As Risser remarks, "it seems ironic that in a book entitled Truth and Method little is said in the book itself about truth."324 Similarly, Gadamer does not give an explicit account of the problem of truth in his articles entitled "Truth in the Human Sciences," and "What is Truth?"325 According to Jean Grondin, the fact that Gadamer does not have a systematic theory of truth is essential to the message of Truth and Method. An explicit theory of truth in its inevitable distance from the concrete experience of truth would consolidate the methodological approach that hermeneutics seeks to undermine.326

This approach is confirmed by Gadamer’s own remark that "throughout our investigation it has emerged that the certainty achieved by using scientific methods does not suffice to guarantee truth." According to Gadamer, what the tool of method does not achieve "must — and really can — be achieved by a discipline of questioning and inquiring, a discipline that guarantees truth."327 Nevertheless, Bernstein argues that "it is extraordinarily misleading — and betrays his [Gadamer’s] own best insights — to say that there is any discipline that ‘guarantees truth’."328 Bernstein’s point is that to appeal to the Sache, which is the basis of the discipline of questioning, is not sufficient to clarify the concept of truth. "For the question can always be asked, When do we have a true under-standing of the thing (Sache) itself?"329

It seems that Bernstein’s argument presupposes the distinc-tion between true understanding and, as Schmidt puts it, the enlightening, i.e., the shining forth of the Sache.330 When Gadamer, following Heidegger, argues that "Truth is unconcealedness," or the shining forth of the Sache, is this concept of truth not a sufficient condition for true understanding? In other words, can ‘truth’ as unconcealedness and ‘true’ understanding be separated from each other? Before trying to understand Gadamer’s approach to this problem, since his notion of truth is Heideggerian, we should first consider Heidegger’s treatment of the question of truth.

Heidegger leads the traditional conception of truth as the agreement of knowledge with its object back to "its unthought presuppositions."331 Since what is demonstrated in the assertion is solely "the Being-uncovered of the entity itself," truth must be understood in terms of disclosedness. Disclosedness refers prima-rily to the world’s disclosedness as the ground of the uncoveredness of entities. According to Heidegger, the discovering of anything new is never done on the basis of having something completely hidden, but takes its "departure rather from uncoveredness in the mode of semblance."332 This is to say that in a certain way entities have been uncovered already, and yet they are still disguised. Since they are disguised, truth as uncoveredness must always be captured from entities. Therefore, Dasein is both in the truth and in untruth.

However, what does Heidegger mean when he asserts that "the way of uncovering is achieved only in distinguishing between these [truth and untruth]"?333 How can we achieve discovering by distinguishing truth from untruth? In this argument does not Hei-degger accept that we have a fore-conception of truth by which we distinguish between truth and untruth, and thus achieve discovering? And if this is the case, does not new uncoveredness have a future by which it differs from the fore-conception of truth?

In Heidegger’s hermeneutics, ‘fore-conception’ of truth re-fers both to the fact that the uncoveredness of beings is grounded in the ‘world’s disclosedness’ and to the basic characteristic of Dasein as ‘uncovering.’ Precisely because of this fact, as Versényi puts it, in Heidegger’s philosophy man and world can never be separated or even discussed in separation.334 Accordingly, since Dasein exists as being-in-the-world, it is always already dwelling with some being, that is, the uncoveredness of such beings is equiprimordial with the being of Dasein and its disclosedness.335 Out of this inseparability between man and world, it follows that entities can never be true in themselves; what makes them true is the fact that they enter into a relationship with Dasein in terms of Being-discovering and Being-discovered. From this perspective, Heidegger’s contention that "‘Dasein is in the truth’ states equiprimordially that ‘Dasein is in untruth’" can be taken to mean that Dasein is always aware of the boundary where truth differs from untruth. If this is the case, we can argue that just as we know that we are in truth since we have a fore-conception of truth, so we know that we are in untruth since we have a fore-conception of untruth.

However, this does not mean certainly that the fore-con-ception of truth is discrete from that of untruth. Rather this distinc-tion reflects only the inner tension between ‘disclosedness’ and ‘closedness’ in the concept of truth itself.336 For that reason, there is no total concealment and total revealment but, as Pöggeler argues, "truth is a co-presence of unconcealment and concealment, a process of instituting and withholding of ground."337 Since truth enters always into a ‘limited opening,’ to bring "something into the light is to cast an aspect of it into shadow."338

From this perspective, we can argue that Dasein can uncover entities only by following this inner continuity which takes its depar-ture from the limited disclosedness of entities. Accordingly, to follow the inner continuity is to suppose that untruth is also truth to be uncovered. To put it another way, to be aware of untruth is to propose a future (or possible) truth. If, as Tugendhat remarks, "disclosure is to be understood as an occurrence that is actively related to its opposite closedness or concealment"339 there must be a circular relation between truth and untruth. Since we take our "departure . . . from uncoveredness" we realize that "entities . . . are disguised," but insofar as we are aware of untruth we can snatch entities "out of their hiddenness."340 Since we have a fore-conception of truth we approach entities in their hiddenness, and insofar as we approach such entities in their hiddenness we can release their truth, i.e., uncover them.

When Heidegger remarks that, through uncovering, entities become "accessible in themselves to Dasein,"341 he refers to the fact that truth is grasping the originality of anything behind the semblance or cover. In this context, he also argues that "Dasein should . . . defend it [that which has already been uncovered] against semblance."342 By this he means that Dasein should preserve the originality of uncovering in discourse and language.

From this perspective, it can be argued that if every truth is finite, i.e., limited, and uncovering is a process, then originality of uncoveredness refers to nothing else than the distinctive aspect and uniqueness of a being uncovered. This is to say that since no discovering can be reduced to another discovering and replaced by another truth, so every truth as discoveredness has its own feature, scope and limit.343 Heidegger’s argument that "disclosedness is essentially factical" calls our attention also to the limit and uni-queness of every occurrence of truth. Precisely because of this fact, we refer to the original feature of disclosedness by means of dif-ferent words. For instance, when we associate the name ‘Newton’ with the ‘laws’ we not only mention that ‘Newton first discovered them,’ but also, and more importantly, refer to the fact that the truth of these laws has been preserved (or handed down to us) in the originality of its discoveredness. For that reason, through language entities become accessible in their originality to Dasein.

However, the originality here should not be confused with the originating moment of uncovering or with the way the author understood what he uncovered. The ‘originality’ refers to the fact that the identity of the entity uncovered cannot be based on something else since the distinctive aspects and features of the uncoveredness cannot be reduced to anything else.344 Since every uncoveredness is finite and thus a phase in the endless process of uncovering, discontinuity or difference is intrinsic to the identity itself. To put it another way, identity is not something to which different aspects can be reduced and thus with respect to which difference between the aspects disappears. Rather since the con-tinuity of uncovering is grasped in terms of the occurrence of the discontinuities, identity and difference reflects the internal conflict between force and resistance within the entity itself. While the intrinsic force is the basis of the revealment of an entity, the intrinsic resistance to this force is the basis of the limited revealment. As indicated above, we refer to this conflict when we argue that revealment is the revealment of the irreducible, unique nature of each aspect of the entity. From this perspective, since there is a counterbalance between intrinsic force and intrinsic resistance within the uncovered entity we perceive a unity (or identity) as the continuity between its distinctive aspects or features. In other words, identity reveals itself in the opposite but complementary functions of the aspects of the entity. By opposite but comple-mentary functions, we refer to the fact that though every aspect (uncoveredness) has its own distinctive and irreducible nature, it becomes a step upon which further uncoveredness can be based. Heidegger refers to this function by ‘fore-conception.’ From this perspective, the co-presence of coveredness and uncoveredness does not mean that what is known previously becomes unknown when an entity reveals its new aspect. Rather, it means that since every uncoveredness is original and irreducible to another un-coveredness, it cannot be subsumed under one general concept which reflects the timeless identity of the entity.

If our analysis of Heidegger’s concept of truth and identity is correct, we can also say that the metaphor of sudden lightening which Heidegger employs in order to characterize the unexpected, surprising nature of truth must refer not only to the temporality (the suddenness of the moment) of truth but also to the original and distinctive features of uncoveredness itself. This is so because, if every occurrence of truth as an interplay of the way in which Being sends itself and its withdrawal were not the occurrence of the new uncoveredness in its originality (irreducibility) and thus in its surprise character, it would be only a mere repetition of what occurred before. In this case, since we would have been already in the same light, i.e., familiar with it, we could not even recognize the occur-rence of the truth and the argument for sudden lightening would be an empty one. 345

How can one solve the puzzle of this relation between fore-conception and the surprise character of truth? Since we have fore-conceptions, we can anticipate or project into the future and thus uncover entities. On the other hand, we argue that every truth is distinctive and thus surprises us.346 In this case, we accept that truth does not occur exactly in the way we anticipated. It is beyond our control and always transcends our expectations. It reveals itself as the negation of our previous conceptions in the sense that it always reflects the narrowness of our fore-conceptions.

Gadamer seems to apply the Heideggerian notion of the surprise character of uncoveredness to his own theory of the negativity of experience.347 Like Heidegger, he also starts from the unity of world and man as the basis of the possibility to experience (recognize) the future truth. As can be recalled, we referred to this fact above by saying that in Gadamer’s hermeneutics every interpretation takes its starting point from familiarity. In this context, Gadamer remarks:

There is always a world already interpreted, already organized in its basic relations, into which experience steps as something new, upsetting what has led our expectations and undergoing reorganization itself in the upheaval. Misunderstanding and strangeness are not the first factors, so that avoiding misunderstanding can be regarded as the specific task of hermeneutics. Just the reverse is the case. Only the support of familiar and common under-standing makes possible the venture into the alien, the lifting up of something out of the alien, and thus the broadening and enrichment of our own ex-perience of the world.348

 

For this reason, "experience is always actually present only in the individual observation. It is not known in a previous univer-sality."349 This means that the particularity of experience as the manifestation of unique truth cannot be surpassed.350 In this case, how is it possible to argue both that the particularity of experience is unsurpassable and that new experience negates and limits pre-vious experience (which makes it possible for us to expect new experiences in the first place)?351 Does Gadamer fall victim to a con-tradiction by arguing both that every experience is unique (unsur-passable) and that "the nature of experience is conceived in terms of something that surpasses it"?352

It seems that the nature of this problem can be understood better if we look at the notion of experience (Erfahrung) as the relation between universal and particular. If experience cannot be known in a previous universality, this means that a new experience has its own unique (concrete) characteristic which cannot be represented by the universal concept. Thus every new experience forces us to look at the universal concept from the perspective it (new experience) opens up before us. In this context, Gadamer remarks that we cannot have a new experience of any object at random, "but it must be of such a nature that we gain better knowledge through it, not only of itself, but of what we thought we knew before—i.e., of a universal."353

Obviously this productive aspect of experience is also the heart of the notion of application. Application is not the correct application of general principles (universal concepts) to the concrete case. Rather our knowledge of the general principles is supple-mented and even productively determined by the individual case. Therefore, since the rule does not comprehend (surpass) the con-crete individuality, it is corrected by it.354

However, even though experience reflects itself in this unsurpassability it "implies an orientation toward new experience."355 Otherwise, since there could be a total fulfillment of the universal concept by one experience, this would be the self-annihila-tion of the experience, a self-contradiction. From this perspective, new experience shows not only the limit of the previous experience and thus of our knowledge of the universal concept, but also limits itself by referring to the possible experiences. Hence the sur-passability of experience does not mean that the difference between the experiences disappears by being subsumed under the universal concept, but rather refers only to the self-negation or self-limitation of experience. It is essentially historical. In this context, Gadamer remarks that "experience in this sense belongs to the historical nature of man." In other words, genuine experience is experience of one’s own historicity. 356

Gadamer writes that it is precisely continuity that "every understanding of time has to achieve, even when it is a question of the temporality of a work of art."357 In his view, continuity should be understood as the togetherness of the timelessness and tempora-lity of aesthetic being. However, by togetherness he does not mean co-existence. If it is understood to mean co-existence, the historical interpretation would be secondary with respect to the essence of the text. In this case, it is presupposed that there is a "real" text which is distinct from the way in which it is later interpreted.358 Obviously this leads to the conclusion that, since the true being of the text cannot be realized in its historical interpretations, there cannot be a true interpretation of it. What is called ‘interpretation’ could be only an approximate repetition (appearance) of the "real" text. We indicated above that all intentionalist views which presuppose the timeless identity of the text as distinct from its historical interpre-tations fall victim to this antithesis.

Precisely because of this fact, "togetherness" should be understood as the belonging of timelessness to temporality. In this context, Gadamer remarks that "timelessness is primarily only a dialectical feature which arises out of temporality and in contrast with it."359 From this perspective, Gadamer seems to put the problem of continuity as the problem of the contemporaneity and presentness of a past text to every age. This is to say that the actual being of a text cannot be detached from its interpretation and that only in this interpretation do "the unity and identity of a structure emerge."360

In order to understand the nature of this paradox, we should see first how the identity of a structure emerges in the act of interpretation. Gadamer remarks that a structure is "one insofar as it presents itself as a meaningful whole. It does not exist in itself, nor is it encountered in a mediation (Vermittlung) accidental to it; rather, it acquires its proper being in being mediated."361 Thus, even though a structure (meaningful whole) is dependent on being interpreted, it can be repeatedly presented as such and its significance can be understood.

Gadamer refers to the manifestation of the unity of the reality and ideality of meaning by his phrase "transformation into struc-ture." The point he makes with this phrase is this: when a game is played, a text is interpreted, or a piece of music is performed, what is played, interpreted, or performed detaches itself from the representing activity of the players or performers so that it can be intended or understood as play, text, or music. This is to say that text or play does not acquire a definite meaning through the particular persons representing or interpreting it since, when the text or play are represented, they are disguised. From this perspective, the more the representing persons or their activity are disguised (i.e., tran-sparent), the more the play or the text achieves ideality, namely, comes to its own truth (reality). Hence Gadamer teaches us the fact that only by total mediation it is possible to have real access to the meaning of the text. Only by transformation into structure is what is otherwise constantly hidden and withdrawn brought to light.362

Therefore, the being of the text is its self-realization, its sheer fulfillment. This means that the identity of a text consists in there being something to "understand." It asks to be understood in what it "says."363 Hence what Gadamer calls "total mediation" is nothing else than participation in the meaning (being) of the text. Only by being participated, i.e., by being understood, can what is meant (die Sache) disclose its world and identity.364 This means that partici-pation requires the recognition of what is essential in the text. At this point, it is to be noted that recognition does not mean to recognize what is already known as essential in the same way. This would make participation a mere repetition. Rather the word ‘recognition’ refers to discovering what is closed (strange, unknown) through what is unclosed (familiar), and to separating what is essential from the contingent or occasional situation.365

Thus, the closedness of truth does not mean that the identity or unity of the work is closed off from the person who reads or is affected by it.366 Rather it implies that there is no radical separation between the work of art and the person who experiences it, and "between the way the work is realized and the identity of the work itself."367 Since truth happens in a closed world, i.e., as a meaningful whole in the mediation of the historical horizon of the interpreter, the work as such speaks to the interpreter in an individual way as the same work, even in repeated and different encounters with it.

However, the fact that the text speaks to the interpreter in an individual way is not the destruction of the identity of the text since the closedness of the world can take place if and only if the autonomy of meaning is recognized, i.e., if the text is understood in its claim to truth. Hence what we called the unity of the identity and difference can be taken to mean that there is a free space in this closed world which allows the interpreter to recognize the autonomy of meaning. As noted above, Gadamer calls this free space "aesthetic dis-tance."368 From this perspective, to use the phrase ‘difference with-in the unity’ seems to be more appropriate for describing ‘herme-neutic identity’ than the phrase ‘unity of identity and difference.’369

The priority of the ‘relation’ over against its relational mem-bers—the I who understands and that which is understood—in Heidegger seems to lie behind this argument. Accordingly, "the self-understanding only realizes itself in the understanding of a subject matter and does not have the character of a free self-realization. The self that we are does not possess itself; one could say that it "happens."370 Hence to understand a text is to come to understand oneself in a kind of dialogue. Gadamer argues that this contention is confirmed by the fact that the concrete dealing with the text yields understanding only when what is said in the text begins to find expression in the interpreter’s own language. "Interpretation belongs to the essential unity of understanding."371

Therefore, aesthetic distance reflects also the happening of self-consciousness. We indicated this situation when discussing the role of ‘otherness’ in the occurrence of textual identity and in application. We mentioned that since the otherness of the text cannot be subsumed under the otherness of the interpretive condition and vice versa, textual identity is bound up with variation and difference. However, if, only through mediation, text and the inter-preter come to their own truth, this means that otherness happens in the process of mediation, and not at the outset. Hence, under-standing involves a moment of "loss of self." Gadamer puts this as follows: "One must lose oneself in order to find oneself . . . one never knows in advance what one will find oneself to be."372

Obviously, this is not to say that understanding takes place in a totally unconscious way. Rather, as Gadamer emphasizes, "under-standing includes a reflective dimension from the very beginning." In this case, what Gadamer implies is the fact that the reflective dimension has no privileged standpoint apart from the temporal experience of the truth of the text. Through the reflective dimension, we can bring to light what is hidden in our experience of the meaning and thus realize the unsurpassable otherness of the text and of ourselves. Hence aesthetic distance must be the reflective dimen-sion of our understanding. In this context, Gadamer notes that "every work leaves the person who responds to it a certain leeway, a space to be filled in by himself." 373

It seems that our task is to show how different interpretations of the same text can have an inner relation with each other if we want to argue for the historical continuity of the mediations of the text. However, if, as Heidegger and Gadamer argue, ‘relation’ is prior to its relational members, namely, to be in historical relation to each other is their mode of being, this means that the historical continuity (or as Gadamer puts it, hermeneutic identity)374 cannot be shown by taking different interpretations as ‘distinct’ entities to be related.

If this is the case, the ‘relation’ is not an object of investigation but must be the ‘experience’ of how a new interpretation arises on the basis of previous interpretations. In other words, the problem of historical continuity is the problem of transition between different interpretations. However, we are not arguing that a new interpre-tation is only the interpretation of previous interpretations. This could be a third remove from the reality, given that the text itself is the interpretation of reality and thus the interpretation of the text is the interpretation of the interpretation. What we are saying is the fact that, since the meaning of the text is grasped in its pointing in a certain direction, the interpretation points in the same direction. Therefore, all interpretation comes to share in the being of the text. In this context, Gadamer remarks that "interpretation seems to be a genuine determination of existence."375

At this point, we should note that this argument (that interpre-tation points in the same direction) does not contradict the previous one that the direction given by the text always changes. Every inter-pretation brings the meaning of the text to light from a different perspective since interpretation does not start from zero (total darkness) but takes its start from the truth (light) of its own horizon which is effected by history. This means that the light of the present horizon gets sourced out of history. Hence ‘present’ makes its difference not by separating (disconnecting) itself from the past, but by presenting its source in its new dimension. Thus, "all relations appear to be ordered in another way and to be joined to new forms."376

In fact, Gadamer accepts this kind of radical discontinuity in the sense that some texts can cease to make a claim to truth, i.e., no longer be able to fulfill their tasks. For instance, some ancient literary forms have lost their function today. Hence their renewal is no longer possible or is only possible in the form of parody. Out of this he draws the conclusion that "not everything is possible at all times. And does not the truth of art lie in this?"377

The transition of which we speak is not the same as the ‘now’ that couples together what has pre-ceded and what is to come, while it itself does not endure. It is in another sense that being-in-transition in a strange way simultaneously causes separation and conjunction: transition appears as the true being of time in the sense that everything is in it at the same time such that past and future are together. Where-as the uniform passing of time is a constant flux. It is clear that the experience of transition does not mean such a simple passing of time. It means rather, a definite-indefinite being, which in the experiences of departing and beginning brings the flow of time to a standstill.378

 

Hence transition, or the experience of time, takes place when the negativity of experience happens.379 In other words, transition as the intermediate position establishes the distinction between what is past and what is to come and at the same time establishes the union of both. In this case, the problem of the continuity of the text as transition takes the form of the problem of "how one is freed for the new by departing from the old."380

Undoubtedly, the departure from the old does not mean necessarily the departure from the old text which ceased to make a claim to truth, but can be also the departure from the old inter-pretation (or, to use Kuhn’s favorite expression, paradigm). In other words, discontinuity can be observed even on the interpretations of the ‘same’ text. For instance, in the history of the interpretations of Qur’an, we observe a radical discontinuity in the case of Zâhirî (literal) interpretation.381 No doubt, the discontinuity in a definite paradigm or in a certain model of interpretation does not mean that text becomes obsolete. Rather, it is most likely that the truth of the text impinges in the new or different interpretation.

We saw above that for Gadamer, the word ‘transition’ does not mean the dialectical mediation of the old and the new, as the word ‘now’ means in Greek ontology. From this ontology, "if one looks to the old that passes away, the process looks like a downfall. If one looks to the new that arises, the same process looks like an evolution, a genesis, a beginning."382 However, the transition between the different interpretations is certainly more than this dual relativity and two-sidedness. This perspective accepts time as cyclical and has nothing to do with the real uncertainty and the open infinity of the event itself. However, Gadamer showed that the determinacy of meaning cannot be separated from the infinite potentiality of the text. Hence every interpretation as the historical determination of the text signifies the infinite potentiality of the text behind it. This means that the past text which is determined in the present interpretation opens itself to the future.

It seems that, according to Gadamer, our knowing or coming to awareness of what is said in the text through old interpretations is not a representation of it from the standpoint of the new, but "such knowledge is itself a happening, is itself history."383 This means that what we call new interpretation happens as an event when some-thing encounters us within the tradition in such a way that we understand it. Therefore, the historical continuity of the text takes place when we understand that which is given to us in the text (tra-dition) as addressing us (ansprechend) and engaging us (ange-hend).384 From this perspective, what we called discontinuity is already the event of understanding the continuity of the engaging power of the truth of the past text. In other words, discontinuity is nothing else than a phase in a communicative event within a historical horizon.

Gadamer calls this ‘insight’ into unity and differentiation "his-torically effected (operative) consciousness" (wirkungsgeschich-tliches Bewußtsein). As he himself notes, this is a somewhat ambiguous expression. "This ambiguity is that it is used to mean at once the consciousness effected in the course of history and deter-mined by history, and the very consciousness of being thus effected and determined."385 Therefore, since our consciousness is deter-mined by real events rather than "left on its own to float free over against the past" to produce within ourselves the consciousness of this determination is an historical event itself.386

The point behind this perspective is this: since the text engages us with its truth and thus is mediated by its interpretation, and since every interpretation as the furthering of the truth of the text becomes the link in a forward-rolling chain387 in this historical continuity, the truth of the text is disseminated through its interpretations. There-fore, each interpretation determines the following interpretation by being dissolved in it. As can be recalled, Gadamer refers to this fact with his expression "history of effect" (Wirkungsgeschichte). He calls the content of this history of effect ‘tradition.’ 388

Manfred Frank’s and Philippe Forget’s argument that Gada-mer proposes a super subject or collective subject who can collect the entire tradition within his own experience cannot be held. This would reduce the negativity of hermeneutical experience (histori-city of understanding) to an empty word. Gadamer rejects this argument by remarking that "I am in no way putting forward a collective subject. Rather, ‘tradition’ is simply the collective name for each individual text (text in the widest sense, which would include a picture, an architectural work, even a natural event.)"389

We can understand what Gadamer means by this if we consider it from the perspective of his favorite expression "fusion of horizons" (Horizontenverschmelzung). To fuse horizons is not in fact to merge two distinct horizons so that we could reach a third horizon including the two previous ones within itself. This would be merely an appropriation of a Hegelian dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis and lead to the conclusion that Gadamer proposes a super subject. In this context, he maintains that "when I speak in my own work of the necessity for the horizon of one person and the horizon of another to merge into one for any understanding between them to take place, I am not referring to an abiding and identifiable ‘one’ [Eines], but just to what takes place in conversation as it goes along."390

Fusion of horizons does not also propose that the interpreter first transposes himself into the situation of the past so that he can acquire the right historical horizon and what he is trying to under-stand can be seen in its true dimensions. As can be recalled, this is what Hirsch and other intentionalists and historical reconstructionists suggest. Gadamer remarks that in this case, since the person who tries to understand the past has, as it were, stopped trying to reach an agreement, he himself cannot be reached. "By factoring the other person’s standpoint into what he is claiming to say, we are making our own standpoint safely unattainable."391 Obviously, this perspec-tive makes what is only a means into an end in the sense that instead of understanding the truth-claim of a text, it stops in reconstructing the past horizon. Thus it forces the text to abandon its claim to be saying something true.

What Gadamer means by the fusion of horizons can be put as follows. We saw above that consciousness of being affected by history is primarily consciousness of the hermeneutical situation. This means that we are not standing outside it and hence are unable to have any objective knowledge of it. Thus all self-knowledge arises from what is historically pregiven, which "both prescribes and limits every possibility for understanding any tradition whatsoever in its historical alterity."392

As we can see, Gadamer’s account leads to the conclusion that there is a dialectical relation between what is historically pre-given and self-knowledge. What is historically pregiven both pro-vides us with a connection to the past and limits our field of vision (horizon) at the same time. Thus horizon, or hermeneutic situation ("world" in Heidegger), is closed (limited) disclosedness (open-ness).393 We referred to this dialectic above when we remarked that old interpretations determine new ones by being dissolved in them. Precisely because of this dialectic of opening and limitation, the fusion does not result in the vertical movement (higher universality) of synthesis taking its departure from the horizontal (historical) relation of thesis and antithesis as proposed by Hegelian dialectic. Rather, it is Herder’s notion of the "link in a forward-rolling chain" which can describe better the Gadamerian dialectic of opening and limitation.

a truly historical consciousness sees its own present in such a way that it sees itself, as well as the historically other, within the right relationships. . . . Thus it is constantly necessary to guard against overhastily assimilating the past to our own expecta-tions of meaning. Only then we can listen to tradition in a way that permits it to make its own meaning heard.394

 

What Gadamer is talking about is the process of the reciprocal foregrounding of the past from the present and of the present from the past. This indicates that the present horizon does not consist of a fixed set of opinions and valuations so that "the otherness of the past can be foregrounded from it as from a fixed ground."395 Rather, since the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past, there can be no isolated horizon for it. In this case, there is only an internal tension between the text and the present in a single horizon. Gadamer notes that the hermeneutic task consists not in covering up this tension by attempting a naïve assimilation of the two but in consciously bringing it out.396

Accordingly, to fuse horizons is to project the historical horizon and to supersede it simultaneously in the sense of coming to an agreement with its truth. Therefore, the process of fusion takes place as follows: on the common ground, which is the pregivenness of the subject matter (Sache), the past and the present horizons are projected in their otherness and are brought together precisely because of the engaging power of the truth of the subject matter.397

However, since in every projection of otherness between the text and the present within this pregiven unity (common ground), each side is put at risk in terms of another, a new (unexpected) perspective to subject matter is attained and thus the new unity between them is not the mere repetition or copy of the previous unity. And since this new unity is differentiated within itself due to the projection of the otherness between the past and the present, it becomes a previous (pregiven) unity for the following unity, and so on.398 Hence the fusion of horizons is the constant dialectical relation of togetherness (unity) and otherness (difference) of the past and the present on the basis of subject matter.399

When science expands into a total technocracy and thus brings on the "cosmic night" of the "forget-fulness of being," the nihilism that Nietzsche pro-phesied, then may one not gaze at the last fading light of the sun setting in the evening sky, instead of turning around to look for the first shimmer of its return?400

Undoubtedly, this is to say that the true (correct) interpretation is the one which disappears in the self-presentation of the subject matter.401 To separate them is to fall into a subject-object ontology as we saw in the case of aesthetic differentiation. Therefore, ac-cording to Gadamer, ‘correctness’ of the interpretation cannot be the aim since it is to miss the point by confusing the means (correctness, the disappearance of the interpretation) with the goal (the truth claim or self-presentation of the text). Hence, in Gada-mer’s hermeneutics, the canonization of any interpretation has no legitimate place.402 However, with respect to diversity of inter-pretations of the same text, is the question of the ‘correctness’ of any interpretation an illegitimate one?

At this point, Gadamer could reply to us by asking the question: do we not have a pre-understanding of the meaning of the ‘correct-ness’ of an interpretation? If so, how could one accept the condi-tional as if it were unconditional, and thus determine or validate an interpretation through it? This shows that even the determination of the meaning of ‘correct interpretation’ and, if any criterion for correct interpretation is maintained, the application of this criterion will be subject to interpretation.403 This means that since a possible criterion for correct interpretation is already dependent on the primordial (interpretive) relation between man and his world, it will be historical and tradition-bound. However, does this rejection of the timeless (fixed) criterion lead to a radical relativism and arbitrariness (or subjectivism) in the act of interpretation?

From this perspective, if one has to see a relativism in Gada-mer’s hermeneutics, it can only be the mutual relativity (depend-ence) of content and context to each other.404 Nevertheless, this does not mean that the content is dependent on only ‘one particular context.’ Otherwise, there could arise a solipsism in the sense that the content could not be known with respect to ever-changing con-texts. However, since a context can be known through its content, this means that if the content were restricted to a particular context, this particular context could not be known either. Therefore, the knowability of content and context is possible only if the context is always changing.

Can we conclude from this with Hirsch that the ‘content’ (the authorial intention) is totally independent of the changing context?405 If this were so, since the ever-changing contexts would be only the external conveyors of the content, there could not be genuine differ-ence and change between contexts. Therefore, the indifference of the content with respect to the changing contexts leads to the conclusion that the changing contexts are in fact indifferent to each other in the sense that they do not have their original characteristics, given that the ‘context’ becomes what it is through its content.

From this perspective, Margolis’ ‘robust’ (substantive) or moderate relativism does not seem to be satisfactory. Robust relativism "entails that there be certain minimal constraints—in terms of what is simply true and false—that relativistic judgments must accommodate."406 Therefore, Margolis distinguishes ‘de-scriptions’ of the literary work which are simply ‘true’ or ‘false’ from the critical interpretations which provide an explanatory context with descriptions. Descriptions are of the necessary substratum, or the properties, of the literary work which corresponds to the ‘facts’ in scientific theories. In this case, critical interpre-tations are like scientific theories whose truth cannot be demon-strated.

This leads to the conclusion that interpretations cannot be referred to ultimately by the relative terms ‘true’ or ‘false,’ since this disregards the contributions or the imputations of different cultural aspects into the work, but by the terms ‘plausible’ or ‘implausible.’ According to Margolis, the criteria outlined for critical plausibility entail (1) compatibility with the describable features of given art works and (2) "conformability with relativised canons of interpre-tation that themselves fall within the tolerance of an historically continuous tradition of interpretation." 407

The mutual dependency of past and present in Gadamer’s hermeneutics reflects the fact that subject matter (common ground) is not something to be objectified by representational consciousness in its being, but rather makes mutual understanding possible. In this sense, Sache remains always as transcendental ground which asserts its truth in the dialogical process between the language of the text (tradition) and that of the interpreter. Precisely because of this, the relationship between the text and the interpreter is primarily in the form of the I-thou (Ich-Du) relation and cannot be "reduced to the epistemological relation between a subject and an object."408

Hence, as Gadamer remarks, language is the form or the manner of mediation in which the historical continuity of the text is able to occur in spite of all gaps and discontinuities. This means that since language fulfills itself and has its proper fulfillment only in the give and take of speaking, in which one word yields another, conversation is the "manner in which past texts, past information and forms of human creative efforts reach us."409 From this perspective, we can understand the relation between the discontinuity and the historical continuity better. The existence of the discontinuity is not in fact an obstacle which is to be overcome, but rather makes historical continuity possible since every discontinuity reveals itself as a partner in the dialogue with the past.

Transmission and tradition have their true meaning preserved not by means of an unyielding grasp on what has been handed down, but rather by constituting experienced and steadfast partners in that conversation which we are. Insofar as they answer us and bring up new questions, they de-monstrate their own reality and their own forward-moving vitality.410

 

It seems that the logic of question and answer is the basic characteristic of dialogue.411 According to this logic, "no subjective consciousness, neither that of a speaker nor of whomever is addressed, already knows enough to fully encompass what comes to light in dialogue."412 Therefore, the Logos is common to all and does not belong to a partner alone.

It seems that this subject matter is both the transcendental ground since it makes dialogue possible, and the truth which can be reached at the end of true conversation which requires openness.413 Again we find ourselves in a circular movement in dialogue. Gada-mer refers to this circular movement with the term ‘anamnesis’ which is sought for and awakened in logoi.414 Accordingly, what is presupposed (transcendental ground) is brought to light in its new aspect (logoi) in the give and take of conversation. Nevertheless, this process should not be confused with dressing up and unmasking for the purpose of knowing better what we already know. Rather, as Gadamer puts it, "it is the true carrying out of anamnesis."415

What Gadamer means is the fact that through conversation the subject matter which is pointed out by the past text is brought back to its original role within language. Undoubtedly, this is not a histo-rical reconstruction, but to let the past text speak as a contemporary text. And since what comes to light in conversation is common to all, "the dialogical character of language . . . leaves behind it any starting point in the subjectivity of the subject, and especially in the meaning-directed intentions of the speaker."416

Contrary to the self-certainty of consciousness of itself, dialo-gue requires an infinite process of mutual testing of the truth-claim of the past text and that of the interpreter and does not allow any criterion other than the logic of question and answer. One might ask whether we do not have previously a criterion for asking correct question? Gadamer accepts this difficulty and says that "to find and elaborate the question, that is the question! For it is the question which gives us access to an adequate interpretation of a statement as a possible answer to the question."417 Certainly there is no criterion for correct questioning. However, do we not have a sense of the subject matter in order to ask the right question? It is clear that there is a circular relation between the question and subject matter (answer) which can never be dissolved in the sense that just as there is no final question, there is also no final answer.

However, this bad infinity, to use Hegel’s expression, has, in fact, a positive aspect since it allows us to grasp the unexpected truth and to see further in every experience a new truth. From this perspective, we can argue that every genuine question reveals itself in the dialectic of self-limitation and openness of truth. In other words, we recognize the genuine questions when they point in a certain direction by giving a limited answer. This means that the real questions are not ‘mere’ questions which refer only to the darkness on the subject matter, but since they are also the limited answers posed by the previous questions, they give us a path to be followed. Hence, there is not pure question and pure answer. Rather, every question includes a limited answer and every answer includes a limited question.418