In this concluding decade of the 20th century great changes are taking place in China. As in other regions of the world, the earlier concentration upon ideologies is giving way to the concrete work of building a stable society. In China this must be sufficiently prosperous to support almost a quarter of humankind.

Hence, the question of the economy emerges as a point not only of individual fascination, but of desperate national im-portance. Experiments in the South of China, as well as the enor-mous success of nearby Confucian cultures, show that the de-velopment of a market economy is feasible. But its impact upon the quality of life is not yet known. Indeed not only the strong earlier Marxist critique of market economies, but recent Chinese ex-perience generate concern that the results could be seriously detrimental. The common human vices of greed and avarice, the special danger of corruption in a highly centralized society, and the displacements and unemployment generated in the process of transition are but a few of the great challenges to be faced. Some even hold the economic field to be, in principle, anarchic.

Others, however, would not despair; indeed, the people as a whole dare not fail.

What resources does China have for succeeding in this delicate transition? In 1994 when this research seminar was held there had not yet developed a body of ethics for the new economic order which then was only in the process of being born. In the context of the series of research seminars begun in 1987 by The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) with leading academic units in China, philosophers from The Institute of Philosophy of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and The philosophy Department of Fudan University, Shanghai had called for discussions precisely on this issue of philosophy and the economic order. They brought to the colloquium not a developed economic ethics, but the materials then available--classical Confucianism, Marxism and echoes of pragmatism from Dewey’s visit long ago. Their goal was to discuss the relevance of these to the new economic order and to develop ways of thinking about the social and ethical issues this entailed. This is the burden of Part I of the present volume.

Second, changes which are evolutionary rather than revolutionary have notable advantages for they can build positively upon the past, its experiences and discoveries, in order to employ these in the development of truly new life. Hermeneutics would suggest that this is a reading of earlier texts from new perspectives and with new concerns. Thus, for example, attention shifts from the efforts of the later Marx with Engels to develop a rigorously scientific and ultimately deterministic view of economics and history to the humanistic and humanizing themes of the earlier Marx. These leave more place for the humanistic content of the Confucian tradition which, in turn, comes to be read in a new light reflecting the experience, concerns and commitments of a par-ticular people. This brings broader epistemological, methodological and metaphysical issues into play. These are treated in Part II.

Third, all of this must be applied to the development of an ethnics for the new economic life. Visiting scholars from other parts of the world brought exciting information and samples of work on business ethics in relation to personal meaning and social processes. Chinese scholars began to articulate from Confucianism and Marxism relevant elements as yet undeveloped. Together some components of an ethics of, and for, the Chinese economic situation began to emerge. In the process related issues from other new concerns, such as women and environment, were brought forth. This is the work of Part III.

This volume has been organized according to that threefold sequence. The research seminar was an exciting -- even dramatic -- beginning of which this book is the record; its studies are founda-tional for understanding the growth of the Chinese economy and the companion efforts needed in order to make it humane and humanizing. Let us look at the sequence of the studies greater detail.

Part I concerns the resources available from Confucianism, Marxism and pragmatism. These are presented both in their classical form and for their potential contribution in facing the problems of the emerging economic order. This Part traces not an adequate blue print for Chinese economic ethics, but some of the issues which must be faced and some of the resources which can be drawn upon.

In the first section on Confucianism, Shi Zhonglian in Chapter I, "The Dual Economic Function of Confucianism," begins with six often stated reasons why Confucianism is not able to provide the philosophy needed by the new economic order. But then he hesitates before the remarkable economic success of other Confucian societies. This enables him to step back from the issue of the emerging economic structures, which by definition must be new and different, and to look at the broader and more properly philosophical and ethical issues in terms of the goals of life as the broader context for present economic activity. Whence comes the assiduous, trustworthy and benevolent culture required for con-fident and hence continued interchange of goods and services? In these terms the Confucian philosophy of life emerges as an essential context for the market economies of Asia.

Chapter II by Deng Mingying, "Restructuring Rationality and Modern Confucian Values," studies the basic character of Confucianism and its potential for providing a value horizon in response to the modern tendency to give primacy to instrumental rationality.

Section II of Part I is concerned directly with Marxism and its focus upon economic production. Chapter III by Wu Xiaoming and Wang Defeng, "Value Judgements and Economic Development," is concerned that economic and technical development not be interpreted in an idealistic light and advances the need for concrete historical content in order truly to engage the problem. The authors see the contribution of Marx as providing

not only a value standard as a social ideal or destination, but also an interpretative program as the embodiment of the standard and a practical program as the reality of the standard. Thus, the fundamental principles of this theory (not its details on particular issues), not only form value judgements on economic development, but also claim theoretical and practical concreteness for their value judgement. This means that any value goal or social destination must embody the concrete socio-historical reality.

 

Chapter IV by Hu Zhengping, "Economic Development as Self-Awakening and Self-Destruction," describes the Marxist analysis of history in terms of economics. Although a progressive self-awakening, it unleashed as well forces of self-destruction. The chapter notes that in the end Marx turned to a material solution based upon an increase in the level of production: "Usually it is forgotten that Marx’s theory takes the development of productive forces as its basic premise and final conclusion." This has been noted in Knowledge and Human Interest by J. Habermas who regrets it as an abandonment by Marx of the most humanizing aspects of his philosophy of social development, namely, its attention to self-awareness and self-responsibility.

Chapter V by Yu Xuanmeng, "The Philosophical Significance of Economic Activity," points up this impact of economic activity: on the relation of man and nature (ecology); on the essence of man -- which now, however, must be understood in terms not of a natural state, but of civilization and culture -- and on the meaning of human life, especially in terms of social norms. Nevertheless, Marx’s earlier humanizing concerns remain in play and the fascinating -- and unfinished story for China -- is how the abstract economic and the concrete and more properly humane factors interact. Much of the ethics for the Chinese economic order promises to be written in terms of this interplay.

Section III of Part I on the philosophical resources for an ethics of economic change concerns the liberal economic theory of Max Weber and pragmatism.

Where Marx stressed the elements of unity and community, liberal thought focused upon individuals and the tensions generated by their clash of will. Indeed, it saw tension as the key to progress. Chapter VI by Yang Fenggang, "Tension and the Healthy Develop-ment of Society," studies this in some detail. But the tension this generates also destroys and suppresses people and classes, as Marx observed of the textile industry in England.

Pragmatism was in part a corrective effort to place at the center the person rather than the blind hand of the market. It did this by starting with human goals and thinking in terms of their achievement. This received great impetus from the extended visit of John Dewey to China at the time of the 1919 New Culture Move-ment. This is expertly treated in Chapter VII by Liu Fangtong, "Market Economy and the Moral Theory of Pragmatism". This chapter situates pragmatism in relation to classical utilitarianism as the philosophy proper to the theory of the market by Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and others. He is careful to protect this against the charge of idealism by citing its recognition of the objective reality of the world, though this reality is considered not in itself, but only from within the human perspective. The focus of pragmatism is on benefitting human life; consequently it is marked by deep social concerns. However, as the chosen means for implementing such concerns is science in an empiricist sense, the goals tend to be external projects rather than the inner transformation of the human person.

The chapter acknowledges that this tends to render the theory, though deeply humane in intent, impoverished in attending to the special character of human life. This reflects a theological position regarding human fallenness, which basic individualism sees people as self-centered and fiercely competitive. Ethics then becomes the task of elevating what is decidedly poor material. Ultimately, justice, equality and sociality are compromises of authentic freedom; they become good intentions to save us from our real selves. But is this enough? Indeed, in the 1940s and 1950s pragmatism was abandoned by and large because of its inability to answer the charge that its empiricist epistemology could give no justification for the ability to form the high social goals upon which all else in the pragmatist system depended.

Part II, "Horizons for the Future Development of an Ethics for the Economic Order," looks for the route along which an ethics for the economic order can properly be pursued.

The spectacular Chapter VIII by Zhang Rulun, "Is an Ethics for Economic Activity Possible?", approaches this issue in a controlled philosophical manner by turning to Aristotle’s distinc-tion between poiesis, whose end is outside and concerns technical action, and praxis, whose end is in oneself and whose norm is truth corresponding to right desire. It is in the latter that the concerns for the quality of human life must center. In contrast, to make ethics a matter of poiesis, that is, of appropriate action in terms of pro-duction is to subject man to machine.

It is no accident then that the ethics tailored to the economic concerns of our times ultimately are concerned not with human dignity, creative freedom, and the quality life, but with how to manipulate humankind as a function of the economy. The chall-enge then is not to technologize human life, but to humanize tech-nology. For this the paper suggests that an ethics of economic life is not possible if it concerns only a specific, e.g., economic, activity which is a matter of techné. Ethics becomes possible only if it is focused rather on human happiness and the relation of the eco-nomic order thereto. This calls for the delicate task of sorting out the truly humanizing aspects of the resources studied in Part I and setting these within a broader metaphysical perspective.

Chapter IX by Zhang Quingxiong, "Marxism and Traditional Chinese Philosophy," approaches this in terms of the history of the thought of Marx. Despite the fact that Marx has been taken as foreign to China and hence temporary, the evolution of his thought could be seen to correspond to elements of the classical Chinese tradition. Thus, the younger more idealistic Marx looked for more radical change which correspond to the "great harmony" of the classical tradition, not simply as a practice of life but as a set of values which inspires and guides all actions. The older Marx seemed more concerned with technical and tactical adjustments in which the search for "small tranquility" might consist. A review of the three modern Chinese revolutions shows that all have been social in character with the goals of "great harmony" and "small tranquility." In this context the philosophy of the "great harmony" suggests a special primacy to the early Marx in order to humanize the economic activity on which the philosophy of the later Marx focused.

Chapter X by George F. McLean, "Metaphysics, Culture and Economic Development," relates to Zhang Qingxiong’s attention to the Confucian "Great Harmony" and to the primacy given by Zhang Rulun’s to praxis rather than poiesis. Both suggest a broader metaphysics of reality and cultural change. It is on this basis that the humanization of economic life can begin.

Chapter XI by Wang Bin, "Man’s Ultimate Concern and Economic Development -- A Chinese Dilemma," looks for the ultimate concern or basic horizon within which the Chinese people tend to view and order all things. This he finds in the family, which augers considerable difficulty and displacement for the future due to the degree that the process of modernization has heretofore tended to dissolve the family. This will be one of the great chall-enges for the family-centered Chinese moral tradition.

Chapter XII by Manuel Dy, "From Economic Development to Human Development: Habermas’s Rationalization of the Lifeworld," brings these issues into the broader context of the development of rationality as characteristic of modern times. This leads to the question whether a whole new epistemological de-velopment is required in order to address the problems generated by modern economic systems.

Chapter XIII by Zhou Changzhong, "Economic Development in Western Society and Changes in the Philosophy of Science," reinforces the themes of Zhang Rulun in historical terms by tracing the evolution of ethical concern from the objective order in Greek thought to the rationalist subjective order, first of principles in modern philosophy and then of practice in more recent pragmatism. It is a sign of the end of the modern period that atten-tion now shifts to literature, art, the social sciences and, still more foundationally, to culture.

Indeed, this reflects the extent of the transformation pre-sently underway as aesthetic concerns come to be seen as founda-tional and as shaping or humanizing the economic and the prag-matic. Thus, we find ourselves embarking on a new era being re-ferred to as global, both in breadth as it opens to the broad range of cultures, and in depth as it begins to take account once again of the full dimensions of the human person.

Part III takes up economic ethics proper.

Chapter XIV by Georges Enderle, "Corporate Responsibilities for Human Development in China," takes up the task of humanizing the economic order by relating it to human develop-ment and mapping the areas of corporate responsibilities. In this the key is to understand economic enterprises as integral parts of the human community, to distinguish levels of ethical obligations and aspirations, and to determine the combination of levels of ethical response for the various areas of corporate responsibility, e.g., to its workers, to its customers, to its community, etc. This creates a dynamic sense of the life of the enterprise in which its ethical stance becomes a creative element in the success of a corporation amply conceived.

This overall schema requires a vibrant moral sense for which the previous part provided the foundations and which the sub-sequent chapters find in the Chinese tradition as well as in con-temporary studies of moral development and in management theory.

Chapter XV by Lu Xiaohe "On Economic Development and Human Moral Capacity," begins from Marx’s identification of the importance of economic production, but goes on to show the distinctive character of the human moral capacity. This enables her to identify what the human being is as moral and to identify the bases of moral decisions.

The problem lies not in whether humans have moral capacity, but in how to respect and promote that capacity: moral capacity too must be treated morally. The economic system in China is now in a transition from a planned to a market economy. Ethics must work out a corresponding new moral system according to the principles of economic relations which determine morality. . . . In fact, all respect those who display a high moral capacity, whether one denies or affirms the capacity, for it manifests the differences between man and animals and is the inner essence of being human. Though economic development has nourished or tested the capacity with its productions of various kinds, it does not of itself produce so noble a reality as the moral capacity.

 

Chapter XVI by Fu Jizhong, "Economic Development and Moral Transformation," also begins from the relation of morals to economics, but, by showing morals to be characterized by action, cultural inheritability and complexity, he is able to identify as essential the maintenance of human dignity, respect for human freedom and full freedom for the human spirit.

Generally speaking, the objective of morals in economic development can be summarized as follows; first, to maintain human dignity, and second to make social progress. To maintain human dignity means to respect human rights and freedom, to respect science and democracy, to respect knowledge and talents, to be just and righteous, honest and faithful, and to be a noble person.

It should be pointed out that in economic development some phenomena do not conform to this objective. For instance, making a large fortune at the expense of public interests, disturbing normal market competition with a view to pro-fiteering and so on. These unjust and greedy deeds damage human dignity, injure the growth of new morals and block economic development. This immoral phenomenon must be checked effectively to prevent it from doing too much harm.

Man is a social product. Only by maintaining human dignity, respecting human freedom and giving the human spirit full freedom can we drive society forward. In economic development, mo-rality is a question not only of theory, but also of practice. Upholding human dignity and driving society forward require that morality be unified on the basis of theory and practice.

Chapter XVII by Allan Abels, "Individual and Corporate Mission," points to the dynamic resources of human consciousness in the higher reaches of effective economic activity. Here the scientific, universal and universally available elements of manage-ment and entrepreneurship are supposed. But what is it that enables people to suffuse these with special creativity? This he finds not in the economic indicators but in a sense of purpose and mission which express one’s set of values and commitment.

It might be feared that individual initiative is by nature conflictual. However, Chapter XVIII by Richard Graham, "The Sense of Justice in Traditional Culture and Economic Develop-ment," explores the development of moral capability and com-petency. He finds that studies in this area suggest that, on the contrary, the development of better judgement and greater creati-vity brings rather "a greater harmony of thought and feeling, of interest and action". If so the "Great Harmony" remains a guiding star for Chinese economic development in our times.

The final two chapters illustrate the humanizing ethical concerns as operative in new areas which in turn will generate new developments in business ethics. Chapter XIX by Wang Miaoyang, "Environmental Problems and Ecological Ethics," shows this broadening of human concerns to issues of ecology as the physical context of human life. It notes the willingness in the West to consider not only the control and subjection of nature, but human participation in a broader sense of nature. Resources for this can be found in the ancient philosophies of China.

Chapter XX by He Xirong, "Economic Development and the Female Personality," looks at the uniqueness of the human person. This was eminently treated by Ghislain Florival in terms of the relatedness internal to all humans in "Perception and Values: The Affective Basis of an Ethics of Encounter" in Beyond Moderni-zation: Chinese Roots for Global Awareness (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1997). He Xirong traces the history of the role of women in society from her initial authority, to industrial subjection and its image of the "strong" manlike woman, to her present liberation so that the full range of her distinctive characteristics can more fully be expressed.

Together, the chapters of this work constitute not only a thrilling account of perhaps the first attempt in China to take up an ethics of the economic order in China but a clear and profound cataloguing of the resources of the tradition, the new dimensions of human life which must now be opened, and the way in which this can be applied to the elaboration of ethics for the newly emerging economic life of China. Further indications of the progress of this development can be found in the volume developed with the Philosophy Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing in 1996 and published by the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, D.C., 1997.