There is a striking and potentially instructive parallel be-tween the structure of Kant’s three critiques and recent Chinese history. Kant’s first critique focused on science and necessity, while his second critique focused on freedom. He had expected that this would be sufficient, but before that decade was out he came to the conclusion that a third critique, that of aesthetic judgment was necessary.

The tantalizing parallel in modern Chinese history is that in 1919 two Misters were invited into China, Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy. At that time it was thought that in order for them to enter, Confucius had to be ushered out. The history of the sub-sequent decades has raised serious question about this formula and now, there is a call to review the May 4th theory. Indeed it appears that the two misters in order to collaborate effectively in the process of modernization are in of Confucius with his sense of harmony as their gracious host.

To understand this one should note that at the beginning of the Enlightenment Descartes’ norms of clarity and distinctness pointed modern philosophy toward science as knowledge that was fixed and necessary. However, human life and relationships tran-scend neat categorization: freedom is by definition not necessitated and love as self giving is essentially unique and spontaneous. If freedom and love are the highest of human realities then the search for what is required for them and hence made manifest through them promises to point through science but beyond it in an especially penetrating exploration into the heart of being itself.

Of special interest here is not only that after Descartes this search was taken up by Kant, but that in this process Kant came inexorably to an aesthetic context for reality and thought which is reminiscent of Confucius’ notion of harmony. If the two be truly related in this, then an investigation of Kant may be a way of discovering both the central place in the thought of Confucius for modern notions of freedom and a special contribution of the Confucian culture and its peoples in the modern world.

Moreover, it has been claimed often times that Confucius’ notion of harmony stabilized life at the expense of creativity. It is important to see if this is true not so much historically as that is a question of the past, but in principle for that concerns the way in which the future can be constructed.

The paper will do this by following the sequence of Kant’s Critiques:

(1) his construction of the universal and necessary laws of science and the role of the imagination therein;

(2) Kant’s discovery of the reality of freedom as transcending the realm of necessity and universality;

(3) the requirement of for an aesthetic dimension, as found in both Kant and Confucius, in order both for science to be creative and for freedom to be real;

(4) the way in which some of these same insights can be found and/or grounded in the thought of Confucius.

Kant reasoned that since sense experience is always limited and partial, the universality and necessity of the laws of science must come from the human mind. Such a priori categories belong properly to the subject inasmuch as it is not material.

We are here at the essential turning point for the modern mind where Kant takes a definitive step in identifying the subject as more than a wayfarer in a given world to which one can but react. Rather, he shows the subject to be an active force engaged in the creation of even the empirical world in which one lives. The meaning or inte-lligible order of things is due not only to their creation according to a divine intellect, but also to the work of the human intellect and its categories. If, however, man is to have such a central role in the constitution of his world, then certain elements will be required, and this requirement itself will be their justification.

In sum, it is the task of the reproductive imagination to bring together the multiple elements of sense intuition in some unity or order capable of being informed by a concept or category of the intellect with a view to making a judgment. On the part of the sub-ject, the imagination here is active, authentically one’s own and creative. Ultimately, however, its work is not free, but necessitated by the categories or concepts as integral to the work of sciences which are characterized by necessity and universality.

How realistic is this talk about freedom? Do we really have the choice of which so much is said in the West? On the one hand, we are structured in a set of circumstances which circumscribe, develop and direct our actions. This is the actual experience of people which Marx and Hegel articulate when they note the im-portance of knowledge of the underlying pattern of necessity and make freedom consist in conforming thereto.

On the other hand, we learn also from our experience that we do have a special responsibility in this world to work with the cir-cumstances of nature, to harness and channel these forces toward greater harmony and human goals. A flood which kills thousands is not an occasion for murdering more, but for mobilizing to protect as many as possible, for determining what flood control projects need to be instituted for the future, and even for learning how to so construct them so that they can generate electricity for power and irrigation for crops. All of this is properly the work of the human spirit which emerges therein. Similarly, in facing a trying day, I eat a larger breakfast rather than cut out part of my schedule; rather than ignoring the circumstances and laws of my physical being, I coordinate these and direct them for my human purposes.

This much can be said by pragmatism. But it leaves unclear whether man remains merely an instrument of physical progress and, hence, whether his powers remain a function of matter. This is where Kant takes a decisive step in his second Critique.

In the above terms the human mind remains merely an ins-trument of physical progress and a function of matter. In his second Critique, beyond pure reason’s set of universal, necessary and ultimately material relations, Kant points to the reality of human responsibility in the realm of practical reason. If man is responsible then there is about him a distinctive level of reality irreducible to the laws of physical nature. This is the reality of freedom and spirit which characterizes and distinguishes the person.

In these terms he recasts the whole notion of law or moral rule. If freedom is not to be chaotic and randomly destructive, it must be ruled or under law; yet in order to be free the moral act must be autonomous. Hence, my maxim must be something which as a moral agent I -- and no other -- give to myself. I am free because I am the lawmaker.

But my exercise of this work cannot be arbitrary. If the moral order must be universal, then my maxim which I dictate must be fit to be also a universal law for all persons. On this basis freedom emerges in a clearer light. It is not merely self-centered whimsy in response to circumstantial stimuli; nor is it a despotic exercise of the power of the will or the clever self-serving eye of Plato’s rogue. Rather, it is the highest reality in all creation; it is wise and caring power, open to all and bent upon realization of "the glorious ideal of a universal realm of ends-in-themselves"; in sum, it is free people living together in righteous harmony. This is what we are really about; it is the person’s glory, as well as his or her burden.

This would appear to correspond to the deeper sense of Con-fucianism as understanding humans as bringing their life into har-mony with other persons and in the concrete circumstances of everyday life. It is not massively programmatic, but one must underestimate the cumulative power which the Confucian sense of harmony and resonance can have when exercised creatively by the many persons with knowledge of their circumstances in an effort to provide for life in its many modes, from family to farm to city. And because the exercise of freedom is a concrete and unique expre-ssion of the distinctive reality of its authors, it sees its task not as how to reduce these to abstractive and personlly stifling universal laws, but how to enliven persons to engage actively in the multiple dimensions of their life.

Kant had a third step to take, for if the free person is sur-rounded by an alien and necessitarian universe, then one’s freedom would be entrapped and entombed within the mind while action would be necessary and necessitated. If this is simply not so then the universe must not be alien to freedom. If there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which man can make use of ne-cessary laws, indeed if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then nature too must be understood as directed toward a goal and manifest throughout a teleology within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms, even in its necessary and universal laws, nature is no longer alien to freedom, but expresses divine freedom and is conciliable with human freedom. In principle the ontology provides the needed space.

There is something similar here to the Critique of Pure Rea-son. In both, the work of the imagination in assembling the pheno-mena is not simply to register, but to produce the objective order. As in the first critique, the approach is not from a set of a priori principles which are clear all by themselves and used in order to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, under the rule of unity, the imagination orders and reorders the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying prin-ciple whose appropriateness emerges from the reordering carried out by the productive imagination.

In the first Critique the productive work was done in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and carried out under a law which dictated that phenomena must form a unity. The Critique of Pure Reason saw the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena as not simply registering, but producing the objective order. The approach was not, however, from a priori principles which are clear all by themselves and are used to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, in the first Criti-que, under the rule of unity, the imagination moves to order and reorder the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle on the part of the intellect, the appro-priateness of which emerges from the reordering carried out by the reproductive imagination.

Here in "The Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment," the ima-gination has a similar task of constructing the object, but not in a manner necessitated by universal categories or concepts. In con-trast, here the imagination, in working toward an integrating unity, is not confined by the necessitating structures of categories and concepts, but ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see whether and wherein relatedness and purpo-siveness or teleology can emerge and the world and our personal and social life can achieve its meaning and value. Hence, in standing before a work of nature or of art, the imagination might focus upon light or form, sound or word, economic or interpersonal relations -- or, indeed, upon any combination of these in a natural environment or a society, whether encountered concretely or expressed in symbols.

Throughout all of this, the ordering and reordering by the imagination can bring about numberless unities. Unrestricted by any a priori categories, it can nevertheless integrate necessary dialectical patterns within its own free and therefore creative production and scientific universals within its unique concrete har-monies. More than merely evaluating all according to a set pattern in one’s culture, it chooses the values and orders reality ac-cordingly. This is properly creative work; it is the very constitution of the culture itself.

It is the productive rather than merely reproductive work of the human person as living in his or her physical world. Here, I use the possessive form advisedly. Without this capacity man would exist in the physical universe as another object, not only subject to its laws but restricted and possessed by them. He/she would be not a free citizen of the material world, but a mere function or servant. In his third Critique Kant unfolds how one can truly be master of his/her life in this world, not in an arbitrary and destructive manner, but precisely as creative artists bring being to new realization in ways which make possible new growth in freedom.

Developing the level of aesthetic sensitivity enables one to take into account ever greater dimensions of reality and creativity and to imagine responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present circumstances and more creative in promise for the future. This is manifest in a good leader such as a Churchill or Roosevelt -- and, supereminently, in a Confucius or Christ. Their power to mobilize a people lies especially in their rare ability to assess the overall situation, to express it in a manner which rings true to the great variety of persons, and, thereby, to evoke appro-priate and varied responses from each according to his or her capabilities. The danger is that the example of such genius will be reduced to formulae, become an ideology and exclude innovation. In reality, as personable, free and creative, and understood as the work of the aesthetic judgment, their example is inclusive in con-tent and application as well as in the new responses it continually evokes from others.

Kant’s third Critique points in another direction. Though it integrates scientifically universal and necessary social relations, it does not focus upon them, nor does it focus directly upon the beauty or ugliness of concrete relations, or even directly upon beauty or ugliness as things in themselves. Its focus is rather upon our contemplation of the integrating images of these which we imaginatively create, that is, our culture as manifesting the many facets of beauty and ugliness, actual and potential. In turn, we evaluate these in terms of the free and integrating response of pleasure or displeasure, the enjoyment or revulsion they generate most deeply within our whole person.

Confucius probably would feel very comfortable with this if structured in terms of an appreciation or feeling of harmony. In this way, he could see freedom itself at the height of its sensibility, not merely as an instrument of a moral life, but as serving through the imagination as a lens or means for presenting the richness of reality in varied and intensified ways. Freedom, thus understood, is both spectroscope and kaleidoscope of being. As spectroscope it unfolds the full range of the possibilities of human freedom, so that all can be examined, evaluated and admired. As kaleidoscope, it conti-nually works out the endless combinations and patterns of reality so that the beauty of each can be examined, reflected upon and chosen when desired. Freely, purposively and creatively, imagination weaves through reality focusing now upon certain dimensions, now reversing its flow, now making new connections and interrelations. In the process reality manifests not only scientific forms and their potential interrelations, but its power to evoke our free response of love and admiration or of hate and disgust.

In this manner freedom becomes at once the creative source, the manifestation, the evaluation and the arbiter of all that imagi-natively we can propose. It is goal, namely to realize life as rational and free in this world; it is creative source, for with the imagination it unfolds the endless possibilities for human expression; it is mani-festation, because it presents these to our consciousness in ways appropriate to our capabilities for knowledge of limited realities and relates these to the circumstances of our life; it is criterion, because its response manifests a possible mode of action to be variously desirable or not in terms of a total personal response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion; and it is arbiter, because it provides the basis upon which our freedom chooses to affirm or reject, realize or avoid this way of self-realization. In this manner, freedom emerges as the dynamic center of our human existence.

There is much in the above which evokes the deep Confucian sense of the harmony and the role of the gentleman in unfolding its implications for daily life. This uncovers new significance in the thought of Confucius for the work of implementing in a mutually fruitful manner both science and democracy in our times. Looking to the aesthetic sense of harmony as a context for uniting both ancient capabilities in agriculture with new powers of indus-trialization and for applying these to the work of freedom is a task, not only for an isolated individual, but for an entire people. Over time, a people develops its own specific sensibilities and through the ages forms a tradition and a culture, which is the humane capital for such a pro-ject. In this sense, one can look to the Confucian cultural heritage for its aesthetic sense of harmony as a way to carry forward the work of freedom in our day.

The Confucian sense of harmony is not a rationalist law whose unfolding would suggest an attempt to read all in an a priori and necessitarian manner. Its sense of life and progress is not that of a scientific view of history after the dialectic of Hegel and Marx. Rather, Confucianism is a way of understanding humans as bring-ing their lives together in relation to other persons and in the con-crete circumstances of everyday life. In this sense, it is not ma-ssively programmatic like a rationalist scientific theory of history. This may be very much to the good, for it protects against efforts to define and delimit all beforehand, after the manner of an ideology.

Further, one must not underestimate the cumulative power which the Confucian sense of harmony and resonance can have when it brings together creatively the many persons with know-ledge of their circumstances and in an effort to provide for life in its many modes. This extends from those farmers who know and love their land intimately and are committed to its rich potentialities (and analogously from all phases of productive economic life), to family members and villagers who love their kin to members of civil society who are willing to work ardently for the quality of life of their neighbors and nation. If the exercise of freedom is a concrete and unique expression of the distinctive reality of its authors, then the task is not how to define these by abstractive and personally stifling universal laws, but how to enliven all persons to engage actively in the multiple dimensions of their lives.

The Confucian attitude is of no less importance philoso-phically. For if harmony and resonance enable a more adapted and fruitful mode of made realization of being, then the identity and truth, dynamism and goodness of being are thereby manifest and pro-claimed. In this light, the laws of nature emerge, not as de-siccated universals best read technically and negatively as pro-hibitions, but as rich and unfolding modes of being and actua-lization best read through an appreciation of the concrete harmony and beauty of their active development. This, rather than the details of etiquette, is the deeper Confucian sense of the gentleman and sage; it can be grasped and exercised only with a corresponding aesthetic, rather than merely pragmatic, sensibility.

Nor is this beyond people’s experience. Few can carry out the precise process of conceptualization and definition required for the technical dialectics of Platonic and Aristotelian reasoning. But all share an overall sensibility to situations as pleasing and attractive or as generating unease or even revulsion. Inevitably, in earlier times, the aesthetic Confucian mode lacked in the technical pre-cision which is now available regarding surface characteristics of physical phenomena. But, in its sense of harmony, it possessed the deep human sensibility and ability to take into account and inte-grate all aspects of its object. This is essential for the contemporary humanization of our technical capabilities for the physical and social mobilization of our world, namely, for Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy. If their presence be essential to modernization then Confucius has much to contribute as their gracious host enabling them to be truly at ease because truly creative for China.

1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A 112; cf. A 121.

2. Ibid., A 121.

3. Donald W. Crawford, Kant’s Aesthetic Theory (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 87-90.

4. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 192-93.

5. Crawford, pp. 83-84.

6. Ibid., pp. 37-200.

7. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A112, 121, 192-193. Crawford, pp. 83-84, 87-90.

8. See Kant’s development and solution to the autonomy of taste, Critique of Judgment, nn. 57-58, pp. 182-192, where he treats the need for a concept; Crawford, pp. 63-66.

9. See the paper of Wilhelm S. Wurzer "On the Art of Moral Imagination" in G. McLean, ed., Moral Imagination and Character Development (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992) for an elaboration of the essential notions of the beautiful, the sublime and taste in Kant’s aesthetic theory.

10. Immanuel Kant, First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, trans. J. Haden (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

11. William James, Pragmatism (New York: Washington Square, 1963), Ch. I, pp. 3-40. For notes on the critical herme-neutics of J. Habermas see G. McLean, "Cultural Heritage, Social Critique and Future Construction" in Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America, R. Molina, T. Readdy and G. McLean, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values, 1988), Ch. I. Critical distance is an essential element and requires analysis by the social sciences of the historical social structures as a basis for liberation from determination and dependence upon unjust in-terests. The concrete psycho- and socio-pathology deriving from such dependencies and the corresponding steps toward liberation are the subject of the chapters by J. Loiacono and H. Ferrand de Piazza in The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas, G. McLean and O. Pegoraro, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1988), Chs. III and IV.