CONCLUSION

In the course of our inquiry, we pursued the problem of how interpretation as a genuine dialogue between past and present is possible in terms of the question of what constitutes the identity of the text. We tried to call attention first to the discussion on the place of method in textual interpretation. We noted that Gadamer allows methods in order to avoid mistakes. What he rejects is the subject-object ontology lying behind the scientific ideal of objectivity which limits the knowledge of the truth of the text by method on the basis of verification and certainty.

The universal claim of scientific method which presupposes a distanciation or alienation between the subject and object is resisted by the human experience of truth (the world). This is so because every experience of truth takes place as a unique (original) historical event which cannot be subsumed under the universal concept. Hence, the problem of interpretation is not only a problem of method, but is more basically the experience of the truth of the text. It is the problem of how human understanding belongs to the being of what is understood. This implies that the problem of interpretation can be the problem of method only in its secondary sense, namely, when the text ceases to claim truth for the interpreter’s present horizon.

We observed that Gadamer’s perspective of method reflects a parallelism with his view on the author’s intention. He clearly argues that the interpreter should aim at understanding the author’s intention in the case of the failure of appreciating the truth of the written text. This is to say that when a distanciation occurs between the text and the interpreter, different methods should be applied in order to reconstruct the author’s intention.

He also maintains that in a living conversation the aim should be understanding the partner’s intention, since the meaning has not detached itself from the person intending it. This does not mean that the truth of what the other says is a secondary issue in a living conversation. Rather, the subject matter (Sache) as the common ground between the partners is brought to light (truth) in the living conversation. Nevertheless, when the meaning is written down through fixed forms, it (meaning) detaches itself from the intention of the author and gains its ideal character. This does not mean that meaning has its own existence as distinct from its interpretation. It can come to being only on the mediations of its interpretations. Therefore, the task of the interpretation is to bring the past (written) text to its original function in the living conversation. In other words, interpretation is the living conversation itself between the past and present.

We demonstrated that Hirsch’s and Betti’s intentionalist models of interpretation cannot fulfill this task. This is because their arguments for the objectivity of interpretation, based on the idea of method, require an alienation between subject (inquirer) and object (meaning). This means that we can understand the text only by assuming the subjective horizon of the author. They fail to realize that the interpreter’s situation and his present interests have been introduced into a supposedly objective reconstruction of meaning. By reducing the being of the meaning to the subjective perspective of the author they created the problem of how the subject might bridge the gap between past and present.

We have shown that their argument for meaning-full forms (Betti) and genres (Hirsch) as self-identical entities mediating (i.e., bridging the gap) between past and present does not hold, since Betti and Hirsch argue that these forms or genres can be understood only if the author’s horizon is assumed. This is obviously a vicious circle. If the meaning-full forms or genres can mediate between the past and the present since they are autonomous (i.e., self-identical), they should be independent of the author’s horizon. A similar problem lies in Hirsch’s argument for ‘evidence for authorial intention.’ Hirsch fails to see that an evidence can function only if it is viewed from an interpretive context.

We observed a paradoxical situation in Hirsch’s theory. While arguing that the object of interpretation is independent of the interpreter’s subjectivity, Hirsch accepts the interpreter’s subjec-tive act of choice as the starting point of interpretation. While main-taining that meaning is self-identical from one moment to the next, he also remarks that the nature of the text is to mean whatever we construe it to mean.

Undoubtedly, this casts strong doubt on Hirsch’s view of textual identity. In the final analysis, Hirsch’s argument for identity takes the form that if meaning is to be determinate it must be identical with authorial intention. Nevertheless, in the next step, he pre-supposes that to show the identity of the intention of the author is also to show the identity of the text. Hence, while treating textual meaning and authorial intention as different entities to be identified, Hirsch stops in the discussion of the identity of the latter by taking that of the former for granted.

In this context, we referred to the one-sidedness of Hirsch’s appropriation of Husserlian intentionalism. While Husserlian inten-tionalism presupposes the irreducibility of the perspective and the intended object to each other and thus accepts the identity within the manifold, Hirsch reduces the identity of the object to the subjective stance of the author. Hence he disregards the distinction between ‘the object which is intended’ and ‘the object as it is intended.’ This is clear when he deprives ‘subject matter’ (the object which is intended) of its identity. Therefore, he makes the tool (author’s horizon) the end of the interpretation. This reveals the inconclu-siveness of his attempt to make the author the only authority on the meaning if we recall the Hirschian argument that interpretation is a matter of choice.

We called attention to the problem, in Hirsch’s theory, of how meaning can be distinguished from other contexts and yet be a matter of consciousness. It was noted that if meaning is distin-guished from changing contexts, it must be autonomous. This contradicts Hirsch’s basic tenet that meaning is a matter of consciousness. Besides this, we found it unacceptable to argue both that meaning is the determination of the author’s context and that it is totally independent of the contexts within which it is recon-structed.

This amounts to disregarding the reality of the differences between contexts and to making the changing contexts irrelevant with regard to meaning and each other. Hence in Hirsch’s theory meaning is essentially discontinuous in the sense that it does not have any vital relation with the contexts within which it is reconstructed. This discontinuity of meaning, which characterizes intentionalist models of interpretation, is generated from reducing the being of the meaning to authorial intention.

We discussed whether Hirsch’s concept of significance (application) can provide the historical continuity of meaning. Even though he accepts with Gadamer that application is part of the meaning, he differs in holding that we first understand a concept from a text and then apply it to our own experience. Hence, while reducing the being of the meaning to its original condition, on the one hand, he concedes that it is open to future applications, on the other. This is at the same time both to reject and accept the autonomy of meaning from its original conditions (the author’s intention).

This paradoxical situation in Hirsch’s theory results in subsuming the present under the past meaning and making the present relative to the past. This is clear when he reduces the par-ticular in the present context of the interpreter to an exemplification of the universal (past meaning). We observed that Hirsch’s view of the relation between universal concept (the author’s general purpose) and its original exemplification in the historical object (the author’s particular intention) takes the form of the relation between means (historical object) and end (universal concept).

However, Hirsch fails to provide a principle to extract the general purpose of the author from his particular purpose (intention). At this point, the determination of the universal concept through the text seems to be dependent on the interpreter’s choice or decision. This leads to the very subjectivism and relativism which Hirsch opposes. Therefore, the continuity of meaning in Hirsch’s herme-neutics does not depend on the historical continuity of the effect of the text on the changing horizons, but rather is determined by the subjective reconstructions of the interpreters. His intentionalist arguments do not provide a basis for the identity and vitality of meaning.

Betti’s argument for the autonomy of the hermeneutic object and thus his distinction between meaning and significance leads to the distinction between meaning and its truth. Hence, it cannot escape from subjectivism and relativism because the validity or the truth of meaning for a particular horizon is determined only by the untested prejudices of the interpreter.

In the case of Knapp’s and Michaels’ argument for the impossibility of intentionless meaning, we noticed that there is no medium to carry the meaning between the author and the interpreter. Their argument falls short of demonstrating that the reconstructed meaning is identical with what the author intended since it presents the concept of author as only a formal requirement. The inse-parability of intention from the language leads to the conclusion that there is no interpretation and only text, since interpretation attempts to make a confused claim clearer. This is a sort of solipsism.

We found that Juhl’s argument for the coherence in order to demonstrate the identity of meaning with the author’s intention is not convincing. This is because he disregards the interpreter’s pre-conception of completeness (the unity) of the text and assumes it only as the evidence of the authorial intention. On this assumption, he also forgets that coherence or the unity of the text is only a formal requirement for the interpretation. The historical fact that the same text can be reconstructed in different but coherent ways on the different presuppositions is enough to show the inconclusiveness of Juhl’s argument for evidence.

Even though Beardsley and Wimsatt accept the semantic autonomy and thus reject the identification of meaning with authorial intention, they fail to see the fact that the interpretive context is a constitutive element of textual meaning. They approach meaning like a physical object to be analyzed in itself. The assumption that meaning is an objective entity leads them to conclude that there must be only one correct interpretation. Hence they overlook the historicity (ontological structure) of understanding.

The moderate or robust relativism of Margolis reduces the event of interpretation to mere intellectual activity by suspending the truth-claim of the text. This is clear in his argument that we can have only plausible interpretations relative to a certain body of evidence. Hence interpretation takes its starting point from the subject-object ontology. By claiming that the basic properties of the text can function as evidence for different interpretations, the robust re-lativism of Margolis does not aim for a genuine dialogue between the past and the present but mostly focuses on showing the impossibility of having a ‘true’ (one correct) interpretation. Hence, it is basically a negative theory of interpretation.

We argued that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics provides a transcendental ground for textual identity in that the being of the text is its self-realization, its sheer fulfillment. The being of the text can never be reduced to a particular interpretive condition, but reflects itself only as the common ground between the partners in the dialogue. This means that in the constitution of textual identity, neither the past nor the present is subsumed under the other. Rather, textual identity reveals itself in the unity of the past and the present.

The constant unity of the past with the changing contexts reveals the dynamic identity of the text. This dynamism of textual identity is grasped through the text’s claim to truth for the changing horizons. Hence, each interpretive context stands as the partner of the dialogue with the text. We noted that the present involvement with the truth of the text does not lead to subsuming the past under the present and hence relativism, since the present is already the determination or the effect of the past (tradition). The past cannot be grasped as an isolated entity but exists always in its vital relation to the present.

This shows the basis of the inseparability of the effect of the past on the present and the consciousness of this historical effect. We noted that, according to Gadamer, this does not mean that consciousness (the present) is a mere determination of the past. Rather, the consciousness of the historical effect is already an historical event itself within which the meaning of the past and the present reveals itself. Hence, the truth of the past text is not an objective fact remaining in its distinct realm, but comes to itself on the mediation of the present consciousness of the historical effect. This means that historically effected consciousness is also operative.

This reflects the fact that the unity of the past and the present is constantly differentiated within itself. Every differentiation is the beginning of a new unity and every unity is the beginning of a new differentiation. Through this indissoluble dialectic between unity and differentiation, the past text is mediated and its identity realized. Since the meaning of the text is mediated through its interpretations, every interpretation becomes like a link in a forward-rolling chain. Hence, what seems to be discontinuity as the unique manifestation of the truth of the text becomes a step for further manifestation of the text. In other words, every interpretation becomes a fore-conception for the following interpretation.

We noted that when Gadamer argued that ‘tradition’ is the historical continuity of the effects (the interpretations) of the text, he does not propose a super subject or collective subject who can collect the whole tradition within his own experience, as Manfred Frank and Philippe Forget contend. This would reduce the negativity of hermeneutical experience (historicity of understanding and perspective) to an empty word. Undoubtedly, in this approach a sort of relativism arises if one emphasizes the irreducibility of each interpretive (concrete) condition.

However, if we look at the relation between text and inter-pretive context from another point of view, we realize that a parti-cular context can make its difference through its content (unex-pected truth). Otherwise, it could be an ‘empty,’ i.e., ‘unfulfilled,’ context. Precisely because of this fact, giving priority to the ‘context’ with respect to the ‘content’ or vice versa is responsible for creating a false relativism. Therefore, the real danger of relativism which Gadamer tries to avoid takes place when either the past or the present is subsumed under the other.

In Gadamer’s hermeneutics the constant dialogue between the past and present (tradition) reveals itself in the form of the dialectic of question and answer. While this dialectic of question and answer between the text and its interpretation opens the realm for the truth of the text, the being of the text never shows itself totally. We grasp this fact through the mutual presupposition of the question and the answer for each other. The relation between them is an ongoing process.