NOTES
1. Gayle L. Ormiaton, and Alan D. Schrift, editors. The Her-meneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 14. Hereafter HT.
2. Hans-George Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). p. 187. Hereafter TM.
3. TM, p. 188.
4. Although Schleiermacher believes that the sacred books of the Holy Spirit finally must not be dealt with differently than others, the question remains that if the books of the Holy Spirit are not different from the others regarding to the actuality of interpretation, nonetheless, since they represent the different callings of the source of being to itself, in this respect they are different from the others.
5. TM, p. 192.
6. TM., p. 192.
7. Rothacker believes relativism does not endanger the immanent "objectivity" of research. Its starting point is the varia-bility and freedom of scientific inquiries, which develop from the variable ways in which the lived world creates significance. From this point of view, modern science itself is seen as the dogmatic of a quantifying world view. This might be the reason why Gadamer con-siders Betti’s remarks to be a "naive misunderstanding" that her-meneutical reflections practiced by Gadamer will mean a weakening of scientific objectivity. (TM, p. 556.)
8. Joseph Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 30. Hereafter CH.
9. CH, p. 47.
10. CH, p. 36.
11. HT, p. 101.
12. "Gadamer has rightly linked science with method -- a development originating with Galileo -- and its introduction into the hermeneutical process can only lead to the objectification of the `object’ and the subject’s mastery over it." (CH, p. 125).
13. HT, p. 161.
14. HT, p. 161.
15. CH, p. 28.
16. HT, p. 162
17. HT, p. 162.
18. HT, p. 163.
19. HT, p. 163.
20. HT, p. 164.
21. HT, p. 160.
22. HT, p. 164.
23. TM, p. 511.
24. HT, p. 177.
25. CH, p. 38.
26. TM, p. 264.
27. HT, p. 94.
28. HT, p. 19. However, we must know that Gadamer ap-plauds Betti for attempting a hermeneutics of justice and history, characterizing him as a "legal historian whose hermeneutics pro-vides an account of the hermeneutica manifesto which is remarkable for the breadth of its horizon in which he was safe from the "dangers of a naive historical objectivism". Gadamer describes him as being in a position "to reap the great harvest of hermeneutical reflection that has ripened over the years since Wilhelm von Humboldt and Schleiermacher". TM, p. 511.
29. TM, p. 311.
30. HT, p. 21.
31. TM, p. 101.
32. TM, p. 102.
33. TM, p. 475.
34. On the Truth of Being, p. 54.
35. CH, p. 230.
36. HT, p. 24.
37. There is a rigid distinction between the universality of hermeneutics which is more likely a characteristic of hermeneutics as such and the hermeneutic universe which embraces all human understandings.
38. Based on this, Dilthey ultimately conceives inquiring into the historical past as deciphering and not as historical experience (Erfahrung). This idea, however, has important significance in our understanding of the text as being what to be ciphered and unveiled in and through interpretation. See: TM, p. 241.
39. TM, p. 249.
40. Hans-George Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 48. Hereafter PH.
41. TM, p. 327.
42. TM, p. 328.
43. CH, p. 127.
44. TM, p. 42.
45. TM, p. 34. Based on Gadamer’s interpretation of Kant’s aesthetic judgement as not made according to concepts which the aesthetic taste implies universal agreement even if it is sensory and not conceptual. Although Gadamer here agrees with the possibility of judgment of aesthetic taste, yet he is silent analyzing how the mere task of hermeneutics is carried by this judgment itself.
46. TM, p. 38.
47. TM, p. 38.
48. TM, p. 32.
49. TM, p. 38.
50. TM, p. 17.
51. TM, p. 11.
52. TM, p. 17.
53. Umberto Ecco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation. Edited by Stefan Collini (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1990), p. 65.
54. TM, p. XXXV.
55. TM, p. 474.
56. TM, p. 475.
57. This ontological universality of understanding means for him the futurality of Dasein. However, for Gadamer, claiming to be more in company with Nietzsche, this universal determination limits the position of the philosopher in drawing radical inferences from every thing and in knowing it all. (TM, p. xxxviii.)
58. TM, p. 299. Gadamer refers to this as "history of effect".
59. TM, p. 228. We saw that Dilthey did not break through to the full consequence of this insight, even if it is in his wake that the consequences are drawn.
60. TM, p. 327.
61. An historian he approaches the historical object in order to determine its historical value, whereas the jurist, in addition, applies what has been learned in this way to the legal present. (TM, p. 326.)
62. TM, p. 326.
63. TM, p. 557. Aristotle, earlier had gone, so far as to claim that the Platonic idea of the good is vacuous, and rightly so, if we have to think of the good as a being of the highest universality.
64. Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: from Nietzsche to Nancy, p. 84.
65. Ibid., p. 84. On the grounds of Schleiermacher’s concept of language constitution, later more developed by Nietzsche, stands the assumption that no historically invariable categories prescribe the rule of the relation of language to objects. (Ibid., p. 199.)
66. Ibid., p. 194.
67. Ibid., pp. 180-181. Here, in the line of Schleiermacher, it must be considered that in order to have a fair explanation which cannot be inscribed in the body of rules of any language community, we need an effort of the divinatory faculty.
68. CH, p. 29. This is true even though they are a priori in so far as they exist on the epistemological level prior to these con-structs and provide their transcendental justification.
69. Ibid., p. 123.
70. TM, p. 339.
71. Ibid., p. 5.
72. Ibid., p. xxxii.
73. Ibid., p. 264.
74. Ibid., p. 396.
75. Ibid., p. 301.
76. Ibid., p. 302.
77. Ibid., p. 303.
78. Ibid., p. 199.
79. Ibid., p. 199.
80. Ibid., p. 199.
81. Ibid., p. 335.
82. Ibid., p. 516.
83. Ibid., p. 516. For the hermeneutic philosopher, after all, the contrast between historical and dogmatic method does not carry an absolute validity. (Ibid., p. xxxiii.)
84. Ibid., p. 261.
85. Ibid., p. 262.
86. Ibid., p. 264. Gadamer comes to this conclusion, since the structure of Dasein is thrown, a projection, indicating that in reali-zing its own being, Dasein understanding must also be true of the act of understanding in the human sciences.
87. Ibid., pp. 296-297.
88. Ibid., p. 244.
89. Ibid., p. 299.
90. Ibid., p. 388.
91. Ibid., p. 388.
92. Gadamer claims to have formulated his universal herme-neutics on the basis of the concept of language not only in order to guard against a false methodology that infects the concept of objec-tivity in the human sciences, but also to avoid the idealistic spiritua-lism of a Hegelian metaphysics of infinity. (Ibid., p. 475.)
93. Ibid., p. 295.
94. Ernest Lepore, Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, U.K.: MacLaughlin, 1988), p. 16.
95. TM, p. 309.
96. Ibid., p. xxviii.
97. Ibid., p. 309.
98. Transforming the Hermeneutic Context, editors’ intro-duction, p. 38.
99. PH, p. 122.
100. Ibid., p. 51. It must be mentioned that this moment of "loss of itself" relevant to the theological hermeneutics.
101. TM, p. 43.
102. Ibid., p. 267.
103. Sein und Zeit, s. 153.
104. PH, p. 9.
105. Ibid., p. 9.
106. TM, p. 5.
107. Ibid., p. 295.
108. Ibid., p. 31.
109. Ibid., p. 299.
110. Ibid., p. 31.
111. As he says this concept does not necessarily mean a false judgment, but part of the idea is that it can have either a positive or a negative value. Ibid., p. 270.
112. Hans-George Gadamer, Wahrheit und Method (Tübin-gen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1985), s. 261.
113. TM, p. 270.
114. Refer to: ibid., p. 245.
115. Charles E. Reagan and David Stwart, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work (Boston: Bacon Press, 1978), p. 46.
116. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, p. 46. It is also impor-tant to note that saying Being speaks to us in its realm is not contrary to Being judges. In fact this realm belongs to the judgment itself while in providing understanding it is free of it.
117. Werner G. Jeanrond, Text and Interpretation as Cate-gories of Theological Thinking, trans. Thomas J. Wilson (New York: Crossroad, 1988), p. 23.
118. This fact that one can never depart too far from conver-sation is also regarded essential for a language itself.
119. Transforming the Hermeneutical Context, p. 161.
120. Hans-George Gadamer, Philosophical Apprenticeships (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, c1985), p. 179.
121. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, p. 90.
122. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 5.
123. PH, p. xxxv.
124. Frank, "Interpretation of a Text". Transforming the Hermeneutical Context, p. 161.
125. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, p. 44. It must be mentioned that for Ricoeur the theory of the text and that of meta-phor enjoy a common ground. Based on this limited notion of the text, we need some explanations in order to interpret the text as the source of hermeneutics as being. See: ibid., p. 135.
126. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, p. 45.
127. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), p. 56.
128. Ibid., p. 57.
129. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Sharing Voices". Transforming the Hermeneutic Context, pp. 211-259.
130. Ibid., p. 223. It must mentioned that Nancy comes to this conclusion that this ontological anticipation is anterior to all anti-cipation as "pre-judgment" of meaning.
131. Ibid., pp. 231-232.
132. Ibid., p. 231.
133. Hans-George Gadamer, "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time" in Southern Journal of Philosophy, 8 (winter 1970), 352-353.
134. Ibid., p. 353.
135. Philosophical Apprenticeships, p. 190.
136. Text and Interpretation, p. 15.
137. TM, pp. 560-578.
138. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
139. PH, p. 6.
140. Ibid., P. 11.
141. TM, p. 256.
142. Ibid., p. 256.
143. PH, p. 154. Thus, based on this concept of phenomeno-logy, the stratification can be grounded by ascertaining the shifts of intention.
144. Suzanne Bachelard, A Study of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1968), p. 147.
145. PH, p. 161.
146. Edmund Ideas, trans., W. Kluback and J.T. Wilde (New York: Twayne, 1958), p. 52. "Objects about which" or "objects con-cerning which" are those which are judged about and must not regarded alone as the way of given being. But "objects about which" are part of the content of the judgment qua content (the other part refers to "judged content of the judgment as such").
147. Ibid., p. 52.
148. Ibid., p. 251.
149. Ibid., p. 251. There is an ambiguity in distinguishing ‘objects concerning which’ as the matters judged about, from the judged content of the judgment. It can be said that ‘reference to which’ be possible taken as ‘what judged about’.
150. PH, p. 169.
151. Ibid., p. 169.
152. TM, p. 255.
153. Ibid., p. 254.
154. PH, p. 149.
155. Ibid., p. 149.
156. CH, p. 219.
157. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harbes and Row, 1992), p. 58. Here-after BT.
158. Ibid., p. 47.
159. PH, p. 73.
160. BT, p. 59.
161. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
162. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
163. Ibid., p. 51.
164. Ibid., p. 58.
165. One of these objections is that, "the ideal of scientificity encounters its fundamental limit in the ontological condition of comprehension"(1975, p. 88); this refers to the hermeneutic experi-ence of belonging to zugehörigkeit. Secondly, Husserl’s reference to intuition remains on the level of epistemology and consequently that of Geistes wissenschaften; whereas hermeneutic philosophy, by contrast, has already pointed out the universality of understanding in the figure of the hermeneutic circle. Furthermore, once produced the object of interpretation, the text takes on an autonomous character, so that it is no longer adequate to refer merely to its original meaning; instead of having a fixed meaning, a text invites plural interpretation. It is on this basis an open, unlimited process. In addition, Ricoeur cites the reservation against an ultimate foundation in subjectivity, as the immanence of the cogito, provided by psychology and the critique of ideology. Since hermeneutics has to aim for the subject-matter of a text which projects a world, and not for the psychology of the other, the implication for Husserl’s conception is that phenomenology, which was born with the discovery of the universal character of intentionality, has not re-mained faithful to its own discovery, namely that consciousness does not have its meaning beyond itself. The idealist theory of the constitution of meaning has thus "hypostatized subjectivity", (1975, p. 94). See: Nancy, "Sharing Voices", Transforming the Herme-neutic Context, p. 221.
166. L. Lawlor. "The Dialectical Unity of Hermeneutics: On Ricoeur and Gadamer". Gadamer and Hermeneutic, ed. Hugh J. Silverman (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1991), p. 80.
167. G.E. Aylesworth. "Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Con-fronting Gadamer and Ricoeur". Ibid., p. 80.
168. TM, p. 105.
169. PH, p. 159.
170. Ibid., pp. 159-160.
171. Ibid., p. 136.
172. Ibid., p. 143.
173. Edmund Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology; an introduction to phenomenological philosophy. Translated, with an introduction, by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 188.
174. PH, p. 153.
175. TM, p. xxxvi.
176. Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 23.
177. TM, p. 258.
178. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 21.
179. Ibid., p. 21.
180. Ibid., p. 20.
181. PH, p. 131. However, the hermeneutics must still be grounded on the basis of phenomenology so that by stepping behind Husserl’s phenomenology Heidegger’s fundamental question leads Gadamer to believe such hermeneutical phenomena as bearing their meaning within themselves, rather than from a single principle.
182. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 162.
183. PH, p. 161.
184. TM, p. xxviii.
185. Ibid., p. xxi.
186. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 114.
187. TM, p. xxii.
188. Hans-George Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation" from Dialogue and Deconstruction, the Gadamer-Derrida Encounter. Edited by Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 22.
189. TM, p. XXIX.
190. Ibid., p. XXIX.
191. As Gadamer pointed out, this does not mean to deny the necessity of methodical work within the human sciences. (Ibid., p. xxix.)
192. Ibid., p. 365.
193. Hans-George Gadamer, "Gadamer on Gadamer", Gada-mer and Hermeneutics, p. 19.
194. Ibid., p. 19.
195. Philosophical Apprenticeship, pp. 178-179.
196. Text and Interpretation, p. 12.
197. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 112.
198. Text and Interpretation, p. 12.
199. Philosophical Apprenticeships, p. 178. The hermeneutical question may seem ‘paradoxical’ both due to Heidegger’s criti-cism of transcendental inquiry and his "turn" (die Kehre) and on the basis of Gadamer treatment of the universal hermeneutic problem, which will be pointed out later. (TM, p. XXXVI.)
200. PH, p. 27.
201. Ibid., p. 38.
202. TM, p. XXXVIII.
203. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 43.
204. Text and Interpretation, p. 14.
205. PH, p. 47.
206. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 48.
207. Hermeneutical Philosophy, p. 71. The doctrine of the thing-in-itself could mean the possibility of a continuous transition from one aspect of a thing to another which would make possible a unified matrix of our experience. Therefore, Husserl’s idea of the thing-in-itself, must be understood in terms of the hermeneutical procedure of our knowledge, whose ultimate dominion lies in scien-tific investigation. (Ibid, p. 73.)
208. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 44.
209. TM, p. 269.
210. "Toute la phenomenology est une explicitation dans l’evidence et une evidence de l’explicitation." Paul Ricoeur, "Phenomenologie et Hermeneutique," in Man and World (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), volume 7, p. 252.
211. Jervolino Domenico. The Cogito and Hermeneutics: The Question of the Subject in Ricoeur, translated by Gordon Poole (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), pp. 100-101. And also "Phenomenologie et hermeneutique", pp. 251-252.
212. "Text and Interpretation", p. 30.
213. The Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 98.
214. Ibid., p. 93.
215. Ibid., p. 93.
216. Ibid., p. 10.
217. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, p. 44.
218. Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 87: "D’une part . . . la phé-noménologie reste l’indépassable présupposition de l’hermé-neutique. D’autre part, la phenoménologie ne peut se constituer elle-même sans une présupposition herméneutique."
219. Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 89.
220. Ibid., p. 22. By reflection we mean a renewed philosophy of the cogito in which the subject which interprets himself, while interpreting signs, discovers himself.
221. Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Translated by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-versity Press, 1982), p. 21.
222. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, p. 232.
223. Text and Interpretation, p. 51. As a result of this, a theo-logical theory of textual interpretation can take exception neither to the idea of participation in the contemporary controversy regarding adequate theories of interpretation, nor to the concern regarding the acquisition of an adequate theory of textuality. (Ibid., p. 73).
224. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, p. 215.
225. Text and Interpretation, p. 58. In the next chapter we will discuss this non-temporal hermeneutical object.
226. CH, p. 219.
227. Joseph Kockelmans, edit. Phenomenology, the Philoso-phy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1966), p. 535.
228. Ibid., pp. 535-536.
229. In comparison we must say that a hermeneutical question can be formulated based on the ego, which is similar to the thing in itself presupposed by being as Dasein, can be taken clearly as a source of hermeneutics. Interpreting Leibnitz, Heidegger holds that the subject which poses for itself the problem of being can put itself into question. Therefore, the subject can take itself as paradigmatic in as much as it provides, as itself a being, the idea of being as such. Hence, the subject can consider itself as that which understands being.
230. BT, p. 49.
231. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 19.
232. Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic. Translated by Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-sity Press, 1984), p. 217. Understanding-of-being and its essential basic modes is the disclosure that resides in the ecstatic unity of tem-porality as we will explain in following chapter.
233. Ibid., p. 217.
234. Reason in the Age of Sciences, p. 63.
235. TM, Introduction, p. XXV.
236. Text and Interpretation, p. 10.
237. Gadamer, like Heidegger, insists that, even if we could, we should not at all want to change the fact that unacknowledged presuppositions are always at work in our understanding at (Reason in the Age of Science, p. 111.). Thus, there is no presuppositionless understanding as Husserl’s phenomenology suggests.
238. PH, p. 13.
239. Reason in the Age of Sciences, p. 105.
240. Ibid., p. 135. As a result, therefore, the experience of interpretation implies something not implied by Schleiemachere sense of self-understanding.
241. Ibid., p. 93.
242. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, p. 216.
243. Philosophical Apprenticeships, pp. 186-187.
244. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 19.
245. For Derrida, this is the épistéme functioning within a system of fundamental constraints and conceptual oppositions out-side of which philosophy is not practicable. (Jacques Derrida, Posi-tions. Translated by Alan Bass [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981], p. 6).
246. BT, p. 194.
247. PH, editor’s introduction, p. xix.
248. Jacques Derrida, Dissemination. Trans. Barbara John-son (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 123. Derrida refers to Socrates in the Crito when he urges Cebes and Simmias to practice philosophic dialogue and seek its most worthy object that is the truth of the eidos is identical to itself.
Henceforth as Derrida says it is always the same as itself and hence simple, incomposite, undecomposable, invariable. The idos is that which can always be repeated as the same. That ideality of idos is its power-to-be-repeated. The law, therefor, is the law of repeti-tion and repetition is always submission to a law.
This fundamental manner of hermeneutics, aimed at by Derrida, determines it as textual study. The textual study here is not demytholization, rather it is assimilation of the philosophy of the text and the myth of the text. Whether we should call such herme-neutics a mythical philosophy of the text or the philosophical mythic of writing is still an opened question. The new concept leads to a realm of analysis within the literary text, unites shadows that can not be included within philosophical opposition, but resist and discon-struct it without ever constituting a third term as an outcome or spe-culative solution. Derrida explains that :
The pharmakon is neither remedy nor poison, nei-ther good nor evil, neither the inside nor the outside, neither speech nor writing; the supplement is neither a plus nor a minus, neither an outside nor the com-plement of an inside, neither accident nor essence, etc.; the homan is neither confusion nor distinction, neither identity nor difference, neither consummation nor virginity, neither the veil nor unveiling, neither the inside nor the outside, etc.; the gram is neither a signifier nor a signified, neither a sign nor a thing, neither a presence nor an absence, neither a position nor a negation, etc.; spacing is neither space nor time; . . . Neither/nor, that is simul-taneously either or; the mark is also the marginal, limit, the march, etc. (Positions, p. 43).
However, this implies that interpretation or thought means nothing, it remains unresolved whether hermeneutics or philosophy in general can be a representation of nothing. Perhaps, we must distinguish here hermeneutics from interpretation or interpretating of, from the mere interpretation or thought itself. For Derrida mere interpretation is to be the substantified void of a derivative ideality, that is, the reflection of a différance of forces, the illusory autonomy of a discourse or a consciousness whose hypostasis is to be decon-structed (Positions, p. 49).
Nonetheless, even assuming the distinction mentioned, as between the text and the interpretation or the thought of it, it does not seem to show how the hermeneutics of a text becomes possible outside of philosophy. It is clear that no hermeneutical text (either philosophical or literary) can simply step outside an historio-meta-physical framework (Rapaport, Herman. Heidegger and Derrida, Reflections on Time and Language, [Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, c 1989], pp. 33-34.); it is not sufficiently argued why des-truction or deconstruction, in terms of the end of a historico meta-physical temporal structure or a going beyond metaphysics, is not to be prophesized.
249. The following hermeneutical sense of time can be corre-lated also with Kant’s doctrine of time as something invisible which cannot appear in any experience, but is only presupposed as the condition of human experience. Hermeneutic time does not isolate each proper time, but grounds a temporal phenomenology free of all obligations to temporal objectivity.
250. On the Truth of Being, p. 40.
251. CH, p. 122.
252. TM, p. 338.
253. Ibid., p. 14.
254. Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation, ed. John B. Thom-pson (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 61.
255. The Concept of Time, p. 20E. But, it follows that, philo-sophy as regards this possibility does not discover too much, since it will never get to the root of what history is so long as its method is to analyze history as an object of contemplation.
256. Deborah Cook. "Rereading Gadamer: A Response to James Risser", Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 107.
257. G.E. Aylesworth. "Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Con-cerning Gadamer and Ricoeur", ibid., p. 78.
258. Ibid., p. 79. Based upon this character of the world, the analogue of eternity is the emanation of the word, the process through which one word emerges from another.
259. TM, p. 198.
260. Reflection & Imagination, pp. 345-346.
261. As Ricoeur says, in an historical perspective of time, we no longer have to say that past is something over and done, but rather, it is something that has been and because of this is now preserved in the present. Thus the historian as such asks not about the ontological status of the trace. Historical science in this sense is limited to the epistemological problem of inference. (Reflection & Imagination, p. 345.)
262. Aylesworth, Gary E. "Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Con-fronting Gadamer and Ricoeur". Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 78.
263. Ibid., p. 74.
264. Leonard Lawlor. "The Dialectical Unity of Hermeneutics: On Ricoeur and Gadamer", Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 81.
265. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 40.
266. PH, p. xvi.
267. Hans-George Gadamer, "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time" of Southern Journal of Philosophy, 8 (winter 1970), p. 346.
268. G.E. Aylesworth. "Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Concerning Gadamer and Ricoeur", Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 75.
269. Hans-George Gadamer, "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time", p. 350.
270. Ibid., p. 351.
271. The History of the Concept of Time, p. 14E.
272. "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time", p. 345.
273. G.E. Aylesworth, p. 76.
274. "Concerning Empty and Fulfilled Time", p. 343.
275. Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 192.
276. The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, p. 274.
277. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 62.
278. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 87.
279. According to Heidegger the interpretation of temporality leads to a more radical understanding of time. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 16.
280. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
281. "Concerning Empty and Fulfilled Time", P. 345. Gada-mer says that Dasein is not the only reality that has a temporal structure.
282. Reflection & Imagination, p. 102. In Ricoeur’s explana-tion of the Heideggerian ambiguous concept of time, this reckoning with time becomes Dart of the characteristic of care as mundane concern.
283. Deborah Cook. "Rereading Gadamer: A Response to James Risser", Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 114.
284. Positions, p. 54.
285. Blanchot, When the Time Comes, p. 71. Trans. Lydia Davis (Barry Town, N.Y.: Station Hill Press, 1985). This poetic turn also is provided by Ricoeur in his serial works, Time and Nar-rative, where he tries to address in what way the ordinary experience of time transforms by coming to narrative interpretation. The apore-tic of time has not been in vain because of its openness to the justification of the concept of historical time. Historical time, in its turn, is justified in the sense that it brings about the conjunction of lived time as mortal and cosmic times. Therefore, we must begin to give a poetic response, the response of poiesis, to the aporetic of time (Reflection & Imagination, p. 346).
286. Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic. Translated by Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-sity Press, 1984), p. 210.
287. "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time", p. 341.
288. The History of The Concept of Time, p. 2E.
289. PH, p. 9.
290. The History of the Concept of Time, p. 19E.
291. Ibid., p. 13E. Heidegger explains, interestingly, that Kant inevitably determines the fundamental principle of his ethics in such a way that we call it formal. Kant must have known, perhaps from familiarity with Dasein itself, that Dasein is its ‘how’. It was left to contemporary thinkers to define Dasein in such a way that the ‘how’ is covered up.
292. Wesley A. Kort, Story, Text, and Scripture (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, c 1988), p. 102.
293. Philosophical Apprenticeships, p. 187.
294. The History of the Concept of Time, p. 7E.
295. Ibid., p. 7E.
296. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 20.
297. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 88.
298. Ideas, p. 91.
299. It is very important for our discussion now to know that for Derrida, in the originary temporalization of the relationship with the outside, nonpresentation or depresentation is as originary as pre-sentation. In this way, the process from the oral to the written text introduces a decisive element into the dialectic between belonging and distanciation. This distinguishes the hermeneutic situation of a text (from the situation of the dialogue.)
300. Gary E. Aylesworth, p. 64.
301. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 146.
302. Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Translated by Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-sity Press, 1984), pp. 209-210.
303. The History of the Concept of Time, pp. 13E-14E.
304. PH, p. 49.
305. On the Truth of Being, p. 59.
306. The Concept of Time, p. 21E
307. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 90.
308. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, pp. 205.
309. Ibid., p. 208.
310. Ibid., p. 208.
311. Ibid., p. 208.
312. Ibid., p. 207.
313. "Concerning Empty and Fulfilled Time", p. 353.
314. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 200.
315. On the Truth of Being, p. 69.
316. Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time. p. 22E. Trans. William McNeill (Blackwell, 1992).
317. Story, Text and Scripture, p. 125.
318. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 135.
319. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
320. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, p. 89; noted from Heidegger and Derrida, pp. 28-29.
321. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 54.
322. Heidegger, What is Philosophy? Trans. W. Kluback and J.T. Wilde (New York: Twayne, 1958), pp. 69-71. Unlike Heide-gger, Derrida sees the history of Being only as a trace structure of erasures and of facements. The history of ontology is not a tran-slation of traces or the handing down of textual residues, but an unwriting as whiting out. (Heidegger and Derrida, pp. 58-59.)
323. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 34. There is a return to a beginning in Heidegger’s destruction. This beginning is what was never studie as such and has been skipped over; it is the essence of metaphysics which comes into view only retrogressively to now.
Heidegger showed that there is priority in the concept of time with regard to the wesen. Wesen understood as a verb is the same as (währen) That means to last or endure. Socrates and Plato already think the essence of something as what comes to presence in the sense of what endures. They find what endures permanently in what tenaciously persists throughout what happens. That which remains (währen) they discover in the aspect (Aussehen, eidos, idea). Heidegger tries to stand that enduring is not necessarily based solely on the Platonic ideas or on what Aristotle thinks that any particular thing has always been (to ti en einai). However, based on Heide-gger’s appeal of time, hermeneutics can go further than what meta-physics interpretatively finds as essentia.
324. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, pp. 204-205.
325. Ibid., p. 202.
326. Ibid., p. 202.
327. Ibid., p. 205.
328. PH, p. 121.
329. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 206.
330. Ibid., p. 206.
331. Ibid., p. 198.
332. On the Truth of Being, p. 66.
333. Ibid., p. 86. In the broader discussion of the issue, as the complementary outlines of this work suggests, I shall bring at least two other chapters concerning the relation between the concept of the text and the concept of being as follows:
Chapter 1. The metahermeneutic lage of the text
A) The authentic hermeneutic of the text
B) The ontological and ontical priority of the text
C) Text in ontic and ontological analysis
Chapter 2. The text in letting be itself
A) The theory of the text
B) The text in itself and for itself
C) Authenticity and the signification of the being of the text
D) The Text Being and the textual Dasein
E) The primacy of the textual truth or the true text
334. Philosophical Apprenticeships (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, c1985), p. 187.
335. Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretation (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1974), p. 289.
336. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 121. In "La parole’sacrée’de Hölderlin", Blanchot says that the poet’s existence is given in the adumbration of time by the poem, in the poem’s forecasting of time. The reason the poet foresees is because the poet exists in the future anterior. In arriving or coming the poem precedes the existence of the poet which it anticipate.
337. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 47.
338. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
339. PH, p. 57.
340. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 106.
341. Ibid., p. 107. As Gadamer himself answers, the require-ment of going back to the motivating questions when understanding statements is not an artificial procedure, but, on the contrary, is the normal practice.
342. PH, p. 11.
343. TM, p. 91.
344. In phenomenology of knowledge, there is no inference from sense stimuli, no subsequent synthesis of various stimulus-effects into the unity of a cause or thing which as a construction has no warrant in the phenomena.
345. PH, p. 132.
346. The concept of the unity of the work of art, for Kant, refers to its form in its referring to the structure of the aesthetic object not as opposed to the meaningful content of the work of art but to the purely sensuous attractiveness of the material (TM, p. 92).
347. Ideas, p. 277.
348. Ibid., p. 277.
349. Ibid., p. 337. Husserl tries to explain harmonious unity in separated acts with what mentioned as "same Something".
350. Ibid, p. 337.
351. Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 44.
352. Phenomenology, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation, p. 188.
353. PH, p. 49.
354. Ibid., editor’s introduction, p. xxvi.
355. BT, p. 61.
356. The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 225.
357. Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänome-nologie (Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), pp. 310-311.
358. BT, p. 175.
359. The Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 95.
360. CH, p. 231.
361. PH, p. xxii.
362. Vincent Descombes. "The Interpretative Text", Gada-mer and Hermeneutics, p. 255.
363. "What happens if I find the text of Wordsworth in a bottle and I don’t know when it was written or by whom? I shall look, after having met the word `gay’ to see if the further course of the text supports a sexual interpretation, so to encourage me to believe that `gay’ also conveyed connotations of homosexuality. If so, and it is clearly or at least persuasively so, I can try the hypo-thesis that the text was not written by a romantic poet, but by a contemporary writer -- who was perhaps imitating the style of a romantic poet. In the course of such a complex interaction between my knowledge and the knowledge I impute to the unknown author, I am not speculating about the author’s intentions, but about the text’s intention, or about the intention of that Model Author that I am able to recognize in terms of textual strategy" (Interpretation and Overinterpretation, p. 69).
364. "Over Interpreting Texts", in Interpretation and Overin-terpretation, p. 64. Ecco stresses that there are somewhere criteria for limiting interpretation. (Ibid., p. 40.)
365. Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation", pp. 50-51.
366. TM, pp. 49-50. The fact of Kant’s going beyond disin-terested pleasure not for the sake of art can be indicated to the aesthetical origin of interpretation as text rather than the ideal of beauty.
367. Vincent Descombes, "The Interpretative Text", Gada-mer and Hermeneutics, p. 250.
368. Murray Krieger, Words about Words about Words: Theory, Criticism, and the Literary Text (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, C1988), p. 9. M. Krieger says: "As a result of our myopic commitment to modernity, we may neglect to remember that the notion of the aesthetic -- indeed the very word aesthetic itself as we know it -- is an invention that goes back only to the mideighteen century. With the word aesthetic came a newly defined discipline, and by the time Kant was through with it in his third Critique (the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, to be sharply distinguished from the earlier two Critiques, of Pure Reason and Practical Reason), this activity and the objects associated with it came to be seen as (separate field. What was special) about them was their freedom from the objectives imposed by the scientific pursuit of knowledge (governed by pure reason) or by the moral pursuit of the good (governed by practical reason). Both these latter two, the cognitive and the practical, served and were controlled by interests stemming from outside those activities and directing them, while the aesthetic -- free from any outside interest or purpose -- could be directed only by its own internally generated purposes that thus seem to trap and hold our disinterested contemplation. So an object is aesthetic only to the extent that it avoids leading us toward our worldly concerns and, instead, exploits its own system of internal relations." (Ibid., p. 9.)
369. "Kant’s Architectonic and Hermeneutical Model", Kan-tstudien, Heft 2, 1993.
370. PH, p. 15.
371. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 66.
372. The Conflict of Interpretations, p. xiv.
373. Ideas, p. 337.
374. Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 250.
375. Ibid., p. 259.
376. Ibid., p. 99.
377. "Text and Interpretation" by Gadamer, p. 35. Indeed Gadamer’s idea here shows that his comprehension of the text is incomplete and taken mostly taken from the non-philosophical back-grounds in law or psychology and so on. He holds a methodological apprehension of the text, motivated perhaps by his orientation to-ward a practical understanding of knowledge.
378. James Risser, "Reading The Text", Gadamer and Her-meneutics, p. 101
379. Ibid., p. 102.
380. Ibid., p. 104. Borrowing from Max Weber, Ricoeur asks to what extent meaningful action exhibits the characteristics of a text, i.e., represents objectiviations of meaning which would render it open to scientific investigation. He finds that by analogy to texts, meaningful actions can assume a fixed form, possibly, in the habi-tual patterns of action in which meaning becomes detached from the event, the intention from the consequences of action. (CH, p. 231.)
381. BT, p. 191.
382. Ibid.
383. Vincent Descombes, "The Interpretative Text", Gada-mer and Hermeneutics, p. 258.
384. Ibid.
385. PH, p. 67.
386. Ibid., p. 68.
387. CH, p. 232.
388. The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 7.
389. BT, p. 108.
390. Ibid., p. 110. Heidegger explains that if ‘indicating’ is a sign, it addresses itself to a Being-in-the-world which is specially ‘spatial’. "Signs always indicate primarily ‘wherein’ one lives, where one’s concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something." (Ibid., p. 111.)
391. BT, p. 114.
392. PH, p. 81.
393. The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 234.
394. Gary E. Aylesworth, "Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Con-fronting Gadamer and Ricoeur", Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 76.
395. Based on Bultmann’s theory of hermeneutical principle of translation the word has primacy over against the text (TM, p. 528). As we pointed out the text can not be separated from the word and vice versa: the word is text and the text is word. If the word is first being, therefore, it is the text as far as it occurs in the interpretation.
396. Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 28.
397. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, p. 137. In Ricoeur’s characterization, the text is never isolated from its proper sense. Text is indeed a real source of all sense, and sense without reference is void. Nonetheless, he expresses an important connection between the immanent design of discourse and the problems of interpretation to the dimension of "reference" understood as the power of dis-course to apply to an "extralinguistic reality" about which it says what it says (Ibid., p. 137).
398. TM, p. 72.
399. Text and Interpretation, p. 13.
400. Ibid., p. 44.
401. TM, p. 194.
402. Philosophical Apprenticeships, p. 181.
403. Text and Interpretation, p. 18.
404. The pre-hermeneutic effective historical consciousness must be conceived as revealed by this pre-hermeneutic of talking of the text. The pre-hermeneutic language that can be understood is interpretation.
405. Deborah Cook, " Rereading Gadamer: A Response to James Risser", Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 111. Gadamer develops the concept of the Thou as representing that which in inter-pretation stands over against me, asserts its own rights and requires recognition and in that very process is understood. Although Ga-damer modifies his concept of the Thou, stating that indeed it is the truth of what the Thou says to us that can be understood, yet it is not well explained why we must define this characteristic based on the term Thou rather than of text.
406. Also, for Derrida the idea that a truth can be wrestled from an interpretive reading is rejected. The very notion of otherness needs to be deconstructed. The text produces its own reading and never discloses a historical or non-historical truth (Cook, Deborah. "Rereading Gadamer: A Response to James Risser", Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 113).
407. Story, Text and Scripture, p. 129.
408. TM, p. 192.
409. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 106.
410. Gadamer. "Text and Interpretation", p. 30.
411. Reason in the Age of the Science, p. 107.
412. Philosophical Hermeneutics, introduction, p. xxi.
413. As an example, the educational process constitutes an increasing awareness of the primarily unnaturalness and not ne-cessarily of the many assumptions and beliefs by which our analysis and assumptions are constructed.
414. Gadamer "Text and Interpretation", p. 26.
415. BT, p. 189.
416. Text and Interpretation, p. 12.
417. Gadamer," Text and Interpretation", p. 33. Nonetheless, Gadamer emphasizes the semantic autonomy of the text from which it follows that the meaning of a text constantly transcends the author and as a result of that the exhaustion of its true meaning has to be thought of as an openhanded process. (TM, p. 265.)
418. The notion of the text as raised by the analysis of the ideal link of meaning within the acts of language can be extended in a manner in which a method of explaining the horizontal aspects of the text is regarded primarily, which is to say, the syntactic and semantic elements and relations which go to make up a text. Text and Interpretation, p. 50.
419. Ibid., p. 52.
420. Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 65. Derrida states that only a "blind or grossly insensitive" reading could have believed that Plato is simply condemning the writer’s activity (ibid., p. 67).
421. Text and Interpretation, p. 135.
422. Ibid., Introduction, p. xvii.
423. Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 83.
424. BT, pp. 190-191.
425. Philosophical Apprenticeships, p. 186. Only based on this interpretation can we follow clearly why dialogue is comparable to writing, while one refers to "being" and the other goes back to the "the same". It can be said that as far as concerns to Dasein, both "being" and "the same" are identified in one.
426. Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 79.
427. Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. xxvi.
428. Ibid.
429. BT, p. 192.
430. Ibid., p. 61.
431. Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 61.
432. Ibid., p. 73. Heidegger’s reflection starting from metho-dological hermeneutics is transformed by Ricoeur into a new under-standing of the opposition between ontology and epistemology, be-tween philosophy and the linguistical sciences, (ibid., p. 74).
433. Philosophical Apprenticeships, p. 180.
434. Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation", p. 21.
435. Philosophical Apprenticeships, p. 190.
436. Ibid., p. 191. In other words, philosophy is not to find its object, but rather to construct it. Nonetheless, it seems there is no clear answer to the question of why the language of philosophy constructs itself unmovingly in philosophical systems.
437. James Risser, "Reading The Text", Gadamer and Her-meneutics, p. 102.
438. Ibid.
439. Text and Interpretation, p. 30. By this statement, Gada-mer apparently means that the concept of the text is characterized by presenting itself in connection with interpretation.
440. "Text and Interpretation", p. 33.
441. See: Hans Lipps, Untersuchungen zu einer hermeneu-tischen Logik (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1938), p. 71.
442. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 179.
443. Heidegger’s interpretation of ‘copula’ showed how being has meaning only in our thinking configuration so far as being means this combination in the proposition S is P. Here, by implying or sig-nifying, being expresses the relation itself. "Is" signifies the being of a being and is not itself an existent (present-at-hand) thing. (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 181-182.) It does not signify something present-at-hand which would be present-at-hand itself. It is not a being outside and prior to thought, and not some-thing that stands for itself independently. The sort of a being of this "is" is obscure.
444. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 21. There is a hermeneutical question , based on what is mentioned, whether it is true that being is.
445. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 101.
446. BT, p. 194.
447. "Text and Interpretation", p. 23.
448. The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, p. 18.
449. Ibid. Resulting from this view, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, Heidegger distinguishes his own vision of pheno-menology by stating that the intention of unveiling the assertion has the character of unveiledness.
450. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 99.
451. BT, p. 182.
452. "Text and Interpretation", p. 23.
453. BT, pp. 36-37.
454. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 275.
455. Ibid., 276.
456. Ibid., p. 16.
457. BT, p. 190.
458. BT, p. 190.
459. On the Truth of Being, p. 33 and p. 60. Therefore, lan-guage is the house of Being, in which humans dwell and are destined. Those who do philosophy and those who poetize are the guardians’s of this home. The house is not made by language, but is brought for it.
460. John D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982). Meanwhile, it is important to mention that, Heidegger refers to Being, as having the character of a happening as an event that comes-to-pass, with the word wesen, which is to be taken in a verbal sense. The technical term Ereignis was used by him for the first time in 1946 in order to show the event character of Being. Derrida acknowledges the hermeneutical doctrine of "es gibt" of being in his fundamental understanding of différance. The play of differences supposes syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment that simple element to be present in and of itself. Additionally, it is impossible for an element to function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This can be followed in any monad phoneme or grapheme, being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system. Is that a new concept of writing produced as différance or gram? (position, p. 26). However, this interweaving, or, as Derrida calls it, textile, the text is produced only in the transformation of another text (or texts). For Derrida, nothing among the hermeneutical parts nor within the system is ever simply present or absent. There are only differences and traces of traces. Derrida considers the term "trace" as it comes after the question of presence. Presence for Derrida is far from what is com-monly thought. The trace refers to presence and it is the trace of the trace. In other words, it is the trace of the erasure of the trace. The trace of the trace can not otherwise appear or be named as such, that is, in its presence, but is in the metaphysical order. (Margins of Philosophy, p. 66).
461. Derrida criticizes later Heidegger, claiming that even he shared the fault of forgetting Being since he has not broken through the logocentrism of metaphysics.
462. "Text and Interpretation", p. 24.
463. On the Truth on Being, p. 68.
464. Ibid., p. 35.
465. Ibid., p. 36.
466. "Text and Interpretation", p. 25.
467. Positions, p. 7.
468. Hermeneutical philosophy focuses not on the methodo-logy of the Geisteswissenschaften, but on their relationship to the whole of our experience of the world; by evidencing understanding as a fundamental characteristic of existence it does not intend to restrict the disciplined and skilled understanding of texts, but only expects to be free from a wrong self-understanding (CH, p. 120).
469. "Text and Interpretation", p. 28.
470. Werner G. Jeanrond, Text and Interpretation as Catego-ries of Theological Thinking, Trans. Thomas J. Wilson (New York: Crossroad, 1988), introduction, p. xvii.
471. On the Truth of Being, p. 43.
472. "Text and Interpretation", pp. 70-71.
473. Ibid., p. 46.
474. Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 94.
475. Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 111.
476. Vincent Descombes, "The Interpretative Text", Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 260. Note here the essential ambiguity which exists behind the claim called the "right of interpretation".
477. See and compare: ibid., p. 255.
478. James Risser, " Reading The Text", Gadamer and Her-meneutics, p. 99.
479. It must be remembered that, in Derrida’s eyes, her-meneutics is an attempt to read what is obliterated within it. It in-scribes within the text that which intended to govern it from without. Derrida tries, on the other hand, to respect as much as possible the internal regulated play of philosophemes or epistememes by re-ducing them to the point of their non pertinence, their exhaustion and closure. Deconstructing philosophy therefore means to think the basis of the genealogy of philosophical concepts. It seems that the inside and outside of a text of western philosophy, as a text in Derrida’s view, have the same credit in simultaneously faithful or violent circulation between philosophemes. Nonetheless, this circu-lative movement from within and without, produces a certain textual work that creates a new interpretational realm. The textual work, interested in itself, also enables us to read philosophemes and conse-quently all other texts of culture as kinds of symptoms of something that could not be presented in the history of philosophy (Positions, pp. 67). But what might be after a total deconstruction of a text is over, Derrida thinks that deconstruction is not interested in it. No event could arrive or make itself present (Heidegger and Derrida, p. 144).
480. Vincent Descombes, "The Interpretative Text", Gada-mer and Hermeneutics, p. 256.
481. Ibid., p. 256.
482. Therefore, the textuality of a text is not, as Hugh J. Silverman thinks, both a result from and establishing of the need for a right to interpretation. See: Silverman, Hugh J. "Interpreting The Interpretative Text", ibid., p. 276.
483. On the Truth of Being, p. 58.
484. TM, p. 475.
485. "Text and Interpretation", p. 43.
486. The given is not the result of an interpretation even though it seems that interpretation really performs mediation be-tween man and the world. As Gadamer discovers, even in the domain of the natural sciences, the grounding of scientific knowledge cannot avoid the hermeneutical consequences of the fact that the given cannot be separated from interpretation (Gadamer, "Text and Inter-pretation", p. 30). The fact that the given is not separable while it is not a consequent outcome indicates that to which we were brought earlier: that givenness is the primary characteristic of the text.
487. Deborah Cook, "Rereading Gadamer: A Response To James Risser", Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 113.
488. CH, p. 123.
489. What is Called Thinking, p. 4.
490. Story, Text, and Scripture, p. 110.
491. "Text and Interpretation", p. 23.
492. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, p. 139.
493. Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas University Press, 1976), p. 80.
494. Story, Text, and Scripture, p. 110. For Frege it is starting for truth which in every case implies that we move forward from sense (sinn) to reference (bedutung) from which Ricoeur draws the conclusion that returning to referentiality is the soul of language (langage) itself. (Frege was concerned with logic, whereas Ricoeur holds reference to reality.) That indicates a clear extension away from the truth value of the sentence and to the reality of the text. The reference of the text is the project of a world. But it is not the reader who primarily projects himself; rather he is enlarged in his capacity for self-projection by receiving a new mode of being from the text itself (Text and Interpretation, p. 59).
495. The Bounds of Interpretation, p. 100.
496. What Is Called Thinking? p. 7. Perhaps it is based on this argument that Ecco brings an interesting example: "We have all heard the legend of the Caliph who ordered the destruction of the library of Alexandria, arguing that either the books said the same thing as the Koran, in which case they were superfluous, or else they said something different, in which case they were wrong and harmful. The Caliph knew and possessed the truth and he judged the books on the basis of that truth. Second-century Hermetism, on the other hand, is looking for a truth it does not know, and all it po-ssesses is books. Therefore, it imagines or hopes that each book will contain a spark of truth and that they will serve to confirm each other" (Interpretation and Overinterpretaion, p. 30).
497. PH, p.71.
498. We must remember that the word helps the thing to its Being and keeps it therein. Thus the word is not merely related to the thing. It is that which maintains the thing as thing, that which Heide-gger calls the "relationship" (das Verhältnis). The word is thought of not as a mere reference or relation, but as that which keeps and maintains (das Haltende) in the sense of that which grants (On Heidegger and Language, p. 86).
499. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 146.
500. "Text and Interpretation", p. 48.
501. Ibid.
502. A text, as Derrida states, is not text unless it hides the law of its composition and the rules of its game. A text remains forever imperceptible. In demonstrating that the text hides itself, Derrida considers that in fact the text can never be found in the present, whereas it can be identified by so called perception. This indicates itself that the text can be lost in any perceptive interpretation.
503. Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. xxiv.
504. Ibid., p. xxv.
505. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 122.
506. Ibid., p. 132.
507. Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 84.
508. Ibid.
509. Text and Interpretation, p. 71.
510. BT, p. 188. Heidegger rejects presuppositionless under-standing taken in Husserl’s phenomenology in favor of bringing understanding out of the vicious circle. Therefore, for us, the con-cept of the text can not be considered again in such a phenomeno-logical presupposition, but it can be described within the herme-neutical circle from the text to interpretation and from interpretation to the text.
511. PH, p. lii.
512. "Text and Interpretation", p. 32.
513. PH, p. 50. The turn will be a recognition that it is im-possible to overcome the forgetfulness of being within the frame-work of transcendental reflection.
514. On the Truth of Being, p. 71. In the previous chapter it was pointed out that there is something which grants Being as well as time. This is not noein nor the einai. Is it as finally expressed in Identity and Difference, the Ereignis that lies deeper than Being and Dasein? What is this "it"? In answering this question, Heidegger suggests, we must not think of this "it" as a "power" or a "God".
515. Veronique M. Fóti, Heidegger and the Poets: Poiësis/Sophia/Techne (New Jersy: Humanities Press, 1992), p. 45.
516. Heidegger and the Poets, p. 45.
517. Heidegger and Derrida, p. 121.
518. Philosophical Apprenticeships, p. 192.
519. Ibid., p. 192.
520. PT, editor’s introduction, p. xxxv.
521. For Wittgenstein learning a language is not explanation but training (Blue Book, p. 17).
522. We can say, based on the occurrence of language, that theology tries to read the textual message already talked about.
523. The Conflict of Interpretations, p. xiv.
524. Ibid., p. 288.
525. Ibid.
526. What Is Called Thinking?, p. 10. Based on this impor-tant point, the only way to consolidate the source of the herme-neutics and interpretation of myth, and more generally, is to found its basis upon of the Plato’s philosophy. In Dissemination, Derrida opens his work with the chapter called "Plato’s Pharmacy". He quotes Socrates statement in Phaedras in explaining the mythology of the writing (grammata) on egyptian gods and tries to discover the importance of the great text. Derrida says: " The value of writing-or of the pharmakon has of course been spelled out to the king, but it is the king who will give it its value, who will set the price of what, in the act of receiving, he constitutes or institutes. The king of god (Thamus represents Ammon, the king of the gods, the king of kings, the god of gods. Theuth says to him: O basileu is thus the other name for the origin of value. The value of writing will not be itself. writing will have no value, unless and to the extent that god-the-king ap-proves of it. But god-the-king nonetheless experiences the phar-makon as a product, an ergon, which is not his own, which comes to him from outside but also from below, and which awaits his condescending judgment in order to be consecrated in its being and value." However, God does not know how to write, but that ignor-ance or incapacity only testifies to his sovereign independence. He has no need to write, he speaks and dictates and his word is sufficient itself. (Dissemination, pp. 75-76.) This can also result to the fact that by dictating his word good the king produces good or what Derrida identifies as father. In addition, the Platonic origin and power of speech, precisely of Logos which is continuously followed in Platonism, is considered to be its father. We can say Logos is a son, a son that would be destroyed in his very presence without the attending presence of his father who answers, who speaks for him and answers for him. Without his father, he become only writing. (Dissemination, p. 77. The father, as Derrida explains later must not be understood in such a way that he is generator or procreator in any "real" sense prior to, or outside, all relation to language. It is Logos that enables us to perceive paternity.) Living Logos in contrast to writing, is alive in that it has a living father who is present, standing near it, behind and within it while sustaining it with his rectitude. Living Logos forbids itself and thinks it can forbid itself patricide.
527. Truth and Method, p. 484.
528. Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 85.
529. Ibid., p. 85.
530. Text and Interpretation, p. xv.
531. TM, p. 309.
532. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 125.
533. Interpretation and Overinterpretation, p. 52. The literal sense of this attitude toward sacred texts has been translated, in se-cularized form, to texts which become metaphorically sacred in the course of their reception. It happened to Virgil, in the medieval world, and to Shakespeare (ibid., p. 53).
534. See: "Text and Interpretation", pp. 41-42.
535. Ibid.
536. Ibid.
537. Heidegger and the Poets: Podesis/ Sophia/Techne, p. 44.
538. Gadamer and Hermeneutics, p. 257.
539. Kant Studien, Heft 2. 1993, p. 159. With this model, we can illustrate Kant in a unified interpretation, that itself moves in tho hermeneutical circle.
540. The intentional relation the proposition has to that about which judgment is made is in itself bifurcated in the "is" of the relation to a being and the bifurcation (The Metaphysical Founda-tions of Logic, pp. 100-101).
541. Ibid.
542. Ibid.
543. Interpretation and Overinterpretation, p. 51.
544. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 137.
545. Ingebarg Koza, Das Problem Des Grüdes in Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Kant (Henn Verlag, Germany: Ratingen 1967), p. 21. "Die transzendeng ist der Grund fur die ontologische Differenze. Dieser Grund jedoch ist noch nicht der nach der Heide-ggerschen "kehre" intendierte letzte seingrund, der selbst auf keinen Ursprung mehr zuruck verweist. Die transzendenz ist zwar der Grund fur Moglichkeit des in der ontologischen Differenze sich aus druckenden Unterscheidungsvermogens von seiendem und sein, doch sie selbst wurzeit wiederum in etwas noch urspruglicherem, dem Dasein zugrunde liegendem das zu erforschen Heideggers gesamtes spatwerk sichzur Aufgabe stellt" (ibid., pp. 20-21).
546. PH, p. 28.
547. Ideas, p. 55.
548. PH, p. 123.
549. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 48.
550. Ibid., p. 93.
551. The figure of the father is that of the good (agathon) Logos represents what it is indebted to, that is the father who is also the chief, the capital, the good. The good, in the visible figure of the father, or the sun is the origin of all onta, responsible for their ap-pearing and their coming into Logos. We can be protected from being blinded by any direct intuition of the face of the father, of good of the origin of being in itself (Dissemination, pp. 81-83.) One must turn to Logos and not merely when the solar source is present and risks burning the eyes if stared at. One has also to turn toward it when the sun seems to withdraw during its eclipse. The star is more dangerous than ever when it is hidden. But after all, it is questionable whether the foundation of metaphysics is in Logos or in writing that is Logos without father. For Gadamer, it is the good (agathon) or father (in Derrida’s term) which leads hermeneutics, whereas for Derrida it is god-theking. God-the-king has his sovereign independ-ence in the good and hermeneutics.
552. Philosophical Hermeneutics, introduction, p. xx.
553. Text and Interpretation, p. 98.
554. Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 77. For Ricoeur the referential aspect of discourse goes back to the capacity of each interlocutor (ibid., p. 81). This perception neglects the initiate defi-nition of the text as the reference of any discursive or nondis-cursive interpretation. Without regarding to the immediate reference of interpretation in general, skepticism remains always superior to the possibility of any knowledge as understood by Socrates.
555. Cogito and Hermeneutics, p. 81.
556. Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysics? (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1965), pp. 7-8.
557. Reason in the Age of Science, p. 102.
558. Ibid. Gadamer agrees that this implies a totally new con-cept of understanding.
559. BT, p. 62.
560. BT, p. 226.
561. On the Truth of Being, p. 60.
562. Sendung itself is above the event of Logos, though Hei-degger never talks above a productive relationship between the two.
In a similar manner, the productive dynamism of hermeneutics appears in the différance, which for Derrida, refers back to the movement that consists in differing (by means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour or postponement). What defers presence is the very basis on which presence is announced or desired in what represents it, its sign or trace (Positions, p. 8). The concept of différance is neither stracturalist nor geneticist, which themselves are effects of différance. The différance is the production of the differences such as sensible, intelligible, intuition, signification and so on. Differences studied by taxonomical science are the effects of différance. They are inscribed neither in the heavens nor in the brain, yet they are to be taken as produced by the activity of some speaking subject. (Ibid., p. 9.) The actuality or productivity, in her-meneutics, connected by the différance refers to the generative movement in the play of differences. These are not fallen from the sky, but rather are the effects of transformations. Derrida acknow-ledges that différance produces systematic and regulated transfor-mation which leaves room for a structural science. Even the concept of différance develops the most legitimate principled exigencies of structuralism. Nothing -- no present and indifferent being -- pre-cedes différance and spacing (ibid., pp. 27-28).
563. Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 22. De-construction theory, requires that hermeneutics and its source in being not be separated since the text is at once contained within metaphysics and intends to transgress it. The very movement of this textual transgression, holds it back short of the limit. Translation and transcription are modalities of this destruction. A destruction (or what Derrida calls deconstruction) allows one to pursue a path toward the bearing of a relationship of Being to being. (Heidegger and Derrida, Reflections of Time and Language, p. 33.) In this way, the philosopher is a destroyer of continuities, while still not breaking with history or dismissing it. This deconstruction itself preoccupies father and son as far as they are announced to us within logos. In addition, Derrida himself believes that it is precisely logos that enables us to perceive paternity although logos itself indebted to father (Dissemination, p. 80).
564. Interpretation and overinterpretation, p. 39.
565. Ibid., p. 39. The reader must suspect that every line conceals another secret meaning; words, instead of saying, hide the untold; "the glory of the reader is to discover that texts can say everything, except what their author wanted them to mean: as soon as the meaning presented is allegedly discovered, we are sure that it is not the real one; the real one is further on, and so on and so forth."