CHAPTER II

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF MODERNIZATION AND THE NEED TO RETRIEVE THE HUMAN

RICHARD KNOWLES

            It may have been possible at some time in the past to pose a choice between a retention of traditional culture and adaptation of modern ways. However, as Berger (1974) suggests, there are very few societies which today can be described simply as non-modern (p. 120). Whatever remnants of traditional attitudes may remain, it seems clear that modernization and the attitudes accompanying it have become the major context within which most of us live. In his analysis of modern technological society Ellul states flatly:

There is no doubt that all the traditional cultures and sociological structures will be destroyed by technique before we can discover or invent social, economic and psychological forms of adaptation which might possibly have preserved the equilibrium of these peoples and societies (p. 123).

Even in societies generally thought of as traditional, the accelera-tion of the move to modernization seems to bear out Ellul’s pre-diction. For example, Shiva Naipaul describes the hero of a recent novel from Kenya:

I have chosen to write about it not because it is a particularly good novel but because of the picture, the sociological portrait it offers of African urban man as not merely detribalized but drained clean of any memory of tribal existence. Its obligations and sensibilities, its rituals and routines--these are all utterly alien to him. . . . Ben, on the face of it, has traveled awfully far awfully fast. His world is relent-lessly urban; his city is universal. The unswept streets, the smoke-filled bars, the cafes serving espresso coffee, the whores, the pestilential tene-ments, the shantytowns are the props of that vast megalopolis thrown up by industrial civilization. Ben is as bereft of "roots," of "identity," as any of his slave-descended American and West Indian bro-thers. He could be in New York, in Kingston, in Jamaica, in Rio de Janeiro, in Soweto (1979, pp. 40-41).

            In a more personal way, the same author, an Indian raised in Trinidad, describes his own experience of modernization:

But in what sense could I be called an Indian--a Hindu? I could not speak a word of any Indian lan-guage -- English was my "mother" tongue; I had been through none of the prescribed Hindu rites de passage. . . . At the age of eighteen (which was when I left Trinidad), I was haphazardly cobbled together from bits and pieces taken from every-where and anywhere. The ugly parallel that sug-gests itself is one of those shantytown hovels built up from whatever dross comes to hand -- bits and pieces of cardboard, tin, wood, corrugated iron. I had inherited no culture; no particular outlook; no particular form. . . . When I left Trinidad at the age of eighteen I was nothing (1979, pp. 103-104).

            For a common understanding of modernization, if a definition is needed, Berger’s is as useful as any other:

Thus, we will discuss modernization as the insti-tutional concomitant of technologically induced economic growth. . . . Modernization, then, consists of the growth and diffusion of a set of institutions rooted in the transformation of the economy by means of technology. . . . As modernization pro-ceeds and is diffused beyond its original territory, we see the institutions of technological production and bureaucracy, together and separately, as pri-mary agents of social change (1974, p. 9).

            The experience of modernization is so familiar by now that it is almost taken for granted and its definitions generally include the same constituents.

            In this paper I am interested in spelling out the modern pre-dicament in more human terms and to do so will make use of the Care Structure of Martin Heidegger as a framework. This structure is described by Heidegger as the central structure of human exist-ence and expresses "the fundamental characteristics of Dasein’s Being" (1927/1962, p. 293). (The term "Dasein" is used by Hei-degger in order to avoid the misunderstandings accompanying the word "self".) The Care Structure itself has three fundamental cha-racteristics: "The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity (Dasein) are existentiality, facticity and Being-fallen" (p. 235).

            The outline of this paper will follow the form of the Care Struc-ture: modernization as facticity, modernization as fallenness, and grounds of existentiality or possibility.

MODERNIZATION AS FACTICITY

            Facticity refers to the fact that the person lives within limits, having a past, having been born into a certain tradition, family or social class, being male or female, and so forth. In sum, this cha-racteristic refers to all the limits within which the person may be free. Facticity refers primarily to the past, but for human beings the past is not linear and set, but is constantly being worked out along with the present and the future.

            As a first step, then, modernization is already an aspect of our facticity; although we may remember our traditions more or less well, we are not operating in a traditional context. We are in a situa-tion where the traditional interpretation is only one of many options. This is a radical difference; we are in a modern situation which sets different limits to our possibilities: modernization is a major aspect of our facticity.

MODERNIZATION AS FALLENNESS:

            THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF MODERNIZATION

            Heidegger uses the term "fallenness" to express what we would call the ego aspect of the person. By this term he means the typical way in which we are occupied by the daily events of life, our everyday tasks, and the way in which this involvement enables us to avoid confronting some other basic issues, such as death. Rather than seeing the narrowly rational, technical person as the ideal, as tends to be the case with proponents of modernization, Heidegger calls this mode inauthentic, meaning that it is precisely in this aspect that we are not ourselves. This ego-functioning is an essential aspect of being human and has its place in the total picture. However, its totalization or primacy in human living can be described as inauthentic or what Heidegger calls living in the "they". "They," the public or the latest fashion, says that technical solutions should be found for whatever problems we have, including those created by technology in the first place. The inauthentic mode prompted by modernization, which will be described below, will need to be modified in order to become authentic.

            Here I shall list a number of psychological characteristics which comprise the inauthentic mode of the modern person and modern life and, in the third section, propose ways in which these characteristics could be modified so as to open up the possibility of authentic living.

Divided Existence and Complex Society

            In his book of this title J.H. van den Berg, a Dutch psychiatrist, takes the position that the modern person experiences a different reality and has an existence different from that of his traditional forebears. The world of the modern person is one of complexity and plurality; the subjective experience is one of being divided or, as van den Berg puts it, of having "not one, but two, three, four, many souls, selves or egos (p. 1). As the society becomes more complex, the person becomes more divided. Van den Berg rephrases the statement of William James (1891) in The Principles of Psychology: "Every person has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares" (1974, p. 4). As distinct from a relatively integrated, undivided existence the modern person is compartmentalized, specialized and divided.

Homelessness

            One of the psychological consequences of living in plurality is what Berger (1974) calls a condition of homelessness. With the pluralization of both the private and the public spheres of life, "the (modern) individual attempts to construct and maintain a `home world’ which will serve as the meaningful center of his life in society. Such an enterprise is hazardous and precarious" (p. 66). He says that in contrast with previous periods of history where individuals lived in life-worlds that were more or less unified and integrated, the modern person is fragmented and split:

The final consequence of all this (pluralization) can be put very simply (though the simplicity is dece-ptive): modern man has suffered from a deepening condition of "homelessness." The correlate of the migratory character of his might be called a meta-physical loss of "home." It goes without saying that this condition is psychologically hard to bear. It has therefore engendered its own nostalgia . . . in oneself and, ultimately, in the universe (p. 82).

            A third psychological characteristic of the modern person is a heightened self-consciousness. In traditional societies it is a com-pliment to say that a person plays the social role well, the role of father, mother, teacher, etc. There is a congruence between the role and the person; the person really expresses himself or herself through the role. The modern person would feel insulted to be accused of playing a role well; being oneself means to be doing something private, something disconnected from the social roles.

            In this position of self-consciousness there is a great concern for spontaneity. Of course, people who talk about being sponta-neous are those who are not, for somehow spontaneity becomes a self-conscious goal. Nothing will bring about self-consciousness quicker than the statement "Now let’s stop playing roles and really communicate," yet this is the approach of the modern person. The attempt to will spontaneity leads to great confusion.

            A shift has taken place from concern with the object of one’s activity to concern with how one is doing. The position of self-consciousness really is the impossible one of standing apart from oneself to observe oneself doing something: this means that the action will not be smooth or harmonious.

            This habit of self-consciousness has grown in large measure from the principles of modern psychology. The modern ideal is not that of the hero or saint, but of the healthy animal -- the natural, healthy animal. The focus again is on being natural or sponta-neous, and there is the illusion that one can will this, thereby creating the condition of self-consciousness.

The Denial of Death and Limitation

            Martin Heidegger has a section in Being and Time in which he shows how the public collaborates in the person’s fleeing in the face of death (pp. 296-299). Ernest Becker describes the many ways modern persons have of denying death, both in the develop-ment of their own character (pp. 47-66) and in their relationship with others (pp. 127-158). The point to notice in both of these descri-ptions is that the more we attempt to deny death, the more anxiety surrounds it.

            Along with the denial of death, the final limitation, there is a similar attitude toward other limitations, that is, the attitude that one should free oneself from whatever limits one’s possibilities. This at-titude is reminiscent of the earlier point about forgetting one’s tra-dition or history, since that limits one’s current possibilities. How-ever, the attitude toward limits includes even more. In seeking to rid oneself of all determinations, facticities or limitations, the modern person actually undermines his or her possibilities, for these facticities are at the basis of our identity and provide the context within which our possibilities exist. In contrast, the modern person defines freedom as the greatest number of decontextualized options.

Consumerism

            On the other side of these denials is the quest for a sense of well-being. But this is not the ordinary human tendency to self-esteem; rather, it is a shift in attitude, a cultural change. The highest goal being to feel good implies a fundamental change. Rieff describes this change as follows:

That a sense of well-being has become the end, rather than a striving after some superior com-munal end, announces a fundamental charge of focus in the entire cast of our culture -- toward a human condition about which there will be nothing further to say in the old style of despair and hope (p. 261).

            This model of life leads to what Alisdair MacIntyre (1981) has called the rich Aesthete (the consumer consumed by consuming), one of the three ideal characters of modern society. The relation-ship such a person has to the world is that of a customer in a supermarket, the person choosing this or that, even this or that philosophy of life. Such a person may do a lot of choosing, but has completely lost the sense of being chosen for a mission or project of some kind.

The Technical Attitude

            The fifth psychological characteristic of the modern person is the technical or manipulative attitude. The other two ideal chara-cters of modern society mentioned by MacIntyre are the Manager who represents in his character the obliteration of the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations, and the Therapist who represents the same obliteration in the sphere of personal life. Both these characters are preoccupied with the use of technique; they are concerned only with the efficient use of means. Jacques Ellul, has written a most thorough description of this in The Technological Society. He has shown how deeply immersed we are in the technical attitude and how practically everything is enclosed within it.

            The manipulative, technical position is one of mastery over things and people. Perhaps a good example would be the attitude which prompted earlier Americans to conquer the West, to cut down the forests, to tame the wilderness and, in general, to subject nature to technology. This same attitude has been applied to winning friends, becoming self-actualized and even to becoming spiritual. What obviously is missing in the attitude is a receptivity to the world and others. It fits well with the aesthetic or consumer mode since it is geared to getting what one wants.

            This attitude is problematic in as much as it means being in control and reducing everything to a matter of technique. The main question is not "What is it", but "How can I get it?" So, for the modern person, meditation, for example, is not a being in the pre-sence of the Other. It is not even concerned with the Other, but is a technique for lowering blood pressure and for maintaining a sense of well-being. To meditate in this way is not to be meditating, but is a technical attitude, which might be involved in writing a book or taking a walk. All activity is reduced to mastery, efficiency and neutrality. But obviously for authentic living one must be able to transcend technique and the technical attitude. This is a very difficult task for the modern person.

Individualism

            Another commonly acknowledged modern psychological characteristic is individualism. Berger describes this characteristic as follows:

The liberation of modernity has been, above all, that of the individual. Modern social structures have provided the context for the socialization of highly individuated persons. Concomitantly, modern so-ciety has given birth to ideologies and ethical sys-tems of intense individualism. Indeed, it has been suggested that the theme of individual autonomy is perhaps the most important theme in the world view of modernity. The experience of ‘alienation’ is the symmetrical correlate of the same individuation. Put simply ‘alienation’ is the price of individuation (p. 196).

            It is somewhat paradoxical that the stress on the individual is accompanied by a reduction of the individual to a unit or statistic. Whether the individual is reduced to a unit of production as seems to be the case in the East, or to a unit of consumption as is more prevalent in the West, the result is a sense of alienation on the part of the person.

            Berger notes also that the reduction of the individual to a ca-tegory is an arbitrary and unproductive strategy on the part of bu-reaucracies. He contrasts the categorizing of the engineer, where such an activity is appropriate, to that of the bureaucrat, where it is somewhat pointless:

The engineer puts phenomena into little categorical boxes in order to take them apart further or to put them together in larger wholes. By contrast, the bureaucrat is typically satisfied once everything has been put in its proper box (p. 49).

            Consequently, the process of modernization makes it very difficult for the individual to engage in genuine communal com-mitment. Rieff makes this point well:

Positive communities were, according to Freud, held together by guilt; they appear attractive only in distant retrospect, but the modern individual would have found them suffocating. Instead, the modern individual can only use the community as the ne-cessary stage for his effort to enhance himself--if not always, or necessarily, to enrich himself (p. 53).

            The above list of psychological characteristics prompted by modernization, though not exhaustive, provides a general picture of the habitual or fallen mode of the modern person. It is the particular form of inauthenticity shared by modern persons. Ac-cording to Heidegger, inauthenticity is an essential constituent of human existence which, with some modification, may become authentic; in any case, inauthenticity appears as the starting point for change.

            Because any description of habitual or inauthentic modes is bound to seem negative, it is important, too, to take into con-sideration the benefits that have been achieved through mo-dernization. Many of these achievements have been described by Berger:

On the other hand, the unqualified denunciation of the contemporary constellation of institutions and identities fails to perceive the vast moral achieve-ments made possible by just this constellation--the discovery of the autonomous individual, with a dignity deriving from his very being, over and above all and any social identifications. Anyone denouncing the modern world tout court should pause and question whether he wishes to include in that de-nunciation the specifically modern discoveries of human dignity and human rights. The conviction that even the weakest members of society have an inherent right to protection and dignity; the pro-scription of slavery in all it forms, of racial and ethnic oppression; the staggering discovery of the dignity and rights of the child; the new sensitivity to cruelty, from the abhorrence of torture to the codification of the crime of genocide . . . ; the new recognition of individual responsibility for all actions, even those assigned to the individual with specific institutional roles, a recognition that at-tained the force of law at Nuremberg -- all these, and others, are moral achievements that would be unthinkable without the peculiar constellations of the modern world. To reject them is unthinkable ethically. By the same token, it is not possible to simply trace them to a false anthropology (pp. 95-96).

EXISTENTIALITY: THE FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

            At the same time that we find ourselves limited, both in ourselves and by the situation of modernization, and that we are constantly falling into the modern mode of inauthenticity, there is a third fundamental characteristic of being human which Heidegger points out: it is the mode of the possible which he calls "exist-entiality." Authentic living is related most directly to this charact-eristic. We are authentic neither in merely surrendering to the facticity of modernization, nor in calculating and busying ourselves in the modern fallen way, but in discovering and creating our possibilities. In these moments and in this mode the future has the highest priority (Gelven, 1970): "The future is the most determinate and significant of the three ekstases and Dasein’s basic focus of meaning is future" (p. 189).

The Recovery of the Relational Self

            Modern approaches tend to identify the person primarily with his or her ego functioning, with what we have called the inauthentic mode of the person. Modern psychology, for example, is concerned with the prediction and control of behavior, rather than with understanding. There is a whole range of authentic human ex-periences which are omitted from scientific study because they do not meet the requirement of being easily measured. In Human Development and Human Possibility (1986), I attempted to rein-troduce some of these which had been suggested originally by Erik Erikson: hope, will, sense of purpose, competence, commitment, fidelity, love, care and wisdom. These experiences were identified as authentic experiences and always involved the self’s relation-ship with others and the world. Because by modern psychology these authentic experiences have been reduced to such terms as prediction, control, direction, technique, decision, consistency, affiliation, responsibility and information-gathering, modern people tend to identify themselves only with these functional experiences and lose the sense of their authentic, relational selves. Then authentic experiences, which in some sense still remain at the core of our lives and our identity, are relegated to the private sphere.

            It is important for modern persons to recover the sense of self, rather than to consider themselves as units, categories or functional entities. The self, which is both the discoverer and co-creator of meaning needs to be recovered and given a central place in the future. The first step is to affirm that it is in our authentic experiences that our authentic possibilities exist and not primarily in the functional, reduced categories of activity.

MODIFICATION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES TO

            SUPPORT AUTHENTIC SELFHOOD

            Berger questions whether it is at all possible to transcend the modern habitual mode:

There is an underlying paradox in all ideologies that seek to control or contain modernity, a paradox closely related to the phenomenon that we have called cognitive contamination: if one wishes to control modernization, one must assume one has an option and the ability to manipulate. Thus one may opt against modernity and seek to manipulate the processes of modernization. These very ideas, however, are modern--indeed, modernization -- in themselves. Nothing could be more modern than the idea that man has a choice between different paths of social development. One of the most per-vasive characteristics of traditional societies is the notion that there is no choice; that the structures of the given society are inevitable, rooted in human nature, or indeed in the very constitution of the cosmos. Similarly, the notion that the course of human events can be deliberately manipulated and controlled is a specifically modern notion, which is alien to the thinking of most people in traditional societies. Therefore, at least in this one fundamen-tal theme, modern consciousness is a well-nigh irresistible force, and it imposes the theme of option and manipulability even on those who most stre-nuously resist it. (pp. 176-177)

            However, in his use of such modern terms as control, mani-pulation, options, etc., Berger seems himself to be caught in the habitual mode of modern thinking, which Heidegger refers to as "calculative thinking". Berger seems to be unaware of the pos-sibilities of "meditative thinking," which Heidegger describes as:

The mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such thinking remains calculative even if it neither works with numbers nor uses an adding machine or computer. . . . Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is (p. 46).

            He goes on to emphasize the necessity of freeing oneself from the habitual mode of calculative thinking:

The approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking. What great danger then might move upon us? Then there might go hand and hand with the greatest ingenuity in calculative planning and inventing indifference toward meditative think-ing, total thoughtlessness. And then? Then man would have denied and thrown away his own spe-cial nature -- that he is a mediative being. Therefore, the issues is the saving of man’s es-sential nature. Therefore the issue is keeping medi-tative thinking alive. (p. 56)

            In order to envision the types of social structures which will promote an authentic sense of selfhood, it is therefore necessary to free oneself for meditative thinking as well as to avoid remaining entirely encapsulated within the modern habitual mode of thought. In contrast to Berger, it seems not only possible, but necessary to transcend the modern inauthentic mode, to alter it in such a way that a livable future for human beings becomes possible.

            There follows an outline of the requirements to which future social structures must respond in order to promote authentic self-hood:

            - Meaning. In order to encourage a sense of hope, the social structures must provide meaning to the seemingly chaotic and tragic experiences of life, such as death and suffering. Berger describes how modern society has not been successful in addressing this need for meaning, which at the same time has weakened religious interpretations which previously addressed this need:

In one way or another, religion made meaningful even the most painful experiences of the human condition, whether caused by natural or by social agents. Modern society has threatened the plau-sibility of religious theodicies, but it has not re-moved the experiences that call for them. Human beings continue to be stricken by sickness and death; they continue to experience social injustice and deprivation. The various secular creeds and ideologies that have arisen in the modern era have been singularly unsuccessful in providing satisfactory theodicies. It is important to understand the ad-ditional burden to modernity implicit in this. Mo-dernity has accomplished many far-reaching trans-formations, but it has not fundamentally changed the finitude, fragility and mortality of the human condition. What it has accomplished is to seriously weaken those definitions of reality that previously made that human condition easier to bear. This has produced an anguish all its own, and one that we are inclined to think adds urgency and weight to the other discontents we have mentioned. (p. 185)

            - Justice: In addition to a shared sense of meaning, people also require an atmosphere of justice in which their will for the fu-ture, and, consequently, their good will is nurtured. Being assured of their basic human rights, they are enabled to participate in the decisions that affect their culture and its future. The legal and political institutions of the culture are particularly formative in this process.

            - Purpose and occasion: A shared sense of purpose and economic institutions must provide an outlet for the activity of its citizens. Vocations of all kinds to which people are called need to find a place in an economy which assures people a livable wage and a sense of participation in the broader vision of the culture.

            - Competence: The educational institutions need to be structured so as to provide young people with the sense of competency which is so essential to a meaningful human life. Their challenge is to overcome the exclusive emphasis of modern society on technical skills and to raise their sights to a higher level of quality performance. According to Herrigel, Eastern cultures may have an advantage in this area:

One of the most significant features we notice in the practice of archery, and in fact of all the arts as they are studied in Japan and probably in other Far Eastern countries, is that they are not intended for utilitarian purposes only or for purely aesthetic en-joyments, but are meant to train the mind; indeed, to bring it into contact with the ultimate reality. . . . If one really wishes to be master of an art, technical knowledge of it is not enough. One has to transcend technique so that the art becomes an "artless art" growing out of the Unconscious (pp. v-vi).

The reduction of a sense of competence to technique has im-poverished the lives of many modern people and has lead to great dissatisfaction.

            - Commitment without fanaticism: Commitments regarding love and work are essential for a full adulthood.

            "Promises are made because by making them a man puts himself into what he considers a `promising situation.’ . . . He commits his person in the joyful hope of bringing to actuality the promise which he foresees as possible in his life (pp. 11-12). These promises mark the transition from adolescence to adulthood. In addition to providing the contractual bases for marriage and work commitments, social structures need to support people in this giving of themselves to open-ended and permanent commitments. In the West at present, more support is given to experimentation in commitments than to permanences of commitment. Those who wholeheartedly commit themselves to projects and groups need to be rewarded in order to sustain themselves in their commitments.

            With regard to the experience of commitment one of the great dangers is that of fanaticism. The American psychologist, Gordon Allport (1962), has defined commitment as being at one and the same time half-sure and wholehearted; he has stressed the need for remaining open to doubt. Fanaticism subverts the experience by being full-sure and whole-hearted; in the twenty century we seem to have suffered greatly from this tendency. Cultural commitments are needed by the citizens, while guarding against the tendency toward fanaticism.

            - Heritage: Finally, cultural institutions must be modified so as to preserve the wisdom of the culture, particularly the historic ex-perience of its older citizens. The tendency of modern society to identify wisdom with information must be resisted and means must be found to reconnect the present generation with the wisdom of the culture. Universities, libraries and the more everyday structures of storytelling should be encouraged.

            Obviously, all of the above suggestions cannot be carried out by a small group starting from a zero point. As noted above, the modern person for the most part lives an anonymous and a historical life. Modern people have lost the sense of their shared stories or histories and have lost the ability to make sense of their individual stories. It is impossible for each person or a small group to invent culture. Rather, it is necessary to reach back into the past and to recover the traditions which should have been passed from one generation to the next in order to make sense of the current situation. The tradition, naturally, will need to be reinterpreted in terms of one’s vision of the future, but it can provide a much needed context for the continuation of the story.

SUMMARY

            This chapter, following the format of Heidegger’s Care Struc-ture, has attempted to establish that modernization is a major aspect of our facticity, for it is the situation in which we find our-selves. It has attempted to outline some of the major habitual patterns which comprise the particular mode of fallenness to which modern persons are prone. These patterns represent the modern form of inauthenticity, the character of being lost in the "they" or the public interpretation of things.

            In order to move to authentic future possibilities, it has been suggested that it is necessary to modify some of these structures. As Heidegger says: Authentic Being-one’s-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the "they"; it is rather an existential modification of the "they" (p. 168).

            In order to begin the process of modifying the inauthentic mode, some conception of the authentic relational self is necessary as a beginning point. This chapter identified some experiences of the authentic self and distinguished them from the more reduced inauthentic experiences. Finally, some general suggestions were made as to how social structures could be modified so as to support authentic selfhood. This implies a recovery of the cultural tradition and dialogue with it in the light of the future vision of the culture.

REFERENCES

Allport, G.W. (1962). Psychological Models for Guidance. Harvard Educational Review, 32, 373-381.

Becker, E. (1973). The Denial of Death. New York: The Free Press.

Berger, P. et al. (1974). The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness. New York: Vintage Books.

Ellul, J. (1964). The Technological Society. New York: Vintage Books.

Gelven, M. (1970). A Commentary on Heidegger’s "Being and Time". New York: Harper & Row.

Heidegger, M. (1927/1962). Being and Time. (J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, trans.). New York: Harper and Row. (Original work published 1927).

Herrigel, E. (1953/1971). Zen in the Art of Archery. (R.F.C. Hull, tran.). New York: Random. (Original work published 1953).

Knowles, R. (1986). Human Development and Human Possibility: Erikson in the Light of Heidegger. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.

MacIntyre, A. (1981). After Virtue: A Study of Moral Theory. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame.

Rieff, P. (1968). The Triumph of the Therapeutic. New York: Harper & Row.

van den Berg, J.H. (1974). Divided Existence and Complex Society. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.