CHAPTER IX

TAO AND COMMUNICATION:

LAO TZU VERSUS J. HABERMAS

VINCENT SHEN

            In a spirit of contrast between universality and particularity I will present here the concept of Tao according to Lao Tzu, in the form of a comparison with Jürgen Habermas’ critical theory. An image of Lao Tzu as critic of society and of ideology will be intro-duced, a theme relatively seldom developed by contemporary scholars of Taoism. Then concept of Tao and the relation between Tao and man according to Lao Tzu, will be discussed, with the idea of Tao being developed as original communication. Having estab-lished this, Lao Tzu and Habermas will be contrasted with regard to the relations between man and nature, and between man and other man. The latter represents communication in a strict sense, where-as the totality of relations between man, nature, and the trans-cendental order constitutes communication in a broader.

            On the whole, the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas has de-fined the relation between man and nature as labour and technical operation, that between man and other men as interaction and communication, that between man and one’s self as reflection and conscientization. But, in contrast to Lao Tzu, Habermas seems unable to furnish any insight into the relation between man and the transcendental, the metaphysical order. Because he sees any ontological affirmation as falling into the errors of objectivism he wants to avoid all ontological commitments. On the contrary, Lao Tzu seems to give priority to the relation between man and Tao. Having been properly restored, this in turn can justify and har-monize man’s relations with nature, with other men, and with him-self. By our method of contrast,1 we shall try to construct a dia-lectical complementarity between Lao Tzu’s and Habermas’s theories of communication

LAO TZU AS CRITIC OF SOCIETY AND OR IDEOLOGY

            Lao Tzu can be seen as first of all a social critic of his time, his concept of Tao being proposed as a solution to the socio-political and spiritual crisis of his society. By his penetrating criticism, fused with a profound praxis, he established a paradigm of social and ideological criticism for Chinese culture in general. His writings on the Tao and its virtues, entitled the Tao Teh Ching, reveals the image of a society in process of radical change, which witnessed, on the one hand, the disintegration of the social order of ancient China as constituted by Chou Li, the social institutions and the politico-religious rites of the Chou dynasty, and, on the other hand, new social elements emerging but being unable to stabilize themselves as a new social order.

            Viewed from this perspective, even with very few historical accounts about the life of Lao Tzu, a rigorous textual analysis of the Tao Teh Ching would show that its author had composed it in the epoque of Warring States (480-221 B.C.). Therefore we are justified in denying the only narrative tradition concerning Lao Tzu since Ssu-ma Ch‘ien, according to which Lao Tzu was keeper of the Archives at the Chou Court and elder contemporary of Confucius (551-479 BC). On the contrary, the Tao Teh Ching was composed much later than Confucius. For it was in criticizing the society of the Warring States and the ideology of Confucianism that Taoism emerged as a way of thinking, sufficiently vigorous to constitute a deep, fundamental trait of Chinese thought and its attitude towards life and society in general.

            Lao Tzu’s penetrating criticism shows the society of his time to be in a state of disorder in which, according to Lao Tzu’s own words:

The people suffer because their rulers eat up too much in taxes; that is why they starve. The people become difficult to govern because those in authority have too many projects; that is why they are difficult to govern. The people take death lightly because their rulers have too many desires; that is why they take death lightly (ch. 75).2

For Lao Tzu, social problems were produced by the political do-mination of the rulers themselves, rather than by the disproportion between desired values and the means for their realization. As a means of social control in ancient China, Chou Li was in Lao Tzu’s eyes but a form of domination hindering and distorting man’s com-munication with nature, with other men, and, most importantly, with Tao. Thus, Lao Tzu’s writing shows the disorder of society at his time to result from the distortion of free and natural communication through all forms of domination.

            Lao Tzu also criticized the conflicts between states at his time, which were so vehement as to evoke military resolutions re-sulting in ceaseless wars. He said, "When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses have to breed on the border" (ch. 46). "When-ever armies are stationed, briers and thorns become rampant. Great wars are inevitably followed by famines" (ch. 30).

The weapons of war are instruments of evil, and are detested by people . . . war should be regarded as an occasion. When a multitude of people are slaughtered, it should be an occasion for the expression of bitter grief; even when a victory is scored, the occasion should be observed with funeral ceremonies (ch. 31).

Today the echo of these critical words of Lao Tzu today still touches the hearts of many people for whom the cicatrix of war still throbs in bitter memory, while their hearts bleed before the deaths of their beloveds.

            Such Laotsean critical descriptions of social disorder and wars show that they belong to the period of Warring State. But in this social disintegration on a grand scale, new elements tended to emerge, seducing the intellectual activities and desires of many. When the "clan-law" and "well-field" institutions were gradually ob-literated, there arose order to avoid the calamities of wars; people left their land to engage in liberal commercial activities. This greatly intensified the lust for goods and the desire of material success. Lao Tzu clearly perceived this new development as a sign of his time and vehemently criticized it. He said, "There may be gold and jade to fill a hall, but there is none who keep them. To be a porter when one has honor and wealth, is to bring calamity upon oneself." (ch. 9) "Do not raise too high the successful, so that people shall not compete. . . . Do not display objects of desire, so that people’s heart shall not be disturbed" (ch. 3). "Therefore he who has lavish desires will spend extravagantly. He who hoards most will lose heavily."

            In this society there was such great social mobility that a person originally of a low class could become a high ranking official. People sought for fame and position. Intellectuals served political power and became instruments of political domination. People sacrificed their spiritual freedom for the rewards of lustful desire and instrumental rationality. All these were for Lao Tzu but con-sequences of having forgotten Tao. What Heidegger calls Sein-svergessenheit, forgetfulness of Being,3 is for Lao Tzu Tao ver-gessenheit, forgetfulness of Tao. Under these social, political and even spiritual crises people need a way out. For Lao Tzu, an au-thentic way out consists in returning to Tao and following Tao’s own way.

            Lao Tzu was a critic not only of society, but of ideology, es-pecially that of Confucianism. As another main current of Chinese philosophy, Confucianism contains in itself many philosophical and ethical truths, and therefore is not to be treated as an ideology. But it could be ideologized when used by the political community to maintain social order and serve political control, transforming its system of ideas into a kind of fausse consciousness. It was this aspect of Confucianism which was criticized by Lao Tzu. Confucius himself had endeavored to maintain the ancient social order in-stituted by Chou Li. In pre-Confucian China, Chou Li embraced the religious, ethical, political ideals and reality of Chinese life. It re-presented a cultural tradition, and even a comprehensive ideal of human life in general, as had the concept of Paideia for the ancient Greeks. But at the time of Confucius, Chou Li began to lose this deeper meaning while still keeping its superficial meaning as a code of behaviour, institutions and ceremonies. Confucius tried to revitalize Chou Li by translating its ideal meaning into the concept of Jen, which represents the inner sensitive connection between man’s inner self and nature, other men and Heaven. Jen manifests man’s subjectivity and responsibility in and through moral awareness. By promoting Jen, Confucius gave a transcendental foundation to our interaction with nature, with other men and even with Heaven. From the concept of Jen, Confucius then deduced that of Yi, which represented for him moral norms, moral obli-gations, our consciousness of them and even the virtue of always acting according to them. From the concept of Yi, Confucius de-duced that of Li which represented codes of behaviour, religious and political ceremonies and social institutions. Through this pro-cedure of transcendental deduction Confucius tried to reconstitute, and thereby to revitalize, the ethical and social order once con-cretized in the Chou Li.

            As a critic of ideology, Lao Tzu claimed that the code of be-haviour and social institutions of Li were not transcendentally grounded in human nature. Rather they were merely forms of con-straint devoid of any positive meaning which served as means of social domination. One must be emancipated from them in order to regain one’s free existence. Lao Tzu said:

It is only when Tao is lost that virtue arises. When virtue is lost, only then does Jen arise. When Jen is lost, only then does Yi arise. When Yi is lost, only then does Li arise. Li is a superficial expression of loyalty and faithfulness, and the beginning of disorder. Those who are the first to know it have the appearance of Tao, but are the beginning of ig-norance. (ch. 38)

Lao Tzu criticized all means of domination as reflecting the loss of the profound co-belonging of all men to Tao and immobilizing the spontaneous virtue of each individual. The Confucian Jen, Yi and Li are for him but specific determinations of the ontological origin, Tao and its virtues, and often lead to superficial and external develop-ments which totally forget their origin and thereby separate from Tao. In Lao Tzu’s eyes, Confucianism as a solution to the problems of his times contains the following difficulties:

            1. Confucianism emphasizes deliberate actions taken with anthropocentric self-consciousness, and by so doing inclines one to forget the spontaneity of man and its root in Tao. Lao Tzu proposes instead a mindless spontaneous creativity springing from Tao itself as the real solution. Any way out that is separated from Tao loses its source of creativity and hence provides no real solution.

            2. Without creative support from Tao and the spontaneous character of Teh, the Confucian system of transcendental philo-sophy -- which grounded Li in Yi and Yi in Jen in a transcendental manner -- tends towards degradation and degeneration. Jen de-generates into Yi, and Yi into Li. Separated thereby from its onto-logical and transcendental foundations, Li, even when supported by instrumental rationality, still could be determined by lustful desire and therefore cause social conflict.

            3. The social anomie and the commercial civilization created by lustful desire and calculating intellect cannot be improved by a Confucian revitalization of Chou Li, because the heart of people inclines towards freedom and emancipation from all constraints.

            For these reasons, Confucianism, in Lao Tzu’s eyes, was not an adequate solution to the problems of his times. Its tendency towards ideologization had to be criticized by an ultimate reference to each being’s spontaneity, the Teh, and the course of all creativity, the Tao.

            Lao Tzu’s critique of society led him to think of a way out for a society in crisis. His critique of Confucian ideology led him to replace the Confucian conceptual framework of Jen-Yi-Li by an emancipating philosophy of Tao and Teh. His main argument con-sists in pointing out that by nature the human heart tends towards freedom and any adequate solution must be capable of leading people to restore the spontaneity of each person and each being--the Teh -- and its ontological origin--the Tao: Teh is the trans-cendental foundation of our freedom; Tao is its utmost ontological foundation.

THE CONCEPT OF TAO AND THE RELATION BETWEEN TAO               AND MAN ACCORDING TO LAO TZU

            The concept of Tao has long since fascinated the Chinese mind. Etymologically speaking, the Chinese character, "Tao", is composed of two elements: the one signifying a head and the other signifying the act of running or walking along. Together they signify a path or a way for a person or something to run upon or to go along and on which to lead his sights. Used as a verb, the word "Tao" means "to direct", "to guide" and sometimes "to say", "to tell" or "to be told of". The significance of guiding or directing could be ex-tended to mean principle, truth, reason, or even method. The sig-nificance of saying and telling could be extended to mean dis-course, speech and even theory. But these later meanings, which were so important for the Greek concept of "Logos" and for Western philosophy in general, are less important for Lao Tzu and Chinese philosophy.

            Lao Tzu had pushed the meaning of Tao to its most specu-lative level. Thereby the concept of Tao became neither the way followed by something or some person, nor a way out of social, political and spiritual crises, but the Way itself, the ultimate Reality or the Being of beings. But the concept of Being here does not mean negatively, as in Hegel’s Logic, merely beingness, the most impoverished ontological determination without any positive con-tent. It represents rather the act of existence, like the Ipsum Esse of St. Thomas, or the self-manifesting Being of M. Heidegger. It is not even a concept, because treating Tao as a concept equals saying that it is merely a conceptual being, or ens rationis, and thereby reducing Tao to ontic status. That is why Lao Tzu said, "The Tao that could be spoken of is not the eternal Tao; the name that can be named is not the eternal name." (ch. 1)

            This Taoist concept of Tao was crucial to the intellectual his-tory of China in the sense that it replaced the traditional, especially Confucian concept of Heaven (T‘ien) as the ultimate principle of reality. Heaven was the core concept in Confucianism, repre-senting the Ultimate Reality either as a personal God or as the highest metaphysical principle; this gave the concepts of Jen-Yi-Li an ultimate foundation. But in a difficult age such as that of Lao Tzu, it was either difficult for people to believe in an impartial personal God or a highest moral principle, or too easy to believe them in so naive a way that justice could not be done to people’s suffering nor could it be explained. Therefore Heaven came to be interpreted by Lao Tzu as nature. The compound term "Heaven and Earth" is inter-preted by him as the totality of beings, or as the locus in which all things are produced, and the Tao of Heaven is interpreted by him as the laws of nature. All these three are treated by Lao Tzu as de-rivative manifestations of Tao. Only Tao is the ultimate Reality, whereas man, together with all things in the universe, are but ma-nifestations of Tao and have to return thereto.

            In replacing the concept of Heaven by that of Tao, Taoism is in fact a philosophy of secularization. The essence of this secu-larizing process consists in the replacement of belief in a personal God by philosophical speculation on the original self-manifesting Ultimate Reality. In short, it replaced theology by ontology. For Lao Tzu, Tao had priority over God. He said, "Tao seems to have existed before the Lord." God and the realm of beings are all derived from the manifestation of Tao. This would mean, similar to Heidegger, that without first experiencing the manifestation of Being, we could not understand the essence of the divine, and without first understanding the essence of the divine, we do not know the presence of God. Thus the manifestation of Tao is given priority over any belief in God.

            But to replace theology by ontology is not to lose any relation with the transcendental dimension. In this point Lao Tzu is quite different from J. Habermas. For Lao Tzu, the dynamism of Tao’s self-manifestation and man’s relation with it is fundamental for our relation with nature and society. For Habermas, any ontological speculation has to be avoided in order not to commit any object-ivism. Because relation with Tao is the most original and funda-mental of all other relations, Lao Tzu does not think that if God did not exist, everything would be permitted even to the point of committing suicide. As Tao itself is the origin of all communication, it is the foundation of all interaction, and thereby of all kinds of communication.

            According to Lao Tzu, Tao manifests itself through the inter-action of two dialectical moments, the You which represents the moment of ontic manifestation, realization, actuality and sub-stantiality, and the Wu which represents the moment of dissi-mulation, possibility, potentiality and functionality. Through the dialectical interaction of these two moments, Tao begets all beings in a process of differentiation. Lao Tzu said, "All beings are be-gotten by the self-differentiation of the Simple Origin" (ch. 28). "Tao begets One; One begets Two; Two begets Three; Three begets the myriad things. The myriad things carry on their backs the yin and embrace in their arms the yang and through the blending of the material forces (chi), they achieve harmony." (ch. 42) This text articulates a process of differentiation, from one to two, from two to three, and from three to myriad things. It can also be seen as a process of complexification, going from the simple to the complex. Therefore the word "begets" represents not an act of creation from nothingness (Creatio ex nihilo), but only this process of differ-entiation and complexification. This theory is common to practically all Chinese philosophical schools. Chinese philosophy has not conceived any doctrine of creation. It has rather a doctrine similar to what Plotinus called emanation, or the way that Spinoza’s natura naturans self-manifests into natura naturata.

            In self-differentiating into all beings, Tao has initiated the first moment of communication. The second moment of this ontological communication is a process of returning back. All beings, as be-gotten by Tao return to Tao through a process of conversion. Cor-responding to the process of differentiation, is the process of con-version. Lao Tzu said, "All things come into being, and I see thereby their return. All things flourish, but each one returns to its origin. This returning to its origin means tranquility. It is called returning to its destiny. To return to destiny is called the eternal Tao" (ch. 16).

            Tao, in self-manifesting in all beings, still works inside all beings in order that they return back to it. Therefore, differentiation and conversion, this process for to and fro constitutes the original act of communication. Tao in fact is an original communication. The process of communication constitutes also all things and man’s relation to Tao, because differentiation and conversion define our relation with Tao. Lao Tzu summarizes this relation in saying that, "Return to the Simple Origin must be the act of all things, since they are begotten by the self-differentiation of the Simple Origin" (ch. 28). Sometimes he uses the metaphor of the relation between mother and son to illustrate this: "He who has found the mother thereby understands the sons; and having understood the sons still keeps to its mother" (ch. 52). Lao Tzu thereby has well grounded ontologically all the other derivative communications between man and other men, between man and other things. Begotten by Tao and returning to Tao, all beings are ontologically related. We can communicate one with another, because we are all sons of the same mother. Therefore, man’s interaction with nature and society has its ultimate reference to his relation with Tao. Lao Tzu’s theory of communication reveals the priority of its ontological foundation.

            On the contrary, we can find no ontological foundation for Habermas’ theory of communication, at least not explicitly. His objective is to protect the possibility of free and responsible communication against all possible distortion by any political domination which, today, takes the form of technical rationality with all its positivist presuppositions. In criticizing the positivist self-understanding of science and of the nature of rationality, he has pointed out that there exists actually an undeniable relation between the positivist scientific enterprise and traditional ontology. Habermas criticizes the philosophical tradition from Plato and Aristotle to Husserl for presupposing an ontology which assumes the existence of a well-structured and self-subsistent world. Even though Husserl correctly criticized the objectivism of the positivists for having neglected the problem of the constitution of our experience, he himself committed another objectivism in affirming the ideal world of essence. That is, according to the words of J. Habermas, in assuming that he had discovered in the cosmic order an ideal world structure including the prototype of the order of the human world. Only as cosmology was theoria also capable of orienting human action,4 and so he accuses Husserl of having committed another objectivism. In criticizing the ontological pre-supposition of traditional theory from Plato to Husserl, Habermas tries to disengage our cognitive activities from all ontological am-bitions, which he accuses of objectivism. By thus doing, he purposively neglected man’s relation with the transcendental order. The term "transcendental" has for him only an epistemological meaning, or, i his terms a cognitive anthropological meaning, which points to our cognitive interest. This cognitive project or inten-tionality determines in an unconscious way our knowing activities. Thus, the term "transcendental" loses for him lose all ontological implications.

            In this way, his theory of communication has gotten rid of all ontological commitment. Therefore communication becomes for him nothing but a process of argumentation, that is, a process of linguistic communication in which the participants propose their reason-for and reason-against in order to achieve finally a con-sensus upon a commonly accepted valid proposition. Consensus determines also the notion of truth, which for Habermas is deter-mined neither by any logical procedure nor by any ontological presupposition.

            For Lao Tzu in contrast, it is important to emphasize the priority of Tao, its original communicative activity and our relation with it. This kind of metaphysical commitment is just what Ha-bermas wants to avoid in order not to commit any objectivism, But without an explicit ontology, his critical theory is incapable of pro-ducing more positive values. His concept of critique performs the function of emancipating us from all illusions, fausse consciousness and pseudo-truth. But is can never lead us to reality, authentic consciousness and truth. Emancipation is not truth. On the other hand, Lao Tzu, in affirming our relation with the transcendental order and providing us with a practical methodology of attaining the transcendental order through a process of life praxis, provides a paradigm of critique with more positive import.

RELATION BETWEEN MAN AND NATURE:

            WORK AND TECHNIQUE

            The relation between man and nature precedes that between man and other men both for Lao Tzu and Habermas, but for dif-ferent reasons: For Habermas, it is so because, on the one hand, our relation with nature concerns the material production on which our subsistence depends, and, on the other hand, the kinds of interest and rationality which intervene in this relation are most basic to our cognitive project. Habermas defines our relation with nature as a relation of work, in the process of which man employs science and technology in order to explain and transform the internal structures constitutive of the natural world. Therefore our work is for him determined by a technical interest which aims at control of phenomena and domination of nature. Science and technology are "transcendentally" determined by our instrumental and strategetic rationality which implicitly always possesses a certain project of domination and could eventually deform and distort free and responsible communication between man and other men.

            Thus, the concept of nature represents for Habermas the totality of the material constituents susceptible of being structured into new combinations by the interventions of science and te-chnology in the process of work. Even he recognizes, in the article "Science and Technology as Ideology", the possibility of conceiving nature, not as an object of technical control, but as an opposite partner to be encountered in possible interaction. However, this possibility exists not on the level of work, but in an alternative structure of action, namely symbolic interaction in distinction from instrumental rational action.5 Hence, in the world of labour nature is always something to be controlled and transformed by technical means in the work process.

            By contrast, Lao Tzu does not conceive nature as the totality of phenomenon to be structured and manipulated by science and technology. Nature means for him rather the spontaneous rhythm of Tao’s manifestation. The most natural way of doing things is to let the spontaneous virtue of each thing unfold and develop itself. According to Taoism, the laws of nature are not that by which we explain and transform the structure of physical world. For Lao tzu, "Reversion is the action of Tao." Since the term "reversion" in Chinese signifies opposition as well as return, the law of nature contains first, the unity of opposing elements and contrasting moments; and second, the process of returning to Tao.

            For these metaphysical reasons Lao Tzu comes to the same critical attitude towards the dominating tendency of technical objects and techno-structure in general. He hopes that "Though people have technical instruments ten hundred times more powerful and efficacious than man power, they will not use them." These words seem to manifest clearly Lao Tzu’s criticism of machines and technical objects in general. This attitude towards machine and technique is fundamental to Taoism. Chuang Tzu articulates it still more clearly:

Whenever there were machines there would be a mechanized situation, and when there were me-chanized situations, there would be an instru-mentalized mentality. And if there is such an in-strumentalized mentality in one’s breast, one is not completely honest and authentic, in which case the life of his inner spirit wavers and whenever it wavers, support is not being provided by Tao.6

Chuang Tzu calls this "instrumental rationality". According to Ha-bermas, science and technology are the product of man’s in-strumental rationality. He criticizes this kind of rationality for its tendency towards the domination of nature by man. For him, the whole techno-structure is also a hindrance to man’s free commu-nication with others. Chuang Tzu’s criticism is that the use of this in-strumentalized mentality would lose support from Tao. This po-sition has its origin in Lao Tzu, for whom, if man were addicted in the use of this instrumentalized mentality would lose support from Tao. This position has its origin in Lao Tzu, for whom, if man were addicted in the use of technical instruments ten hundred times more powerful and efficacious than man power, this surely would hinder man from returning to Tao. And if man does not return to Tao (or has forgotten Tao), then the use of technical objects and techno-structure in general could lead only to the abuse and do-mination of nature and other men.

            But we must clarify also that the expression "they will not use them (technical instruments)" does not mean absolutely no use of any kind of technical instruments. There was no textual evidence and no sustainable reason for Lao Tzu to reject any use of in-struments or machines. How could a man in a technical civilization exist in such a way so as totally to be rid of any instruments? What Lao Tzu really protested against is the use and abuse of technical instruments or machines without the function of non-being, and thereby the loss of support from Tao. He has recognized and even praised the use of technical objects with the function of Wu.

Thirty spokes share one hub; it is on its non-being that the utility of the carriage depends. Knead clay in order to make a vessel; it is on its non-being that the utility of the utensil depends. Cut out doors and windows in order to make a room; it is on its non-being that the utility of the room depends. There-fore turn being into advantage, and turn non-being into utility (ch. 11).

            What Lao Tzu criticizes clearly is not the use of utensils and instruments itself, but the use and abuse of them without respecting the function of non-being and therefore without support from Tao. In this his criticism of technical objects is different from Habermas. For Habermas, the intervention of technology and machines in the relation between man and nature is itself determined by an interest for domination. But Lao Tzu’s criticism has taken a metaphysical detour. He points to the fact that, without the function of non-being and support from Tao, the use of technology and machines would tend to a forgetfulness of Tao and thereby the domination of nature by man, as well as of man by man.

            Here we discern the priority of Tao which Lao Tzu emphasized. Only with Tao can man achieve the positive use of technical objects and of techno-structure in general. But this kind of metaphysical and ontological presupposition is just what J. Ha-bermas wants to avoid. For Habermas, all metaphysical assump-tions and all ontological affirmations commit the error of ontolo-gism. This deliberate avoidance of any metaphysical foundation renders Habermas’ critical theory impotent in creating more po-sitive values out of his negative criticism.

            In contrast, Lao Tzu emphasizes the metaphysical found-ation and ideal essences as fundamental to all critical movement. For him, only truth can render authentic emancipation, and truth is the manifestation of Tao. Only Tao’s manifestation could justify the ontic world and our critical activities in it. "There was a beginning of the universe which may be called the Mother of the universe. He who has found the Mother (Tao) thereby understands her sons (all things), but having understood the sons, still keeps to its mother, will be free from danger throughout his lifetime" (ch. 52). This is the best description of the relation between Tao and all things, technical objects included. All criticism of the technical world ultimately has to be grounded in a deeper knowledge of this re-lationship.

RELATION BETWEEN MAN AND OTHER MEN: INTERACTION               AND COMMUNICATION

            Generally speaking, J. Habermas has the merit of having clarified the relation between man and other men as a process of interaction through which men communicate one with another in order to achieve a meaningful life. Chinese philosophy also has long since emphasized the relation with one’s fellow men. The epigram cherished by the Verbiest Foundation, "Within the four seas all men are brothers" could best articulate the Chinese vision of the relation between man and other men. It is very interesting to note that, according to the philosophy implied in its etymological constitution, a saint in Chinese means some one who knows best to communicate, for the Chinese character of "saint" is composed of a first part signifying ears, which listen and thereby receive me-ssages, and a second part signifying mouth, which talks and there-by transmits messages to men. A saint is therefore a model of perfect communication. Here I will not enter into detail on the doctrines of Lao Tzu and Habermas on communicative action be-tween man and other men, but will concentrate on the contrast between their different attitudes towards the problem of linguistic communication. In general, Lao Tzu criticized linguistic communi-cation and proposed a more original and authentic mode of commu-nication; whereas for Habermas communication means first of all linguistic communication through a process of arguing and of ren-dering reason in order to obtain consensus between different participants.

            In chapter 80 of the Tao Teh Ching, Lao Tzu said, "Let the people again knot cords and use them (in place of writing)." These few words concerning Lao Tzu’s preference of knotting cords over that of writing reveals his fundamental attitude towards linguistic communication. Cord knotting constitutes a system of signs serving for communication before the invention of the writing system. We communicate for example the importance of an event according to whether we make a big knot or a small knot. Both cord knotting and writing are systems of signs invented by man for the purpose of communication. Their difference consists in the fact that the signs constituted by cord knotting are not sufficiently abstract, con-ceptual and systematic, but serve only to communicate in a very immediate and limited way. By contrast, the invention of writing has created more conceptual, systematic and even fixed ways of communication. It has the advantage of being able to communicate a message through a fixed and somehow abstract medium, and thereby transcends the limitation of space and time to the point of attaining what P. Ricoeur calls "the semantic autonomy of the text."7

            Writing has a life of its own in the sense that once written, it could endure over thousands of years and miles to be deciphered and interpreted by a competent reader in another space and time. It is by this autonomy of text that we could enjoy today the reading of Lao Tzu’s text. But the system of writing has also many deficiencies. It often dissimulates the true meaning and serves to dominate rather than communicate. It is not without historical rea-son that the system of writing was invented in the epoque of emerging empires, where it served to transmit political and military order through relatively long spatial and temporal distances. Moreover, as Plato has pertinently pointed out in th Phaedrus, writing is as inert as a picture; it cannot respond to the reader’s reactions. If you ask it any question it can only keep its same manner as an impoverished and abstract system of signs; it can never respond with an answer. It can neither pay respect to the readers, nor protect itself against any insult.8 As we know, Plato criticized writing from the point of view that dialogue is active, responsive and dialectical, whereas writing is but a remedy to resist the wear and tear of time. It is merely a technique of reminding, but cannot produce any reminiscence of ideas. J. Derrida also has criticized the system of writing as the product of logocentric civilization and as internally connected with representational thinking, metaphysical rationality and social domination.9

            Therefore, Lao Tzu seems to be justified in criticizing the use of the conceptual, systematic, fixed way of communication through the medium of writing, and in proposing to return to the immediate way of communication by knotting cords, in which the message is communicated and deconstructed once the meaning has been constructed. Writing can only be representation, not presentation. It is fixed and inert, not active and living. It can serve to record, not to perceive. That is why it could lead to Tao-forgetfulness. Under the reign of Tao-forgetfulness, linguistic communication could not become authentic. Hence, for Lao Tzu, communication with Tao has priority over linguistic communication and can render it meaningful.

            By contrast, J. Habermas emphasizes the priority of linguistic communication. He derives his notion of communicative com-petence from what N. Chomsky calls "linguistic competence". For Habermas intersubjectivity is to be constituted by linguistic com-munication,10 in which process participants propose their own reasons -- for the reasons -- against through the use of language and arrive finally at certain consensus after a process of inter-action.11 So called "rationality is based on the intersubjective con-sensus obtained through the process or linguistic communication, not on any ontological foundation or on any human subjectivity.12

            Habermas’ theory of communication uses the linguistic model to replace the model of consciousness used in modern philo-sophy since Descartes. Rationality is not constituted by the struc-ture of consciousness or subjectivity. On the contrary, it is con-sidered as an outcome of the act of rendering reason (Regrundung) through linguistic communication. Only through this process could one legitimately obtain intersubjective recognition of valid state-ments. In short, communication is interpreted by Habermas as a process of linguistic argumentation.

            Lao Tzu, contrary to Habermas, does not think that any au-thentic communication could be attained through linguistic argu-mentation, that is, through the process of argumentative interaction between the reason -- for or against -- in order to formulate a common ground of rationality and to achieve thereby consensus. An authentic communication must base itself on Tao, which tran-scends all linguistic Begrundung. If people could return to Tao, they could communicate with each other even without speech and writing. This is similar to what M. Heidegger says in Being and Time, that since authentic communication consists in sharing the same Mitbefindlichkeit and Mitverstehen, there could be com-munication even in silence.13 Sometimes silence is more eloquent than speaking; in everyday experience there are situations in which we have complete sharing of meaning without any intervention of language.

            Therefore Lao Tzu’s proposition that "Let the people again knot cords and use them (in place of writing)" must be interpreted as proposing a prelinguistic, pre-written mode of communication grounded in perfect communion of Tao. In the matter of com-munication, the essential teaching of Lao Tzu consists in an original and direct way of communication supported by the communion with Tao. It does not matter which medium one chooses.

CONCLUSION

            In concluding I want first of all to point out the fact that Lao Tzu’s critique of society and of ideology is always accompanied by a praxis of life which could disengage him from all illusions, fausse consciousness and pseudo-truth, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, bring him back to a communion with Tao in which he could be sure of reality, authentic consciousness and truth. There-fore his criticism is related to a universal praxis, which could finally grasp the essence of things by letting them manifests their own being, not by grasping the essence of things within a dominating subjective regard. This praxis of life through profound self-re-flection is the basis of all social and ideological criticism. Even those cognitive interests criticized by Habermas could be reduced by this praxis. Compared with Lao Tzu, Habermas, even when he has the merit of pointing out that reflection is not merely theo-retization, and praxis not merely application of theories to control phenomenon, does not furnish any vision of the praxis of life. Hence his critique has only the function of negativity without being able to emancipate us in truth. Lao Tzu’s example revealed to us that all criticism must start with life praxis and lead to life praxis. Theory is always connected with praxis because it is begotten by praxis and leads to praxis. Lao Tzu has never treated mere criticism as praxis. Only a praxis of life leading to an ultimate communication with Tao would be for him the real way of praxis. Criticism is by essence the act of transpassing any deficient situation of oneself and world. In short, Lao Tzu emphasizes the metaphysical foundation and ideal essences as fundamental to all critical movement. For him, only truth could render authentic emancipation, which truth is the manifestation of Tao. Only the manifestation of Tao through our life praxis could justify the ontic world and our critical activities therein.

            Secondly, in analyzing Lao Tzu’s text we must always pay attention to the apparent contradiction between its literal and its dialectical meaning. For example, in chapter 80 of the Tao Teh Ching we read, "Yet the people there may grow old and die without ever interacting one with another." This statement does not mean an absolute negation of communication, and thereby deny the essential constitution of society. It implies rather a more profound layer of meaning, which affirms the communion with Tao or man’s returning to Tao as the first condition sine qua non for all kinds of interaction and communication. Taking this as a premise, it is natural that, on the relation between man and nature, Lao Tzu does not agree with any use of technique and instruments for the control of natural processes. His position is that man should not limit himself to the domination of nature by instrumental rationality, because this would hinder him from returning to Tao and result thereby in Tao-forgetfulness. As to the relation between man and man, Lao Tzu thinks that priority must be given to the spiritual communion with Tao and then, with this as the basis, to the establishment of a kind of spiritual community in which people could communicate originally and directly with one another, trans-cending all the constraints of language.

            As a whole, Lao Tzu criticizes, as does Habermas, man’s domination over nature and society. But Habermas differs from Lao Tzu for whom domination can be avoided only by communion with Tao. Habermas much emphasizes the argumentational, and there-fore dialogical, aspect of communication. In consequence this ne-glects either that the agreement reached through communication results in mere compromise, or that the critical function itself becomes shared negation, without any positive grounding in truth.

            By contrast, Lao Tzu has well established the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of communication and social interaction. For him even frequent interaction between human beings could become devoid of any significance, and could even-tually lead to total conflict -- even war -- should man be deprived of a meaningful life in communion communication, and his texts do convey the impression of a monologue. As Chuang Tzu said, Lao Tzu seemed "to dwell in utter calm in solitude with the gods and spirits."14 But let me synthesize by saying that an authentic man in communion with Tao must be also a man who truly knows how to dialogue with others. The metaphysical order is not only prior to the socio-political order, but must also justify and fulfill our socio-political existence. Our effort to establish an authentic relation with the transcendental order through a process of life praxis could eventually fill our life with meaning, to the point that we could realize free and responsible communication with our fellow men.

NOTES

            1. Vincent Shen, "Method, History and Being -- A Philosophy of Contrast" in Universitas, 8 (1993), 190-200.

            2. All texts of Lao Tzu quoted here are translated from the original Chinese texts in The Works of Lao Tzu, with commentaries by Wang Pih (Taipei: Hsin Shing Book Store, 1963). The number of the quoted chapters immediately follows the text cited.

            3. M. Heidegger, Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1972), p. 336' "Uber den Humanismus" in Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1964), p. 159.

            4. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 306.

            5. J. Habermas, "Technology and Science as `Ideology’" in Toward a Rational Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), pp. 86-90.

            6. Chuang Tzu, Works (Original Chinese Texts), ch. 12 (Taipei: World Book Co., 1982), p. 194.

            7. P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Austin, Texas: Texas University Press, 1976), pp. 25-28.

            8. Plato, Phaedrus, 275a-277.

            9. J. Derrida, De la grammatologie (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967), pp. 11-12, 15-41.

            10. Habermas calls it "linguistically established intersubjectivity". Cf. J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, p. 396.

            11. "The rationality proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to the practice of argumentation as a court of appeals that makes it possible to continue communicative action with other means when disagreement can no longer be headed off by everyday routines and yet is not to be settled by the direct or strategic use of force." Ibid., 17-18.

            12. "If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination is established through communication and in certain spheres of life, through communication aimed at reaching agreement, then the production of the species also requires satisfying the condition of a rationality inherent in communicative action." Ibid., p. 397.

            13. M. Heidegger, Sein and Zeit (Tubingen: Neomarius, 1953), pp. 155-157, 162-166.