CHAPTER VII

MARCEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF TOLERANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

MANUEL B. DY, Jr.

            As we approach the end of the 20th century, we witness phenomenal growth in globalization brought about by science and technology, notably by the mass media. Yet ironically, as globalization intensifies, ethnic conflicts have increased in many parts of the world. Most, if not all, of these conflicts have their root cause in intolerance of another group’s religion, e.g., between Christians and Muslim factions in the case of Bosnia as well as in the Philippines. It is but fitting then that the United Nations has declared a Year of Tolerance; any discussion of civil society should include this notion.

            Gabriel Marcel, the Christian existentialist--although he refused to be labeled as such--provides insight into the meaning of tolerance in his essay, "The Phenomenology and the Dialectic of Tolerance."1

THE PROBLEM OF TOLERANCE

            Marcel raises this issue in the context of his reflections on the relationship between belief and faith, or, more precisely, between opinion and faith. Between opinion and faith there lies a spectrum of meanings, with conviction serving as an intermediary. For Marcel, faith can degenerate into opinion which is characterized by externality and lack of commitment. Conviction is closer to belief, but its definitive judgement lacks the temporal openness and trust in someone which is characteristic of belief.

            But if faith extends unlimited credit to an absolute Thou, how is it possible for one to tolerate another opposing belief without falling into skepticism, or reducing one’s own belief to opinion? What is the principle on which we can base a tolerance which at the same time is a living incarnation of faith? Marcel attempts to answer this essential question regarding tolerance.

            At the outset, Marcel justifies the use of the phenomenological approach because tolerance is not a psychological reality but a frontier zone between feeling and attitude or behavior. He doubts whether it can be said that one simply is tolerant; rather one shows that he or she is tolerant. Tolerance has to do with expressions which can be on this or the far side of tolerance.

            What is the object of tolerance; with respect to what does a person show himself to be tolerant? Generally speaking, tolerance refers to expressions or manifestations of belief or opinion. There is tolerance only to what can be presented or overtly manifested, versus what occurs only in consciousness. Also tolerance involves a relation to an other qua other.

            What does it mean then to tolerate? It does not seem sufficient for tolerance to mean non-prevention or non-prohibition. "To tolerate" can mean simply to support, and this is more than just non-prevention or non-prohibition. Still, "support" can be ambiguous. At one end, it can mean to "undergo" as when I say, "I have resigned myself to having M as my student," when I could have him removed from my class. At the other extreme is the meaning of recognizing not just the fact, but the right of M to stay in my class. Tolerance in this sense is ultimately a counter-intolerance, the negation of a negation. Tolerance then is not basic, but presupposes intolerance. As counter-intolerance, tolerance is inconceivable without a certain power or authority to sustain it.

            This power or authority implies a mandate. Here, Marcel cites two negative examples of intolerance. The first is that of a gentleman who does not tolerate remarks made in his presence in defense of pederasty. The second is that of a father who does not tolerate sub-versive remarks made by a stranger at his table in the presence of his children. In both cases of intolerance, what is in question is not only the inner sincerity of the person, but the validity of the mandate entrusted to him. Like intolerance, tolerance implies a mandate; it is also man-ifested "in the name of. . . . "

            At this point, Marcel distinguishes two different cases of tolerance. The first is when my position is contrary to the one expressed by the behavior of the other which must be tolerated. The second is when with respect to both my position and the contrary, I hold a neutral position.

RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

            In the first case, I exhibit tolerance towards those who hold be-liefs contrary to mine. I guarantee them freedom to practice their be-liefs and I prevent anyone from interrupting them--a counter-intolerance. What makes this attitude possible? Does it not imply a contradiction of my own beliefs? Is it that I have loosened the ties to my belief and allowed it to slide into an opinion; that I show tolerance towards an adversary, who now becomes my neighbor? Is tolerance in this case the fruit of a certain skepticism of which I may not be sufficiently aware? This certainly is possible, but the inverse is also conceivable: a dialectic of tolerance, or to be more precise, of con-viction.

            To the extent that I am convinced of my opinion, I also envisage the other to be as convinced of his or her own opinion. I put myself in the place of the other and therefore guarantee his or her right to express his or her opinion. Here the emphasis is placed solely on the subject. Just as the validity of my belief consists in its expressing my actual being, so I must consider the other’s contrary belief to be an expression of his or her own subjectivity. In the same way that I affirm myself, I must also affirm the other.

            However, there is a difficulty in this kind of dialectic. In switching the center of gravity from the object of my belief to the subject, do I not betray my own belief? Isn’t tolerance rooted in such a betrayal? I believe in a certain reality, and to the extent that I hold this reality to be true I am mandated, so to speak, to impose or spread it to others. When I encounter an obstacle to my proselytizing, my tendency would be to attribute error to his or her belief. I cannot grant that belief any-thing comparable to the absolute privilege of my own belief. To tolerate his or her belief would be tantamount to betraying my own belief, nullifying it or contradicting myself.

            In the light of the above difficulty, does this mean that the believer who sees a responsibility to spread his faith must oppose the invidious use of the unbeliever’s freedom in the same sense that I should prevent a child from hurting himself or herself or others? Marcel rejects this intolerance; proselytizing is not in itself intolerance. For to use such an approach ultimately compromises and debases the very end to which it was to be subordinated, i.e. conversion. Such action would confirm the believer in his or her unbelief.

            Insofar as I consider the object of my faith sacred, am I not then prevented from taking any action such as showing tolerance which would confirm the other in his or her disbelief? Is it possible for a person who is completely certain of possessing the truth to show a tolerance based, not on skepticism, but on faith? Is it possible for tolerance to be a living incarnation of faith?

            To set the proper dialectic, Marcel first analyzes the presuppositions concealed by an intolerance cognizant of itself and justifying itself. Intolerance of this sort would involve a state of distrust or apprehension. "If I do not prevent the overt manifestations of the subversive belief, if I do not check its development, many evil conse-quences would follow." I hold a certain responsibility similar to that of a doctor who has to prevent an epidemic from spreading. "I must reject the argument that people have the right to poison themselves if they want and eventually to infect one another; such a right does not exist, is null and void, and must be categorically denied."2 The analogy, however, with the doctor is faulty. In the latter case, the doctor’s con-cern is with the reestablishment of a normal state of affairs, not with a violation of a higher law.

            In the case of a heterodox belief considered from the orthodox point of view, the fundamental difference from the case of the doctor is transcendence. The end of the orthodox believer is service to God, to the divine will. This divine will, however, can be misconstrued by a believer who converts it into a simple idol and becomes guilty of the subtlest kind of betrayal. On the other hand, to serve the divine will is to establish a type of relationship with God which is triadic: to serve the divine will is to act as a mediator between God’s will and the believer. As a mediator, I act in such a way that the other turns to the divine will that I serve. Therefore, I the believer must be absolutely sure that the other consciousness, i.e., the unbeliever, does not feel that I am acting out of personal motives--for example, a desire to proselytize, in which I would be the center.

            The only way to evoke the others’ turning to God is to show love to them. I must go out to the others as they are with the belief that nour-ishes their souls. My love must be strong enough to allow others to be transformed and renewed, such that their belief may itself burst out of its narrow confines and throw off the elements of heterodoxy. It is obvious that in this process, I am merely an instrument and not the cause. Everything issues from God, the transcendent; I must respect this transcendence which includes others and their belief. Before God, I must remain humble.

            To use instruments of force in the service of God’s will is to engender in the other the feeling that I am acting out of self-interest and to project an image of a God of prey whose goal is to annex and to enslave.

            Thus, to serve God in a way which respects and protects His transcendence, i.e., to show tolerance of another’s belief, is in reality to go beyond tolerance itself, towards charity and grace. To act to-wards the other in love and grace is to embody God’s transcendence in my action.

POLITICAL TOLERANCE

            Marcel admits that the case of the doctor and that of the believer are limited cases. Between them are intermediate cases where his solution does not apply, at least not fully. Such cases are political situations; for instance, that of a government or head of state who must deal with a revolutionary party out to destroy the existing order. Any consideration of a transcendent may seem out of place here. Nevertheless, this situation cannot be identical with that of the doctor who is out to combat an epidemic. We cannot equate revolutionaries with rats or mosquitoes, even if the ends they pursue seem completely evil.

            Therefore, a compromise measure is called for which will eliminate the capacity to harm. But the head of the state cannot exhibit anything like tolerance, otherwise he will be guilty of a weakness which can endanger the society he is supposed to protect. Tolerance in the political sphere can be practiced only within certain limits. These are impossible to trace out a priori, and only to the extent that the divergent opinions which are permitted free expression can be considered relatively harmless. Here we enter into a kind of tolerance that is more like a neutrality on the level of precepts. As to actual practice, this needs further investigation.

            Marcel concludes that tolerance is:

Rough and ready compromise between certain psychological dispositions which are moreover distributed between benevolence, indifference and aversion, a Machiavellianism in the larval state--and a spiritual dynamism of a completely different kind whose ground and main driving force is to be found in transcendence.3

TOLERANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY TODAY

            How relevant is Marcel’s notion of tolerance to the contemporary discussion of civil society? As part of culture, religion plays an important and powerful role in our social lives. For many community organizers and development workers, it is their faith that inspires and challenges them to act for social transformation. For many citizens, it is their common faith that moves them to associate, unite and participate in forging a common stand on human rights and social justice issues, in preserving their identity and autonomy, in enhancing their lives as a community and as individuals.

            Religion, however, can degenerate into mere opinion characterized by lack of social involvement or commitment; it can ex-press itself simply in rituals and worship indifferent to the daily lives of ordinary peoples. For such religion, tolerance would simply mean a passive non-prevention or non-prohibition of the expression of a con-trary opinion. If a dialogue were to take place, the meeting would be an exercise simply of rhetoric that would not make a difference in the participants’ social lives.

            On the other hand, religion can become a matter of conviction, which, carried to its extreme, can lead to dogmatism and proselytizing. Though imbued with social involvement or commitment, religion here is tempted to suppress contrary beliefs and to show intolerance to its opponents. In the public discourse essential to a civil society tolerance takes on an active character.

            In the realm of religion, as of morals, both tolerance and intolerance imply a mandate, "in the name. . . ." Although Marcel does not specify what or whence this mandate comes, one can glean from his explanation that as far as religion is concerned there is a qualitative difference in the mandate of tolerance from that of intolerance. The mandate of intolerance is from an authority that has vested itself with a definite judgement and has thus opted to close itself to other points of view; its God is a god of prey or possession. On the other hand, the mandate of tolerance is from an authority that remains open to the history of truth and value; its God is a God of love that unites differences.

            Is religious tolerance possible in civil society? Marcel, speaking mainly in the interpersonal level, clearly affirms the possibility. But can one transpose these ideas to the societal level? Can people of dif-ferent religious beliefs live together in harmony in one society or in a world community without relinquishing their faith?

            Marcel says that just as I am convinced of my opinion, the other must also be convinced of his or hers; therefore I must put myself in the place of the other and guarantee his or her right to express his or her opinion. Almost all religions contain the Golden Rule formulated in different ways: Do not do unto others what you would not want others to do unto you. On the subjective level, whether personal or social, tolerance appeals to the universality of the Golden Rule. There can be a common reason for peoples of different religions to respect each other, to tolerate each other.

            Marcel, however, goes beyond this subjective inference and points to transcendence and a triadic relationship that is the ground of tolerance. But he admits that in the political sphere, tolerance can be practiced only within certain limits, perhaps by compromise. When free expression is relatively harmless, tolerance in this sphere is more neutrality on the level of precepts. On the level of action, he suggests further investigation.

            Indeed, on the level of social action and transformation, it is difficult to envisage a religious tolerance in civil society. Civil society needs to interface with the state, and public discourse cannot stay on the level of respect for another’s opinion, but must come to a consensus. Would the reference to a transcendent and the ensuing triadic relationship then be sufficient ground for tolerance in civil society?

            Following Marcel, I would suggest that philosophical, as well as sociological/historical inquiry on civil society reflect more deeply upon the transcendent that is in each culture. The transcendent was cer-tainly the ground and inspiration of Mateo Ricci’s work and achievement in China. Beyond tolerance, he embraced the Confucian culture (though he rejected the Buddhist and Taoist) and interacted with the Emperor, because he saw the divine in Confucian society. In the Philippines, the phenomenon of the 1986 People Power Revo-lution, where Christians and Muslims alike united for the sake of freedom and democracy without denying their faiths, is testimony that the transcendent, called by different names, may truly be One in our humanity.

Philosophy Department

Ateneo de Manila University

Manila, Philippines

NOTES

            1. Gabriel Marcel, Creative Fidelity, pp. 210-221.

            2. Ibid., p. 217.

            3. Ibid., p. 221.

DISCUSSION

            Oftentimes today tolerance is looked upon simply as the negative stance of not interfering with others. For such tolerance it would be sufficient simply to discount what others do as being of no meaning or value. But it is too short a step from this attitude to that of considering that others themselves are of no importance, and thence to murder or even genocide when for any reason a person or people appear to be inconvenient. This seems to have been the case in the past when whole classes of humans were slaves and were put simply at the disposition of others for whatever service, even to the extent of serving as human sacrifices, and of the prevalence of abortion in our day.

            A more positive sense of tolerance consists in recognizing the importance of others. In practical matters this can be realized by compromises. But when this extends to entirely integrating world views, compromises are less possible, for such views concern deepest commitments, in terms of which I conceive my self-identity and orient my self and my actions in this world.

            In this case Marcel’s phenomenological approach can be helpful for it directs attention not only to the content of one’s beliefs and commitments, but to the subject who holds these. In these terms it becomes possible to recognize the positive, indeed vital, importance of enabling others to hold to their beliefs, for only in freedom can one act humanly and proceed through life in a manner that is authentically human.

            However, this is not merely a matter of treating as absolute the position of anyone or everyone. If one is able to appreciate the infinite reality of Truth and Goodness, and the way in which this transcends, while being participated in by the life of any limited mind or heart, then it is possible to recognize the limited and relative character of the pos-itions of others while acknowledging in them nonetheless a glimpse of the eternal in time.

            In this light tolerance can be an active stance as I look positively for the truth in the view of others and, stimulated thereby, both ad-vance in my own views and help others to proceed along their proper path. The attitude then is not that of trying to make them like oneself, but of accompanying them in their pilgrimage in search of truth.

            Habermas would reflect this in terms of communication theory by attempting to see the universal good in enabling all to take part equally in the public dialogue. But this appears ultimately to remain self-centered inasmuch as the shared formal good of universal participation is also my good, in the sense of being a recognition of my right to participate as well. This takes account of the common project, but does not appear to reach out to recognize explicitly the importance of the unique contribution brought by each to the common project. For this one needs not only a characteristic common to every person, but an openness to the infinite being and truth which transcends any and all persons and positions, societies and cultures, and holds out new possibilities for each.

            There are dangers in this, for various groups or state powers attempt either to seize this sense of absoluteness for themselves or to suppress it. Hence, the work of freedom consists centrally in preser-ving this absolute horizon of human life.

            On the other hand, if in this process of communication each particular culture or ethnos must be able to justify its identity before all others, it can be expected to fail. For if each must provide a neces-sitating reason or one that is good for others, then the personal and free creativity by which they are most properly human will be dis-counted.