In early Chinese antiquity many philosophers such as Confucius, Laotse and Tschuang Tschou used the words "the same", "sameness", "the one", "the one and the same" and "the oneness". Therefore, without philological difficulty, we may say that there was a clear consciousness of identity in Chinese antiquity. Nevertheless, as the term identity is not univocous, but poly-semantic, we must refrain from a horizontal extension of the many kinds of identity and limit the range of the problem to the present task. For methodological reasons I will choose the following four dimensions where a comparative study of identity is possible between East and West, namely:

(1) linguistic scope (from the point of view of subjectivity),

(2) ontological structure of a person (from the point of view of inter-subjectivity),

(3) logical perspective (from the point of view of objectivity), and

(4) cosmological sphere (from the point of view of inter-objectivity).

As these four problems will be treated separately this study consists of four parts. But this does not mean that each part is separate one from the other. As ethical identity, all four parts have a common task and systematically compose one theme; hence this will be a comparative study of identity with regard to ethics.

The word "eco-ethica" will be used instead of "ethics", because consideration of the problems of identity brings us to the need to reflect on the collective identity of human beings in the eco-logical crisis caused by the technological superiority of the collective identity of the enterprises (legal person or corporation) or the state or nations as secular groups.

The term eco-ethica designates neither environmental ethics nor ecological ethics, but ethics in the oikos in the widest sense of human beings; this is ethics in the sphere of human life consisting not only of , but also of culture and technology. We shall begin then with some notes on technology and its humanization.

The transformative effect of the machine upon humanity has had three modes.

(1) The human physical force is so strengthened through technological machines that the man who has a car of better quality can arrive earlier than the man with a normal car, although the latter may be a marathon champion who runs far better than the former. The superiority of individual physical power is nothing compared with the efficiency of technology in such a case. Humanity becomes so dependent on machines for human beings that it is not important to have physical strength for the labor necessary for human society. At least as regards the efficiency of physical labor our attention shifts from human physis to machine techné, for automation in general means operation without a person.

Whereas social justice is calculated upon the power invested in work, the space for individual differences in physical work is so diminished that it is regarded as unnecessary. Hence, social justice concerning human physical efficiency is absent from present day social consciousness. The benefit of the "mechanization" of humanity is undoubtedly the diminution of the difficulty of labor and abolishment of inequality in physical conditions. But there are also negative sides which may not be overlooked, namely, the alienation of humanity in favor of the machine and disregard for individual physical differences. The danger of the mechanization of humanity consists in the ontic universality of the machine in which individuality is absorbed in the collectivity. The collective form of egoism, "nosism", must be avoided, because nosism asserts only the benefit of the group to which people as nos belong.

(2) The human faculty as mental force is so effectively strengthened through the technology of the machine that one who has a computer can calculate far better than one without one, although the latter be a professor of mathematics and better in calculation than the former. The qualitative superiority of individual mental power is as nothing compared with the efficiency of technology in such a case. The use of the machine by humanity is sought to the extent that it is not important to have mental abilities for memory or calculation. Education in a technological society inclines from humanism to the mechanical working of computers. No doubt it is necessary to operate machines like computers given the technological development of present society. But this often forces us to forget the importance of the mental problems which cannot be operated upon at the mechanical or technological level. For instance though signs can be worked by machines, language is on a higher spiritual dimension than are signs. The mental creativity linked with the individual’s spirituality must not be forgotten, in spite of the marvelous efficiency of the mechanization of humanity. But as to social tendencies, the curriculum in high schools and universities is being changed more and more from humanism into the mechanism which despises the non-quantitative problems of spirituality.

(3) The human attitude of religion with regard to divinity generally is despised by technological progress. Here too is a mechanization of humanity in connection with divinity as the object of human piety. In older days as a symbol of salvation a cure from the agony of illness was sometimes interpreted as divine supernatural power; almost all predictions also were interpreted as divine supernatural knowledge. But now the cure of difficult diseases is the business of medical treatment, while the prediction of storms is the business of meteorological science. Control of gender also is possible through bio-scientific technology. Organ transplants between living individuals are now possible, though even the divinity could not show us an ordinary method of rescue from death. As a result people now very often believe that miraculous events in both the curative and predictive domains are caused not by divine power, but by scientific methods. Not only mechanization of humanity, but also mechanization of divinity are now the mode for world culture.

Although in bio-science the code of inheritance in DNA becomes more and more known, everyone knows that life science cannot touch the individual secret of why this individual exists here and now between general deterministic conditions and personal free decisions. The personality as an historical development of a person may be the object of scientific description, but the reason why it is so in its individuality is beyond scientific universality. Haeceitas is the problem of dignity as the religious correlate of the personal subject.

If the mechanization of humanity is not entirely acceptable and humanity is necessary for the future of human society, then the humanization of technology must be discussed in order to change the horizontal technological dimension into the poly-dimensional configuration of society. For the human being has at least one other vertical dimension as nostos, that is to say, reflexion as epimeleia tes psyches. We must think principally in order to find some concrete points from which we can begin metaphysically a humanization of technology. We must examine the history of technology in the manner of a meta-technica or metaphysics of technology. There are five such stages in the history of technology.

Technologia in principio (1750-1900): This is the age of heavy industry beginning from the invention of the steam engine by J. Watt in 1765. If effectivity be positive immutability and accident be negative immutability, both became far more grave because the steam engine is stronger than the human hand. There was a transition from individual immutability to responsible inter-individual relations. Therefore the application of the notion of responsibility to the inter-relation between humanity and technology was an ethical event. The locomotive (developed in 1825 between Stockton and Darlington by Stevenson) was for public service and symbolized the gigantic progress in transportation which generates a dynamic society. In this age technology was in the hands of public authorities, and in the domain of heavy industry there was a confusion of morality with public order.

Technologia individualis (1900-1950): This is the age of precision industry. The universalization of precision instruments is characteristic of the first half of the 20th century. In the place of the locomotive, the automobile became popular and was used individually. Hence, traffic regulations became moral virtue so that blind obedience to traffic signals was classified in the category of moral goodness. The mechanization of humanity in the moral domain took place here first. The amalgamation of precision industry with heavy industry resulted in the production of the atomic bomb. This gigantic destructive power can be activated by just pushing a button with one finger. The transformation from inter-individual responsibility to the inter-subjective co-responsibility is absolutely necessary in the moral dimension. The aretological revolution prepared by eco-ethica must be recognized for human survival.

Technologica circumstans (1950-1980): This period is the age of technology as circumstance. Technology became more an environment than separate instruments. This is one of the most important transformations of our century. We must recognize the logical change of the practical syllogism, new social crimes regarding information, the change in the concept of neighbor in telecommunications and new classification of the real world through the efficiency of human activity.

Technologica ut agens (1980-1990): This is the age of the technological agent in various domains, and so-called automation appears. Technology plays the role of servant to human beings, e.g., robots, computers, automation, organ transplants, etc. These are realizations of technology as agents of humanity. Though the human being wished to use robots and computers like domestic animals, domestic technology is a far more effective servant of humanity. At least as regards affectivity even in the intellectual domain, the human being cannot rival technology as an agent.

Technologia ut dominus (1991- ): In various domains technology becomes the master of human beings. In an aeroplane we must abandon our destiny entirely to the technological machine, as if technology like a feudal lord could decide our life and death.

Hence we must make efforts to humanize technology, lest we lose our humanity at the hands of the inhuman lord of technology. In order to recover our dominion as human beings, we must create new virtues through the aretological efforts of eco-ethica because we must live in technological circumstances and with technological apparatus. This implies such new virtues as punctuality, philoxenia, tolerance in thought, entrapelia, justice regarding human rights, machinastics, the learning of one foreign language, regard for , etc.

In this modern sphere of human life during the second half of the 20th century many ethical phenomena have arisen which cannot be resolved through the traditional ethics established for a natural society. For example, in traditional ethics individual identity has always been considered higher and more important than the collective identity.

Many scholars who investigated primitive societies have written, like Durkheim, that in pre-cultural savage societies there is only collective identity. Therefore individual identity is the product of the cultural activity of human beings. Hence, the so-called collective identity has not been regarded as important for philosophical meditation. Indeed collective identity as nationalism or militarism during the Second World War is an example to be avoided. Thus, we ceased to think of collective identity in treating ethical problems.

However, in a technological society we must face collective identity as a new dimension in the practical syllogism. Through technological development, the means for the purpose or end of actions has been so very much advanced that the traditional practical syllogism schematized by Aristotle has been changed in its logical structure.

The classical form of practical syllogism in the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 1111b 26-1112b 17, was as follows:

Major: A is wanted (I wish to have A).

Minor: p, q, r, etc, are means which will realize this wanted A.

Conclusion: I choose p for A because of some reasons.

This classical form of syllogism remains valid even today in our individual decisions to act.

But today one experiences at the same time a reversed logical structure of the practical syllogism because the extreme development in technology as means has brought about the primacy of the means over purpose. Hence, we have a really new practical syllogism:

Major: We have the power P (the subject is plural).

Minor: P can realize a, b, c as purpose.

Conclusion: We choose the purpose a.

This new type of practical syllogism has many implications for moral philosophy; here I would select two things regarding our theme:

(1) the new ethical meaning of collective identity, and

(2) the moral responsibility of this collective identity.

We have already referred to the plurality of the ethical subject: the subject of the act of decision in a technological society normally is not an individual person, but a committee. Hence in techno-ethics we must think about the moral meaning and ontological structure of the committee as a collective identity with respect to decision making power. This is a new dimension of post-cultural society and we must consider what is the topos of responsibility of such a collective identity. The theme of identity must be developed in terms of this most modern problem of consciousness.

We must treat collective identity as well as personal identity as a very important moment of philosophical anthropology, that is to say, we must discover the new sense of collective identity not as a pre-cultural primitive mentality, but as the post-technological ethical mode. In order to think in this line, we must rethink the principal code of identity in the comparative linguistic dimension. Each cultural circle has traditional linguistic customs which sometimes suggest philosophical meaning concerning identity.

The linguistic form for presentation of oneself in everyday activity in society provides a basis for thinking about our theme, identity. For example when a brief self-representation is required in a certain committee in Western society each member would speak in the following way: "I am Tomonobu Imamichi, professor of philosophy at the University of Tokyo in Japan." One announces one’s personal name first, secondly ones family name, thirdly ones profession, fourthly the name of the society to which one belongs, and at last the name of the city or country.

In this short self-presentation the first or the second person are more impressive and attractive than the third person so every other member can recognize clearly who is present as a member of committee. Therefore the above word order of self-presentation would seem to be the sole suitable form all over the world.

However, in the Orient, the linguistic form for self-presentation has just the opposite word order as in the West. According to Oriental custom, one must speak in the following way: Watakushi-wa Nihon-no Tokyo Daigaku-no kyoju, tetsugakku tanto-no Imamichi Tomonobu de gozaimasu: literally "I, of Japan, Tokyo University, professor of philosophy, Imamichi Tomonobu am" or in correct English form: "I am from Japan, from Tokyo University, a professor of Philosophy, Imamichi Tomonobu." And usually according to Oriental custom one must announce ones name in a low voice because of modesty. Through this self-presentation in the East all other members of the committee have a very clear cognition from what country the man comes and to which society the man belongs. But sometimes they cannot understand the name of the person, for very often in presenting oneself one eliminates his or personal name and says only the family name to which one belongs.

We interpret the above facts as follows. In Western society personal identity is of essential importance, so that one’s personal name is the first thing one wants to present to the other and the first thing others wish to know. In contrast, in the Eastern world one’s collective identity as belonging to a society is the most important; hence, the first thing one wishes to let the others know is not one’s own name, but the name of the society to which one belongs.

What does this mean philosophically? One of the ethical dangers caused by the Oriental form of collectivism is a psychological resignation from individual morality. In place of the harm from egoism there arises in the Orient harm from nosism, that is, looking for the benefit of the group. This is very efficient for team work, but it presupposes the defeat of another team. Moveover, the principle of Oriental collective identity is domesticism, which has the danger of inclining to nationalism. This, however, is not primitive collectivism under which individuality is dominated through one and same ideology. It is a functional collectivism, that is to say it is free from the ideology or religion of each member; what matters is the ability of the member to contribute to the function of the group. Hence, there is no spiritual identity, but there is effective functional identity.

Each member is really two individual subjects, one is the functional subject as a unit of the collective identity in public life, the other is the personal subject as a substance of individual identity in private life. This discrepancy of one’s own existence is expressed in Japanese as tatemae and honne, fasade, or face and authentic voice.

Tatemae as fasade in the techno-ethical dimension sometimes is not acceptable for the honne as true voice in personal ethics. This existential paradox is often regarded as lack of sincerity by Western people who express their true voice by all means and under any circumstances.

Because of the technologization of society, even in the Western world there arises the need for collective decisions by a committee and for team work in various domains where in the past individual decisions were final. For example, no individual person has nuclear energy, but the society as a collective identity does have it. In this techno-ethical dimension some individual members of society may oppose the general decision for personal ethical reasons, but they are forced to accept it as members of society. Thus, the moral landscape of the modern technological society approaches the Oriental situation of two subjects, tatemae and honne.

Most Oriental people are used to realizing their true voice as honne in the private perspective of taste in poetry, painting or calligraphy, escaping from the public difficulty. This is half resignation as a modern hermit; in such a way one can find personal fulfillment, but this will not help to improve society. The theoretical contribution to technological society is collective identity from the Oriental tradition. We await the theoretical contribution to this problem of personal identity from the Western tradition. This is the topos of mutual dialogue in the eco-ethical dimension.

The philosophical origin of the two sorts of subject or the difference within subjective identity is found in the reflective philosophy of Tchuang Tschou, a contemporary of Aristotle. So, the fact that in the Orient personal identity is at least socio-ethically less important than collective identity never means that philosophical reflection on personal identity is not found in the Eastern tradition, as was the case in some primitive societies. According to Confucius the highest happiness of the human spirit was the transcendent ecstasy of spirit caused by liturgical music. But in his time liturgical music itself was made for the royal dynasty as the center of collective identity. Thus the spiritual ecstasy of Confucius might be a self-forgetfulness of the individual spirit in the collective identity of the glory of the royal dynasty. Tschuang Tschou criticized this Confucian confusion of self-forgetful fascination with true ecstasy or pure awakening in the eternal one.

According to Tschuang Tschou there is a definite structural difference between the phenomenal subject "I as wo", which is objectified as an object of reflection and the un-objectified fundamental subject "I as wu", which is never used in the oblique cases and therefore is a constant subject. The former, namely, "I as wo" may be offered to the collective identity for its benefit, but the latter, namely "I as wu" is the reflecting, evoking subject and the original personal identity.

The practical difference between tatemae as fasade and honne as true voice must be combined with this reflection of the ontological intersubjectivity of the subjective identity proposed by Tschuang Tschou, so that the eco-ethical subject might be more clearly understood. The problem of intersubjectivity of the personal structure is not the epistemological inter-subjectivity in Husserl, but the ontological intersubjectivity which covers the phenomenal dimension and the ontological sphere.

The linguistic and ontological dimensions reflect the subjective side of the identity; now we turn to its objective side. On the subjective side decision always concerned ethical acts. But the decision must also be in logical thinking for objective truth.

Here loyalty to reality is always the principle of thinking. To say being is being, to say nothing is nothing, that is, to say the same is the same is the only correct principle of thinking in general; that is to say to recognize identity as identity is the principle of logic. Plato’s koinonia is one concrete form of logical identity.

A positive judgement consists in the recognition of koinonia as the commonness between subject and predicate; a negative judgement consists of the refusal of koinonia as commonness between subject and predicate. So, the identity as commonness is a condition for logical decision. This is well developed in identity as "to auton" in the metaphysics of Theophrastos, who wrote: Generally speaking to know identity is the task of science. "Holos de to en pleiosin to auto synidein epistemes. So the intuition of identity as sameness in different objects is the principle of positive judgements which makes thetic assertion possible.

If we wish to make some positive propositions in order to describe the objective world we may not combine any predicate with any subject without recognizing an identity between them. In such a way, in the Western tradition of logic, science has exposed objective differences between beings through objective identity. The establishment of differences among beings constitutes the analytical perspective of the world. Cognitio clara et distincta is therefore the ideal of science in the Western tradition.

In this respect Tschuang Tschou is particularly interesting because he proposes the opposite view, saying "All things are the same if we regard them as non-nothingness." If in addition to this proposition we say that all things are the same if we regard them as non-perfect, then we can really see this vast identity as indifference all over the world. Such an indifference theory may be the basis of the "non-struggle" attitude of symbioticity in a future society without borders. In any case, in the Oriental tradition, the ideal of philosophy is this insight of a unifying identity through negative identity.

Nevertheless, humanity may not be simply identified with the other beings because, as Western science shows, everything is different. Could the differentia specifica of a human being have the right to survive without axiological difference from the other beings? Till now we have thought of ethics only inter homines. From now on we must think of eco-ethica not only inter homines, but also on a larger scale inter res. Is it none other than a nosism for the collective identity of humanity to think only of human survival? So we must think of inter-objectivity, in order to clarify the task of human beings among the various objects.

We have observed above the objective side with respect to identity. Now we shall consider inter-objectivity. In order to concentrate on the moral problem we will treat here the cosmological identity rather than the ontological identity, for the range of ontology in Western philosophy is larger than cosmology due to the grammatical identity between the verb as copula and the verb as existence. As Thomas Aquinas said in Western philosophy ens dicitur dupliciter, "being is said in two ways": being means both real beings and categorical beings as predicates.

Hence in the Western philosophy inter-objectivity is very well exposed through the analogia entis. The concept being contains ontologically not only being in the cosos but also being the category as a concept, but the direct object of moral philosophy is being in the cosmos. We shall limit our reflections within cosmological identity because our theme is eco-ethical. In this regard I would comment on one of the ontological characters of oriental philosophy, namely, the impossibility of an analogia entis between the real being and the categorical being, because the copula is not the same as the verb for existence. Therefore the range of analogia entis in the Orient is limited only to the cosmological domain.

Moreover there is semantic identity between to be and to have in oriental philosophy. The fact that A exists in the cosmos means that the cosmos has A. So, from the point of view of the cosmos concerning A, to be and to have are the same. This cosmos is sometimes interpreted as nothingness, because it is beyond being and it is not being. We can compare this hyper-ontological nothingness with the grammatical subject as the impersonal pronoun in European languages: "il y a" or "es gibt". In any case in the cosmological identity of being there must be a cosmological difference as an analogia entis between the res and the reale. But until now we have confused the reality of the reale and the reitas (reity) of the res. In my opinion both the man-made things and the machine-made things are principally not res, but reale as resemblance of res, because the reale can be replaced with the simile.

Res is absolute data, which cannot be replaced with the other (the clear difference of "il y a" from "L’homme y a", of "es gibt" from "der Mensch gibt"). We may be lord over reale, but we must not be lord or dominus for res; we must be administrator for res in order to realize the symbiotic world. For reality we may be content with legal regulations, but for "reity" we must have moral consciousness, because its dignity and vitality are cosmologically beyond our quality with respect to its existence. So we have argued the cosmological identity for being as regards existence and the cosmological difference between the reality and "reity" with regard to axiology. We are in a collective identity with regard to the cosmological identity of symbioticity and in cosmological difference through our personal identity which can reflect our moral task for ourselves and for the cosmos.

Cosmological identity as constant circulation in is one of the collective identities. Vegetable and animal life can participate in that endless movement through their specific identity. Human beings as collective identity cannot participate in it because of their individual identity which vertically cuts this cosmic circulation. What we can contribute to the cosmic life is only to reflect on the lasting possibility of cosmo-logical identity, in which we do something in our individual difference and are sustained by our personal identity. We must be conscious of our collective symbiotic identity with the cosmos and present ourselves as individual identities in our spiritual activity -- something never permitted for the other beings.