APPENDIX

 

SOME REMARKS ON

FAZLUR RAHMAN’S HERMENEUTICS

 

Fazlur Rahman’s hermeneutics revealed the problem of the historicity of the Qur’an to be one of the most fatal problems confronting contemporary Muslims. While indicating the two dimensions -- temporal and historical -- of the Qur’anic text, he failed to reconcile them due to his adherence to a subject-object ontology in his method of interpretation. By his new method of interpretation of the Qur’an, he tried to make the following three points:

 

1. the Qur’anic text can be understood objectively;

2. the historical Islamic tradition, i.e., the historical interpretations of the Qur’an can be criticized from the Qur’anic view itself; and

3. the activity of interpretation of the Qur’an is a dynamic (i.e., endless) process.

 

In Rahman’s hermeneutics, the process of interpretation consists of "a double movements, from the present situation to Qur’anic times, then back to the present."1 The first of the two movements consists of two steps. "First, one must understand the import or meaning of a given statement by studying the historical situation or problem to which it was the answer."2 Hence the first step consists of understanding the meaning of the Qur’an, as a whole as well as in terms of the specific tenets that constitute responses to specific situations. "The second step is to generalize those specific answers and enunciate them as statements of general moral-social objectives that can be ‘distilled’ from specific texts in the light of the socio-historical background and the often-stated rationes legis."3

In the first moment, an interpreter moves from the broadest horizon which embraces all kinds of historically and culturally significant events on the eve of Islam to the narrowest horizon or problem to which a particular Qur’anic verse was an answer. This means that without taking the historical problems into account, there cannot be any access to the meaning of the Qur’an. Hence, the interpretation of the Qur’an is a dialectical movement of question and answer. In this dialectical movement, the interpreter scrutinizes the particular meanings of the verses in terms of the whole context of the Qur’anic text so as to grasp the most general principles (universals) of the Qur’an.

The interpreter experiences a tension which emanates out of leaving his own present horizon by plunging into the particular historical horizons of the Qur’anic verses to attain their historical ground. It is clear that when the historical ground is attained, all kinds of distinctiveness (temporality) of the Qur’anic verses disappear and the interpreter finds himself or herself in a world of meaning not circumscribed or designated by any historical event. This is a world that has no immediate relation to the temporality of the interpretations. Moreover, this is a world which each temporal interpretation of the Qur’an tries to incorporate.4

Hence, Rahman’s hermeneutics appears, from teleological perspective, to be differentiating between two levels or dimensions in the Qur’anic text. On the first level, there are particular meanings of the verses, which consist of historical interpretations of the extra-historical principles. More clearly, from the standpoint of Rahman’s hermeneutics, the Qur’an embodied its transcendental principles in the form of historical interpretations. Hence it is a self-interpreting text. On the second level, there are general meanings (principles) which underlie those particular historical meanings (interpretations).

However, two levels (dimensions) can be distinguished when the Qur’anic text is subject to cognitive interpretation. As the argument that the Qur’an is a divine response to the historical problems at the time of revelation indicates, the two levels constitute a unity for an existential interpretation. More precisely, only existen-tial interpretation can grasp the historical meanings (principles) in their concrete historical forms. Precisely because of this, Rahman’s hermeneutics proposes that in the second movement of the process of interpretation, the general principles must be brought into exist-ence within the living temporal conditions of the interpreter.

Therefore, while the first movement of interpretation is cognitive, the second movement is existential. In this existential movement, what is distilled from the text is applied to new living problems as an answer. In other words, while in the first movement, cognitive interpretation attempts to uncover the theoretical aspect of the Qur’anic meaning, in the second movement existential inter-pretation endeavors to actualize its practical aspect. Hence, Rahman’s hermeneutics moves from theory to practice in the dialectic of question and answer.

When viewed from this analysis, one can better understand why Rahman proposes two steps within the first movement of interpretation. Since the Qur’an revealed itself in the beginning as the unity of theory (historical meaning) and practice (interpretation or application of historical meaning), the interpreter should grasp first this unity by reconstructing the original historical situation. Nevertheless, due to the historicity of this unity, in the second step, the historical meaning should be distilled from the historical meaning (interpretation) within the text. That is to say, the original unity must be disunited if an interpreter wants to apply the Qur’an to his own situations. Hence in the second movement of interpretation, another unity between the extra-historical meaning and the historical (practical) situation of an interpreter is entrenched. This openness of the Qur’anic text for future applications (unities) explains why the activity of interpretation is an endless process.

This analysis shows also how Rahman hoped to establish a firm basis for criticizing the historical Islamic tradition (i.e., historical interpretations of the Qur’an). It is clear that in Rahman’s view, only out of the transcendental (theoretical) perspective of Qur’anic principles, can the historical interpretations be made a subject for criticism.5 Nevertheless, in order to accomplish such a task, as shown above, the transcendental meaning must be differentiated from the historical meaning within the Qur’an. In view of its transcendental (historical) character, we endeavor to call the former meaning ‘text’, and in consideration of its historical character we call the latter meaning ‘interpretation.’ Hence, Rahman’s herme-neutics, in our view, proposes a radical dissolution of text and interpretation within the Qur’an as well as between the Qur’an and its traditional interpretations.

We assume that behind the idea of this dissolution between text and interpretation in Rahman’s hermeneutics lies his belief that Qur’anic meaning is essentially functional. This means that when-ever meaning has some functions in a living condition, it can attain its real existence. In this context, he remarks that "we must also remember that knowledge in Islam exists in order to enable us to act, to change the current events in the world. The Qur’an is an action-oriented book, par excellence."6 However, this approach refers to the following technical problem, which Rahman tried to overcome in his method of interpretation: How is it possible to bring the Qur’anic text to its new function in the living context by overcoming the historical distance between the past (Qur’anic times) and the present?

It is clear that in view of the historical distance, the function that the Qur’an performed in its original context cannot be identical with that which it can perform in the present context. By ap-proaching the rationes legis as the ‘telos’ of the particular meanings of the Qur’an, Rahman seems to admit that though the function of the response (particular meanings) is bounded to its original historical problems, the intention (maqsad) of the text transcends any given historical context. Referring to this fact, he notes "And yet the message must -- despite its being clothed in the flesh and blood of a particular situation -- outflow through and beyond that given context of history."7

However, how can one contend that the message can transcend its given historical context and be applied to new problems if not in terms of one’s own present context? It seems paradoxical to argue that the general meanings or extra-historical principles of the Qur’an must be attained through its historical context. How can a given context be sufficiently determinative for a meaning that transcends itself? Besides, in order to contend that the general principles must be distilled from the particular meanings in the first movement of the process of interpretation, Rahman has to presuppose that particular meanings of the Qur’an already have lost their adequate functions for the present context. This is amount to saying that the present context (i.e., value-system) of the interpreter is introduced into supposedly objective reconstruction of the past meaning.

Moreover, Rahman’s hermeneutics falls short of explaining how a general principle can be applied in a new condition. Since Rahman wants to separate the historical tradition not only from the present but also from the Qur’anic principles themselves, it (tradi-tion) cannot mediate between the general principle and the new condition. In this case, because each application of the Qur’an will be confined to a specific condition, the Qur’anic meaning will reveal itself in closed circles.

In conclusion, by following the basic tenets of historical criticism, i.e., appealing to the subject-object ontology in his theory of interpretation, Rahman separates the tradition not only from the extra-historical meaning of the Qur’an but also from the present context. Precisely, by ignoring the effect of the tradition on attaining past meaning, he fails to explain how it is possible to move from the present situation to Qur’anic times and then back to the present.