This essay is an attempt to provide a concise description of the problem of value judgements regarding economic development in our time. As this problem is vast in scope, we cannot go into theoretical detail; only a preliminary discussion of its essential nature and tendencies will be possible here. The main points of this discussion are as follows:

(1) Especially since the beginning of this century, some important changes have taken place in the evaluation of economic development; these have been reflected in a series of quite urgent contemporary problems.

(2) Although these problems can and should be discussed in their economic, political and social aspects, substantially they have been reduced to philosophical problems.

(3) The contemporary response to them in the West is mainly relativism. While this has cleared up a great many false theoretical conceptions, it entails some tendencies which are subject to criticism.

(4) Insofar as the matter in question probably is related to historical theory, it is necessary to understand afresh the contem-porary significance of Marx’s theory.

During a long period in modern times, in spite of continued unrest and protest, people rarely considered economic development, as with scientific development, to be problematic. The goal expressed by Francis Bacon seemed unquestionable: namely, increase in human happiness and decrease in human sufferings, i.e., the improvement of the human situation. For most people in the Victorian Age the idea of progress as the related development of science and the economy were undeniably of value in promoting the well-being of mankind. Optimism was a characteristic of that age.

Arnold Toynbee once described the general feature of this kind of optimism: the late Modern Age (beginning with the gene-ration of Pepys) was one of the great ages of belief -- belief in progress towards a perfect situation. This optimism of the self-contented middle class was no novelty at the time Queen Victoria was to celebrate the 50 anniversary of her coronation. Towards the end of the 19th century the world outlook prevalent among the British middle class was best expressed in these words: "History is finished now, therefore it is the last history." This world outlook was also shared by contemporaries in Germany and North America. "They are keeping satisfactory accounts, imagining that a steady, peaceful and pleasant modern life has mythically fallen on, and persisted in, the timeless present which has suddenly manifested itself."

The theoretical aspect of this preponderant world outlook was expressed in the completed form of classical economics. It was a near postulate of the whole classical school of political eco-nomics that over-production in general is impossible. For example, according to Ricardo: (1) demand is boundless; (2) demand can be and is met by means of production; (3) therefore, production will never exceed demand. As Marx demonstrated, Ricardo’s theory reflected "the absolute developmental tendency of productive forces in the capitalist mode of production." As the completion of classical politico-economics, Ricardo’s theory affirms the bound-less development of capitalist production. Its basic conception has long had a dominant influence upon the average consciousness, though it was rejected by Sismond from the outset.

Nevertheless, especially since the beginning of this century, this optimistic belief in economic development has been shaken from within. It value criterion -- never challenged before -- now has come to be widely suspect. Just as the social function of science and technology should be re-examined, the value of economic develop-ment also has become a serious question.

The future of humankind was rendered nebulous by the flaming gunpowder of the Great Wars and the fireball of the nu-clear bombs, as well as by the waste gases of industry and the thick fog in cities. The concept of "progress" most familiar to common consciousness has become a subject of controversy, criticism and reflection. Spenglar predicted "the decay of the West"; Luckacs described "the destruction of reason"; Husserl discussed "the European crisis of science", and Russell asked strikingly, "Has mankind a future?" Nearly all the most important thinkers of this century have shared these questions. To them we can add Hei-degger, Jaspers, Freud, Fromm, Bloch, Habermas, Weber, Camus and D.H. Lawrence.

This calls for a re-examination of the meaning and value of economic development for human existence. More interesting are the remarks which have been put forward by contemporary thinkers and critics and the problems of prime importance in economic development to which these remarks are related.

The most general formulation of the problems may be found in the reports of the "Club of Rome". One of the reports, entitled "Mankind at a Turning-Point", says that it is as if man suddenly discovered himself faced by a great many unprecedented crises: the population crisis, the environmental crisis, the food crisis, the energy crisis, etc. The old crises have spread over the whole globe and are far from ending, while new ones are emerging rapidly. All these crises comprise a "complex disease" in the world process. In order to get over the crises, humankind must make a great change, i.e., choose a new road for the development of the entire globe. Seeing that many global crises have been caused by the speedy growth of economy, such growth must be subject to reevaluation.

The authors of the reports have listed a series of problems related to economic growth. These can be sketched as follows: (1) Do the crises of food and energy arise from casual negligence or from long-term faults? (2) Can these crises be overcome in the scope of one country or district, or must they be overcome by com-mon efforts throughout the globe? (3) Is it possible to overcome them by separate technological, economic and political efforts or must they be treated by a comprehensive strategy? (4) Are these crises really urgent; will delaying a response win time and reduce bitterness or will it make the problem more difficult to resolve? (5) In attempting a resolution of all these crises, is there any way of protecting some parts of the globe from excessive injury through global cooperation? What danger lies in the fact that some regions seek their own interests against those of others?

The above questions are not easy to answer; in fact they involve some much more fundamental questions. As admitted by the authors of the reports, the predictions made in the reports will have only academic value unless a new world system is developed. How then should such a new and vigorous world system be con-ceived? Or, to present the question more substantially and yet more modestly, we may ask how one can understand and evaluate contemporary economic development, and how to ensure and improve our future existence through suitable present adjustments and reforms?

It is apparent that this question is more fundamental; in fact it is the question about value judgement themselves. The question cannot be evaded if we want to suggest something about the future "good", or so-called "improvement".

Russell proposed distinguishing science from its economic application. According to him, the spread of the scientific world-outlook, opposite to the theological world-outlook, has thus far been helpful to happiness, but, not all of science’s technological effects brought about by the economic application of theoretical science are helpful. More importantly such "scientific technology" functioning in the actual economic processes has developed anything but the "scientific spirit". The practitioners applying scientific technology, and especially those who employ the practi-tioners, have developed a high sense of unlimited power, arrogant assurance, and satisfaction in manipulating experts. All this constitutes a mood which is just the opposite of the scientific spirit. Therefore, Russell put forward a seemingly strange proposal that we should develop science continuously, but not develop industry at the same time. In other words, on the one hand, he has a positive appreciation of science while, on the other hand, he persists in criticizing the economic application of science in industry.

Toynbee and , in their famous dialogue about the 21st century, more fiercely criticized contemporary economic develop-ment. For both the alleged progress, whether material or mental, is at the cost of heavy and unbearable losses. The dominant thinking in the contemporary world restricted itself within the scope of economic ideology, forgetting that, in every system of human society, economy is but a part, not the whole. It is a major error of our modern age to lift economy, which is but a part of the whole, to an absolutely preferential position. The contemporary development of the economy has resulted in a gradual decay of the whole system of human society throughout the globe. Such an economic development, if left alone, will destroy humankind’s right to existence on the globe.

For Toynbee and , the key to the settlement of the problem lies in its spiritual aspect. The crucial question is whether the economic and technological progress will immediately lead to cultural progress and naturally increase spiritual achievements. Their answer is negative. So far, whatever people have called the "progress" of civilization has been no more than the promotion of technology and the economy, and advance in using impersonal forces. These can never be identified with the promotion of morality.

Today’s crises are effected by people themselves and originated in their rapacious and aggressive character, which in turn derives from their "self-centeredness". To cure the self-centeredness, we have to appeal to religion, because religion is "the source of human life" and the real root of spiritual and moral life. Today, perhaps, religion is similar to philosophical "wisdom" as an attitude towards human life. The principle of this "wisdom" is the necessity of a "human spiritual revolution" which consciously situates the meaning and essence of human life. This principle also stresses the life of the individual and claims that its dignity can be preserved only when it is reconciled with Nature. In this sense, Toynbee persuaded people in modern times "to abandon economic goals, and to establish spiritual goals instead", in order to found "a global society which is socialist in its economic aspect and liberal in its spiritual aspect."

From the above description we can discover easily that not only has the evaluation of economic development become an urgent problem in contemporary times, but that the basic position has changed greatly. The problem has already been presented in a very biting and challenging way; it seems not to be limited to the West, but has universal, worldwide importance. Let us give a simple instance. After his return to China from Europe in 1920, Liang Qichao wrote a book named "The Spiritual Records of the Journey in Europe". Everyone who has read some lines of this famous book knows the shock to Chinese intellectuals which was the problem it raised of evaluating science and economic develop-ment and their resulting contradictions and conflicts. There soon followed not only the debate between "Eastern Culture School" and "Western Culture School", but also the controversy over "science and the outlook of human life". These violent debates reflected the fact that the same problem was also widely and realistically significant for old China.

On the other hand, from the above description it is manifest that the issue of evaluating economic development is not only urged by many contemporary social problems, but also reflects some more fundamental problems which can be discussed or judged only on a philosophical level of high principle and cor-responding value standards. Russell’s proposal -- the distinction and choice between the "spirit" and the economic application of science -- is effective only on a philosophical level. Similarly, Toynbee and ‘s scheme of reformation -- the definition of material progress as ethically neutral and the demand of giving preference to "spiritual welfare" in contemporary human life -- is nothing other than a kind of philosophy and philosophical value standard.

Therefore, if we want to approve or oppose these thinkers’ proposals or schemes we also must stand on a certain philosophical level and value standard. The conception represented in such words as "practical settlement of problems one by one" negates the high principles involved in the problems and proves itself ignorant of their nature. Of course, the problem of evaluating economic development is caused by a series of very concrete social problems in modern times; it is necessary to analyze and resolve them in various particular fields and through many detailed research efforts. But, the more they appear increasingly complicated, the more their essential and philosophical comprehension is important and urgent. We can even say that if our day be devoid of philo-sophical comprehension we will be unable to form a real judgment on the complex of problems and hence be unable to judge any concrete problems.

In contemporary thought circles, philosophical research on the problem of evaluating economic development has never ceased. Especially humanistic philosophers, social theorists and ethical scholars have promoted the study of the problem. They have made a critical analysis of technological-industrial society and have approached the subject of objectification and alienation. They have not only re-examined the concept of conquest and the value system based upon it, but also reflected upon the so-called "ra-tionality" -- instrumental reason and analytical reason -- which is overwhelming modern life, especially modern economic life. All this converges to form a philosophical theme regarding the relation of humankind to nature: what is it and what ought it to be? If the relations are determined by a certain mode of community (i.e., the relation of person to person) or of spirit, then, in order to ensure a sound relation of man to nature what ought to be the mode of community or of spirit?

This philosophical theme, which emerges in the problem of evaluating economic development, has compelled concern with the question of value, and has strikingly changed attitudes towards economic development. However, there is much divergence and debate regarding value orientation. More importantly, contemporary ethical theory in general seems not to tend to surpass this divergence and conflict, but rather to hold to a relativist balance of various positions.

As the title of Luther J. Binkley’s Conflict of Ideals suggests, the ideas of value in Western society have not only been under-going change, but stand in mutual conflict. As a gene-ralization, Binkley termed the contemporary understanding as "relativist". In the 1920s, Walter Lippman pointed out that the acid of modernity has dissolved the past para-religious faiths; the development of industrial urban societies and the influence of scientific method are the primary agents undermining faiths in the various absolutes. E. Westermark and E. Durkheim stressed more adequately the variety in moral criteria. Westermark affirmed that there was great variation between different times and cultures. Analogously, Durkheim claimed that the specific society in which a person happened to live was the supreme authority regarding moral criteria. At nearly the same time, such notions were su-pported by the discoveries of many social scientists that quite different values were held in different cultures. W.G. Sumner claimed that morals were precisely those social customs which were more stable and more compulsory. K. Manheim went further to say that a moral system was no more than an ideological reflection of the behavior which was socially beneficial for the dominant group in a country, and therefore that it was impossible to seek universally valid values beyond various ideologies.

Regarding this general characteristic of contemporary ethics Binkley notes two different interpretations of the thesis that "all values are relative". One popular interpretation is that all values are decided carelessly and have no rational ground. The other, more profound interpretation sees even the most fundamental value commitments as related to a particular people living in a specific historical period. "Therefore, we should not be the slaves to some principles of the past, but instead we should try honestly to find those rationally justifiable values which are helpful in molding our present world into a loftier world." The relativism in contemporary moral theories has indeed been effective in terms of criticism and negation: it has not only undermined the traditional value systems, but has cleared away many false theoretical conceptions. For example, it has now become questionable that only our value commitments are possible for all sound human beings.

Here, we do not intend to discuss further ethical relativism. What interests us is that, against this general background, we can find another contemporary tendency in understanding values and the evaluation of economic development. This character goes beyond excluding the absolutely negative views which give no attention to establishing any criteria and those uncritical views which are limited to present ideologies. It notes that almost all theories which attempt to set up their claims about value criteria and form a judgement on the evaluation of economic development have a more or less romantic tint with a theoretical tendency to oppose "what ought to be" to "what is".

Just as Russell’s proposal -- continuously to develop science, not industry -- was remarked upon sarcastically by J.D. Bernal, Eric Fromm’s suggestion of a new man and a new world has been much criticized for its "extremely utopian tone". Doubtlessly. Fromm’s normative humanist ethics has great success in criticizing contemporary technological-industrial society and in diagnosing the dilemma of the modern person. His analyses of the modern person’s "unproductive temperament" and "evasion of freedom" are, so to speak, essentialized; his value standards of self-creation, self-fulfillment, love, humanistic conscience, etc., are lofty. How-ever, as soon as one is involved in restoring the person to his or her dignity and greatness and in building a sound society with reason, the weakness of his theory betrays itself. His theory has little of the character of immediate reality. Though we might agree on the goal he sets, that is still an abstract and hollow "ideal". In this sense, Fromm’s criticism is quite analogous to Feurbach’s "twofold contemplation". Therefore, Fromm’s value judgements on con-temporary economic development often are simply negative. Binkley has perceived the unavoidable theoretical difficulty with these judgements, "If he is right in saying that we will gradually become robots, it may be asked whether it would be possible for the robots to rise in rebellion. Who would establish a new society?"

Similarly, in the above-mentioned dialogue between Toynbee and , the opposition between the ideal and reality appears to be stronger. In their proposal of "abandoning economic goals and setting up spiritual goals", they are attempting more to foster a kind of willpower out of despair than appealing to action supported by realistic ideas. Their proposal aims at the realization of an unassured but necessary salvation. Because their scheme of "spiritual revolution" was worked out on the presumption of a separation between the revolution and material and economic development, it separated itself from the practical mundane ground of human life. This separation inevitably results in an unlimited opposition between "what ought to be" and "what is", in an abstract ideal and vast goals. As Toynbee and appealed to the simple awakening of religion and to a revolutionary reformation in the inner life of individuals, the call to overcome the crises and realize new ideals was developing in the direction of romanticism. They turned their attention to the East in order to confine modernization to a minimum and to retain the traditional pastoral mode of life centered on agriculture, not to seek wealth. Among former theories, this would find sympathetic resonance from the physiocrats, Sismondi and Proudhon.

Although the above tendency is worth criticizing, it is by no means ungrounded; it is historically real and practically signi-ficant. But for the subject we are discussing, its practical signi-ficance lies in its thorough and intransigent standpoint which sets mercilessly before one the problem of evaluating economic development. It is not a cool external overview, but reflects strain and unrest from within. It presents the problem with the acute bitterness of the modern person and calls forcefully for settling the problem.

The theoretical and emotional tendency described above calls for correction, while taking the contemporary world as a whole. Perhaps it is not yet the time to resolve the problem com-pletely and to choose a definitive goal and road thereto. The problem would seem to lie especially in historical theory. Hence, if the contemporary significance of Marx’s theory is re-understood and re-expressed, it will be beneficial in remedying that defect and for a realistic and simultaneously critical evaluation of economic development.

In evaluating economic development with Marx’s theory, we would generalize three aspects of its contemporary significance.

Firstly, in a more general sense, Marx’s theory is a kind of humanism. This is seen more through the changing contemporary social life than as a scholastic fact. There still are many con-troversies on this point, and this humanistic interpretation of Marx’s theory by Lukacs and Korlsch is still far from un-questionable. Nevertheless, more and more people, through their own lives, are coming to recognize that in the social goals ex-pressed in Marx’s theory there are such value orientations as concern for human destiny, for human fulfillment of all potentials and for humankind’s establishment of itself as the real purpose. The "Paris manuscripts" demand "the actual appropriation of the human essence through and for man"; the "Manifesto of the Communist Party" calls for a society "where every individual’s free development is the presupposition of all human being’s free development." Therefore, for a general judgement on economic development it is apparent that economic development as such is not the purpose; rather the purpose is the human person or "human society or socialized humanity".

However secondly, at least for Marx it is inadequate -- even impossible -- to evaluate economic development merely according to this value goal. Here, what is most important is a realistic history. This has been seriously neglected by those theorists who accept a humanistic interpretation of Marx’s theory. They tend to present the contemporary meaning of Marx’s theory as a kind of "humanistic religion" and a "moral prediction which appeals to us". They have tried to achieve a "second birth" through reading Marx’s early writings. However, as with the "Paris Manuscripts", it is incorrect to interpret them merely as "moral radicalism", for even those "manuscripts" contained the history principle, of which contemporary moral radicalism is significantly void. The history principle is manifest not only in Marx’s sarcasm of "romantic sentimental tears" and his criticism of "crude communism", but also his thesis that "the overcoming of self-alienation follows the same course as self-alienation."

It can easily be discerned that this notion demands a rejection of romanticism’s retrospective orientation as well as opposition to an uncritical positivism. Thus, for instance, when Marx made it clear that natural science and industry, under existing conditions, were dehumanizing human relations, at the same time he stressed that natural science had penetrated and transformed human life all the more practically through industry, preparing for human emancipation. In this way the nature of industry (i.e., the nature of economy developed in the modern age) was historically criticized, but at the same time the meaning of industry was historically affirmed. On the one hand, industry is a "realistic and historical relation" of man to nature; on the other hand, it positively over-comes self-alienation as "a thorough and self-conscious reser-vation of all the fruits accumulated during past development."

The realistic history principle is one of the primary charac-teristics of Marx’s value judgements on economic development. This principle does not mean an abandonment of social goals or value standards, but only that these goals or standards must become realistic ideals. It insists upon avoiding basing moral criticism on the sole premise that they persist on historical grounds. Simply speaking, the demand here is to base value judgements on both value goals and historical reality. According to this principle, Marx not only affirmed generally the great significance of the com-mercial economy, but also affirmed particularly "the civilized aspect of capital". Without this principle, it could hardly be imagined that this sternest criticism of the capitalist mode of production could have ascribed such great (probably the greatest) historical significance to the capitalist mode of production. Therefore, we strongly suspect Binkley’s assertion that Marx was pessimistic about man in a capitalist society but optimistic about man in an illusory classless society. The defect of theory would be to be without the history principle; it is impossible to attribute this to Marx.

Thirdly, in evaluating economic development, as in under-standing historical theory, it is a great misunderstanding to con-sider Marx’s position as "economic determinism" (as for the theorists of the Second International) or to attack his position as "economic determinism" (as for Reichenbach, Cassirer, Colling-wood, etc.). It is not possible for us to discuss fully this misunder-standing. We need only note that, for Marx, just as a social revolution is not "caused spontaneously" by economic movement, higher social goals and their attainment are not identical with progress in the economic or material sphere. Progress in these material areas, according to Marx, represents humans bringing forth their own species-powers and treating them as objects -- something which is possible only in a situation of alienation. It is because of this inevitability of alienation that the economic development and material progress of human society have been actualized in the spontaneous form of "economic necessity". How-ever, this spontaneous form is not a permanent natural form, but the result of history. The human species-powers brought forth in this form as objects, on the one hand, have governed human subjects (because they are in the alien form of economic forces), but, on the other hand, also suggest some loftier social destination (because they are the human quality of nature produced through history and among human achievements). Therefore, Marx concludes that, for one thing, the spiritual goals set by loftier social ideals should not be disconnected from developments in the material and economic areas; and for another these spiritual goals are by no means the spontaneous outcomes of existing material and economic conditions, but are formed through criticism of these conditions.

Therefore, it is the same mistake to ascribe the realization of Marx’s social goals to mere "economic necessity" as to define his value orientation within the scope of economic values. It must be noted that Marx demanded that general historical theory dis-tinguish changes in economic conditions from the ideological forms of which people were aware. Further he insisted that in understanding value orientation, genuine freedom be put "on" the basis of, and "outside" of natural necessity:

In fact, the area of freedom only starts with the boundary where the labor prescribed by necessity and external purpose stops -- according to the nature of the thing, freedom only exists beyond the area of genuine material production. . . . Only beyond this area, does the area of genuine freedom or the development of human capacities start for its own sake. And this area of freedom can only flourish by basing itself in that area of necessity. The fundamental condition is the shortening of working days.

 

It is not necessary to treat fully in this essay the theoretical details.

What we note here is that Marx’s concern is about the understanding and value criteria of economic development and that this has important significance for our time. For it not only re-solutely opposed the positivist position which was not only uncritical and devoid of high value orientation, but was also resolutely backward and illusory. Both of these mutually com-plementary positions and orientations are still quite common in the evaluation of economic development. In contrast, Marx’s histo-rical theory has suggested in principle a possible program of understanding, the critical reality of which, as manifest in its evaluation of economic development, is at the same time the historical reality of its value criteria.

This essay has intended mainly to describe and discuss generally in terms of philosophy and historical theory the problem about value judgements regarding economic development against the background of the contemporary world. However, just as concrete economic development problems cannot be resolved without reference to their existing conditions and particular nature, it is impossible to evaluate economic development at the different historical stages of a particular nation, state or district according only to a general criterion exclusive of essential differences. Unquestionably, what is needed here are concrete research and a comprehensive grasp of "the differences constituting development". Nevertheless, because "universal history" has become an empirical fact, the evaluation of economic development will un-avoidably become a universal problem. This problem is indeed important for the Western economically developed nation, but it is especially important for China in its process of development. For the understanding and resolution of this problem, Marx’s theory, called by Sartre "the main trend of the contemporary culture", has at least a significant meaning. That is, it provides not only a value standard as a social ideal or destination, but also an interpretative program as the embodiment of the standard and a practical program as the reality of the standard. Thus, the fundamental principles of this theory (not its details on particular issues), not only form value judgements on economic development, but also claim theoretical and practical concreteness for their value judgement. This means that any value goal or social destination must embody the concrete socio-historical reality.

women’s personality development. A modernized economy will enrich the female subject’s personality and open the possibilities for women to rediscover their self and improve their personality.

Almost every nation has undergone a time when they worshiped female goddesses and had beautiful legends concerning their authority. Female goddesses could not only repair heaven and make the earth, but could also create and multiply human beings. The worship of female goddesses reflects the authoritive position of female in material things and in producing human beings during primitive economic times. With respect to material production, their level then was very low. Women collected natural fruit, while men hunted for animals, but because of poor instruments men often came back with nothing, whereas the collection of fruit by women was the main source of food. In their state of group marriage, everyone knew his or her mother without knowing the father; child bearing was considered the business of women alone. In both material and human production women occupied a dominant position and were respected by everybody. With men they worked hard for the development of humankind, but did not ride roughshod over people by means of their position. Hence, their personalities were sound and beneficial. In such a time women had both position and personality, but they could not be said to have had independent individual personalities. They were conscious of a heavy dependence upon nature and human beings; there was no place for a sense of independent personality.

Progress in productive tools changed the natural division of labor. The rise of agriculture and livestock provided a new productive force. In addition, individual marriage replaced group marriage so that people knew their own parents. Child bearing was no longer a holy affair, but a burden binding women in the family. Men came to occupy the authoritive position in society originally held by women. With the establishment of the system of private property, women no longer had an independent personality, but became an exploited and oppressed part of men’s property.

The development of economy and the progress of the marriage relation need not have led to the loss of women’s personality, but the fact is just the contrary. We have seen several antinomies above: first, women invented primitive agriculture, contributed to the invention of fire and livestock farming, and helped to bring about the development of the economy and progress in history. At the same time, women showed themselves less competent than men in such productive activities as agriculture and livestock farming, which made them subordinate to men; second, women contributed to the continuation of the human race, but child bearing bound them in families and deprived them of the opportunity to take part in social activities; third, males created the culture and value system and made themselves subjects of the society, while treating females as object and tools. Although these are historical antinomies, they were inevitable for human beings in their efforts to free themselves for the bonds of nature. In a society of low productive power, it is an axiom that the weak are prey to the strong. The backwardness of production and its corresponding feudal system and culture could not provide room for an equality of both sexes. Therefore, for the progress of the economy it was unavoidable that women’s personality would be sacrificed. In the dark ages in China as well as in the West women could not participate in politics and the praiseworthy characters of the female were also distorted: women become jealous due to living together with their husband’s concubines; they became self effacing due to being subject to maltreatment; and they became narrow-minded through living for a long time in the boudoir without going out. In the meantime, the distortion of the male personality was manifested in another way. Many men were subordinate to other men due to the social system which gave primary to the father’s rights so that they had no personality of their own. In the family, marriage for the sole purpose of child bearing and expression of the sexual impulse without love alienated the human essence of males.

The industrial economy destroyed the natural sense of the family as the basic unit. Great quantities of labor were needed by large industry. This created opportunities for women to enter social life, to participate in economic activities, to earn salaries, and hence no longer to be the property of others. This provided a good basis for their positions as social subjects. In addition, the democratic system, corresponding to the industrial economy, promoted such ideas as "all are equal in terms of money"; "all are equal before the law", "all are equal before God". This gave rise to public opinion favorable to the independence of women as regards their personality. All this was helpful in awakening women’s personalities as subjects. In industrial society women actively fulfilled their obligations while seeking their legitimate rights and interests in activities which constantly improve their personality. However, the following elements in industrial society frustrated the development of women’s personality or even subjected it to certain deviations.

First, industrial production places the machine at the center; it aims at producing material objects and is determined by the investment of human power and other resources; it emphasizes physical labor and operational technology, and the proportion of physical labor is much greater than that of mental work. This situation is unfavorable to women; they suffer sexual discrimination in seeking a job, which hinders the establishment of women’s personalties as subjects.

Second, due to the backwardness of ideas in comparison to the progress of the economy, certain feudal ideas such as "the male has dignity while the female is humble" and "a woman should be subordinate to a man" still fetter women, and influence social expectations regarding their role and value. This gives rise to certain dilemmas for women in seeking their rights and fulfilling their obligations. Many women feel a tension between their role in society and in their family, and in seeking a position in social life while feeling a sense of obligation to be a good wife and mother.

Third, the male culture inclines women to be masculine: as society has long been dominated by men the behavior of successful men in social life is taken as the pattern for all people. As women have not created their own pattern of behavior, they must conform to the pattern of man’s behavior so that their role in social life will more easily be accepted. This stage cannot be surmounted until women fully participate as subjects in society. Although the slogans such as "equality for both sexes" play a great role in freeing women from the fetters of family to become subjects in society, they are harmful to the maintenance of the distinctively female personality. In China, a trend toward the masculinization of women was strong after the 1950s, and reach its height in the 1970s. The "Iron Young Woman" in the 1950s was very similar to the male physique; in the 1970s the dress, even the style of women’s hair, was masculinized. Coming into 1980s, people exclaimed with surprising that "there are no woman in this country"; they began to doubt whether the "strong woman" was perfect in personality. Women refused to be masculinized.

However, people have no answer to the question what is the ideal personality for women? They sink into puzzlement and inertia. Men are afraid of their wives being "strong women", and women themselves fear being "strong women". In order to be thought of as tender, many women do not dare to show their talent, but then they worry about being too feminine; they do not know how to mould their personalities. The solution to the problem requires further development in the economy as well as constant progress in ideology; one is complementary to the other.

The modernized economy is a great revolution over the traditional one and will bring about change in all facets of society. The female personality will be developed and improved in the process of the modernization of society and its ideal will be realized.

First, the productive mode of the modernized economy helps manifest the personality of women as subjects. In modern industry, what determines the production is no longer physical human strength, but the application of a high level of technology, which increases the proportion of mental work. Now in some developed countries, the proportion of mental work versus physical labor approximates 1:1, while the value created by the former far exceeds that created by the latter. Therefore, the application of high level technology will reduce or eliminate the physical inferiority of women in production, and enable women to give play to their superiority in patience, carefulness and nimbleness. This is obviously indicated in developed countries: in the U.K. women have more job opportunities than men.

Second, the operational mode of a modernized economy enables women to choose the job suited to them. The open, dynamic pattern of the economy enables women to find positions of their own in a wider range of social activity. In developed countries, women are exploring molding ideal personalities. They are not the traditional good mothers and wives who sacrifice themselves in a closed family context, nor are they the so-called strong women of industrial times. They develop their own standard and hope to get a valuable job with flexible hours and a good location; they hope to take account of both family and career. Some women give up work and become housewives while bring up their children, but their return to the family is for the purpose of educating their children and giving their children the natural love of a mother so that the children can grow soundly. In the meantime, they engage in further studies to give play to their potentialities or to develop their interests, so that they will be more competitive when they take up a career after their children have grown up. Such exploration is praiseworthy under the conditions of a modernized economy; it advances the civilization of the whole society.

Third, the high educational level of society, the high degree of democracy and the modernization and socialization of house work due to the modernization of the economy will enable women to elevate their quality as human beings, to demonstrate their personality, to strengthen their competitive power in social life, and to realize a sound personality. There will be a day when we need no longer emphasize that the male and the female differ and recognize that there is something common to both sexes. Then the peculiar and varied beauty of the character and personality of the female will demonstrate itself naturally in the world.

Of course, molding the female personality depends not merely on the progress of economy and is not merely a matter for women alone. It depends on the consistent efforts of the whole society; this requires theoretical work by scholars to find the incompatibilities and in time eliminate them.