GEORGE F. McLEAN

Perhaps a first thing to note with regard to this issue is how radically the question has shifted in this century in China, as throughout the world. In 1919 there was little doubt not only that development required scientific reason and democracy, but that in order for these to be ushered in it was necessary that classical China’s ancient worldview, typified by Confucius, be ushered out. 25 years ago in the United States it was constantly repeated that application of the technological reason that took man to the moon could solve the major social problems of modern life. In India ten years ago it was argued by many that progress could come only upon the substitution of science for shruti (or sacred books).

Now such a supposition appears largely outmoded. It is not that progress has been defeated and that tradition now reigns, but rather that precisely with the broad spread of intensive economic development, or at least its beginnings, the insufficiency of scientific and technical development as a total and exclusive pattern for human social life has become manifest. Once again the resources of the ancient wisdom borne by the tradition begin to be valued and sought. But how do the two relate one to the other? Are they simply antithetic such that the advance of one entails the loss of the other? Do they come from quite different sources, e.g., moral sentiment from within and economic factors from without, so that one must be an intrusion upon the other?

Or does a cultural tradition consist of the progressive inte-gration of the experience of life in this world? If so the challenge may be both more natural, more difficult and challenging, and more rewarding than has been foreseen. It will be more natural if the process of modernization is, in effect, a new experience to be inte-grated. At the same time, it could be more challenging if that new experience is founded in a type of reason (analytic) which contrasts to the synthetic reason by which the integrated cultural traditions have been constituted. Finally, this could be especially rewarding if it allows us to plumb more deeply into the roots of a culture and unleash more of its power and beauty.

CULTURE AND HERMENEUTICS

The early view that science would replace cultural tradition soon proved inadequate. By the mid-thirties the scientific instru-ments of progress had been turned directly against persons and whole peoples. The last fifty years could be summarized as the struggle to liberate the person from the dehumanizing effects of subjecting all to the external forces of economics (mercantilism), or of power (totalitarianism), or of their combination (colonialism). Philosophically in the West this struggle has been carried forward especially by phenomenology and existentialism which opened a path first to the interior subjectivity of the individual, but then to a new appreciation of cultures, no longer as mere ethno-logical curiosities, but as the social forms of creative human free-dom itself. Thus, the historical hermeneutics of H.G. Gadamer opened the way to understanding cultural traditions as patterns of values and virtues developed through human experience and bearing moral authority. Could such cultural traditions evolve with the times, and even provide a source of creativity in a period of economic development?

Living things survive by seeking the good or that which perfects and promotes their life. Thus, a basic exercise of human freedom is to set an order of preferences among the many things that are possible. These are values in the sense that they "weigh more heavily" in making our decisions. Cumulatively, they set the pattern of our actions. As practiced they develop special capabi-lities or strengths (virtues) on the part of a people. The pattern of values and virtues is the heart of a culture as an integrated human life in which the creative freedom of a people is expressed and implemented.

Tradition is the cumulative process of transmitting, adjusting and applying the values and virtues -- or culture -- through time. It is the heritage of cumulative experience that is inherited or re-ceived and which we reaffirm and actively pass on to the next generation. Attending to tradition taken in this active sense allows us to uncover not only the permanent and universal truths sought by Socrates, but to perceive the importance or authority of the values we receive from the tradition in the work of mobilizing our own life project actively toward the future. We shall look more closely at each of these.

As received, tradition is not against freedom; it is rather the cumulative freedom of a people. Persons emerge from birth into a family and neighborhood from which they learn and in harmony with which they thrive. Horizontally, through experience one learns what promotes and what destroys life and accordingly makes pragmatic adjustments. Vertically, and more importantly, one learns what is truly worth striving for and the pattern of social interaction in which this can be richly lived. This, rather than all that happens -- good or bad, or history -- is what is passed on (tradita) and hence called tradition. The importance of tradition derives then from the cooperative character of both the learning by which wisdom is drawn from experience even the experience of failure and from the cumulative free acts of evaluation, re-commitment and sacrifice which have defined, refined, reaffirmed, defended and passed on through time as keys to the corporate life of the community.

Application of the tradition requires prudence (phronesis) or thoughtful reflection which enables one to discover the appropriate means for the circumstances. But it includes also the virtue of sagacity (sunesis), that is, understanding or concern for the other. One can assess the situation adequately only inasmuch as, in a sense, one undergoes the situation with the affected parties. This is more than respect for their universal rights, for economic activity requires a detailed sounding of the free preferences of others and entails an active empathy and a positive concern to promote their welfare.

Such a reading of the tradition is then less a matter of appr-eciation and conservation than of original, creative and free expression. In any case, it is impossible to read an ancient text with the eyes long closed of its author. This is so not least because, to the very degree in which that were to succeed, it would destroy the text as a vital expression of the process of life. Attention to a culture does not seek to reiterate old times in remembering the lives of our forebears. Rather, it is a recognition that in new times with new horizons and new questions, we inherit, draw upon and shape the learning and cumulative responses of our people. This enables the tradition to speak new meaning so that the tradition does not die, but lives and is ever more enriched and enriching. In tradition thus understood we can situate an effective effort to face the challenges of economic development as a dimension of the broad effort to create a future worthy of the generations to come.

It is true that in the past values of stability prevailed over those of progress, and undoubtedly, according to the needs of society, at times they will again in the future. But whether the search is for stability or progress or, more likely, for stability in progress -- the proper human and religious values and virtues of a people, articulated in the symbol system proper to a culture, will remain essential.

The norm for truth is the degree of universality of its applica-tion. In this there is some similarity to Aristotle. His scientific syllogism requires a middle term (M) expressing the formal constituent of the subject that is the proper reason for the phenomenon to be understood (P).

S M

M P

S P

This middle term must be universal in the sense of extending to all and only the instances of the phenomena to be understood. This extension, that is, the set of instances to which it applies, directs the search for the intention, that is, the meaning content which must constitute the middle term. Thus, the requirement of universality of extension guides the intellect to focus upon and abstract the precise nature or intention which renders intelligible the phenomenon or predicate in question. In this sense, universality is a sign of, and hence a guide to, understanding, and hence to the abstraction of the nature in question and its articulation as a concept.

For Habermas, in the tradition of Kant’s first critique regarding the nature of scientific knowledge, the form is, however, a constituent reality not on the part of the thing in itself, but of the operation of the mind. In the sense of Kant’s Second Critique of Practical Reason, it is a law which is autonomous in that I give it to myself, but which is universal in that it is able to be a law for all. In Habermas’s communicative action this corresponds to a principle which would be agreed to by all in an ideal dialogue in which all may take part, imagining themselves as playing all or any role in all situations. Rawls’s Theory of Justice is an extensive attempt to codify justice in these terms.

This can be very helpful in the implementation of Gadamer’s notion of application which stresses the importance of the content of the tradition being continually rethought in new situations in order that its implications or applications be unfolded. An ideal dialogical situation, taking full account of all who are engaged in an issue, can be an important model for the development of a cultural tradition in a time of intensive economic development. It stresses the need continually to rationalize the lifeworld by making its principles more clear, more just, more adequate and more humane.

I would go further, however, to make this reversible. For if, in fact, that lifeworld or culture is the cumulative result of lived experience, such a process of application not only applies old principles in new ways, but can expand or refine principles on the basis of new experience. As seen above this is a natural and necessary dimension of the life of a culture as the creation of a people in facing the challenges of life. It is particularly important in a situation such as the present with a vast explosion of economic activity. The concern for universality in the sense of including all persons in a society and of applicability to all their increasingly differentiated roles can be an important metatheoretical consi-deration for expanding, enriching and deepening the ethical con-tent of the tradition.

Habermas would want to add a quantitative criterions, namely that open discussion will enable the strongest or most powerful arguments to prevail. But the reference to strength or power surreptitiously returns through metaphor to a quantitative criterion when nothing less than a quantitative one will do.

Further, in a time of economic development there is a re-quirement in justice for equal access by all to this development and for protection against abusive and exploitive practices. But, on the one hand, if this is done in a negative manner simply by suppressing all initiative then development itself is stifled; it is not sufficient simply to do away with what is unjust or socially corrosive. On the other hand, Madison and the American Federalists in the tenth of the Federalist Papers suggested in terms of Hobbesian conflict that creative development can be fostered on the basis of individual ambitions and interests competing in a conflictual process ruled only by laws from afar. In fact, the result has been a rapacious exploitation of nature, employees, companies and people whose dimensions are daily being discovered in corruption which suc-ceeds in surpassing even the imagination.

What is needed now is rather the development of a worldview or culture which evokes creative freedom and promotes initiative both personal and social. Moreover, it must overcome the dicho-tomy between these two so as to engage the essentially social character of the person and the essentially personal character of society. How can philosophy undertake this challenge; what dimension of reflection is required for this task?

Kant himself thought initially that it was sufficient to have two critiques, the first for pure reason or science and its universal and necessary laws, and the second for practical reason and its universal laws of freedom for its moral exercise. It was only when he had completed these two that he could see that his task was not over. On the basis of the first critique, freedom when confronted by a world ruled by universal and necessary laws without purpose or goal would have to become a fugitive from the world and find sanctuary only in the heart; as dependent for its alternatives upon the imagination described in the first critiques whose task it is to coordinate all in relation to those same necessary laws, freedom would be but a servant of the universal and repetitive processes of nature.

This would appear to correspond to the rich sense of harmony found in Confucius, provided that be taken, not in the sense of immobility and obedience, but in its earlier sense of taking account of many and diverse elements and bringing them together in a harmony or balance that is sensitive to, and promotive of, all. Hence, Mencius’s sense of the mean at which virtue is located was not that of a fixed mark as on a ruler, but of a constantly adjusting equilibrium as on a movable scale (ch’üuan) which depends on a movable element that must be adjusted continually to take precise account of each and every addition or subtraction. This requires a new dimension of reason -- one that is synthetic rather than analytic, unitive rather than disjunctive, and able to take account of the concrete and weave all into a larger harmony.

Vaclav Havel in a talk on July 4, 1994 took this a step further. He said that it was not sufficient that life in our day be predicated upon disjunctive individual human rights (reflecting the universal laws of Kant’s second critique above), but that these must be related one to another socially and founded upon a higher real principle of unity that extends beyond the individual to peoples, to cultures and to physical nature as well. This attends not only to what all share equally, but evokes the uniqueness, creativity and initiative of each and inspires them to open their horizons. Paul Tillich described this phenomenologically as ultimate human concern which reconciles our dichotomies, enlivens our freedom and guides it in paths of harmony and love.

This suggests the originating sense, and even the etymology of the term "philosophy" as love of wisdom. It calls for it to return to its original, properly metaphysical task of evolving an appre-ciation of being or reality which can relate both the physical and the spiritual in turn of a real absolute principle which transcends both, and to understand how all are united therein and expressive thereof: the infinite and the finite, the One and the many, the Absolute and the relative. To this each culture responds in its own distinctive manner. Indeed, inasmuch as this is the primary principle of a culture it might be said that the development of its own deep sense of this unitive and coordinating principle is the key to the develop-ment and appreciation of a culture and of its relation to others.

But what is the dynamism here: does a people’s sense of the character of this unitive principle develop first and then shape all of life, or does the experience of life with its new and changing character constitute a veritable revelation of the source and goal of all? In the latter movement, the appreciation of the principle or source results from the experience of the development of life that is both spiritual and economic, or to come closer to Marx, that is manifested in its struggle for development. What then should we conclude regarding the basis of the sense of the good or of per-fection in which we have been raised, which gives us dominion over our actions, and which enables us to be free and creative: does it come from God or from man, from eternity or from history? Chakravarti Rajagopalachari of Madras answered:

Whether the epics and songs of a nation spring from the faith and ideas of the common folk, or whether a nation’s faith and ideas are produced by its literature is a question which one is free to answer as one likes. . . . Did clouds rise from the sea or was the sea filled by waters from the sky? All such inquiries take us to the feet of God transcending speech and thought.

 

Seen within such an interaction of concrete experience and the development of awareness of principles, both speculative and concrete, the present explosion of economic activity becomes particularly important for philosophy and vice versa. If many now "go to the sea", the mist generated by their intensive activity can rise to enrich or unfold the higher principles of their culture. These, in turn, can provide the dynamizing and orienting elements needed for action that will be both creative and constructive. This could mean a reenactment of the 1919 reception for Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy. This time economic activity would provide the bread and Confucius would remain as the genial host leading all in dialogue. After the manner of Habermas’ communicative action all might learn from one another, and together work out ways to cooperate for the good of one’s own people and all humankind.

Paul Tillich’s phenomenology of ultimate concern can open the way democratically for such an appropriation of being in terms that are based upon human consciousness and that relate to economic development. His phenomenology follows the human spirit as it moves from choices between multiple objects of con-sumption (which kind of housing) or even between multiple careers to be a businessman, agriculturist or doctor), to the basic meaning of life in whatever mode it is lived. Sometimes this question is forced upon one with the greatest urgency, as by a catastrophe which threatens or takes away one’s possessions, careers or even families. At times it develops when, as Aristotle suggested, the necessities of life having been taken care of, we have leisure to reflect. But in all these cases our mind breaks beyond its attention to contraries (e.g., to be either a doctor or an agriculturist) to focus upon existence or life itself which can be lived in these many modes. Thus, before the threat of death -- as at the moment of birth -- the entire atmosphere and range of preoccupations shifts dra-matically, being suddenly transformed from tactical adjustments for limited objectives to confronting existence in sorrow or in joy and in terms that plunge to the center of the entire range of meanings. In these dramatic and defining moments attention is directed to the basic sense of our daily life; this is to see life in terms of one’s ultimate concern.

Here, awareness of being as existence enables the mind to span the whole range of reality as a single field and to undertake a controlled and critical investigation of what it means to be. This, in turn, opens the way to awareness of a transcendent level of reality. For, as Parmenides carefully and critically reasoned, being itself, as totally other than nonbeing or nothingness, must be free of negation and limitation and hence be unlimited or infinite; un-marked by inner negations, it is one, simple and in total self-possession; it must not begin, but always be -- it is eternal.

In this Absolute all limited existents share and have their being; in turn, it is what their lives image, express and reveal. This is Plato’s sense of participation (mimesis or image) which con-stitutes a kind of unified field theory according to which all that is finite, multiple and relative is the image of that which is Infinite, One and Absolute. In the Christian context of creation, as well as with Heidegger, existence appears even more dynamically as erupting into time, explosive and creative.

What is the implication of this for economic development: does it distract one from the details of daily life which must be attentively controlled for economic success, or does it enable one to discover the basic nature of reality and hence facilitate all efforts in this world? The allegory of the cave in Plato’s Republic suggests both, namely, that beginning from scrutinizing the details of the images as shadows cast upon the wall of a prisoner’s cave, we need to turn to the basic formal patterns of similarity between the images (as in the discovery in chemistry of the periodic table) and above all to the light, existence, or Being itself by which and of which, the shadows are cast -- that by which all is. This is true freedom from bondage in the cave and is the unveiling of one’s ultimate concern. Enlightening all, this reveals the definitive significance both of the formal types as the range of possible ways of being or living, and of concrete realities as the actual exercise of being or existence. Indeed, Tillich would invert the allegory and suggest that this is not to abandon the concrete for a transcendent reality, but to penetrate to the immanent or inner core of the meaning, dynamism and purpose of concrete daily life.

This suggests that management methods be informed not only, as in the past, by efficiency techniques based upon ever closer attention to the surface details of the time and place of each motion made by each worker, but also by attention to the nature of the worker as a person who acts and to the nature of his or her work as a dynamic expression of the Source of being. Conversely, it suggests that the crucial task of philosophy as wisdom, namely, to unfold the nature of being or what it means to be, may be enriched by examining the challenge of life in each age through which a people develops its culture.

Classically, this has been done in the Greek philosophical tradition in terms of unity, truth and goodness, each unfolding the preceding characteristic. In Hindu thought, at the root of Buddhism, this is an unfolding of the inner life of the Absolute Being or Brahma as existence or sat (corresponding to being), consciousness or cit (corresponding to truth), and bliss or ananda (corresponding to the good). In Christian cultures it is the inner life of God seen as triune: namely, the Father as existence and the one source of all existents; the Son, as the conscious expression of the Father as Word (logos) or truth; and the Holy Spirit as the enjoy-ment of goodness, bliss or love. The different Greek, Hindu and Christian traditions converge in describing the threefold inner life of being. Let us then examine unity, truth and goodness in se-quence, now with attention to economic development, in order to see how such development and the inner life of being can be mutually enlightening.

Here, our methodology will draw upon Habermas’s sense of communicative action by looking into the divisions which need to be worked out in the process of dialogue. However, rather than taking these as surface conflicts which can be resolved simply by the compromise of factors which are of no inherent significance, we will look more deeply into the human realities involved in order to learn of the basic nature of reality in terms of which the re-solution of these differences is possible. This, in turn, can point the way to a real resolution of tensions which promotes development rather than compromising human dignity.

This, of course, is not the first time such a depth reflection will have taken place; indeed the traditions of the various cultures consist of the fruits of just such continuing reflection through the ages. Hence, it can be hoped that such a process of reflection will both enrich our appreciation of the deep sources of our cultural traditions, and carry them forward as life-giving for our times. Here it will be possible only to sketch out the general lines of such a process. It is for each culture to undertake the many dimensions of the issue in terms of the specific character of its present dilemmas and with regard to the content of its cultural tradition.

With regard to unity the dilemma which arises in economic development in our times, as elsewhere, is the tension between the unity of all and the uniqueness and hence diversity of each. It is clear that for economic progress the unique initiative and creativity of each person, or at least of most people, is required. At the same time, it is clear that conflictual self-seeking by many individuals without cohesion and complementarity will be destructive of all. Compromise in a Hobbesian manner would garner the needed cohesion, but would do so in a negative manner, namely, by com-promising dimensions of personal freedom in order to reduce the level of mutual attacks. Some theories of justice are but a working out of these compromises. Looking more deeply into the nature of particular being promises to reveal whether the many are nece-ssarily antithetic so that their uniqueness needs to be compromised, or are complementary such that promoting the true and authentic uniqueness of each is the way to develop the community and its cooperative enterprises.

This dilemma of uniqueness and unity directs attention to our traditions to see what has been learned over the ages. At the very beginnings of Greek philosophy unity was recognized by the first metaphysician, Parmenides, as a first characteristic of being. He reasoned that in order simply to be rather than in some way not be, that is, in order to stand against the nonbeing or negation implied in the notions of beginning, limitation or multiplicity, being as such -- and, hence, Being Itself -- had to be eternal, infinite and one. Further since finite or limited beings do, in fact, exist, Plato added that their reality must be a participation in the infinite, eternal and unchanging One, the "external" transcendent, which they reflect in every facet of their being.

When this is seen in terms of the Christian sense of existence as the dynamic, creative power of being communicated from the one divine Being a number of things follow. On the one hand, sharing in this Absolute, limited beings are not mere functions of other realities, but subsist in their own right: the creator, in making them to be as participations of Himself, makes them to stand in -- if not by -- themselves, and to have a proper identity which is unique and irreducible. This is the foundation of Boethius’s classical definition of the person as a subject of a rational nature. Inasmuch as they reflect the divine, such beings are unique and unable to be assumed by some larger entity -- even by the divine. To the degree that they reflect the Absolute and Transcendent, they exist in their own right.

On the other hand, because all limited beings are made to be by the same unique transcendent Being, their foundational existence-in-themselves, rather than alienating them one from another, makes them to be related one to another, and this by the very fact of their participated individual uniqueness. If to be is to exist in oneself as a creature of God, it is thereby to be founda-tionally related both to Him and to all manifestations of His being.

What is more, each being exists in its own way or as ana-logous. That is to say, it is not that beings are made up of com-ponents most of which are common to many and to which is added something unique. (This undergirds the various forms of tota-litarianism when that which is unique to each is discounted in favor of what is common; it undergirds the various forms of indivi-dualism when what is common is discarded in favor of what is unique.) Rather, each is an entirely unique realization of the com-mon humanity in its own proper manner; one’s uniqueness is a unique realization of humanness, not some inhuman or nonhuman self-identity.

Seen in the light of the Transcendent, being or "to be" is then to be radically myself, irreducible to nonbeing whether in the form of any reduction in my own being, subjection to another, or merger as a mere member of a group. But, by the very same participation in the One divine source and goal of all, to be myself is equally and indissociably to be related to others. One is not compromised, but enhanced by the other in such wise that one achieves one’s highest identity in loving service to all.

This constitutes a crucial context for economic development integrating the sense of being a unique, irreplaceable and creative eruption into time with a task to accomplish. It recognizes the per-sonal dignity of all -- oneself, one’s employees, one’s customers -- even to the extent of each being an image of God. This includes as well an indissociably social and civic character for business, such that the uniqueness of the person lies above all in his or her realization of service that reaches beyond oneself.

Conversely, the context of economic development renders these factors ever more evident. Not only does the dynamism of a whole people suggest to our minds the dynamic power of the divine, but the difficulty of coordinating the different interests of so many forces us to look with new eyes at the importance of the single Source from which all come. To the degree that we learn of its nature we shall be able to appreciate the possibilities not only of living together, but of intensively interacting and cooperating in the economic development of our times. If the divine is the one source of being, the economic order is now one of its most dynamic reflections.

Truth has to do with the openness to mind and hence of communicability between minds. Increasingly, it appears that economic development depends less on the simple possession of physical resources and more upon the development of scientific and technological knowledge. Today, in its joint enterprises a country looks not only for funding and machinery, but for the technological understanding on which these are based, for such understanding is the real key to future development. The nature of the reality that this supposes most basically has been called truth.

Truth is an unfolding of the unity of being. Unfortunately, too often unity has been seen in terms that are static, reductionist and even merely selfish. Property, for example, has been looked upon as the right to withhold possessions. Rights have been seen as license to turn inward along the lines of the all-consuming orien-tation of freedom-as-choice. In that light, one’s being comes to be looked upon as a possession to be acquired and conserved or, worse still, to be bartered. Were the sense of reality to be reductively material, the laws of the conservation of energy and of commercial exchange would dictate that we guard what we have, share it only when we can obtain equal return, and exploit others to the maximum possible degree. In this case, Hobbes’s description of man as wolf to man as short, brutish and mean, would not be far from the mark. Unfortunately, this has colored the model of the market developed paradigmatically by Adam Smith.

In contrast, a culture marked by a sense of outer Tran-scendence should be quite the opposite. The original and origi-nating instance of being is pure knowledge, Aristotle’s knowing on knowing (noesis noeseos) or, better yet, simply Truth. As im-minently one and simple, it does not have the division we experience between our capability for knowledge and its actuation, between our mind and the ideals it generates. Instead, in perfect unity complete intelligibility is identified with complete know-ledge to constitute truth itself. From this it follows that each of its participations is true, intelligible or open to mind to the very degree that it is or exists.

Hence, Parmenides could say immediately upon initiating metaphysics: "It is the same thing to think and to be." All being is indeed openness to intellect; what is radically closed to mind simply is not and cannot be. In such a context philosophy moves confidently -- if not always correctly -- to overcome obscurity and fear; science races forward, confident that each step of insight constitutes solid progress in humankind’s exploration of this universe; in the practical order of economic development problems are not destructive dilemmas and permanent contradictions, but challenges to be solved. When rational decisions are founded upon reality, the mind thrives, the creativity of human genius is in-vigorated, and development moves forward.

Truth speaks itself as word; indeed it proclaims itself or reaches out to intellect; as truth being is openness, manifestation and communication. To attempt to hide the truth would image Chronos in the ancient Greek myths who attempted to swallow his children rather than allow them to enter into the light. This is con-trary to the nature of being and as violent as attempting to force a river to flow upstream; eventually, it must be unsuccessful. Where untruth enters or the expression of truth is inhibited the effect is paralysing, disorienting and destructive of economic and scientific development.

Hence we learn more of the nature and significance of truth as we discover today how essential is an open and truthful atmosphere for promoting research, production, advertising and sales. Further just as a musician or poet unfolds the many potential meanings of a single theme, so via truth being unfolds its meaning and com-municates itself to others. Here, the human intellect plays an essential role by conceiving new possibilities, planning new pro-ductive relationships, and providing for the needs of mankind on its pilgrimage. In terms of truth, economic development constitutes then both spectroscope and kaleidoscope of reality.

Conversely, if truth is in its source infinite or unlimited then we can know that the modern accomplishment of clear and distinct ideas is but one dimension of reason. As techné this identifies what is common and repeatable; as with a mathematical formula, once learned it is completely known. Economic development, in con-trast, is ever in search of what is not yet exhaustively known or realized. This requires symbols which suggest but do not yet define, and mystery reflecting what is inexhaustible and ever unfolding.

While truth relates especially to the nature of things and thus unfolds the range of possibilities, more is needed for the dynamism and the orientation required for development. This is the ambit of the good. Without this consistent orientation to what is in some way perfective, rather than to what is evil or destructive, the physical order could not be organized, freedom and creativity could not be mobilized and, as Kant pointed out, orders of science (the first critique) and of freedom (the second critique) could not be coor-dinated as is essential for economic development.

Goodness as the third property of being expresses the conjunction and fulfillment of unity and truth in celebration of the perfection of being or, where imperfect, in the search for that perfection or fulfillment.

Indeed, we are delicately but dynamically perched. Realizing some goodness or perfection in ourselves, but open by intellect and will to unlimited perfection or goodness (vertical transcendence), we are not indifferent and inert, but dynamically inclined. Deve-lopment is not alien to our nature, but essential thereto. This has twofold significance. On the one hand, it is an implication and ex-pression of the divine source, while on the other hand the dynamic power of economic development becomes in turn a revelation of the pervasive powerful and persistent attractive power of divine love. The same is true of the horizontal dimensions of tran-scendence which are closer to us, e.g., the community in which we live and the enterprise in which we work; these should draw us out, enliven us, and found the development we seek.

A philosophy of the person as image of this divine tran-scendent principle transforms the sense of the person in this world. The human person remains part of nature; but rather than being subject thereto as a mere producer or consumer, it is a creative and transforming center, responsible for the protection and promotion of nature. Similarly, the person is by nature social and a part of society; but rather than being subject thereto as an object, it is the creative center of society and must be an integral part of all decision making.

As the movements of freedom in this half century reflect the emergence of new understanding of the person and its fuller role in social life, human dignity, equality, and participation in the socio-political and economic process have become central concerns. The search for adequate foundations for economic development can both draw upon the insights of a culture and enrich them.

In this the existential character of being and its three charac-teristics are central. First, the exercise of freedom in economic affairs is not simply a choice of one or another type of object or action as a means to an end, but is moreover a radical self-affirma-tion of existence within the unity of Existence Itself and with all others. Second, the truth of being assures that the world -- physical and social -- within which we act is not irrational and obscure, but is subject to rational planning and interaction which demands openness and communication. Finally, being as good constitutes an inviting realm of action into which we are drawn, not simply for gains that return to us, but as reaching beyond ourselves to share the being we have received.

This new life of freedom means, of course, combating evil in whatever form: hatred, injustice and prejudice -- all are privations of the good that should be. The focus in terms of being, however, is not upon negations, but upon giving birth to reality as good and bringing this to a level of human life marked by an enriched har-mony of beauty and love after the manner of Confucius and Christ, Buddha and Mohammed and all who have inspired humankind on its journey.

1. H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroads, 1975), pp. 245-258.

2. A. Cua, "The Idea of Confucian Tradition," The Review of Metaphysics, 45 (1992), pp. 803-844.

3. Gadamer, pp. 281-286.

4. Jaroslav Pelican, Vindication of Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 65.

5. Cua, loc. cit.

6. For a consideration of the relationship between Marx, the Frankfurt School and Habermas see Albrecht Wellner, "Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic of Enlightenment," in Habermas and Modernity, ed. Kichand J. Bernstein (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985). For a reconstruction of Habermas’s critical theory which places his work in the tradition of meta-critique, see Garbis Kortian, Meta Critique: The Philosophical Argument of Jürgen Habermas, trans. John Raffan (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980); for a reconsideration of Habermas’s commutative theory as a contribution to metaphysics and vice versa see Robert P. Badillo, The Emancipative Theory of Jürgen Habermas and Metaphysics (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1991).

7. Cf. Stephen K. White, The Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and Modernity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 56.

8. Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990) p. 65.

9. Ibid. p. 63.

10. White, Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas, p. 76.

11. J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, PP. 116-194.

12. Cf. Ibid., pp. 76-77.

13. Ibid., p. 76.

14. For a discussion of this issue in the light of Habermas’s discourse ethics, see Badillo, pp. 101ff.

15. For a fuller treatment of the relation between Kant’s trilogy of critiques, see G.F. McLean, Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence, (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994), chap. III.

16. J. Maritian, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (New York: Pantheon, 1955), chap. IV.

17. Yves R. Simon, Freedom of Choice, P. Wolff, ed. (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1969), p. 106.

18. Mortimer J. Adler, The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958), I, 606.