When searching for an explanation of the fact that no science in the Western modern sense was produced in traditional Chinese culture under the dominant ideology of Confucianism, we should first of all trace back to the philosophical origins of both Western and Chinese sciences, and compare their differences. To be brief, we could qualify Chinese science as a search for practical wisdom and Western science as a searching for theoretical knowledge. In other words, one of the fundamental reasons for the absence of modern science in Chinese culture is the latter’s lack of purely theoretical interest.

With regard to wonder, Aristotle wrote in Metaphysics:

By contrast, Chinese thought in general and Confucianism in particular were originated as a result of the attitude of concern which led not to universal theorization, but to universal praxis. It was because of his concern with the destiny of the individual and society that the Chinese mind began to philosophize. The Great Appendix to the Book of Changes, traditionally attributed to Confucius as its author, proclaimed that the author of Yi must be face anxiety and calamity with compassionate concern. It reads:

This important text shows that in the eyes of Confucius, philosophy as a serious intellectual activity began with an attitude of concern in the situation of anxiety and calamity, not at all in the situation of leisure and recreation, as Aristotle would suggest. The proposition that "the way in which these things come about is very comprehensive, and must be acknowledged in every sphere of things" would suggest that Chinese philosophy intended to be a practical wisdom that could serve as guidance for a universal praxis. Consequently, Confucianism did not have any distinctive method of dialectical discourse, taking no explicit system of logic as canon of reasoning. Neither did it, as did modern science, take mathematics as model of true knowledge. The dialogues that we read in the Analects (or Lun Yu) do show us a way of discursive interaction, yet they contain no explicit logic. Dialogues are not yet dialogic.

The difficulty of evaluating Confucianism’s import upon science consists in its ambivalent attitude towards the latter. Joseph Needham has pointed out this paradoxical position of Confucianism which helped the beginnings of science, on the one hand, and injured them, on the other.

Here we have the contrast between "Natural Things" and "Human Affairs". The above judgment of Joseph Needham is correct to a certain degree, but it has to be developed by deeper reflection. We can ask, does this paradoxical attitude imply a contradiction within the system of Confucianism, or, on the contrary, does it manifest a coherent philosophical attitude that insists on developing science only in a humanistic context?

Confucianism’s agnostic rationalism is manifested in the texts where Confucius expressed his distance from such supernatural powers as ghosts and spirits.

J. Needham’s judgment upon Hsun Tzuis sound, but it does not tell the whole story.Viewed from the philosophy of science, Hsun Tzu’s ideological framework is favorable for the development of modern science and even for that of technology: an attitude of domination over nature by seizing her causal regularities and her transformation by technical process. In the following text, Hsun Tzu said:

Your glorify Nature and meditate on her,

Why not domesticate her and regulate her?

You obey Nature and sing her praises,

Why not control her and use her?

You look on the seasons with reverence and await them,

Why not respond to them by seasonal activities?

You depend on things, marvel at them,

Why not unfold your abilities and transform them?

You meditate on what make a thing,

Why not so order things, that you do not waste them?

You vainly seek into the cause of things,

Notice that this important text is interpreted by Needham as merely a protest against Taoists, especially Chuang Tzu’s preference for nature and negligence of man, and as exhibiting a certain legalist learning. In fact, it was not so simple, because here "to domesticate and regulate" and "control over the course of Nature" would mean an attitude of domination over Nature by using her causal regularities. "Unfold one’s abilities", "transform things" "order things and appropriate what they produce" would mean the application of technology in accomplishing things and transforming natural process.

Therefore Hsun Tzu had an ideological framework favorable to the development of science and technology in the modern sense. His difficulty consisted in the fact that he did not understand the importance of investigating "what makes a thing" and consequently missed the dimension of knowledge for knowledge’s own sake, the disinterested pursuit of truth. What he had in mind was a pragmatic and utilitarian vision of domination over nature and technological application.

Modern Western science is a rational way of constructing knowledge of the world in view of its valid explanation and efficient control . Science is a product of human construction as well as a continuing process of construction. As we have said in the first chapter, this process of construction consists in three aspects.

- First, on its rational side, modem science is an activity of constructing theories that use logical-mathematically structured language to formulate knowledge of local validity, that is, knowledge about a particular domain of phenomenon with explanatory and predictive power.

- Second, on its empirical side, modem science is characterized by its well-controlled systematic experimentation which, by elaborating on the sensible data and our perception of them, assure itself of keeping in touch with the Environment, the supposed "Real World", but in an artificially, technically controlled way.

- Third, there is a conscious checking of the correspondence between the rational side and the empirical side in order to combine them into a coherent whole to serve man’s objective in explaining and controlling the world. The rational side of science builds up a theoretical vision of the world, while the empirical side relates this vision to the scientist’ s sensible construction and controlling experience of the world. Philosophical reflection, in checking the correspondence between these two aspects, assures us of their coherence and unity.

Now, let us compare Confucianism with Western modem science. Apparently speaking, Confucianism seemed to have emphasized the accumulation of empirical knowledge on the one hand and their intelligible unity on the other. B. Schwartz is right when he says,

Unfortunately, further reflection shows that, first, the empirical knowledge in Confucius was not technically controlled data collection; second, the ultimate unity for him was not merely the logico-mathematically structured theories; and finally the mode of interaction between the above two moments was not that of deduction and falsification in Popper’s sense, or induction and verification in Logical Empiricists’ sense or in other looser concepts such as testing and confirmation. Let us explain this more explicitly in order to evaluate the epistemological import of Confucianism.

First, concerning the empirical side of Confucian learning, Confucius did not have in mind any sensible data gathered by technically controlled process. What he stressed consisted rather in the concrete and factual knowledge of the institutions, the code of behavior, the achievement of an idealized culture, that of Chou dynasty for example, and the realities of our life environment. This extended from knowledge in respect to the names of birds, animals, plants and trees, to that of the meaning of a religious rite. This empirical knowledge concerns mostly the meaningful world of human being, rather than with the savage world of nature, which in Confucius’ eyes was to be constructed in terms of codes congenial to human nature, not to be controlled by mere technical process. Even if we take the broad concept of"technique" such as the one given by Weber, which means the rule-governedness of reproducible behavior to which others can adapt themselves in a calculative manner, we cannot say that empirical knowledge in the Confucian sense is technically controlled. Perhaps it is for this reason that Confucianism did not offer any method conducive to modem scientific development.

Second, concerning the rational side of Confucian learning, there seemed to be no regard paid to the rigorous logico-mathematic structure of discourse. One thing Confucius proposed which was connected with the rationality of discourse was his emphasis on the correctness of names. This concerned mostly the use of language and the relation of language to reality. In fact it was not proposed by Confucius as a semantic theory, not to mention any concern for syntactical issues. It concerned terms not in themselves, but as used in human speeches and actions. Therefore it had some pragmatic significance determined in term of the social, rather than theological. Confucius said:

This text shows that the Confucian theory of language refers not to any observed physical entity, but to modes of human behavior. Confucius never tried to formulate any definition in the sense of Aristotelian logic. Neither did he propose any semantic theory. What we can discern here is only an ethically oriented pragmatic vision of language.

In the long history of Chinese science, mathematics was never considered by Confucians as the measure of rationality, not to mention taking it as necessary for structuring a meaningful discourse. The only exception was perhaps Shao Yung, who gave a very high place to numbers, seen by him as the manifestation of Tao. But this is a metaphysical rather than scientific thesis. Anyhow, mathematics was not highly evaluated in itself. The priority of social and ethical concern in Confucianism seems to explain this attitude. As Needham suggests,

This social and political reason given be Needham explains partly the unimportance of mathematical discourse in Confucianism. A more internal reason might be that mathematics was considered as technique of calculation and instrument of organizing empirical data, not as the objective structure of reality and discourse.

Third, concerning the mode of relation between empirical knowledge and the intelligible ground of unity, Confucianism had not conceived of any interactive relation in the mode of deduction/falsification, or induction/verification, or testing/confirmation. The mode of unity was for Confucianism a kind of mental integration in referring to the ultimate reality through the process of ethical praxis. Here praxis or practical action was not interpreted as a kind of technical application of theories to control concrete natural or social phenomena. It was understood rather as an active involvement in the process of realizing what is properly human in the life of the individual and that of the society. As to science and technology, they are not to be ignored but must be reconsidered in the context of this ethical praxis.

Although Weber’s judgment here is convincing to a certain degree, still we have to distinguish what is rational from what is reasonable. To be "rational", as we have said before, we have to control the gathering of empirical data through systematic technical process, to formulate theories in a logico-mathematic manner, and to establish their correspondence through an interactive checking process. On the contrary, to be "reasonable", we have to refer to the totality of our existence and to its meaningful interpretation by human life as a whole. Confucianism endeavored to be reasonable, while neglecting its own rational potentiality. Without scientific rationality, Confucianism did not produce modem science in the long history of Chinese culture. But with its reasonableness, it can serve today as remedy to modem science when the scientific rationality has brought humankind to the impasse of the impoverishment of reason.

In the latter sense, modem science and technology could also be seen by the Marxists as a model of rationalization. Because, according to Marx, the rationalization of society takes place in the development of productive forces, that is, in the expansion of empirical knowledge, in the improvement of production techniques and the increasingly effective mobilization, quantification and organization of socially useful labor power.

This conception of modem science and technology as model of rationalization and measure of progress could be traced back to the time of the Enlightenment. For example, Condorcet had, under the influence of Turgot and d’Alembert, well articulated this ideology in his famous Esquisse d ‘un tableau historique des progres de l’esprit humain of 1794. The mathematical sciences of nature were seen there as the model of rationality. Especially, Newtonian physics was taken as a paradigm for knowledge in general. In his Tableau ge’nerale de la science qui a pour object I ‘application du calcul aux sciences morales et politiques of 1793, Condorcet took as examples the questions concerning demography, electoral operations, the theory of value and that of prize. He took probability calculation as technique indispensable for the progress of human spirit. With what he called as "social mathematics", he hoped for the elimination of superstition and skepticism, and for the possibility of relating humankind to reason. The methodology of the natural sciences thereby was extended to the social sciences, human sciences and even to the philosophical vision of history in general.

Habermas has well pointed out that this philosophy of progress has four basic presuppositions.

- First, it interpreted the concept of perfection according to the model of scientific progress and thus based a linear conception of progress on the advancement of natural sciences.

- Second, it universalized the rationality represented by modem science which took on the function of enlightenment and emancipation.

- Third, it connected the cognitive aspect of scientific progress with the moral-practical aspect of the coming of age of mankind.

This positivist philosophy, with all its presuppositions, has long dominated our visions of science, society and reality. It constitutes a dominant paradigm of scientific research and social development in general . But recently, with the fall of this dominant paradigm, we see quite clearly now that this conception of rationality has many unacceptable implications.

It implies that, first, science and society follow a linear and irreversible way of development. But in reality, it fails to recognize the fact that desired changes in a few indices do not necessarily lead to overall development of the society in question, and that growth rarely follows an irreversible, unilinear path. It implies also an overemphasis on the rupture of the modern society with traditional values and practices as a precondition to modernity. Tradition and cultural values are viewed as obstacles to growth and have to be removed. This tradition/modernity dichotomy leads to an erroneous assumption that there is only one way to modernity which too can be manifested in but one single model. In reality, new discoveries in science and technology must find support from the existing cultural tradition before they can take hold in the system. Finally, on the cognitive level, it implies a sort of domination of empirical data by theories. On the social level, it implies also a strategy of domination of the more developed over the less developed, and of the center over the periphery. To a certain degree, we could say that scientific rationality means domination.

In contrast to the rationality of modern science, Confucianism is a system of reasonable ideas which refers ultimately to the totality of human existence and its realization as the horizon within which the meaning of human actions, and even that of natural phenomena, is to be determined. Instead of thinking of explaining natural phenomena by law-like theories and of my technical control over the world, Confucianism thinks in terms of our relation to others, to Nature and even to the transcendental. It thinks in the framework of the totality constituted of Humanity, Nature and Heaven.

In the case of Classical Confucianism, as we have said, this system of ideas was constituted essentially of Jen, Yi and Li. Jen could be seen as the dynamic interconnectedness of one’s Self with others, with nature and even with Heaven, seen as the ground of the transcendental dimension of existence. It is the ultimate ground of cosmic harmony and the transcendental foundation of men’s ethical life. It is our subjectivity as well as our intersubjectivity to be manifested especially in and through our moral awareness.

From Jen, the Confucians would derive Yi, which represents respect of, and the appropriate behaviors towards, others. From here emerge all moral norms, moral obligations, moral judgments, our consciousness of these obligations and even the virtue of acting always according to moral norms. From Yi, the Confucians would derive Li which represents code of behavior, religious and political ceremonies and social institutions.

Both Yi and Li represent the "ought to be" of human existence, whereas Jen represents the Being of beings, natural, divine and especially human. The rule-governedness of human nature is not to be understood in light of natural laws, or to be reduced to them. On the contrary, it is to be understood in accordance with the to be and the ought to be of human beings as expressed in the conceptual framework of Jen, Yi and Li. Even the laws of nature have to be reinterpreted by, and reintegrated into, the dignity of human existence and its transcendental foundation. Arthur F. Wright seems to have grasped this reasonable system centered around the human agent when he says:

Compared with the Western scientific rationality, the Confucian vision of reasonableness has the following implications:

First, in place of the linear conception of progress presupposed by scientific rationality, Confucianism proposes a creative movement which cherishes the sedimentated traditional values while moving forward towards novelty. Confucianism does not presuppose a linear and eschatological concept of time. In the Confucian eyes, progress must not be an excuse for entering into the situation of dependence. On the contrary, it must be an authentically creative act based on the dynamism of each tradition.

Second, in place of a radical rupture from the past, Confucianism cherishes the notion of continuity. In the Confucian eyes, "modernization" should not be understood in rupture with tradition. On the contrary, it is but a modern manner of interpreting traditional values and of forming a novel tradition according to the demand of modern times.

Third, in place of the strategy of domination implicit in the scientific rationality, Confucianism proposes a strategy of harmonious coordination. Science and technology are not to be seen as instruments for domination over nature and society. They are but knowledge of, and technique for, coordinating human being and nature, individual and society.

In view of the above, even if Confucianism did not produce any science of the modern Western type, it could have the following advantages in facing today the challenge of science and in overcoming its malicious presuppositions and ill effects.

On the theoretical level, Confucianism emphasizes the priority of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity over logical and technological systems. In other words, according to Confucianism, the human being has to be master and not slave of science and technology. All development of the latter must be in the service of the unfolding and realization of human potentiality. Confucianism also accentuates the priority of the meaningfulness of human life over the rigor of mathematical and experimental structures. In short, it emphasizes the existentially meaningful, rather than the semantico-syntactic side of discourse. Finally, it stresses the priority of the human and social sciences over the natural sciences. Because human sciences concern mostly the ways through which human beings understand themselves in history, rather than the mathematical structure of natural laws in the case of natural sciences. They are characterized by human being’s historicity and therefore cannot get rid of traditional values.

On the practical level, Confucianism would not favor modernity to the detriment of tradition. On the contrary, it would try to adapt to the demands of modern world on the basis of the dynamism and resources of the cultural tradition. All new developments in the domain of science and technology are to be conceived in a way to be absorbed into the cultural dynamism of each historical community. In short, it prefers acculturation, rather than westernization. Finally, it would protest against any policy of domination, but will agree with any policy of harmonious coordination on both the national and on the international levels.

Today these Confucian principles have already proved their effectiveness in promoting modernization on the societal and economic level. Herman Kahn affirms in World Economic Development -- 1979 and Beyond:

The problem now is that mere economic development is not enough. There is no modernity without science. The concept of modernization is inextricably bound up with advancing modem science and technology. How could Confucianism, in mastering the creative tensions between theoria and praxis, logical structure and empirical data, the reasonable and the rational, produce novel development in science and technology worthy of its noble principles and create thereby a new cultural synthesis, this is still a task for those who are Confucian-minded in the days to come.

But, on the other hand, when Western science is now more and more trapped in a menacing scientific rationality, Confucian emphasis on reasonableness, on the holistic relation of human beings to the Reality, can help us to redefine science’s place in human existence as well as man’s place in the cosmos. In this perspective, we need more a reasonable system of ideas such as the one offered by Confucianism, rather than the modern Western science. Also Confucianism can help humankind to think over the urgent problem of how to reintegrate science into the context of human existence.

1. Vincent Shen, Disenchantment of the World (Taipei: China Times Publishing Co., 1984), pp. 31-37.

2. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b, 12-22.

3. Georg Picht, "Der Sinn der Unterscheidung von Theorie und Praxis in der griechischen Philosophie," in Evangelishe Ethik (1964), pp. 321ff.

4. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 981b, 6-7.

5. Ibid., 982a 3-10, 20-23.

6. The Text of Yi Ching. Chinese original with English translation by Z.D.Sung (Shanghai, 1935), p. 334.

7. Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 99.

8. Lun Yu, XIV 24, my translation.

9. Joseph, Needham, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Vol. II, p. 12.

10. Lun Yu, VI 20, tr. Legge, modified by myself.

11. Ibid., XI, 11, tr. Legge, modified by myself.

12. Max Weber, The Religion of China, tr. by H. Gerth (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 155.

13. Lun Yu, VII, 17.

14. Ibid., VII, 24.

15. Ibid., VII, 20.

16. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol., pp. 26-29.

17. The Works of Hsun Tzu. Tr. Dubs (London: Probstain, 1928), p. 236.

18. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol. II, pp. 493-495.

19. Ibid., p. 458.

20. Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, p. 89.

21. Lun Yu, XV 3. (tr. Waley).

22. Ibid., II 15.

23. Ibid., XV 30.

24. Ibid., XIII 3.

25. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol. II, p. 30.

26. Max Weber, The Religion of China, trans. by H. Gerth, pp. 150-151.

27. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. T. Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner’s Son, 1958), pp. 13-31.

28. Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), pp. 145-153.

29. Arthur F. Wright, ed., Confucianism and Chinese Civilization (California: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. ix.

30. Herman Kahn, World Economic Development--1979 and Beyond (New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1979), pp. 121-122.

31. Ibid., p. 122.

1. The Broken World, a Four Act Play by Gabriel Marcel, trans. by K.R. Hanley (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1998).

2. "Concrete Approaches to the Ontological Mystery", in Gabriel Marcel (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980), pp. 9-46.

See also: Two Play, by Gabriel Marcel: "The Lantern" and "The Torch of Peace" plus From Comic Theater to Musical Creation, a Previously Unpublished Essay, ed. Katharine Rose Hanley (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988).

"The Dangerous Situation of Spiritual Values", in Home Viator, an Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope (Glouster, MA: Peter Smith, 1978); Katharine Rose Hanley, Dramatic Approaches to Creative Fidelity: A Study in the Theater and Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), esp. ch. VII, "Colombyre or the Torch of Peace: The Role of Person-Communities in Living Creative Fidelity to Values", pp. 129-136.