Truth and Method,’" pp. 433-434.

563. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History," pp. 128-129.

564. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History," p. 123.

565. TM, 468/WM, 443-444.

566. TM, 389-395/WM, 367-374.

567. TM, 457/WM, 433.

568. TM, 458/WM, 434.

569. TM, 458/WM, 434.

570. Gadamer, "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, 88.

571. Ibid.

572. Ibid.

573. Ibid.

574. "Die hermeneutische Analyse aber vermag zu zeigen, das solche Gelegentlichkeit das Wesen des Sprechens selbst ausmacht." See, Gadamer, "Semantik und Hermeneutik," GW, II, p. 179; cf. "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, p. 88, where the key phrase "Gelegentlichkeit" is translated as "relativity to situation."

575. Gadamer, "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, 88-89.

576. Ibid., PH, 90.

577. Ibid., PH, 90.

578. TM, 294, note 224/WM, 278-279, note 2; Gadamer, "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, 90.

579. Gadamer, "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, 91.

580. "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, 91; "Semantik und Hermeneutik," GW, II, p. 181.

581. "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, 91; "Semantik und Hermeneutik," GW, II, p. 181.

582. "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, 91-92.

583. "Die eine ist die stillschweigende Inanspruchnahme von vorurteilen." See, "Semantik und Hermenutik" GW, II, p. 181. Again, the English translation of this sentence is misleading. "One is an unstated reliance on prejudices." See "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, 92. We have seen the difference between concealment in language and concealment through language. The concealment through language can be conscious or unconscious. Prejudices considered in this sense do not belong to subjective consciousness, but it is the duty of the interpreter to bring them to consciousness, and to put them in risk.

584. "Semantik und Hermeneutik," GW, II, p. 181; "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, 92.

585. "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, 92.

586. TM, 474/WM, 450.

587.. "Semantics and Hermeneutics," PH, 103.

588. Ibid.

589. Ibid., PH, 103-104.

590. "The Heritage of Hegel," RAS, 51.

591. Grondin, Hermeneutische Wahrheit, p. 94.

592. Gadamer, "Theory or Philosophy of Science," RAS, 166. Also "Sprache und Verstehen," Zeitwende 41 (1970), pp. 349-57; "Wieweit schreibt Sprache das Denken vor?" Zeitwende 44 (1973), pp. 289-96. These articles are shorter versions of the theme of language developed in TM, 383-491/WM, pp. 361-465.

593. TM, 68, 99/WM, 64, 95.

594. Gadamer, "The Continuity of History and the Existential Moment," Philosophy Today 16 (Fall 1971), p. 232.

595. Ibid.

596. Gadamer, "The Western View of the Inner Experience of Time and the Limits of Thought" in Time and Philosophies (Paris: UNESCO, 1977), p. 33.

597. Gadamer, "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time," Southern Journal of Philosophy 8 (Winter 1970), p. 343.

598. Ibid., pp. 342-344.

599. Gadamer, "The Western View of the Inner Experience of Time," p. 41.

600. "The Continuity of History," p. 233.

601. Ibid.

602. "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time," p. 349.

603. "The Continuity of History," p. 233.

604. TM, 284-285/WM, 269.

605. "The Continuity of History," p. 233.

606. Ibid., p. 236. Cf. "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time," p. 348.

607. "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time," p. 348.

608. Ibid.

609. Ibid.

610. Ibid., p. 349.

611. Goethe, Geschichte der Farbenlehre, xxxix, 4, 61; quoted in Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, trans. David Green (New York: Colombia University Press, 1964), p. 230.