The knowledge of virtue is an important philosophical issue for Chinese neo-Confucianism. In this regard the Chinese public commonly makes a category mistake by treating the mind-nature problem in ancient Chinese philosophy in a way similar to the problem of cognition in Western philosophy.

In his book The Guiding Principle of Chinese Philosophy, Professor Zhang Dannian wrote that the knowledge of seeing and hearing is from perceptual experience, while the knowledge of virtue arises from intrinsic intuition. The knowledge of seeing and hearing relates to experienced objects, while the knowledge of virtue relates to everything.

In his book The Guiding Principle of the Known History in Ancient Chinese Philosophy, Professor Pan Fuen notes that Zhang Zai also distinguished between the knowledge of seeing and hearing, and that of virtue, relating the first to perceptual cognition and the other one to the cognition of reason. He recognizes that perceptual recognition has limitations, which cognition by reason overcomes.

Professor Xiao Jiefu and Li Jinquan, in their book The History of Chinese Philosophy, observe that Zhang Zai does not understand the link between perceptual knowledge and that of reason and cuts the bond between perception and reason. He insists that virtue is not according to perception, but can concern all things in the world. In his book Ancient Chinese Philosophy and Develop-ment of Logic, Professor Fong Qi sees Zhang Zai falling into idealism in his cognitive theory for failure to understand correctly the relations between perception and reason. He divides knowledge of seeing and hearing from that of virtue. Obviously, in their books, the difference between virtue and seeing and hearing is not only a distinction between homogeneous objects of cognition, but bet-ween heterogeneous perception and reason.

The concept of virtue belongs not only to the characteristic propositions of Chinese philosophy, but to western philosophy as well. It would be a mistake to think that the Chinese philosophical public did not pay attention to the study of the concept of virtue in Western philosophy, where it is a central problem in ethics and even for philosophy as a whole. This began with ancient Greek philosophy. Socrates traced the nature of virtue in the market place in Athens. He discussed with others whether virtue means some outstanding character of things, similar to "Arete" in Greek.

Later, Plato put forward the famous theory of the four virtues in Book Four of his Republic. He considered every social stratum in the state to have their special nature, character and capabilities. The ruler is good at organizing; his virtue is wisdom. The soldier is good at fighting; his virtue is bravery. The worker is good at end-uring; his virtue is temperance.

In Aristotle’s ethics the concept of virtue retained its tradi-tional meaning. But it suggests also force and strength, because wicked and weak are synonymous. Aristotle considers the main meaning of virtue to be in the choice of the means.

Although Kant was aware of the tradition of Western philo-sophy he did not agree with Aristotle’s notion of the mean because principles must be constant throughout time. For Aristotle virtue and wickedness differ in quantity, rather than quality. According to circumstances there is great difference between excess and de-ficiency, hence virtue seen as the mean would remain indefinite. Instead, for Kant virtue is the highest goodness; it is the unity of virtue and happiness in the same person. In fact, Kant sees virtue as the mastery of practical reason so that by reason one decides one’s own destiny and overcomes one’s own loves, desires and motives. Virtue is the moral force of the human will for fulfilling one’s duty. This duty, however, is a moral necessity of the human legislative will and is the source of all moral value. Only if an action derives from duty could it have moral value. Only when reason overcomes desire and impulse is duty complete and the people pleased and quiet. This is real happiness in moral life.

It is important that Kant constructs his theory of virtue upon the basis of a general and a priori moral law; and he accepts moral ontology. The basis of duty is in pure reason, not in human nature or external circumstance. Thus the concept of duty is linked to the priority of reason restraining one’s will through the reasoned legis-lative function of moral law. Duty is an active necessity according to objective universal principles. In the final analysis, the nece-ssity, restraint and compulsion of duty, its priority, objectivity and lofty dignity are all from law. It is on the basis of pure, universal, effective and a priori moral law, that duty can be necessary and compelling, and hence the fountainhead of all moral value.

Kant’s real intention was to draft a pure philosophy or meta-physics; he was against experientialism, and against perception in ethics. His is a moral metaphysics which depends upon the demon-stration of the purity and loftiness of morals and the seriousness and sacredness of duty. There is a famous sentence in Kant: "There are two things with which I am more and more surprised and res-pect in my heart: the sky densely covered with stars over my head and the moral law in my bosom." In Kant’s heart the actions of reasonable persons must be the basis for moral law just as all phenomena constitute the basis for natural law.

The concept of virtue in Western philosophy reflects not only its cognitive theory, but also its theory of human nature and moral-philosophy. The knowledge of virtue and of seeing and hearing belong to different levels of knowledge. Virtue is not equal to reason purely and simply but contains also perceptual intuition. In ancient Chinese philosophy virtue belongs to human nature or moral philosophy.

One section of a book, copied on silk and exhumed in 1973 from the third Han grave in Changsha Hunan, is named virtue. This belongs to the Zisi school of thought and was written as early as Mencius. It provides very important information for the study of the eight Confucian schools after Confucius. It tells us:

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After this, Confucius described virtue in his books Luen Yu and Zhong Yong:

In the history of Chinese philosophy Zhang Zai put forward the difference between the knowledge of virtue and of seeing and hearing. "The knowledge of seeing and hearing is from contact with matter, but not knowledge of virtue, which does not arise from seeing and hearing." In Zhang Zai’s view, the knowledge of virtue is a priori moral knowledge, which in turn is according to reflection upon oneself and recognition of human nature, whereas the know-ledge of seeing and hearing is from objective things. But, as there are matters which such knowledge could not see and hear, in order to attain complete knowledge about the ontological world persons must try their best to know the mind and nature, This brings about the knowledge of virtue. Mental abilities are the sign of the subject; it can recognize the law of world without seeing and hearing. Virtue is known by conscience, which is intuitive knowledge in-trinsic to oneself. Conscience and open-mindedness are of the nature of sky and of earth; trying one’s best one could know nature.

Here, mind is not only the power to recognize, but the moral power to transcend oneself. It is Zhang Zi’s idea that open-mindedness can grow in the light. This is to learn and observe the Tao. It insists on intuition and elevates the subjective spirit as absolute substantial existence. Here, Zhang Zi joins the subjective thought of the Taoist school with the moral content of Confu-cianism. He turns the "mind" into knowledge of virtue and of seeing and hearing, insisting that the knowledge of virtue does not start from seeing and hearing. His purpose is to advocate that the self recognizes morals and decides on the subjective principle of human morality. He differentiates the mind-nature problem into problems of moral theory and of cognitive theory. It is very im-portant that Zhang Zai’s knowledge of virtue is through direct contact with ontology, for in the final analysis it is a perceptual transcending of oneself and observing the world substance. In fact, knowledge of virtue is self-recognition of human nature, as well as of sky and earth which is included in moral ontology.

The distinction of the knowledge of virtue from that of seeing and hearing aided and popularized Neo-Confucianism and the neo-Confucianism. When Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao accepted the dif-ference between virtue and seeing and hearing, they attended to virtue and depreciated seeing and hearing, and hence were more moralistic than Zhang Zai.

Zhu Xi tried to unify virtue and seeing and hearing, so that in his moral knowledge his greater experiential content. He considers that Ge Wu Qion Li must start from seeing and hearing, but this contains Qion Li, not only pure perceptual experience. In Zhu Xi’s view, persons know a truth only from ordinary seeing and hearing. But if one puts a lot of work into seeing and hearing, he could attain perfect understanding and get Li. Although Zhu Xi attached impor-tance to experiential knowledge, but remained a moral priorist, not an experimentalist. His purpose is mainly to respect virtue.

Lu Jiuyuan, opposite to Zhu Xi is a moralist thorough and thorough. He considers the knowledge of virtue to lie intrinsic to a person’s nature, and don’t to need outward knowledge. He insists on supporting and controlling one’s subjective spirit, intuition and introspection. Wang Yang-Ming did not negate all knowledge of seeing and hearing like Lu Jiuyuan, but he opposed seeking knowledge outwardly did Zhu Xi. Wang Yang-Ming considered intuitive knowledge to be virtue, and that there is no virtue without intuitive knowledge. All knowledge including seeing and hearing is intuitive, not only seeing and hearing. In Wang Yang-Ming’s view, intuitive knowledge is knowledge of virtue and as substantial consciousness is the fountainhead of all knowledge. In fact, in-tuitive knowledge is a pure subjective spirit. It could not be gained from experiential knowledge, but is realized through perceptual experience.

Wang Yang-Ming considers the relation between virtue and seeing and hearing noumenon and function. If the knowledge of virtue were limited to seeing and hearing it would lack its sub-stance; and if is began from seeing and hearing, it world become body without use and reality. Wang Yang-Ming bases his moral ontology on the concept of intuitive knowledge. In his words, in-tuitive knowledge is the distinction of right and wrong. It is the highest yardstick for judging right and wrong, the good and evil of all things. Only the political and moral things and wrong existence in this sense; to limit the right would be to hold that "there is no Li and nothing beyond mind."

Modern neo-Confucianism approves and propagate even more the knowledge of virtue and moral ontology. Xiong Shi-Li accepts the notion of affection in Bergson’s vitalistic moral onto-logy. When h discussed intuitive knowledge with Feng You-Lan, he stated clearly: "why do you say that intuitive knowledge is a supposition, whereas it is true and real, and certain in appearance. It needs present intuition and affirmative." In Xiong Shi-Li’s view, moral substance is not an object to be recognized, but the subject which observes. Only knowledge of virtue is the way to observe substance. His "New Wei Shi Theory" is not separated from his mind-substance in the unity of noumenon and function. He con-siders, the moral substance to have no shape, to be peace and quiet, vigorous, complete, absolute and eternal. The human mind is the substance having these conditions; no-noumenon is no-function, departing from function is no-noumenon. Workmanship is function through which noumenon is revealed. Substance can be drawn from function. Human mind is the nature and kindheartedness.

As Xiong Shi-Li’s legacy spread, Mou Zong-San propagated a neo-Confucianism moral ontology in clear philosophical lan-guages. Mou Zong-San held that it was through conceptual analysis that Kant takes freedom us a basic supposition, but regard the pos-sibility of proving human conscience through such analysis.

Because persons have intellectual intuition, we know that they have hold conscience; this is an open and wonderful real the free will is intuitive knowledge; this is, not only the basis of moral practice, but is also the source of subsistence. The moral substance proves its self-existence from actio and the appearance of mind and kindheartedness. In practical moral action, we directly awaken the sincere and honest conscience. Therefore, the person is not only a limited but has intuitive knowledge of the infinite. The infinite moral mind is identical with the fate appealing in human nature. This is not only the basis of morals in the heart, but also the source of universal subsistence.

Modern neo-Confucianism then not only carries on the virtue tradition of Chinese philosophy, but also expresses Kant’s rational content. This raises the virtue theory of Chinese and western philosophy to a new height and serves deep reflection with regard to the modernization of Chinese philosophy and culture.