CHAPTER VIII

THE MODERNIZATION OF CONFUCIANISM

-- A Discussion of the Cultural Change from Consanguineous Feeling to District Concern

PETER KUN-YU WOO

            Modernization is a relative procedure in which traditional and contemporary life styles encounter each other with the aim of en-gendering a transformation relevant for the present situation. It is relative because it is only a stage of development within the historical continuum. For example, in the Western world, the Hellenistic culture was traditional, and Rome was modern according to the standpoint of the Roman Empire, but for the Middle Ages, Rome became traditional and Christianity was modern. Likewise, in Chinese history, the Chin Dynasty was modern as compared to Pre-Chin dynasties, whereas it became traditional with regard to the Han Dynasties. Thus, modernization, though relative, is nevertheless valid for all time because traditional wisdom needs to be rejuvenated in order to cope with the life style of a certain time. The term modernization also signifies the prolongation of tradition with the addition of some new spirits as contributed by certain temporal conditions. For example, when ideas from the Hellenistic period were transmitted to the Middle Ages there was an amalgamation of philosophy and faith so as to give birth to a new spirit which enabled Christianity to flourish in the Western world. In a similar manner, in China Buddhism was the new stimulant which invigorated the sus-tenance of the Confucian and Taoist traditions in the Sui and Tang Dynasties. Thus, modernization is by no means anti-traditional or non-traditional; on the contrary, it is coherent and coincident with tradition in the historical continuum.

Traditional Culture

            Without doubt Confucianism belongs to the Chinese tradi-tional cultural heritage. It concerns political, social, moral, philoso-phical and cultural affairs. From the anthropocentric point of view Confucius (551-479 BC) insists that personal individual perfection is situated within the notion of "Chun-tzu" (gentleman), whereas interpersonal communal perfection is manifested through the no-tion of "Shen-jen" (sage). The philosophy of life is the focus of Confucianism which is built around moral-praxis. The question of how to live like a "Chun-tzu" and like a "Shen-jen" becomes the ul-timate concern of the Confucians throughout Chinese history. The Confucian ideal society is visualized through the notion of the "Tatung-world" -- a cosmopolitan universalism in which all men live fraternally together like one big family. Universal brotherhood means interpersonal fraternal love all over the world. In Li-chi (The Book of Rites) it was said:

When the Great Tao prevails, the communal so-ciety is verified under Heaven and Earth. The vir-tuous and the potent are chosen for public offices. Fidelity and harmony are valued by all. People not only love their own parents and children, but also ensure that the old live their last years happily; adults are employed usefully, children are reared properly. . . . This is called the Age of Ta-tung.1

            In the ideal society, all men are not only equal but are also immune from all natural and artificial pains and passions. Equality is upheld not so much from the viewpoint of innate human nature, but from that of the benevolence of the stronger towards the weaker. Immunity from pains and passions is likewise achieved due to fraternity and charity in social life.

            The Confucian doctrine neither maintains the innate equality of man nor sees him as born for beatitude. Confucius himself makes a classification of man according to his talents and surroundings. Some are wise and some stupid; some are rich and others poor. But, instead of complaining about all these inequalities Confucius rather insists that interpersonal cooperation can take place among all men ranging from the wise to the stupid, from the rich to the poor. In regard to the political and social sphere he emphasizes that the government should be run by the virtuous.

            Once Mencius was asked about humanity and about the difference between man and animal. He said:

Between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between old and young, a proper order; and between friends, fidelity.2

For Mencius interpersonal relationships show the essence of humanity. Hence he gives a definition for humanity not from the substantial standpoint, but from that of interpersonal human re-lationships.

            Thus, Confucian doctrine insists on charity both from the vertical viewpoint and from the horizontal, i.e. from the viewpoint of the government towards its people, and from that of one person towards another. Man has to learn to practice charity in daily life. In Ta-Hsueh (The Great Learning) Confucius shows the way of learning:

The Tao of Great Learning consists in illustrating illustrious virtue, in loving people, in resting in the highest Good. . . . The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue under Heaven (the whole world), first ordered well their own state. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons.3

The ideal society which Confucius intends to build would be verified through the perfection of different levels such as: personal cul-tivation of virtue, family regulation, order in the state, and peace in the whole world.

Consanguinity and Affectivity

            Concerning the process of perfection starting from the in-dividual person to the whole world, there are two mediate stations: the family and the state. The family consists of one’s heritage by consanguinity and marriage; it is characterized by generation. The state can be enlarged by families and tribes; it is bound together by blood relationships or by social contracts like the one that Jean-Jacques Rousseau described in modern time.

            In an agricultural society, because of the spontaneity of inter-subjectivity, people live together in their consanguineous rela-tionship. Multi-generational families enlarge themselves into tribes and clans. People encounter one another within five types of inter-personal relationship which Mencius considers to be the cha-racteristics which differentiate man from animal. These five types of relationship are those between father and son, between sovereign and minister, between husband and wife, between the old and the young, and, last but not least, between friends.4 In an agricultural society these five types of relationship really include every possible kind of interpersonal relationship and are well-known by everyone. Therefore it is not difficult to recognize the five coherent inter-personal virtues, namely, affection between father and son, right-eousness between sovereign and minister, separate functions be-tween husband and wife, proper order between the old and the young, fidelity between friends.5

            Thus, the Chinese traditional social order in the ancient agricultural society was rooted deeply in this familiar tribal moral re-lationship. The natural consanguineous relationship and its com-panion moral virtues were enough to sustain social order. There would be no need for the promotion of any religious com-man-dments or institutional laws in order to build up the society or to maintain social life.

            From the personal cultivation of virtues to the regulation of family, and from the regulation of family to the promotion of order in the state, there is only one central term, namely the con-sanguineous-affective relationship. This consanguineous-affective culture was characteristic of Chinese traditional thought, especially of Confucian moral philosophy.

            Confucius spoke of the metaphysical foundation of this con-sanguineous-affective culture, in a very condensed form:

What Heaven has conferred is called nature; accord with nature is called Tao; the regulation of Tao is called instruction.6

Heaven here perhaps means some transcendental divinity. Men-cius offered an axiom with regard to the relation between man and Heaven, between man and parents, and between man and things:

Serve the Heaven. Be affectionate to parents, love people, be kind to creatures.7

This moral obligation in traditional Confucian ethics seem to be both transcendental and immanent, theistic and anthropocentric.

            Thus, the consanguineous-affective culture has its foundation both in metaphysical sophistication and in its praxis-orien-tation. However, Confucians, especially in modern times, con-centrate rather on practice. The traditional axiom "to know is difficult; to do is easy,"8 reveals the practical characteristics of the ancient Chinese philosophical spirit.

            The general question of moral philosophy after Confucius and Mencius is therefore not "Why should one do good?", but "How can one be good?". The investigation of the ethical principle was delayed. So, charity would be practiced only because of the con-sanguineous-affective relationship, not because of any sub-stantial or essential characteristics of the human person. The essential content of Mencius’ definition about humanity was inter-preted only in the light of interpersonal human relationships without any con-sideration of the human substance or its objective dignity. Furth-ermore, interpersonal relationship has its function only because of consanguinity and affection, not because of rationality or legality. Man cherishes friendship and warm-heartedness only because he has affection. In other words, man acts friendly because he lives in an affective world. All interpersonal rites and rituals which are practiced in the ancient society manifest warmth and politeness because of this affection. The social structure supports and protects this kind of interpersonal relationship.

            I do not mean that, in the ancient Chinese society, there was only an agricultural structure without commerce or technology. However, I do mean that agriculture formed the main structure of traditional Chinese society for over two thousand years. This began from the Shan Dynasty (18th century B.C.) and lasted for many centuries until recent times. It should be emphasized then that traditional Chinese social structure subsists mainly in consanguinity and affection.9

Functional Relations

            The fruitful and valuable function of this praxis-orientation was carried out by the Chinese Confucian tradition for over 2,000 years. Consequently, it contributes to the tranquility, peace and progress of traditional Chinese society. It promotes the benevolent and frugal character of the Chinese people. But, with the challenge of Western technology and commerce, commercial cities and technical districts emerge day-by-day in contemporary Chinese society. The social attitude deteriorates rapidly from being con-sanguineous and affectionate to indifference and alienation. The most prominent type of interpersonal relationship is that among strangers. People live together not because of consanguinity, but because they share the same profession: this relationship between people lacks affection. That is the typical urban life-style in a technical commercial culture. The simple interpersonal relationship of the former family-centered society is not sophisticated enough to face this complex structure.

            The ethical question "How should I be kind to my neighbor?" changes into "Why should I be kind to my neighbor?". The tra-ditional categorical imperative "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth"10 evidently cannot sustain interpersonal relationship in the combative society caused by technology and commerce.

            The metaphysical approach of Mencius’ five types of rela-tionship has an ethical practical function, but it cannot resolve the difficulties raised by the combative society in which a new type of relationship emerges, namely that among strangers and enemies.

            The Mosaic commandment "Love your neighbor!"11 was well practiced by Confucians for over 2,000 years. The commandment of Jesus Christ, "Love your enemies,"12 was also fairly known by the Confucians. It is true that the Confucianists upheld the virtues of tolerance: that "injury should be recompensed with kindness"13 was true in theory and in practice. But there is a lack of any meta-physical motivation, i.e. there is ignorance of the substantial in-dividuality of the enemy, who in Christianity is known as the Image of God and an object of redemption. Human dignity as recognized explicitly by Western philosophy is the metaphysical foundation of the social legal structure, in which all men are equal because of their origin. The philosophical problem of the arché or origin is valid and useful here.

            In technical and commercial society the ethical principle "Do not do to others as you would not wish others to do to yourself!"14 has of course the passive function of avoiding or diminishing evil, but social order surely requires a more active principle to promote good for common life. There should be such an ideal as "anyone who wishes to be established himself, must seek first to establish others; anyone who wishes to be enlarged himself must seek first to enlarge others!"15

            In the consanguineous-affective society it was easy to understand and to practice the above-mentioned passive principle. But, for the active principle, how can man in a competitive society abandon egocentric values and accept an altruistic view without first understanding the principle of equality which reflects the notion of Image of God?

            The Confucian philosophy does not exert itself through sophistication, i.e., it does not endeavor to look for the meta-physical foundation of the theory of man as Image of God so as to give an explanation for human dignity and the equality of mankind. In consequence, the consanguineous-affective relationship which was valued in traditional agricultural society loses its validity in contemporary technical-commercial society. One might defend oneself for struggling or for aggressive action with the following reasons:

            a. "I do not know him; why should I yield to him?" As the categorical imperative about one’s relationship towards strangers is not explicitly expounded in Confucianist theories, the common people were not prompted to do good for strangers.

            b. "If I yield to him, he would not yield to me; so I suffer loss." Naive egocentricism would scarcely be transcended without supernatural motive.

            The first example reflects the consanguineous and affective effect of interpersonal relationships. The second, however, has its psychological foundation in human behavior. In traditional agri-cultural society, one was accustomed to wait for the same yielding when one yielded. But in modern society, the expected yielding does not come spontaneously. One becomes disillusioned and begins to develop a defensive attitude: no more yielding, but combat and even struggle. Both culturally and psychologically we can explain the combative phenomena of our society today.

            The genuine Confucian theory contained only the consan-guineous-affective relationship, which was had in traditional agri-cultural society, but did not continue its influence in the modern technical commercial society.

            The sentence "Injury should be recompensed with kind-ness"16 certainly reveals the implicit significance of one’s love to-wards strangers and even towards enemies. However, the question arises of "How to have sufficient reason and motivation to justify and realize the above-mentioned axiom?" From the anthropocentric point of view, is it enough to maintain that the ethical postulate exists within human nature? Or, does it require some more profound reasons such as religious retribution or some kind of samsara? In folk religion, the common people believe in retribution after death according to good or evil acts one has done in this life. Seeking eternal beatitude and to avoid evil forever might be a sufficient motivation to urge one to fulfill ethical obligations. In this light Confucian theory from Confucius on till historian Ssuma Chien (145-86 B.C.) was ignorant about life after death.

            The fifth relationship "Fidelity between friends" by Mencius must be indefinitely enlarged, not only to allthe acquaintance, but also to the strangers and even to the enemies. The Buddhistic predestined relationship (pratyaya) might be held in such an understanding.

            The Confucian school as the main philosophical stream had two periods of development in Chinese history: one was the Pre-Chin period in which Confucius and Mencius grounded the genuine Confucianism; the other was the Sung-Ming period which was in a certain sense a response to the challenge caused by Buddhism. In these two periods, Confucianism remained intact and was free from the infiltration of other schools of thought in the Pre-Chin period, and then from Buddhistic influence inthe Sung-Ming period. On the contrary, in the second period, it managed to build up a new theory called Neo-Confucianism, which was the result of the dialogue among Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism.           

            Now Confucianism has to face the challenge of Western science and technology. This challenge is not per se dangerous; but if Confucianism loses its spiritual heritage in exchange for material values, then there will be a crisis for Chinese culture.

            In the Lu-shih Ch’un-ch’iu, a compendium of various schools of philosophy written in the third century B.C., there is a chapter titled "The Value of Agriculture". In this chapter a contrast is made between the mode of life of people who are engaged inthe "root" occupation -- the farmers, and that of those who are engaged in the "branch" occupation -- the merchants. The farmers are primitive and simple and therefore always ready to accept commands. They are childlike and innocent and therefore unselfish. Their material properties are complex and difficult to move, and therefore they do not abandon their country when it is in danger. Merchants, on the other hand, are corrupt and therefore not obedient. They are trea-cherous and therefore selfish. They have simple properties which are easy to transport, and therefore they usually abandon their country when it is in danger.18

            Here the author of this chapter obviously maintains that the mode of life of the farmers is far superior to that of the merchants. Herin lies the value of agriculture. This value is verified in fact through more than two thousand years in Chinese history. In the social change agriculture diminished day by day, whereas trading by merchants flourished. That is just the step of modernization. Our problem lies well not in "How to change the situation?", still less in "How to return to the agricultural form of life?" but in the question "How can we accept modernization and diminish the bad effect of the commercial society?" or "How can we live in a commercial so-ciety and still preseve the good value upheld in the agricultural society?"

            It seems advisable to propose the following tentative pro-gramm:

            (a) Transcend the theoretical sphere of Neo-Confucianism of Sung, Ming and Ch’ing Dynasties (960-1912) and concentrate on its practical side in which man participates in social affairs, being concerned with social welfare like those charitable acts of Christians.

            (b) Abandon anthropocentrism in favore of a metaphysical and transcendental standpoint to support the motive of ethical praxis.

            (c) To avoid the anthropocentrism, one must accept the doc-trine of original sin, i.e. human nature is born with evil tendency, and in fact human history is full of evils, sufferings and pains. Hu-man being is not ontologically causa sui nor morally self-sufficient. The criterion for good and evil does not depend on man, human being cannot redeem himself. Redemption for human being comes from outside, just like the fact that his existence is caused by the external divinity.

            (d) Although human being is ontologically ens ab alio and therefore a dependent being, the theory of the Image of God reveals, however, the supreme dignity and infinite value of the hu-man person. Human being does not derive his value from inter-personal relationship because human being cannot be the found-ation of himself. Human value lies in his own humanity which is related to the supreme being from whom all men participate their essence and existence. The definition of humanity lies, therefore note only in interpersonal relationship (as Mencius maintains) but also in the human essence.

            Properly speaking, from Confucius on, the relationship be-tween Heaven and man is often discussed. In his Analects, Confucius himself had frequently confessed that he believe in God. This was especially evident when he faced the ultimate limit of his life.

            (e) In the process of modernization it should be very useful to uphold the Confucian traditional heritage. If we adopt the sab-batical system, it means not only that Sunday is a holiday, but also that it is day of spiritual exercise for fraternal love which is to be extended from consaguinity to strangers, from the beloved to the enemies, so as to fulfill the ultimate goal of Confucianism -- the Ta-tung world (the Great Commonwealth of Peace and Prosperity).

NOTES

            1. Li-chi (The Book of Rites), chap. Li-yun.

            2. The Works of Mencius, BK. III, PT. I, chap. IV, ver. 8.

            3. The Great Learning, a text of Confucius.

            4. The Works of Mencius, BK. op.cit.

            5. Op.cit.

            6. The Doctrine of the Mean, chap. I, ver. 1.

            7. The Works of Mencius, BK. VII, PT. I, chap. 1, ver. 2.

            8. Shu-ching (The Book of History), Shio-ming.

            9. This structure can be seen in Chinese societies, mainly in the associations for common ancestry and for fellow countrymen overseas in technologically developed nations.

            10. 2 Moses, 21, 24; Math, 5, 38.

            11. Mt., 19, 19.

            12. Mt., 5, 24.

            13. Confucian Analects, BK. XIV, chap. 38, ver. 1.

            14. Op. cit., BK. XII, chap. 2.

            15. Op. cit., BK. VI, chap. 18, ver. 1.

            16. Op. cit., BK. 14, chap. 38, ver. 1.

            17. If this was not the case, Ssu-ma Chien would not have complained about providence when he wrote the history of Po-I who was clever and virtuous, but suffered from hunger and death.