In its purest and simplest form, consequentialism is a moral doctrine holding that the right act in any given situation is the one that will produce the best overall outcome, as judged from an impersonal standpoint giving equal weight to the interests of everyone. Its most familiar version is utilitarianism, found in its classical form in the writings of the English philosophers, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. This holds that the best state of affairs is the tone that contains the greatest net balance of aggregate human pleasure, happiness or satisfaction.

This view has been subject to three particularly influential objections. The first is that utilitarianism gives no direct weight to considerations of justice or fairness in the distribution of goods (see John Rawls’s, A Theory of Justice). The second is that utilita-rianism requires people to do whatever, in a given situation, will produce the best available overall outcome, which may mean doing something quite horrible (see Thomas Nagel’s War and Massacre). The third claims that utilitarianism is an excessively demanding moral theory because it seems to require that one neglect or aban-don one’s own pursuits whenever one could produce even slightly more good in some other way. The demands of utilitarianism are so extreme even as to undermine the integrity of the individual agent (see Bernard Williams, Consequentialism and Integrity). In short, these three anti-utilitarian arguments point out that the classical utilitarianism is at odds with ordinary notions of justice, individual rights, and so on.

As a result some people conclude that utilitarianism is un-acceptable and hence must give way to other views. But this con-clusion does not appear justified and, as a matter of fact, the alter-natives to utilitarianism are also subject to objections.

Generally, the alternate views are called "agent-relative mo-ralities" or non-consequentialist views. Unfortunately, they have their own problems. First, there are times when such moralities would forbid doing as much good as we could, or preventing as much evil. Second, they insist that there are occasions when one must not violate an agent-relative constraint even if that is the only way to prevent more widespread violation of the very same con-straint by others (for example, in a trolley we should not pull the switch). Third, while these prohibitions may seem intuitively appropriate when applied to individual cases, nevertheless, they have a distinct appearance of irrationality. For it seems extremely odd for morality to forbid acting in such a way as to minimize the occurrence of the violation of agent-relative constraints. In short, there is an apparent conflict between our moral intuitions and a very natural and familiar conception of rationality. This apparent conflict suggests that the most defensible moral view is not an agent-relative morality, but some form of utilitarianism.

Being subject to objections does not imply that utilitarianism fails, but may be a sign of life. Through its response to objections utilitarianism modifies itself and becomes more adequate. The gap between utilitarianism and common sense morality does not imply that utilitarianism is not acceptable because moral common sense is not reliable.

First, common sense is history and culture-bound, and may incorporate various irrational elements. Why simply assume that our feelings are always correct; why reject as plausible a rational theory of ethics such as utilitarianism simply because it conflicts with such feelings? Smart points out in his Outline of A System of Utilitarian Ethics:

Admittedly utilitarianism does have consequences which are incompatible with the common moral consciousness, but I tended to take the view "so much the worse for the common moral con-sciousness." That is, I was inclined to reject the common methodology of testing general ethical principles by seeing how they square with our feelings in particular instances.

 

Second, even if we admit the objections, it is not necessary to accept a version of agent-relative morality, for the objections can be accommodated within a broadly utilitarianism framework or reinterpretation. The troublesome aspect of the theory was its implication that each individual action is to be evaluated by reference to its own particular consequences (act-utilitarianism); hence, the theory has been modified so that individual actions will be judged right or wrong by reference to rules. We should accept such rules because as a regular practice, following them promotes the general welfare. But once having appealed to the principle of utility to establish the rules, one does not have to invoke the prin-ciple again to determine the rightness of particular actions. In-dividual actions are justified simply by appeal to the already established rules. Thus theoretically, rule-utilitarianism cannot be accused of violating common moral sense, or of being in conflict with ordinary ideas of justice, personal rights and the rest. In shifting emphasis from the justification of acts to the justification of rules, the theory is brought into line with our intuitive judgments to a remarkable degree.

Among all available versions of utilitarianism, T.M. Scanlon’s version appears to be the more adequate and stands as a symbol of utilitarianism surviving its objections. Rule-utilita-rianism avoids the problems confronted by act-utilitarianism but still is not the most adequate which is rather T.M. Scanlon’s "new" rule-utilitarianism, a two-tier view: one that gives an important role to consequences but which takes rights seriously as placing limits on utilitarian reasoning at the level of casuistry. It retains the basic appeal of utilitarianism, at least as it applies to the foundation of rights, and yet avoids the problems that have plagued traditional rule-utilitarianism.

In order to establish his new rule-utilitarianism, Scanlon first reforms the foundation and content of utilitarianism. He rejects subjective preferences as the basis for evaluating outcomes, and accepts instead as ethically significant an objective notion of the relative importance of various benefits and burdens. As to content, the benefits and burdens considered must include not only the things that may happen to people, but also factors affecting the ability of individuals to determine what will happen. Such a version of utilitarianism is less demanding.

Scanlon involves distributive justice in the theory. As he points out in "Rights, Goals, and Fairness", there are at least two ways to accommodate distributive concerns in the evaluation of outcomes. One is by giving extra weight to the interests of those who are worst off, so that the satisfaction of their interests counts disproportionately in determining what the best outcome would be in any given situation. The other is by treating distributive equality as a good in itself, which must be considered along with factors like net aggregate satisfaction in determining the value of an overall outcome.

Third, Scanlon gives rights a special place in his "new" rule-utilitarianism. He looks at an assignment of rights as a way of parceling out various forms of discretion over which individuals are in conflict. His view of rights is utilitarian in a broad sense in that it hold rights to be justified by appeal to the states of affairs they promote. It differs from the usual forms of rule-utilitarianism, however, in that it does not appear to be a maximizing doctrine. He sees a central concern as being the promotion and maintenance of an acceptable distribution of control over important factors in our lives. ln this light, Scanlon’s `new’ rule-utilitarianism is a reply to accusations of insensitivity to rights.

Scanlon’s "new" rule-utilitarianism appears to be the most adequate form of utilitarianism and to respond to the objections to utilitarianism. Hence, we conclude that the fate of utilitarianism seems optimistic. It is not dying, but in contrast shows strong life and creativity through its accommodation and modification. It still plays an effective role in evaluation on both the individual and the social levels and can provide a qualified means of evaluation in the present process of reformations in China.

women’s personality development. A modernized economy will enrich the female subject’s personality and open the possibilities for women to rediscover their self and improve their personality.

Almost every nation has undergone a time when they worshiped female goddesses and had beautiful legends concerning their authority. Female goddesses could not only repair heaven and make the earth, but could also create and multiply human beings. The worship of female goddesses reflects the authoritive position of female in material things and in producing human beings during primitive economic times. With respect to material production, their level then was very low. Women collected natural fruit, while men hunted for animals, but because of poor instruments men often came back with nothing, whereas the collection of fruit by women was the main source of food. In their state of group marriage, everyone knew his or her mother without knowing the father; child bearing was considered the business of women alone. In both material and human production women occupied a dominant position and were respected by everybody. With men they worked hard for the development of humankind, but did not ride roughshod over people by means of their position. Hence, their personalities were sound and beneficial. In such a time women had both position and personality, but they could not be said to have had independent individual personalities. They were conscious of a heavy dependence upon nature and human beings; there was no place for a sense of independent personality.

Progress in productive tools changed the natural division of labor. The rise of agriculture and livestock provided a new productive force. In addition, individual marriage replaced group marriage so that people knew their own parents. Child bearing was no longer a holy affair, but a burden binding women in the family. Men came to occupy the authoritive position in society originally held by women. With the establishment of the system of private property, women no longer had an independent personality, but became an exploited and oppressed part of men’s property.

The development of economy and the progress of the marriage relation need not have led to the loss of women’s personality, but the fact is just the contrary. We have seen several antinomies above: first, women invented primitive agriculture, contributed to the invention of fire and livestock farming, and helped to bring about the development of the economy and progress in history. At the same time, women showed themselves less competent than men in such productive activities as agriculture and livestock farming, which made them subordinate to men; second, women contributed to the continuation of the human race, but child bearing bound them in families and deprived them of the opportunity to take part in social activities; third, males created the culture and value system and made themselves subjects of the society, while treating females as object and tools. Although these are historical antinomies, they were inevitable for human beings in their efforts to free themselves for the bonds of nature. In a society of low productive power, it is an axiom that the weak are prey to the strong. The backwardness of production and its corresponding feudal system and culture could not provide room for an equality of both sexes. Therefore, for the progress of the economy it was unavoidable that women’s personality would be sacrificed. In the dark ages in China as well as in the West women could not participate in politics and the praiseworthy characters of the female were also distorted: women become jealous due to living together with their husband’s concubines; they became self effacing due to being subject to maltreatment; and they became narrow-minded through living for a long time in the boudoir without going out. In the meantime, the distortion of the male personality was manifested in another way. Many men were subordinate to other men due to the social system which gave primary to the father’s rights so that they had no personality of their own. In the family, marriage for the sole purpose of child bearing and expression of the sexual impulse without love alienated the human essence of males.

The industrial economy destroyed the natural sense of the family as the basic unit. Great quantities of labor were needed by large industry. This created opportunities for women to enter social life, to participate in economic activities, to earn salaries, and hence no longer to be the property of others. This provided a good basis for their positions as social subjects. In addition, the democratic system, corresponding to the industrial economy, promoted such ideas as "all are equal in terms of money"; "all are equal before the law", "all are equal before God". This gave rise to public opinion favorable to the independence of women as regards their personality. All this was helpful in awakening women’s personalities as subjects. In industrial society women actively fulfilled their obligations while seeking their legitimate rights and interests in activities which constantly improve their personality. However, the following elements in industrial society frustrated the development of women’s personality or even subjected it to certain deviations.

First, industrial production places the machine at the center; it aims at producing material objects and is determined by the investment of human power and other resources; it emphasizes physical labor and operational technology, and the proportion of physical labor is much greater than that of mental work. This situation is unfavorable to women; they suffer sexual discrimination in seeking a job, which hinders the establishment of women’s personalties as subjects.

Second, due to the backwardness of ideas in comparison to the progress of the economy, certain feudal ideas such as "the male has dignity while the female is humble" and "a woman should be subordinate to a man" still fetter women, and influence social expectations regarding their role and value. This gives rise to certain dilemmas for women in seeking their rights and fulfilling their obligations. Many women feel a tension between their role in society and in their family, and in seeking a position in social life while feeling a sense of obligation to be a good wife and mother.

Third, the male culture inclines women to be masculine: as society has long been dominated by men the behavior of successful men in social life is taken as the pattern for all people. As women have not created their own pattern of behavior, they must conform to the pattern of man’s behavior so that their role in social life will more easily be accepted. This stage cannot be surmounted until women fully participate as subjects in society. Although the slogans such as "equality for both sexes" play a great role in freeing women from the fetters of family to become subjects in society, they are harmful to the maintenance of the distinctively female personality. In China, a trend toward the masculinization of women was strong after the 1950s, and reach its height in the 1970s. The "Iron Young Woman" in the 1950s was very similar to the male physique; in the 1970s the dress, even the style of women’s hair, was masculinized. Coming into 1980s, people exclaimed with surprising that "there are no woman in this country"; they began to doubt whether the "strong woman" was perfect in personality. Women refused to be masculinized.

However, people have no answer to the question what is the ideal personality for women? They sink into puzzlement and inertia. Men are afraid of their wives being "strong women", and women themselves fear being "strong women". In order to be thought of as tender, many women do not dare to show their talent, but then they worry about being too feminine; they do not know how to mould their personalities. The solution to the problem requires further development in the economy as well as constant progress in ideology; one is complementary to the other.

The modernized economy is a great revolution over the traditional one and will bring about change in all facets of society. The female personality will be developed and improved in the process of the modernization of society and its ideal will be realized.

First, the productive mode of the modernized economy helps manifest the personality of women as subjects. In modern industry, what determines the production is no longer physical human strength, but the application of a high level of technology, which increases the proportion of mental work. Now in some developed countries, the proportion of mental work versus physical labor approximates 1:1, while the value created by the former far exceeds that created by the latter. Therefore, the application of high level technology will reduce or eliminate the physical inferiority of women in production, and enable women to give play to their superiority in patience, carefulness and nimbleness. This is obviously indicated in developed countries: in the U.K. women have more job opportunities than men.

Second, the operational mode of a modernized economy enables women to choose the job suited to them. The open, dynamic pattern of the economy enables women to find positions of their own in a wider range of social activity. In developed countries, women are exploring molding ideal personalities. They are not the traditional good mothers and wives who sacrifice themselves in a closed family context, nor are they the so-called strong women of industrial times. They develop their own standard and hope to get a valuable job with flexible hours and a good location; they hope to take account of both family and career. Some women give up work and become housewives while bring up their children, but their return to the family is for the purpose of educating their children and giving their children the natural love of a mother so that the children can grow soundly. In the meantime, they engage in further studies to give play to their potentialities or to develop their interests, so that they will be more competitive when they take up a career after their children have grown up. Such exploration is praiseworthy under the conditions of a modernized economy; it advances the civilization of the whole society.

Third, the high educational level of society, the high degree of democracy and the modernization and socialization of house work due to the modernization of the economy will enable women to elevate their quality as human beings, to demonstrate their personality, to strengthen their competitive power in social life, and to realize a sound personality. There will be a day when we need no longer emphasize that the male and the female differ and recognize that there is something common to both sexes. Then the peculiar and varied beauty of the character and personality of the female will demonstrate itself naturally in the world.

Of course, molding the female personality depends not merely on the progress of economy and is not merely a matter for women alone. It depends on the consistent efforts of the whole society; this requires theoretical work by scholars to find the incompatibilities and in time eliminate them.