CHAPTER XIII

CHAPTER XIII

THE KUNG-SUN LUNG TZU AND

WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

ZHOU CHANGZHONG

A SPECULATIVE SYSTEM OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

The philosophy of the Kung-sung Tzu (hereafter cited as the KSLT) was speculative in nature. This is due firstly to its having presented its ontology and epistemology in a purely formal manner, and on this basis having built as its main body a philosophy of language and logic. Secondly, it was constructed in terms of a set of abstract categories, many of which were strictly defined, such as "wu" (thing, matter), "shih" (actuality, individual), "chih" (concept), "wei" (order, class).

KSLT was a philosophy of understanding in the Kantian senset. This is extremely important for it to be considered a do-ctrine of reason in the Kantian sense one could conclude that it is sophistic. This philosophy of understanding can be understood in two ways. Firstly, it developed around a centre, i.e., the knowing and grasping the essence ("wei" as order) of empirical individuals ("wu", "shih") by concepts ("chih") within the sphere of "concepts of understanding, the phenomenal world and theoretical knowledge of phenomenal world." In this connection, it strove to grasp the definiteness characteristic of understanding as thinking. Secondly, it established the autonomy of qualities (such as hardness, white-ness) as a part of the universal world.

KSLT was an analytic philosophy of language. On the one hand, it constructed ontology and epistemology by way of linguistic analysis. On the other hand and on this basis, it elaborated a philosophical doctrine of language itself. At the same time, many chapters of the KSLT are presented in the style of a dialogue. The question expresses ordinary usage in natural language, which forms the material; to this the Kung-sung Lung answers through a linguistic analysis and clarification. That is, it adapts the method of linguistic philosophy to analyze the ordinary usage of natural language.

KSLT was a systematic philosophy, not only materially, but also in a rigorously formal sense. This included two aspects. Firstly, it appeared in a systemic structure. The philosophy consisted of four parts: ontology, epistemology, philosophy of language and logic, together forming a theoretical system. As a structure those theories stood in a relatively definite relation with an inherent logical interdependence. The ontology acted as a basis and logical starting point for this entire philosophy. It established a two-world reality consisting of individual things and universals (as classes of individuals and qualities). The emergence of the world of substance entailed opposition between subject and object. This led in turn to an epistemology distinguishing sensibility and understanding, and working out the principles of the latter. Within the framework of the ontology and epistemology, a philosophical theory of language was developed with the well-known thesis: "white horse is not horse" as its center and inquiring deeply into the relation between name and actuality as its underlying context. In the course of this linguistic analysis, some logical ideas were generated. Secondly, the set of categories formed a structured system. For example, "shih" was restricted, and was individualized as "wu"; "wei" came into being along with "shih". If the structure of the theories was the "surface structure" of the philosophy of the KSLT, then the structure of the category system was its "deep structure".

In close connection with this systematic character is the sequence of the five chapters, except the chapter "Jifu" (Biography) on Kung-sun Lung’s life. This has been a focus of attention on the part of the scholars in research regarding KSLT, for it shows that great care has been paid to its systematic character. The arrange-ment of the five chapters arranged reflects the fundamental view of KSLT. Several arrangements are given here.

(a) Bai-ma lun (On White Horse), Chih-wu Lung (On Concept and Thing), Tong-bian Lun (On the Explanation of Change), Jian-bai Lun (On Hardness and Whiteness), Min-shih Lun (On Name and Actuality) (the Tao-tsang version);

(b) Bai-ma Lun, Jian-bai Lun, Chinh-wu Lun, Tong-bian Lun, Min-shih Lun (Fung Yu-lang);

(d) Jian-bai Lun, Chih-wu Lun, Mih-shih Lun, Tong-bian Lun, Bai-ma Lun (Du Guo-yang); and

(e) Chih-wu Lun, Min-shih Lun, Jian-bai Lun, Bai-ma Lun, Tong-bian Lun (Hou Wai-lu).

Based on the analysis of the deep and surface structures of the philosophical system of the KSLT, the present study orders the chapters in the following sequence: Min-shih Lun, Jian-bai Lun, Chih-wu Lung, Tong-bian Lun, Bai-ma Lun. This implies that, roughly speaking, the world of individuals was set up in Min-shih Lun. Quality as being in itself was established in Jian-bai Lun, thereby completing the world of universals. In the two chapters to-gether with Chih-wu Lun, the epistemology was constructed upon the basis of this ontology. Then beings were further defined in Tong-bian Lun. All the four chapters formed the basis, upon which the philosophy of language was built in Bai-ma Lun.

ONTOLOGY: REALITY CONSISTING OF TWO WORLDS OF INDIVIDUALS AND UNIVERSALS

A Philosophical Theology of Substance

The general ontology of the KSLT can be described as follows.

Firstly, this ontology was based on the opposition between the knowing human being as subject and physical nature as object. "There is separateness throughout the world. Therefore, all things have turned out to exist independently in themselves" (Jian-bai Lun). This means that reality is none other than the world of se-parate things in themselves. The expressions "there is in the world" and "there is not in the world" appeared repeatedly in Chin-wu Lun and Jian-bai Lun; this fixes reality as the world of physical beings. It is obvious that the category "existence" was presented in the terms of "you" (there is) and "wu" (there is not). This object world was set up together with the subject world. "The world of things" was first stipulated in Mih-shih Lun which showed that the object world as relative to the human was signified by "min" (name). What is most important here is the opposition between subject and object. In the last analysis, this so-called opposition consists in separation and opposition in relation to knowing. "If there were nothing in the world, who could speak of concept?" (Chih-wu Lun). Here, "who", i.e., the subject, takes objects only through the objects themselves. As indicated in Min-shih Lun, "to rectify names" is essentially to rectify "shih" (individuals) according to "wei" (class), which manifests the opposition between subject and object. Furthermore, as explained in Jian-bai Lun, this opposition also con-sists in hiding hardness and whiteness by themselves. Indeed, the word "cang" (hide) sets the relation of knowledge between the subjects and objects as opposites.

Secondly, as previously mentioned, this ontology was con-structed in the terms of abstract philosophical categories. Lastly, the entire philosophy including its four parts developed within the three-dimensional framework of "reality-thinking-language". The first two, reality (world, heaven, earth) and thinking (concept, "who"), have been mentioned. Language is especially important for gaining insight into the true nature of the philosophy of the KSLT as a philosophy of language.

"To justify `shih’ according to `wei’ means to justify (or rectify) the `min’ (name) of `shih’" (Min-shih Lun). That "all things have their own name" (Chih-wu Lun) shows that Kung-sun Lung wanted to stipulate substance with the help of language: as "things cannot be signified without `chih’ (concept), things which are not signified by `chih’ do not exist" (Chih-wu Lun). This means that all things are signified by "chih" which has "min" as its expression, or knowing consists in speaking things by expressing the concept thorough names, thus introducing language into knowledge. Moreover, in Bai-ma Lun on the philosophy of language, Kung-sun Lung wrote straightforwardly at the beginning of the chapter: "The word horse is intended to name the shape, the word white to name the color. Therefore, we say that `white horse is not horse’." This made clear from the very beginning the purpose and main theme, namely, the philosophy of language.

The World of Things

Before constructing substances Kung-sun Lung distinguished between accidental and essential beings and between actual and potential beings. He showed that particular things such as a horse, a yellow horse, a white stone are beings in an accidental sense, while universals both as classes (such as horse, stone) and qualities (such as hardness, whiteness) which are separated from particular things are beings in an essential sense. "If horses had no colors, there would be simply horses; how can then we speak of white horses?" (Bai-ma Lun). "If there were no stones, where would hard and white stone come in?" (Jian-bia Lun). On the one hand, this affirms the being of horses and stones as classes; on the other hand, it emphasizes that they are essential beings in relation to particular horses and hard or white stones. As classes both horses and stones can be of different colors, particular things are beings in an accidental sense. "Hardness does not have to be combined with stone to be hardness; it is shaped by things. As it does not have to be combined with things to be hardness, it is hardness by necessity of its being hardness" (Jian-bai Lun). This indicates that as universals qualities are essential beings.

The meaning of actual being repeatedly indicated in Jia-bai Lun. For example, "Stone is one; Hardness and whiteness are two and reside in the stone. Therefore, in the stone one of them can be touched and the other cannot; one of them can be seen and the other cannot." Hard and white stones are perceptible beings in the actual sense; potential beings are also clearly indicated. "Hard-ness, whiteness and stone do not exclude each other. Could one of the three be hidden? They are hidden by themselves, not because someone has hidden them." "There is no hardness which does not make a stone and other things hard, because it is hidden." Classes of things and qualities as beings in themselves are hidden; they are not in the world.

The theory of the world of things can be described in three ways.

Firstly, the world of things consists of separate individuals. Kung-sun Lung wrote at the beginning of Min-shih Lun: "Heaven, earth and their products are `wu’ (matter). When `wu’ (matter) becomes `wu’ (things) they are of themselves without `shih’." This strictly defined the two categories and their relation, thereby depicting the world of things. "Wu" is the most general charact-erization of the physical material world. In this sense, "wu" means matter. This in turn is depicted and restricted by "shih" which includes two parts; on the one hand, "wu" means things, on the other hand, "shih" as things fill up space and time, in which sense "shih" is individual; hence, "wu" are actually individuals. "Wu" then has two senses, namely, as matter and as individuals. In fact, "wu" was used synonymously with "shih", especially in Chih-wu Lun and in Jian-bai Lun. The main characteristics of individuals are se-parateness or discreetness and autonomy. Therefore, the entire chapter, Jian-bai Lun, was devoted to demonstrate that "there is separateness throughout the world. Therefore, all things have turned out to exist independently in themselves."

Secondly, individuals are analyzed into matter and shape. As previously mentioned, "shih" means substantiating, which implies that "shih" consists in filling up a space-time region with matter. At the same time, as indicated in Bai-ma Lun: "The word horse is intended to name the shape"; it is used to denote horse as substance, but here it was considered as naming shape. It follows from this that shape was given a status equivalent to "shih"; in other words, "shih" as individual is composed of shape and matter. Obviously for Kung-sun Lung, the contribution of "shih" consists in endowing "wu" as matter with shape, thereby forming individuals.

Lastly, natural language uses the singular demonstrative pronouns "this" and "that" and proper names for referring to in-dividuals. "If naming is correct, then the name for denoting that individual corresponds to that individual, and the name for denoting this individual corresponds to this individual." "Therefore, that name can be used to denoted that individual and is restricted to that individual, while this name is used to denote this individual and is restricted to this individual" (Min-shih Lun). It is clear that "this name" and "that name" denoting particular individuals serve as names proper for reference. Indeed, Kung-sun Lung here unveils the ontological commitment of natural language to the world of things.

The World of Universals (I): Class

The "wei" as class was stipulated is connection with in-dividuals.

Firstly, class is potential being and in universal as substance. "Wei" is class; class is being in itself; class is potential being. The two latter points having been discussed, let us now turn to the first. "When `shih’ (actuality) becomes `shih’ (individual) of itself without wanting, it is `wei’. Out of its proper `wei’, `shih’ is not in `wei’, while remaining in its proper `wei’ `shih’ is called to be correct in `wei’" (Mih-shih Lun). Individuals as the members of the class to which they belong form the class, in this sense, individuals are identical with the corresponding class, which is what is meant by saying that "`shih’ is `wei’". At the same time, since "shih" is the members of its "wei" (class), "shih" can be in the class, and can also be out of the class. In this sense, "shih" is not "wei"; that is, "shih" means individual, while "wei" means class.

Secondly, both class and individual are substances, and are equal in status as regards substance, as is shown in Min-shih Lun. However, here KSLT is not coherent. As indicated by the passages previously quoted from Jian-bai Lun and Bai-ma Lun, classes such as horse and stone are primary, while individuals such as white horse and white stone are secondary. But, this is due to the emphasis on different aspects of the problem. Speaking generally, they were considered as equal, especially inasmuch as individuals came into being independently from the class, as is noted in Min-shih Lun.

Thirdly, the class is the norm for the individual. In this sense, "wei" is order, which incorporates a set of the determinants which determine the membership of the corresponding class. Therefore, when an individual is in its proper order it possesses the determ-inants of the corresponding class and thus is a member of the class. To say that "shih" is ascertained (or rectified) to be correct in order, means that "shih" as an individual is judged as belonging to the cor-responding class; and to say that an individual of itself is "without wanting", means that the individual completely and properly pos-sesses all the determinants which should be had by a member of its proper class.

In this connection, an important idea regarding both the invariability of the universal and the variability of the individual is presented in On the Explanation of Change. This is in the Min-shih Lun, which showes that "shih" is variable, and should be certified (or rectified) according to the invariable "wei". In On the Expla-nation of Change, it is shown further that class and quality as universals are invariable whereas individuals are variable. For example, "right" as universal is invariable. However, when "right" is combined with something and comes to reside in an individual, as an attribute of the individual it appears variable, and could change into "left". Two operations "he" and "yu" means to combine so as to produce another individual or third. "Ox he ram are not horse", but are "ox and ram". In the universal as a sum of "ox and ram", both universals ox and ram are invariable, and remain ox and ram. For Kung-sun Lung, it is natural that universals as the basis for ordering (or rectifying) individuals should be invariable.

Lastly, names or general names are an apparatus for re-ferring to the class. "To say that `wei’ is rectified, means that `shih’ is rectified according to `wei’. And to rectify `shih’ according to `wei’ means to rectify the name of `shih’" (Min-shih Lun). When a name is used to denote an individual, it actually is being used to stipulate the latter. This is to say, the individual should be denoted by this name because it possesses all the notes of the class so named and is a member of the class. In a word, the name ("min") is the expression of "wei" both as class and order. At the same time, "Zheng-min Lun" (the theory of the rectification of name) is ex-amined here from an ontological view.

The World of Universals (II): Quality

The Kung-sun Lung’s world of universal incorporated class and quality. The theory of quality as universal forms an important part of this ontology and can be explained in the following three ways.

Firstly, qualities are universals as beings in themselves. In order to indicate this, Kung-sun Lung made the distinction between the qualities residing in individuals and those as universals. He wrote: "Some thing is white, but whiteness is not fixed on it; some thing is hard, but hardness is not fixed on it. To say that they are not fixed, means that they are shared things, so how can they be said to reside only in the stone?" (Jian-bai Lun). On this basis, as pre-viously described, Kung-sun Lung further asserted that the qua-lities as universals are separate beings in themselves; they are po-tential but essential beings.

Secondly, qualities as universals are equal with the sub-stance of classes and with individuals as regards their status as beings, but they differ from, and stand opposition to, substances. This opposition was repeatedly emphasized in Jian-bai Lun: "Stone is one; hardness and whiteness are two, reside in the stone." Here "two" did not mean the sum of one and one, but to be different from "one", thus showing that qualities (such as hardness and white-ness) are distinguished from substances (such as stone). In addition, as previously indicated, shape as substance is distin-guished from the color as quality in Bai-ma Lun.

Thirdly, in the last analysis, the opposition between qualities and substances consists in considering qualities as attributes of substance. Kung-sun Lung first distinguished between essence and attribute. Essence is fundamentally among attributes and differs from attribute in general. For essence consists of a set of attributes, which constitute the determinants possessed necessarily by the individual members of a class. In this sense, essence is "wei" as class. Now it is clear that class as substance is a set of individuals, while class as the norm for the individual is the essence of the individuals of a class. In other words, the reference or extension of "wei" as class is the set of individuals, while the inten-tion is their essence. When demonstrating the invariability of the class such as ram, ox horse in On the Explanation of Change, the class was showed as the essence and the attributes forming the essence were indicated as follows: "Ram has horns, ox has horns", "horse has not horn, but has mane, both ram and ox have none", "ram had upper front teeth and ox has none."

EPISTEMOLOGY: KNOWLEDGE AT THE LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING

The epistemology of the KSLT as a theory about knowledge as understanding was based on its ontology and manifested the principle such knowledge in the following three ways. Knowledge as understanding is characterized by definiteness; in contrast to knowledge as reason it aims at insighting into the universals and includes sensibility in addition to thinking.

The Concept of Understanding

This is the primary moment of the epistemology of the KSLT, which can be described in the following three ways.

Firstly, it established explicit consciousness of the subject. As previously indicated, "who", namely the subject, was em-phasized in discussing the relation of concepts and things in Chih-wu Lun so as to give prominence to the existence of the subject. Then consciousness consisted in introducing the subject into the knowledge relation. For Kung-sun Lung, "Zheng-min Lun" should also be examined from the epistemological point of view, as this problem is inherently connected with the subject. He wrote: "It is imperative to correct (or rectify) the incorrectness in the order of `shih’ by the correct order; it is impermissible to fix `shih’ in the correct order with the incorrect order." "To rectify" and "to fix" both are acts of the subject making `shih’ conform to the norm of order. This was further developed by showing that the knowing subject consisted in sensibility and still more in mind (the `shih’ in Jian-bai Lun): "So-called `shen’ is also a separate thing" (Jian-bai Lun). This emphasized the status of mind as being in itself, in opposition to substance.

Secondly, it characterized the thinking subject by the concept of understanding. Kung-sun Lung emphasized the distinction between the concept and the thing signified by it: there are things in the world, and humans signify them by concepts. But he insisted that there are not things which are not signified by concepts. This was expressed mainly in the following passage cited from Chih-wu Lun.

There are not concepts, therefore things cannot be said as concepts are not the concepts signifying things. However, all things are signified by concepts. To say that ‘there are not concepts, therefore things cannot be said as concepts signifying things them-selves’ does not means that there are things which are not signified by concepts. There not being things which are not signified by concepts’ means that all things are signified by concepts. Therefore all things are signified by concepts, but the things signified by con-cepts are not the concepts signifying things.

In addition to this, Kung-sun Lung emphasized the independ-ence of concepts from things. "Concepts are concepts; things are signified by concepts, and the things signified by concepts are not the concepts." "Furthermore, concepts in themselves signify things, why do they have to be combined with a thing in order to be the concepts signifying things?" (Chih-wu Lun).

That "chih" is a concept can be recognized further in view of the relation among the main categories: "wu", "shih", "wei" and "chih". As previously indicated, "wu" was used in the same sense as "shih" when discussing "chih" and "wu" in Chih-wu Lun. "Wu" meant individuals; "wei" as the norm for individuals is the intention of "chih", i.e., concepts; while "shih" is the extension of "chih". "Classes" when manifesting themselves as the thinking of subjects become concepts and are used by subjects to signify individuals.

Having shown that "chih" is concept, it is imperative to make clear that concept in Kung-su Lung is of the nature of under-standing. Concepts of this kind have two features: they are directly connected with empirical individuals, and they insure definiteness in thinking. In connection with the first feature, it was stated re-peatedly and positively in Chih-wu Lun that "chih" is used to signify "wu", this is to say, that the concept is used to signify the individual. As to the definiteness of thought as understanding, the invariability of universals was emphasized and demonstrated in On the Expla-nation of Change, and concepts as the form of understanding con-tributed to grasping and recognizing the universals. Therefore, con-cepts in understanding are characterized by definiteness because universals are invariable.

Lastly, it justified "chih" as the contribution of subject to know-ledge by linguistic analysis. A passage from Chih-wu Lun repre-sented a common sense view about the usage of language, namely, that the name as the linguistic carrier of a concept is at most a symbol denoting the thing, thereby emphasizing the auto-nomy of "wu" and the passivity of "chih". "Three not being concepts in the world means that the concepts come into being only for the purpose of making all things have their own names. But things are not the concepts signifying them. If though not concepts, they are called concepts, then all are concepts." In response, criticizing the common sense view, Kung-sun Lung wrote" "There are not con-cepts in the world; nevertheless, things not signified by concepts cannot be things." Here he showed that things exist, but that existence has significance for humans as knowing subjects only when things are signified by concepts and hence referred to by names. In other words, for a knowing subject, the existence of things involves the contributions of language. Therefore, for hu-mans, there are not things which are not signified by concepts. This showed that for humans the existence of things depends on im-plicitly on language.

Understanding Aimed at Knowledge of Universals

KSLT showed that knowledge at the ordinary level is limited to sensibility and thus gives opinions which seemingly are correct but really are incorrect, while the knowing at the level of under-standing aims at insight into the essence behind empirical phe-nomena.

Firstly, understanding aims at knowing the essence of things. On the one hand, "chih" consists in knowing "wei"; as previously discussed, "wei" is the essence of things, and the object to be known by "chih", i.e., the concepts in understanding. "Chih’s" grasp of "shih" is based on the knowledge of "wei". However, according to the common sense view indicated in KSLT, "chih" is used directly to signify only "wu" and thus is foreign to "wu".

On the other hand, "chih" as realizing essence transcends empirical individuals. As repeatedly indicated in Chih-wu Lun, "there are things in the world", "there are not concepts in the world". It is clear that here the "world" means empirical individuals. Episte-mology shows that the essence known by "chih" is not in the world. Jian-bai Lun showed that hardness, whiteness and stone are separate universals; in the world of things "they are separated from each other by nature and will forever be so." In a word, within the world of things universals are hidden.

Secondly, understanding aims also at knowing qualities as beings in themselves. This idea can be seen from a dialogue cited in Jian-bai Lun.

The asker:

The eye cannot perceive hardness or whiteness. They have different functions, and cannot sub-stitute for one another. Hardness and whiteness reside in the stone. How can they be separated?

This passage shows that at the level of common sense qualities are known by sensibility alone. Kung-sun Lung replied:

Hardness does not have to be combined with stone to be hardness; it is shared by things. As it does not have to be combined with things to be hardness, it is hardness by necessity of its being hardness. It is hardness without being the hardness of the stone or other things. But there is no such hardness in the world, because it is hidden. If whiteness is originally not capable of becoming whiteness of itself, how can it make the stone and other things white? If whiteness is whiteness by necessity of its being whiteness, then it is whiteness not because some things appear white. . . . Whiteness is perceived by the eye. This sees in virtue of light, but the light itself does not see. So, neither light nor the eye sees; hence, it is for the mind to see.

This passage showed the following four principles based upon which the qualities are know by understanding:

(1) What is perceived by the senses or by sensibility is hardness or whiteness "residing in the stone", but not the nece-ssary hardness or whiteness as being in itself. Such quality is know by the mind with the help of understanding.

(2) The senses do not perceive such qualities because these are not in the world of things.

(3) The qualities are separate, which separateness can be realized only by the mind with the help of the concepts of under-standing.

(4) For knowing the qualities as universals it is imperative to realize that they are shared with things, which is to say that the universals can be realized through discovering the attributes com-mon to many things.

Sensation as a Moment in Understanding

In contrast to knowledge at the level of reason, understanding is connected with experience, for which reason sensation or sen-sibility is a necessary moment in understanding.

Firstly, sensation perceives phenomena. KSLT showed that such attributes of individuals as hardness and whiteness are per-ceived by sense organs. Furthermore, individuals are perceived through their attributes. "When whiteness but not hardness is per-ceived, we have a case of two. When hardness but not whiteness is perceived, we have a case of two" (Jian-bai Lun). The two here means "whiteness and stone" or "hardness and stone". This pas-sage means that the individual is perceived as an attribute be-longing to this individual.

Secondly, the perception of attributes features separateness. Attributes such as hardness and whiteness are perceived sepa-rately, as is pointed out repeatedly in Jian-bai Lun. Especially, it was shown that the separateness is rooted in the separateness of qualities as universals. This explained epistemologically why think-ing as understanding is definite and analytic.

Thirdly, it is imperative for knowing subjects to advance from knowing phenomena to knowing universals. KSLT showed that, being limited to the knowledge of sensibility, common sense realized only "the fixed whiteness" and "the fixed hardness" "re-siding in the stone"; thus it thinks that "either whiteness or hardness is necessarily combined with the stone which pervade each other." In order to surmount this limited view and to take note of the qua-lities as beings in themselves, it is of crucial importance to realize that "what is not fixed on anything is shared by things; how could it be only in the stone?" That hardness and whiteness are shared by things obviously is an empirical fact. It follows from this that when Kung-sun Lung was criticizing the view that "hardness, whiteness and stone do not exclude each other", he claimed that it is ne-cessary to confine oneself to the use of the sense organs and to use the mind to know qualities as universals on the basis of attributes as phenomena.

Finally, knowledge of the senses, especially an separateness, can be subject to linguistic analysis. As indicated in Jian-bai Lun, according to the common sense view, the expression "hard and white stone" means that "hardness, whiteness and stone are three". Kung-sun Lung pointed out that they cannot be said to be three, and should be said to be two. He showed that this expression is actually the conjunction of the two expressions "stone is hard" and "stone is white". Therefore, as previously cited, in any case "we have a case of two."

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: THE THEORY OF MEANING

The doctrine of the KSLT was known for "Shou-bai chih Lun" (the theory of maintaining whiteness) or "Bai-ma chih Lun" (the theory of white horse); in essence this is a philosophical theory of language. This was developed around the relations between lan-guage and world and between language and meaning. This theory of meaning was stated in the famous thesis "White Horse is not Horse" as a central thesis in Bai-ma Lun. It consisted of two parts, namely the theory of sense and that of reference.

The Theory of Sense or Meaning

The KSLT theory of sense can be described in the following four ways.

Firstly, sense and reference are distinguished: reference is the contribution of the world taken as substances to the meaning of language; sense is the contribution of mind with its knowledge of substance to meaning.

Such general names as "stone", "ox" and "ram" denote substances as universals. Their reference is wei as class, and their sense is wei as order. Moreover, general names express chih, namely, concept. From this it follows that from a logical point of view, thinking uses chih to signify universals; its extension is wei as class, its intention is wei as order. From the point of view of meaning, chih is a general name whose reference is wei as class and its sense wei as order.

The proper names or singular demonstrative pronouns denote wu, namely, individuals. Their reference is shih, and their sense has order as its main or essential part.

The classes are sets of shih, i.e., individuals. The distinction between reference and sense is used in the theory of the recti-fication of names. Let an individual be named "a". If the individual changes, then its essence is no longer in accord with the order of the name "A" of class A, of which it is a member; thus it is no longer the referent of "A" and hence of "a", which results in correct naming. Therefore, the rectification of name consists in examining the sense of "a", i.e., shih according to the sense of "A", i.e., wei.

Secondly, a distinction is made between object-word and concept word. Words have two different uses: expressing sense and denoting reference; that is, when a speaker uses a word, he either expresses its sense or denotes its referent. In expressing the sense of a word, one does not consider its referent; when one denotes its referent, one attends to its sense. When a word is used to express sense, that is, to signify a concept, it is called a concept-word. When it is used to denote its referent, that is, to signify an object, it is called an object-word. Clearly, this distinction intro-duces the user of language and therefore is a pragmatic distinction. For the speaker, an object-word has only reference, while a concept-word has only sense. And whether a word is an object word or a concept-word can be determined only in the context of practical use. In the ordinary uses of natural language speakers are usually unconscious of the way in which they use a word, but usually use it is as an object-word.

Kung-sun Lung realized the confusion in the ordinary uses of natural language and based his thesis: "White horse is not horse" on that distinction. He showed that the common sense thesis "white horse is horse" involves using "white horse" and "horse" as object-words. Having discovered the distinction between concept-word and object-word and the fact that in ordinary usage words are usually used as object-word, he proposed the thesis "white horse is not horse" by using the words as concept-words.

The distinction between object-word and concept-word is made in three groups of passages in Bai-ma Lun.

The first group is:

A (asker): ‘Is it correct to say that white horse is not horse?’ B (Kung-sun Lung as answer): ‘It is.’

A: ‘Why’

B: ‘The word horse is used to name the shape; and the word whiteness is used to name the color. What names the color is not what names the shape. Therefore we say that white horse is not horse.’ ‘The white horse means horse combined with whiteness. Can the horse combined with whiteness be horse? Therefore, we say that white horse is not horse.’

These two passages positively pointed out that both the words "white horse" and "horse" in the thesis are concept-words because they signify the intentions of the respective concepts: color combined with shape or shape alone. These express the senses of the two words, but they are used not to refer to objects, namely, to a white horse and a horse.

The second group is:

Ask for horse, either a yellow horse or a black one may answer. If white horse were horse, then what is asked for in both cases would be the same. ‘What is asked being the same’ means that white horse should be not different from horse. Since what is asked for is not different, it follows that the yellow and black horses may answer in the one case, but not in the other. How can this be? Obviously the two cases are incompatible. Therefore, the yellow and black horses both answer to horse, but not to white horse. Thus, it is clear that white horse is not horse.

This long passage showed in a comparative way that the word "white horse" in "white horse is not horse" is a concept-word, while "white horse" in "white horse is horse" both are what is an object-word. Both white horse and horse in "white horse is not horse" are what is asked and are conceptualized. The former means "whiteness and (the shape of) horse", while the latter means "horse" alone. Beacause they are different we can say that "white horse is not horse". In "white horse is horse", "yellow horse is horse" or "black horse is horse", "colored horses" denote the horses which can answer to what is expressed by the concept-word "horse" or the like.

The last group of passages is:

When we say that ‘there is white horse’ cannot be said because there is no horse, we are dismissing the whiteness. If we take the whiteness into account, then we cannot say that there being white horse means that there is horse. It is obvious from this that when we think that there is horse, we do so simply because it is horse, but not because it is white horse.

This passage further reflects Kung-sun Lung’s consciousness in making the distinction between object-word and concept-word. "Saying without whiteness" means speaking words while ignoring their senses. This is to say, both the words "white horse" and "horse" in "there being white horse means there being horse" do not involve their sense, but denote only their referents. "There being white horse is not there being horse" is "saying with white-ness". This is to say, both "white horse" and "horse" therein are used to express sense.

Now, we can comprehend "the theory of white horse" of Kung-sun Lung’s. It showed that knowledge at the level of common sense is limited to the sense knowing of individuals in "the world of things", whereas beyond sensibility knowledge at the level of understanding transcends the sense knowledge of common sense and uses concepts of understanding to grasp the universals behind "things". In language all these are the competence, apparatus and result of human knowledge. Language condenses the knowledge of universals through understanding into its sense, and fixes the sense identification or recognization of the object through its reference.

Using language, we can both speak of, or refer to, objects and express the knowledge of the essence of objects, i.e., universals. It is imperative to be conscious of this double fact. In this way, "the theory of white horse" acknowledged that "black horse is horse" or "white horse is horse", but showed that the words "white horse" or "black horse" here are object-words; they denote only their referents regardless of the senses; they are "saying without white". Therefore, as their referents are horses, of course they "are horses", the latter word "horse" being a concept-word. It also admitted that "there being white horse is there being horse", both "white horse" and "horse" here being object-words. "The theory of white horse" aimed at showing that "white horse is not horse", and "there being white horse is there not being horse". Here both the words "white horse" and "horse" are concept-words. As they have different senses, that is to say, express two different universal, they naturally are not identical.

It is clear that the "theory of white horse" does not violate common sense, still more it is not a sophism. It aims not at grasping the dialectics of things, but at revealing the principles of knowledge at the level of understanding, and thereby working out a philoso-phical theory of meaning for language as the capacity for knowing.

Thirdly, different levels of concept-word are distinguished. The relation between the concept-words "horse" and "white horse" is treated in Bai-ma Lun. Kung-sun Lung wrote: "Horses originally have color; therefore, there are white horses. If horses had no color, there would be simply horses. How can we speak of white horse? Therefore, whiteness is not horse. The white horse mans horse combined with whiteness." This passage shows that Kung-sun Lung thought that "horse", on the one hand, and "white horse", "black horse" and "yellow horse", on the other, are concept-words of different levels. "Horse" is the concept-word for naming shape, but is always combined with a certain color, thereby constituting the concept-words "white horse", "black horse" and "yellow horse". "To say `horse’ does not involve any choice of color"; "to say `white horse’ does involve a choice of color" (Bai-ma Lun). This means that the reference of the concept-word "horse" is wider than that of the "white horse". Therefore, the concept-word "horse" is higher in level than "white horse".

It is still more important to note that as indicated by Kung-sun Lung, the relation between object-word and concept-word is dif-ferent from that between two concept-words of different levels.

The relation between object-word and concept-word includes both sense and reference. As regards reference, "there being white horse cannot be said as there not being horse". This mans that the reference of white horse lies in the range of the reference of the corresponding concept-word. In terms of sense, "ask for horse, either a yellow or a black one may answer" actually asserts the fact that "black horse is horse" and "yellow horse is horse". In this way, the sense of the concept-word "horse" grasps and depicts the essence of the individual objects, black horse or yellow horse. This means that the object-word and the concept-word corresponding to it have something in common with respect to sense.

The relation concept-word on the two different levels is also two fold. Regarding reference, as shown from the previously cited passage, he thought that the relation between "horse" and "white horse" is that between class and subclass or between whole and part. Regarding sense, he said: "The white horse means horse combined with whiteness. Can the horse combined with whiteness be horse?" "What does not exclude color is not the same as what excludes color." Both these passages show that the concept-words relathion on the two different levels "horse" and "white horse" are different in sense. It should be noted that both passages are followed immediately by the sentence: "Therefore, we say that white horse is not horse." This reflects the essential significance of "the theory of white horse", revealing the three closely interrelated principles of the philosophy of language, namely, the three dis-tinctions between sense and reference, between object-word and concept-word, and between concept-words of two different levels.

Lastly, the structure of sentences is analyzed. What is claimed by "the theory of white horse" is the thesis "white horse is not horse". However, thus far our discussion has not involved the linguistic analysis of the sentence formulating the thesis, which no doubt is of great importance.

There was no grammar available to Kung-sun Lung for doing this analysis. However, he carried out not only a grammatical ana-lysis of the structure of sentences, but also a logical analysis. However, as he did not use grammatical terms, this analysis used only coarse ideas as principles.

The analysis of the structure of sentences by Kung-sun Lung can be described mainly in three ways: copula; two kinds of sentence structures: subject-predicate structure and identity re-lation; and the distinction between sentences referring to objects and those referring to concepts.

The KSLT formulated its "theory of white horse" in the terms of the four sentences: "white horse is not horse", "there being white horse does not mean there being horse", "white horse is not horse", "there being white horse mans here being horse". When con-structing these sentences, he used the copula shiu (to be), fei (not to be), wei (to be) and nai (to be). The structure of sentences includes two levels, namely surface grammatical structure and deep logical structure. The same grammatical structures frequently conceal different logical structures. In order to uncover the deep structures it is imperative to distinguish two different senses of copulas. Kung-sun Lung did just this, which also forms an important link in "the theory of white horse".

It is obvious that the two different senses of the copula are closely interrelated with the two different logical structures of sen-tences, namely, the subject-predicate structure and the identity relation.

The four sentences mentioned above belong to the two different logical structures, respectively. "White horse is horse" is of the subject-predicate structure. "To ask for horse" is to ask for horse according to "horse" in the mind of the asker or the concept of horse. For this purpose a real white horse should be brought out. Then, "the asker" said: "This white horse is horse" or "white horse is horse". In fact, this introduces the white horse into the sentence as the subject by use of the object-word "white horse", as the object of which the sentence speaks. When, this subject is predicated by the concept "horse" denoted by the corresponding concept-word, it reveals the essence of the individual denoted by the subject and hence of the class to which the individual belongs. In other words, the concept-word is used as the order playing the role of norm for stipulating shih (the white horses). The other three sentences all belong to another logical structure in which copulas express identity or difference between the grammatical subject and pre-dicate. The sentence "white horse is not horse" is typical of the three.

Kung-sun Lung showed this logical structure in four places cited from Bai-ma Lun.

"Therefore, the yellow and black horse both answer to horse, but not to white horse. Then, it is clear that white horse is not horse."

"What names the color is not what names the shape. Therefore, we say that white horse is not horse." White horse means horse combined with whiteness. Can the horse combined with whiteness be horse? Therefore, we say that white horse is not horse."

"To say `horse’ does not involve any choice of color . . . to say `white horse’ involve a choice of color. . . . What does not exclude color is not the same as what excludes color. Therefore, we say that white horse is not horse."

It is obvious that by these expressions Kung-sun Lung em-phasized that the intention or sense of the two concept-words "white horse" and "horse" are different, the former being the shape of horse combined with whiteness, but the latter being the shape alone. Therefore, they are different, that is to say, "white horse is not horse". What is expressed here by copula is not the relation of predication, but that of difference. Similarly, "there to be white horse is not there to be horse" also expresses the relation of difference between two concept-words "there to be white horse is there to be horse" expresses the identity of the reference of the two object-words. In sum, the sentences which express the identity or difference between two words have only a grammatical subject, but not a logical subject. Furthermore, in these sentences usually both words are concept-words.

When arguing the sentence "white horse is horse", Kung-sun Lung appealed to the fact that real horses can answer the request for a horse. However, when analyzing th sentence "white horse is not horse", he appealed to pure conceptual analysis. Thus, he realized that the sentences of the two different logical structures denote fact and concept respectively: the sentence "white horse is horse" refers to a fact, while the sentence "white horse is not horse" refers to a concept. This involves the well-known distinction be-tween synthetic and analytic sentences.

The Theory of Reference

Kung-sun Lung based his philosophy of language on his on-tology. Therefore, it was natural for him to pay great care to the pro-blem of reference. His theory of reference can be described in the following ways.

Firstly, he established the objectivity of reference. "All these are signified by concepts, but the things signified by concepts are not the concepts signifying things." This thesis was repeatedly argued and an important aspect of this thesis and its arguments consisted precisely in establishing the objectivity of reference.

His ontology established the objectivity of "the world of things" and the universals which are self-hidden as beings inde-pendent from mind. This provided a premise for fixing the object-ivity of reference. Concepts are expressed as names and "all things have their own names"; furthermore "all things are signified by concept". This implies that all "things" are denoted by name or that all names signifying things. In this way, it is affirmed that all names have reference; thereby the reference of language is affirmed. "The things signified by concepts are not the concepts signifying things," but are independent of each other. This shows that "things", i.e., re-ferences, are not influenced by concepts, because they are two dif-ferent things. In sum, all names have reference to objective being independent from concepts.

From this idea about reference, we can further realize his ontology and epistemology. He emphasized that concepts are used to signify things, which have their own names. This means that the reference of language is individual. It follows from this that, al-though he considered classes as beings in themselves, yet classes are known by understanding; therefore they are expressed as the intention of concepts. Obviously, this is in accordance with his philosophy as principles of understanding. That is, understanding knows the world of universals via the world of things. This shows also why concept-words denoting universals are essentially the apparatus by which speakers express sense, but they do not signify objects.

Secondly, the problem of how reference is fixed was dis-cussed. The KSLT gave two answers to the problem: the reference of a name is fixed both by naming and by wei as the essence of individuals.

Kung-sun Lung wrote: "The so-called problem of name and individual is that of naming. If we know that what is called by this name is not this individual, and that this name no longer refers to this individual, we shall not call it by this name. If we know that what is called by that name is not that individual and that that name no longer call that individual, we shall not call it with that name" (Min-shih Lun). This is to say, naming makes things have their own names and at the same time fixes the references of these names.

An important part of the theory of the rectification of names in the KSLT consists in showing that the essence of an individual, i.e., wei as order fixes the reference of names. For example, to what individual does the name "white horse" refer? According to the theory of the rectification of name, the sense of the name as the essence of the individual object which is referred to by the name (i.e. the intension of this concept-word) is now "the shape of horse and whiteness". The "shape of horse and whiteness" as the correct order determine the reference of the name white horse, i.e., as an individual. In this way, in a sense, "the rectification of name" is to fix the reference of name according to the order, i.e., the essence of object. It is clear that in the connection of reference, wei as order is equivalent to the definite description.

Thirdly, the problem of how reference is identified was discussed. The theory of the rectification of names also showed how the reference of name is identified with the corresponding order as norm.

This principle forms the main part of Tong-bain Lun.

Ram has horns and ox also has horns. Yet it is incorrect to say that ox is ram, ram is ox. For they both have horns, yet belong to different species. Ram and ox have horns, but horse has none; horse has mane, but ‘ram and ox’ has none. Therefore we say that ram and ox together are not horse. . . . Ram had upper front-teeth, yet ox has none.

This is to say, the references of the names "ram" and "ox" are ram and ox respectively. In order to identify these references it is imperative to take "ram has upper-teeth and horns" and "ox has no upper-teeth and has horns" as the basis. They can be said to be the indexical determinants composing their respective order. There-fore, the reference of a name is identified according to the indexical determinants of the order corresponding to the name.

It is further shown in Tong-bian Lun that this identification is based on the recognition of the difference of the indexical determ-inants of the reference of different names. Therefore, for him, it is important for identifying reference to compare similar names, while in the case of two names having too great difference the identi-fication does not come into question. For this reason, he wrote: in order to identify the references of ox and ram, "horse is better than fowl for the purpose of illustration". Fowl is not suitable because "it is too obvious that fowl and `ram and ox’ are of different species."

Lastly, the change of references was shown. This includes two sides. On the one hand, as shown by the above-cited pas-sages, the individual is variable. Therefore, when individual objects change the names which previously referred to them are no longer used to denote them. On the other hand, as just-cited, "if we know that what is called by this name is not this individual, and this name no longer calls this individual, we shall not call it with this name." This is to say that the reference of name itself is variable.

LOGIC: THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF UNDERSTANDING

The KSLT as analytic philosophy of the knowledge by under-standing necessarily produced a logical theory. But it does not pro-vided a system of inferential rules like the syllogism, but only some fundamental principles. They include the following five points.

Primary definiteness and Analyticity

It can be said that definiteness as the fundamental principle of understanding runs throughout the whole KSLT. It is obvious that thinking as understanding aims at grasping universals via indivi-duals. As universals are invariable, as long as individuals are in their order they are definite. For this reason, both as signification of individual and as the expression of order and class, names are definite. This determines the definiteness of thinking because names are forms of thinking.

As to analyticity, the KSLT showed that in order to realize the essence of stone it is imperative to analyze the individual as a whole, thereby grasping its three separate determinants, i.e., "hardness, whiteness and (the shape of) stone". At the same time, these three determinants are grasped through analyzing one stone after another.

In a sense, the spirit of logic consists in bringing the thinking subject to the norms of definiteness and analyticity. In this con-nection, the KSLT contains the essence of logic.

The Law of Identity

A remarkable achievement of the logic of the KSLT is to advance the ideas of the laws of identity and contradiction. The law of identity is put forward in Min-shih Lun at three levels.

Firstly, the self-identity of things was uncovered at the level of things, Kung-sun Lung wrote: "It is imperative to rectify the incorrectness in the order of shih with the correct order, it is impermissible to fix shih in the correct order with incorrect order." This means that the individual norms itself according to the cor-responding order, thereby becoming self-identical.

Then, the principle of identity is shifted from things them-selves to the relation between speakers and things.

If names are correct, then the name to denote that individual corresponds to that individual, the name to denote this individual corresponds to this individual. If that name denoting that individual does not correspond to that individual, then that name will never do. If this name denoting this individual does not correspond to this individual, then this name will never do.

This passage clearly points out that names must be identical with the things denoted by them.

Finally, the law of identity of thinking in linguistic form was presented.

Therefore, it is permissible that that name be used to denote that individual, and be restricted to that individual and that this name be used to denote this individual, and be restricted to this individual. It is impermissible that that name be used to denote this individual so that that name is used to denote both that individual and this individual; or that this name be used to denote that individual so that this name is used to denote both this individual and that individual.

On the one hand, this passage uses the expression "to be restricted" to fix strict identity. On the other hand, the requirement of identity is imposed from both positive and negative sides in terms of "to be permissible" and "to be impermissible". This gives full play to the strict requirement for identity in the logic of the KSLT.

The Law of Contradiction

The logical norm and the law of contradiction also were clearly expressed in the KSLT. This is seen from the passage which should be cited once again here.

Ask for white horse, neither the yellow horse nor the black one may answer. If white horse were horse, then what is asked for in both cases would be the same. What is asked for being the same means that white horse would be no different from horse. Since what is asked for is not different, it follows that the yellow and black horses may yet answer in the once case but not in the other. How can this be? Obviously, the two cases are incompatible. There-fore, the yellow and black horses both answer to horse, but not to white horse. It is clear then that white horse is not horse.

Here the sentence ". . . may yet answer in the one case but not in the other case. How can this be?" positively put forward the requirement of the law of contradiction: that it is impermissible for one and the same word or sentence to be something as well as not to be something, because "to be" and "not to be" are incompatible.

Kung-sun Lung logically refutes "white horse is horse" and justifies "white horse is not horse" by the law of contradiction. If "white horse is horse", that is to say, if the two concept-words are the same in sense, then if follows that the yellow and black horses may yet answer in the one case, but not in the other for that would violate the law of contradiction. In this way, the thesis "white horse is horse" is refuted, and "white horse is not horse" is justified via reduction to absurdity on the basis of law of contradiction. It is also clear that here the law of contradiction is put forward either as a logical law or a law of things, because he appealed to the fact that horses are led out as did linguistic analysis.

The Logic of Concept

Singular and general concepts, substance and attribute con-cepts. The former pair of concepts is the division of concepts with respect to extension. In Kung-sun Lung, concepts in general are chih. Realizing that what is signified by chih includes individuals and their sets, he distinguished singular and general concepts, namely shih and wei (as class) respectively. The extension of shih is individual, that of the wei is the class consisting of individuals.

The latter pair is the division of concepts in respect to intention. He pointed out that "horse" is used to denote the shape, and "white" to denote the color, while be contrasted "hardness and whiteness" with "stone", thereby consciously making the distinction between concepts substance and of attributes.

Extension and intention. In Kung-sun Lung extension and intention are shih and wei (as order) respectively. Shih is the occupation of wu in space and time. It characterized the existence of wu with respect to things, and represents the aspect of wu in respect to chih. Wei is the content filling the space and time occupied by wu, and the expression of the knowledge of wu by mind.

It is obvious that both shih and wei have double meaning. Shih means both singular concept and extension. This reflects also the inherent connection between the singular concept and ex-tension. The singular concept generally is intended to denote things; therefore it is equivalent to extension and usually is con-sidered as having no intention. Wei means both universal and intention. Which reflects also their inherent connection. A niversal concept is usually intended to express sense; therefore it is equivalent to intention and is used especially to reveal the common essence of the individuals covered.

The extensional relation of concepts and division. Kung-sun Lung revealed two kinds of extensional relations. One is inclusion: "horse" and "white, black and yellow horses" are in the relation of inclusion. Furthermore, "horse originally has color", and becomes, e.g., "white horse" as it chooses color. In this way, the relation of "horse" to "white horse" is different from that of "white horse" to "horse". The former is superalternation, the latter is subalternation; "horse" is superaltern, "white horse" is subaltern.

The other is an incompatible relation. The relation among "white horse", "black horse" and "yellow horse", that among "ox", "ram", "horse" and "fowl", and that among "green", "white", "yellow" and "blue" all are relations of incompatibility, this is to say, they have no common member in their extensions.

He also put forward division as a logical method of making clear the concept by revealing its extension: "Horse chooses color", resulting in "white horse", "yellow horse", "black horse"; this is to say, the extension of "horse" can be determined by division with respect to colors. "Ask for horse, a yellow, a black horse or a white horse all may answer follows", because they are in the relation of inclusion with respect to extension.

Restriction and generalization of concept. "The whiteness means horse combined with whiteness. Can the horse combined with whiteness be horse?" The intention of the concept "horse" is added to by "whiteness" to form the concept "white horse". The intention of "white horse" is "horse" added to by "whiteness", there-fore it is no longer "horse". This is the method of restriction which makes the concept clear by increasing the intention. As the concepts "white horse" and "horse" are different in intention, "white horse is not horse".

Kung-sun Lung also wrote: "If horse had no color, there would be simply horses." This means that the component part "color" is subtracted from the intention of the concept of "color horse" to give the concept "horse". This is the method of "generalization" which makes the concept clear by decreasing its intention.

In this way, he also revealed the relation of the inverse re-lation of the intention and extension of a concept. He wrote: "The expression `white horse’ does not involve any choice of color; therefore either yellow or black horse may answer. But the expression `white horse’ does involve a choice of color. Both the yellow horse and the black one are excluded because of their color; only white horse may answer." "Horse" is less in intention and wider in extension while "white horse" is great in intention and more narrow in extension.

The "union" of concept and its commutalivity. He pointed out in Tong-bai Lun that "ox ‘he’ ram" gives "ox and ram" ‘he’ (to add) here is the operation for forming the compound concept "ox and ram" from the simple concepts "ram" and "ox". The union "ox and ram" as class or set consists of ram and ox. In other words, its members are oxen or rams.

According to algebraic logic, union obeys the law of com-mutativity. Kung-sun Lung realized this commutativity as can be seen from the fact that "ox ‘he’ ram" and "ram ‘he’ ox", "ox and ram" and "ram and ox," are used interchangeably in the Tong-bia Lun.

The logic of copula. The logic of copula follows immediately from the analysis of logical structure of the sentence. Kung-sun Lung distinguished two logical functions of the copular through the analysis of logical structure: connecting the logical subject and predicate in the sentence (expressing the logical subject-predicate relation) and expressing the relation of identity. Indeed, in con-temporary symbolic logic, the copula is divided into two different logical connectives: the logical copula and the identity sign.

CHINESE GLOSSARY

a. wu thing, matter

b. shih actuality, individual

c. chih concept

d. wei order, class

e. jifu biography

f. bai-ma lun on white horse

g. chih-wu lun on concept and thing

h. tong-bia lun on the explanation of change

i. jian-bai lun on hardness and whiteness

j. min-shih lun on name and actuality

k. yu there is

l. wu there is not

m. min name

n. cang hide

o. he add

p. yu combine

q. zheng-min lun the theory of the rectification of name

r. shen mind

s. shou-bai chih lun the theory of maintaining whiteness

t. bai-ma chih lun the theory of white horse

u. shi to be

v. fei not to be

w. wei to be

x. nai to be