CHAPTER XIV

 

ONTOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION

OF ETHICS

 

GAO GUOXI

 

In China today, there is still no book or paper on the foun-dation of ethics; this subject-matter seems to be beyond question. On the contrary there are many studies concerning this in Western philosophy. Surely, there should be a relation between metaphysics and ethics. Even though there is now study of ontology in philosophical textbooks in China, the warm discussion concerning "the ontology of nature", "the ontology of material" and "the ontology of social existence" or "the ontology of praxis" since 1987 shows that the problems of ontology has not been eliminated or deconstructed. Ontology, as the total grasp of the universe by human wisdom and the search of its foundations by natural intelligence, has lasting vitality but is in need of renewal. The goal of this chapter is to explore this relation between ontology and ethics.

When George Lukacs wrote "No ethics without ontology"1 he left a puzzle for he provided no argument to support this. How can two poles of theory: ontology which is so abstract and ethics which is so actual, touch each other, as Lukacs suggests. Various theories concerning this appear in modern Western philosophy. Since the middle of the last century, a strong trend rejecting ontology emerged in Western philosophy, and then evolved into an overall movement of anti-foundationalism. This wants to break the absolute and unitary, and to concentrate on specificity, parti-cularity and experience. This challenges any unitary view of value or any absolute system; it struggles against total and uncritical ac-ceptance of the tradition and rebels against any absolute model of cognition. Thus, from time to time ontology is questioned.

Firstly, for more than a century the death of ontology has been called for by positivism. In those circles substantive pro-blems, let alone the relationship between ontology and ethics, were expelled from philosophy as an academic field. Ontology was maintained only in religion and non-academic philosophy.

Secondly, F. Nietzsche’s proposed "transvaluation of tradi-tional moralities" threatens their foundations; moral knowledge was also shaken: is there then any stable basis for morality?

Thirdly, existentialism began with individual persons descri-bing their psychological experiences, but can these provide a basis for morality?

Finally, as Alasdair MacIntyre said, since the Renaissance individualism has lead to relativism in morality which then appears to lack a common basis.2

This engenders a puzzle: is there any basis and ground for a position on values? If so is the basis shared or distinct for each culture? If the latter, then are the grounds comparable or not? This involves the issue of whether morality and ethics have fixed grounds, which is the task here.

Ontology and ethics have been regarded as having nothing to do with each other; this is the issue of our age. In ancient and early modern philosophy, the relation between them was very clear: ontology was the root, ethics the fruit. The Stoics took natural philosophy as the tree and ethics as the fruit. Descartes’s metaphor is familiar: metaphysics is the root, and ethics the fruit. From its earliest ages till now ontology aimed at a unitary account of phenomena, and a fixed foundation for change or becoming. Frank Thilly saw the world as one, presenting to us a unitary whole. No phenomenon can be understood thoroughly in isolation from all others.3

According to its original meaning as a love of wisdom, philosophy is a grasp of the whole world. Thus it cannot be res-tricted within the limits of the empirical and logical spheres as with analytic reasoning, nor within the psychological or mental ex-perience which lacks positive content as with dialectic reasoning. Philosophy, both in analytic or positive theoretic reasoning and in dialectic or synthetic practical reasoning is a systematic funda-mental understanding and explanation of the universe. As the basic and overall grasp of being, ontology is an important part of philo-sophy and must not be suppressed. What then is the role of ontology in the construction of ethics?

 

1. Ontology provides ethics with the foundation of a Weltanschauung and principles for argumentation and agreement. Thereby it provides ethical theory with unity and continuity.

Moral phenomena are diverse and confused; they are entangled with other social actions. How can we find the point for unifying them upon a fixed and adequate basis? As directions for human life, ethics must advocate something, critique something; it must promote the good, and suppress evil. At the level of a Weltanschauung, it must provide a basic point of view for the human’s place in the cosmos and the human mission in society. All the above constitute the starting point and foundation for rational inquiry. This is Aristotle’s arche, Aquinas’s principium and A. MacIntyre’s first principle. It determines the direction, trend, task, standard and criteria of ethics. In this sense, ontology determines ethics. Sartre noted, "Ontology and existential psychoanalysis must reveal to the moral agent that he is the being by whom value exists."4

Different bases for moral philosophy can lead to different ethical commitments: to take the feelings and the reactions of the subject as the basis of morality would engender ethical subjec-tivism; to base it upon different particular groups would lead to ethical relativism. It is often said that facts are the bases of values, but facts alone cannot construct values. This implies the problem of the objective or subjective grounds of morality. Some philosophers build their ethics on the basis of "nature", "utility" and "analysis", but none of those ethics is on stable ground.

Let us take the utilitarianism as an example. Utilitarian prin-ciples are not primary premises, but are dictated by other more fundamental thinking. Before J. Bentham came to his "utility" and "maximal happiness principle", he had started with ethical thinking on human nature; but the latter in turn was drawing upon an onto-logy of human existence. In this way, ethics is related to ontology.

Ethical concerns involve various levels, both in general and in particular, from social events to individual life. Under some fundamental principles, coherent reasoning leads to an explanation of phenomena and appropriate actions. Ontology, as a total wel-tanschauung, provides the main direction, the fundamental prin-ciples, the basic identity of the phenomena, the essence and the grounds. F. Brentano’s ethics, for example, was constructed ac-cording to his ontology of intentionality as the foundation; R.M. Hare’s ethics embodies overall an analytic ontology -- universal prescriptive utilitarianism. A. MacIntyre takes Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s aretai (virtue), principlium and telos as the keys to ethics and philosophy, and insists that it is precisely because these conceptions have been abandoned that contemporary moral philo-sophy has fallen to pieces. He criticizes Sartre’s self as a leap into the absurd from one state or moral promise to another with no basis in "a set of social relations". Such an opinion is so fragmented that it cannot provide a basis for coherent choices.5

 

2. Ontology provides value-orientation and value-criteria. Ontology has two main characters: principium and telos. Telos is common to all human acts in the practical and cognitive orders. It distinguishes the human and the animals and gives direction to human activity, whereby people choose the means to achieve their goals. The good and evil in ethical life are determinated in view of value, which in turn is based on ontology. Values are engendered from the point of view of the total universe. F. Brentano suggested that ethics was of ultimate importance, "one who identifies a goal at which he will aim is like a marksman who sees his target; he has a far better chance of striking it than someone who shoots at random.6 In the same sense, MacIntyre said that the first principle "provides the standards and direction from the outset."7

Just as value orientations are not universal, so value stan-dards also differ. Kant takes universal validity and the valuing per-son as the basis for moral principles. Contemporary utilitarians judge the right and wrong according to the consequences of actions, Thomists according to their telos, and so on. All above opinions are far from being coherent with one another though each system has its own consistence. The reason for this is that different trends emerge on the ontological level. What one exalts the other excludes; to what one pursues the other is apathetic: all dispense with such synthetic social factors as the place in society, the level of education, the ideal of human life, and social relationships which provide the comprehensive social contexts. For these we need to turn to such sciences as psychology, religion, literature, culture and economics, all of which can be combined with ethics.

 

3. Ontology transcends morality. Moral life has ideals which can elevate human beings to a lofty realm of thought. We cannot treat the details but morality teaches humans to transcend themselves, to purify the goals of life and to elevate the human search. This sense of super-empirical, sublime ideals and of the transcendent comes from ontology. Induction cannot attain tran-scendence and essences. To observe and enquire about these as social beings, we must broaden our sights, to appreciate the ethical dimension or significance of everyday life. Ethics gives a non-empirical account of empirical affairs in order to provide humans with a basis for their stance in the world. This is where the strength and dignity of morality lies, and the reason why morality can elevate the human mind. Science is knowledge, but beyond this thought is a style of life. Morality then is not only knowledge, but surpasses this and concerns the moral style, meaning and structure of human existence.

S. Freud considered morality to be a function of the superego. As ideas and actions rooted in actuality but superior thereto morality shares this identity. The inclination to go beyond the details in order to promote a life is precisely the insight and con-tribution of ontology -- going through phenomena to grasp the substance, Kant considered the natural inclination of human reason to substance as the problem of how to be human: it is the key to the transcending grasp by the spirit and its reaction to the outside world of beings. Man’s grasp of the whole of existence enables pure reason not to remain with observing the natural world, but to leap beyond all possible experience; it is in this that metaphysics is produced. The natural rational inclination to inquire regarding the ultimate foundation leads to the principles of practical life. The problems of substance are very important in practice; if there is no such realm to satisfy human hopes and desires, the absolutely necessary universality which reason seeks as a moral goal can never be achieved. Thus, in Kant’s philosophy the principles of moral practice come from a transcendent ontology.

To achieve the goal, we must choose the means and the way that leads to it. This principle of action also come from ontology.

 

4. Ontology provides the first principle of action. Much ethical action follows the principles posited by ontology which provides the fundamental preconditions, specifies the actions and plays a deep directive role. Socrates held that knowing what is good, man can practice the good. This is posited on the principle: "No man can do evil intentionally." Hence, Socrates kept dis-cussing with others in order to clarify various conceptions, for only by knowing virtue could one do virtue.

Ethical actions are applications of practical reason and fol-low its action rules. According to Kant practical reason, as the practical application of pure theoretical reason, is indispensable for the completion and application of reason. As concerned with prac-tice ethics certainly involves principles of action for living in the actual world. So, Plato did not distinguish ethics from social pro-blems, and Aristotle’s politics was a continuation of his ethics.

Traditional philosophers hold many common beliefs re-garding right action, the adequacy of moral rules and the certitude of moral knowledge. Because they have broad agreement on mo-rality, philosophers can search together for the common principles of morals and for resolving factual issues.

The principles of action should involve medium range rules which tell how to apply the principles. Because action is about discrete matters, one’s theory must be coherent with particular things (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1107 a30). This leads to applied ethics.

It is the ontological foundations which coordinate the uni-versal principles with particular maxims or rules so that they cor-respond one with the other. Thence derives the continuing coherent linkage and unitary method which can lead to the solution of particular and specific affairs.

5. Ontology provides ethics with its primary method of moral enquiry. An integrating world-view undergirds the method in the process of thought and practice; in this way ontology can influence directly moral enquiry and the resulting positions. Kant’s philo-sophy is the best example. He held that in practical reason "Denn in der gegenwartigen werden wir von Grundsatzen anfangend zu Beg-riffen und von diesen allererst womoglich zu den Sinnen gehen."8 This reflects Kant’s view of philosophy as superior to reason and will which allows morality to transcend the influence of expe-rience. He began his ethics positing universal legislation by the categorical imperative. This endowed his ethics with transcendence, obligation, form and autonomy. This method of beginning from an application of pure reason and eliminating experience was determined by his metaphysics.

Another distinguished argument regarding ontology and morals is found in A. MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990). He sees the three different oncologies (ency-clopedia, genealogy and tradition) leading to three fundamentally rival opinions in moral research: Thomas’s teleological tradition, the encyclopaedist’s optimism regarding the progress of reason and Nietzsche’s genealogy destroying the idols of traditional morals and reason. The different perspectives and methods lead to con-trary or perhaps complementary solutions. This discrepancy in method is engendered from differences in views concerning sub-stance. Various theories surely have their own methods of ethical enquiry and goals, which may lead to conflict. One of the tasks of ethics is to provide a method for comparing and making choices in moral problems.

The actions chosen by Socrates reflect a universal norm or principle; yet among those principles one must still consider which one has the greater importance -- the most important one being the first principle.

What does it mean to say that some actions are right, good or moral? The criteria for measuring them comes from principles at a deeper level and various levels require various methods. For example, the experience level requires a method of descriptive analysis, the normative level requires speculation and a selective method, while the meta-level calls for a critical method. Anglo-American philosophers now look for a rational method of moral inference and judgement.

 

6. Ontology provides ethical criticism. One of the functions of philosophy is criticism and ontology engages in the criticism of being-itself, which surely includes criticism of the discipline of ethics. Without mentioning ancient theories, contemporary ethics, from G.E. Moore’s to R.M. Hare’s analytical criticism of moral languages, and MacIntyre’s criticism of contemporary moral theories all proceed from ethics to ontological criticism, and all embody different world view ontologies.

The difference between the philosopher’s and the common person’s view of moral problems is that philosophical criticism does its best to elucidate the moral versions, to argue its truth, to apply logical analysis and demonstration, and to examine the pro-posed principles and the prevailing theory of morals in society. Criticism includes unveiling the origin and essence of morality, examining moral criteria and standards, and analyzing the ability to know moral phenomena, such as whether this is a matter of a priori intuition, faith or feeling? Criticism includes also discovery the logical character of the language of morals, moral thinking and the levels of ethics. To take the levels of ethics as an example, moral thinking, according to W. Frankena, includes describing the levels of experiment, norm, analysis and criticism or meta-ethics.9 Most of the criticisms of metaethics proceeded at the level of logic, epistemology and semantics, and have not yet engaged criticism at the level of ontology. For this reason metaethics can do nothing for the different value-orientations and the difference between dif-ferent systems of ethics still cannot be settled by metaphysics (such as R. Hare’s criticism of fascism). Ethical criticism includes: the nature and scope of moral enquiry, its tasks, goals, principles, levels and its relations to history, literature, anthropology and sociology.

 

7. Ontology can provide the ultimate explanation of moral status in society. To analyze and understand adequately moral status in society, we must connect a moral phenomena with its concrete status. This requires understanding the broad cultural background, which in turn requires establishing an ontology concerning social existence. This bases ethics on the actual historical, practical and scientific criticism of reason, which then may merge with concrete social affairs to become the stable bridge and actual goal for improving society and leading to human happiness.

In his distinguished work, After Virtue, A. MacIntyre pro-ceeded to criticize deeply the contemporary situation of Western morals. He argues that our society privileges emotivism and liberal individualism, which leads society into crisis. The lack of common moral criteria leads people into moral conflict. "All moral judge-ments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling."10 He criticizes emotivism’s "lack of any ulti-mate criteria."11 The overall cultural background with its philo-sophical foundations suggests "virtue", "telos" and "principles" as the way to resolve the crisis of morality and philosophy. In linking moral and social life the 1960s pointed out that conceptions of morals must be embodied in social life. The difference between styles of social life can be traced to their different moral con-ceptions.12

The fundamental roles played by ontology in ethics have been traced above. In fact, all the ethical theories have their own foundation, value-orientation and viewpoint on human life. If ethics is to play a greater role in human life, we must have a more rational system of moral philosophy. The process of choosing, transforming, criticizing and completing must be based on an ade-quate social history, a scientifically critical mind and theoretical coherence; it cannot do this without an ontological base in social existence. Both J. Rawls’ contract theory and G. Lukacs’ labor-practice are constructions of such a social ontology.

With the development of society and the progress of science and technology, the new problems of morals appear one after another, and the old problems, since they concern the fundamental status of human existence, emerge again and again in human life. They remain for thousands of years with no loss of charm or fascination; they last but are renewed. All of those phenomena can be understood adequately and truly only by being embodied in the social relations and products, in culture and ideology. The readjust-ment of universal institutions and morality required by the new changes can achieve their ultimate explanation only if they are embodied in actual social life. Only thus can morals be founded on a broad and stable base of social existence.

 

NOTES

 

1. E. Joos, Lukacs’s Last Autocriticism: the Ontology (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), p. 42.

2. A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1981).

3. Frank Thilly, Introduction to Ethics (New York: Scrib-ner’s, 1913), Chap. 1, par. 7.

4. J.P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), pp. 795-797.

5. A. MacIntyre, ibid.

6. F. Brentano, The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, trans. E.H. Schneewind (London: Routledge & Kigan Paul, 1973), p. 4.

7. A. MacIntyre, First Principles, Final Ends and Contem-porary Philosophy Issues (Milwaukee, Wisc.: Marquette University Press, 1990), p. 34.

8. I. Kant, Kritik Der Praktischen Vernunft (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1974), par. 17.

9. W. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NY: Prentice-Hall, 1973), chap. 1, par. 2.

10. MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 12.

11. Ibid., p. 33.

12. C.f. A. MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966), preface.