In the present circumstances in which everyone is talking about culture and a jumble of all kinds of viewpoints are on display, what is the historic mission of philosophy, now and for a long time to come? It is important that philosophy not follow the fashion and simply drift with the tide, for example, building a new system of cultural philosophy, or translating all sorts of new trends into cultural thought, etc. Rather it must aim at critical reflection to clarify the essential viewpoints which exist generally in present cultural research. Otherwise, the more we talk about cultural research, the further we are likely to wander from the truth. In present cultural research, the coexistence and conflict of many different viewpoints is obvious. Some call this a "multi-cultural state", which, of course, is beyond reproach. Moving from the past "unitary cultural state" to the present "multi-cultural state" is a type of historical progress, but it is not sufficient simply to stop on this point. To admit a "multi-cultural state" and to treat different ideas on culture with lenience and openness, though necessary, does not mean that the existence of each viewpoint on culture is reasonable, or that one viewpoint on culture has no right to think critically about other viewpoints. In fact, without critical thinking, not only will the "multi-cultural state" degenerate into a simple juxtaposition of viewpoints, but all cultural research also will lose its vitality.

If one looks closely at the very different viewpoints on culture, one finds a general and significant phenomenon, namely the loss of the subject and a disorder of values. Here "subject" refers to the Chinese people in the 1990s; the so-called "loss of subject" refers to the subject’s loss of any objective position upon which to stand. This kind of loss of subject or of identity necessarily causes a disorder, and even a reversal of the appreciation of the value of the subject, thus leaving it to float like duckweed on all kinds of different ideas. This loss of subject appears in the following circumstances.

The first is the misplacement of the subject, namely, the subject does not regard itself as Chinese in the 1990s, but replaces its own position by that of other people when researching all sorts of cultural phenomena and problems. Of course, "the people" referred to here are varied, but the most typical or common are the following two kinds: one is the ancients, especially Confucianism as represented by Confucius himself. Although such a research position as "approve the past, not the present", "stress the past, not the present" is not so flagrantly manifest as the school of the quintessence of Chinese culture bitterly attacked by Lu Xun, but its latent appearance in the present cultural research can be found everywhere.

One example is critically to praise the Chinese cultural tradition, unconditionally worshipping such ancient texts as The Confucian Analects, The Works of Mencius, The Book of Chang, etc., while avoiding or concealing the historical limitations of Confu-cianism, etc. These are instances of the subject misplacing his or her position onto the ancients.

Another example is the attitude toward contemporary representatives of Western modernism and postmodern cultural thoughts. In recent years, Chinese scholars have scrambled for such new thoughts coming from the West as anti-rationalism, existen-tialism, the philosophy of the absurd, deconstructionism, post-colonialism, etc. They have employed the position, attitude and methods of these new thoughts uncritically to describe and even to comment on Chinese modernization and social and cultural problems, while neglecting to a great extent their identity. In pursuing moder-nization contemporary Chinese society has a completely different life interest and value-orientation than contemporary Western society. Therefore, when the subject uncritically replaces his or her own position with that of such representatives of the Western modernist or post-modernism schools on culture as Camus, Lyotard, Derrida, etc., they not only cannot correctly solve the types of problems which contemporary Chinese society is facing, but misdirect the discussion.

A second mode of loss of the subject is prejudice, that is, the subject being unable to master the objective value-orientation needed by the Chinese in the 1990s, replaces this with one that is purely subjective. The subject’s prejudice appears mainly in two inclina-tions: one is that the subject evaluates all sorts of cultural problems and phenomena completely according to one’s own liking, for example, the one who worships Lao Zi praises him up to the heavens or those who worship Confucius and Mencius praise them as perfect sages, forgetting that Confucius himself has even said: "I am fortunate that if I have any errors, people are sure to know them" (The Confucian Analects). In contrast, people who dislike Confucius denigrate his thought as devoid of any merit. Another example is how often in investigating cultural and social problems people miss the essence of these problems, and grasp only some partial, accidental, temporary or detailed elements. This echoes the common expression that prejudice is further from the truth than innocence. In a word, setting out from a purely subjective value-orientation and writing articles interpreting the six scriptures seems to be a high activity of the subject, but in fact it is a new form of the subject’s ignorant, homeless and embarrassed state.

The third is lack of awareness of the subject, namely, when research on the subject’s identity and on such cultural phenomena as cultural character, cultural events, texts, etc., attempts to clear up any elements and feelings through so-called purely objectively investigation of all objects in order to make not value judgements, but factual judgements. This research attitude seems extremely fair, and even can be honored by such high sounding terms as scientific research. In fact, it is a timid approach through which the subject avoids the difficultly of researching the life world in which he or she lives and avoids ascertaining the value-orientation he should possess. Actually, factual judgments completely devoid of value dimensions never exist. Even in research on the natural sciences, our choice of research theme and our interpretation of its meaning indicate our values.

From the above analysis it becomes manifest that loss of the subject is a key problem in cultural research. If we leave aside the subject’s identity to expand blindly the range of cultural research, for instance, to prostitution, tea, dietary cultures, etc., or argue endlessly on some side issues, we cannot lead general cultural research along a healthy trajectory. Nor can the loss of subject be avoided only by continually using such expressions as "I think" or "I find" or "I believe". On the contrary, the more these sentences are used, the more the rootless, homeless and embarrassed state of the subject is revealed. Besides, as also can be made out from the above analysis, the loss of subject necessarily causes confusion, even disorder in one’s value views, as well as errors in one’s cultural critique. This deforms "plural cultural states" into purely exterior and pseudo-morphologies.

Let us look further into what actually causes the universal phenomena of loss of subject and disorder in values. There are two primary reasons.

Objective Reasons

One reason is objective. With the development of the market economy and the acceleration of social transition all sorts of problems have sprung up. To solve these people resort to various ideas and cultural viewpoints. When all forms of cultural views are chaotically on display, however, contemporary Chinese scholars, who have just freed themselves from the pure ideological cultivation of the style of the "Great Cultural Revolution," are at a loss as to what to do. It is like Grandma Liu visiting a great theme park. Under the clash of the cultures pouring in, the standpoint as well as the monistic axiological perspective begins to oscillate.

By continually translating and introducing new thoughts and using them in a semi-skilled manner some try to indicate that they are continually thinking and in earnest. This unceasing pursuit of new ideas and terms and continued change of one’s position seems to some people to be thinking in earnest, but it may be only loss of the subject’s identity. Of course, in all fairness, whenever a society is in a period of great transition, the above phenomena are almost inevitable. But this should not continue for long, for drifting with the tide without thinking and criticizing is contrary to the contemporary scholar’s mission.

The other reason for the loss of the subject and a disorder of values is subjective, namely, the peeling off of historicity. This appears in two respects. The first is the peeling off of subjective historicity. As mentioned above, "subject" in this article refers to the Chinese person living at the turn of the millennia, or the contemporary Chinese to use an imprecise concept. What is the historicity of the contemporary Chinese, and how can it be peeled off? Generally speaking, this means the historical circumstances in which they have placed themselves. These are complicated, but here we refer not to the whole scope and detail of these historical circumstances, but to the essentials which are its developing trends. To contemporary Chinese, these historical circumstances appear to constitute an extremely rich and concrete life-world. At the heart of this world and promoting its forward development is the emergence of a Chinese style market economy. This is where the historicity of the contemporary Chinese lies. The Chinese market economy possesses both the general characteristics of a common market economy and the particularity formed in the Chinese cultural context. With regard to its general character, the rise and develop-ment of a market economy is bound to lead to the disintegration of the primitive ethical spirit based on natural blood relationships and local connections, and to the rise of new outlooks based on independent personality and centrally characterized by the spirit of democracy, freedom, equality and science. With regard to its particularity, the Chinese market economy emerged and developed under the conditions of a planned economy radically characterized by administrative decree. Therefore the existence of such phenomena as administrative power interfering unreasonably, and even illegally with economic life, and the use of one’s political power for one’s own profit, corruption, etc., are facts without question. Under the circumstances, it is especially important to advocate equal opportunity and social fairness and to set up and perfect various laws and regulations.

In a word, the inescapable historicity of contemporary Chinese, especially those living in the 1900s, is embodied in the Chinese style market economy. To develop the market economy in a healthy manner, namely, to move it forward in a more perfect and reasonable manner, it is necessary to develop a new value system which cooperates with this style. Its core idea is precisely the spirit of freedom, equality, democracy, science and social fairness which presuppose the establishment of an independent personality as mentioned above. This is the objective value orientation that contem-porary Chinese, especially those living in the 1900s, should possess. Those who consciously can apply this value orientation in the analysis and research regarding different cultural phenomena are those who really understand their own historicity.

Otherwise, the subject’s historicity is in the state of being peeled off, not to say that this state naturally leads to loss of the subject’s identity and to disorder in values. For example, the basic theme of Western modernism and postmodernism is to reflect the social problems caused by a highly developed science and tech-nology. Obviously, this kind of reflection is a profound contemporary Western apprehension of its own historicity. But, these contemporary Western themes cannot simply be moved into contemporary Chinese subject. In contrast to the contemporary West, the Chinese are moving into modernization, that is to say, in contemporary Chinese society it still is very important to devote effort to developing science and technology and to expanding the scientific spirit. Consider how the chaotic state of administration leads to endless bureaucratic delays in the construction of roads and houses, or the superstitions which pervade popular, especially rural, culture. There is reason to repeat Hu Shi’s discourse of seventy years ago in the well-known "debate between science and metaphysics". If we look about everywhere there are altars for divine sages and Taoist and Buddhist shrines everywhere with divine prescriptions and ghost photos. With such underdeveloped traffic and industry where do we get the right to exclude science.

Certainly, compared with the time of Hu Shi, contemporary Chinese science and technology has already developed to some de-gree, but, who will doubt that China still needs to develop a scientific technology and spirit for realizing modernization? In recent years, some mainland scholars have advocated objecting to scientism and expanding the spirit of humanism. Outwardly, they seems to try to let contemporary Chinese society absorb in advance the experience and lessons which Western society have undergone in the process of modernization. However, this is actually the complicated response of a conservative psyche contending with the historical process of Chinese modernization. Indeed, to oversee and contain the extension of scientism in some degree is significant. We should realize also, however, that in contemporary Chinese society the urgent matter is not to prevent the popularization and development of science and technology under the excuse of anti-scientism, but to develop scientific technology and to cultivate the scientific spirit. This goes beyond simple utility and bravely devotes one to truth (such as Coper-nicus, Galileo, Bruno, Darwin, Huxley, etc., in Western history). To advocate an ill-timed and excessive containment of scientism, to disregard the scientific spirit and expand lopsidedly the spirit of humanism is a typical mode of peeling off the historicity of subject. Inevitably this would lead to a loss of the subject and a disorder of values. Perhaps this state can be called conflict between the life situation of preindustrial society and the cultural state of mind of post-industrial society.

The second peeling off of objective historicity is found when the subject researches such cultural issues as the cultural character, ideas and affairs, etc., but does not organically associate the theoretical side of the object with its social and historical side, thus peeling off the historicity of the object. For example, when some scholars conceal the great difference between ancient Chinese society and contemporary society in its present historical circum-stances, and discuss abstractly the relation in theory, the historicity of the object of which they talk is peeled off.

Equally, when scholars conceal the historicity of Chinese and Western society, abstractly comparing similarities and differences of the two cultures, they make the same mistake. For instance, some contemporary Chinese scholars propose expending the humanistic spirit of the Confucian school, in terms of abstract theory. This is beyond reproach. How can one gain say or contradict such humanistic ideas as "let the father be kind, and son filial" advocated in Confucianism? However, the problem is that we cannot remain on the side of abstract theory, but must present the concrete, social and historical connotation which the Confucian humanistic spirit possessed in the historical circumstances at this time, namely, historicity. Only thus can we bring to light the correct attitude for treating the spirit.

The Confucian Analects: Xue Er have the maxim that the superior man bends his attention to what is radical. That established, the practical applications follow naturally. Filial piety and fraternal submission are the root of all benevolent actions. That is, in his time he hoped to found a humanistic spirit based upon "filial piety and fraternal submission". In this spirit a man was taken first for son and brother, in other words, he was regarded as an element of the patriarchal clan system which turned to natural blood relationships for its ties and regarded patriarchy as its center. In the opinion of Confucius, not only were man and woman not equal, but neither were father and son; thus there is the direction that the son conceal something for his father in the Confucian Analects.

It is well-known that the humanistic spirit in modern civilized society is based on the independent personality, that is to say, man is not first regarded as son and brother, but as an independent personality. In family life, modern people still advocate "let the father be kind, and the son filial", but this cultural idea has been given a new social and historical connotation, i.e., "kind" and "filial" are discussed on the basis of independent personalities and equal re-lations between people. To disregard this concrete character of society and history, and to discuss abstractly the humanistic spirit of the Confucian school necessarily obliterates the essential difference between the modern and ancient humanistic spirit, thereby leading to confusion and even a crisis of cultural construction.

For an example in Western culture one might ask why philoso-phical circles in our country inquire into the identity philosophy represented by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Often they analyze this in its purely theoretical aspect, namely, as maintaining that thinking and being are identical, thereby denying agnosticism in epistemology , etc. They completely neglect its social and historical characteristics. In fact, identity philosophy was put forward under the influence of the French Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Its social and historical connotation, in accord with Hegel’s view, is to "construct reality according to thought". In other words, it means using the general principles of Enlightenment thought to remodel German social reality. Thus, "identity philosophy" is not an abstract and tasteless philosophical doctrine, but a kind of revolutionary theory expressed by German philosophers in obscure language. In studying "identity philosophy", to disregard this concrete historical intentionality is to peel off the historicity of this research object, leading to a loss of the subject and to disorder in values.

By way of summary, it is not difficult to see that the subjective reason for the phenomena of loss of the subject and the disorder of values is caused mainly by peeling off historicity. This tells us that in any cultural research, it is decisive that the subject clarify in advance its historicity so as to identify consciously the objective value-orientation which the subject should establish.

The main point in all this thusfar has remained in the shadows of negation and critique. Now , we must answer such questions from the positive side, namely, how to avoid loss of the subject and disorder in values in cultural research, in other words, how to clarify historicity in cultural research, and thereby to establish the objective value coordinate of the subject.

Before solving these problems, we need to clarify in advance the preconceived ideas that most easily lead the subject along the wrong path. The "central axis era" theory put forward by German philosopher, Jaspers, is just such a preconceived idea. It seemed to him that from the eight to the second century B.C. was the period in which Confucius, Sakyamuni, Socrates, etc. founded respectively the different normative cultural forms. This age is called the central axis era because the subsequent development of cultures is under the control of the normative cultural forms of this era. If one understands Jaspers only according to the transference and development of normative cultural forms, one cannot say he is wrong. But his error lies in regarding that era as the central axis, which implies that later developments of culture revolve around this "central axis era". This theory is focused on the phenomenon of the misplaced subject. In fact, the "central axis era" lies never in the past, but in the present. The present, of course, is a relative concept; it is what the history human beings attains. Contemporaries are those living at that time: their life interest is the genuine central axis, starting from which one interprets ancient cultures and their character.

The Romans and Greeks lay in tombs; their culture was not aroused until the Renaissance European spirit acquired maturity. Similarly, the sense of long periods of history which we now regard as annals and many documents which are still silent will be made manifest in the light of new life, and will speak once again.

In view of this, Croce put forward the well-known proposition that "all genuine history is contemporary history," affirming the central function of contemporaries and of contemporary culture. In fact, according to Croce’s logic, even such a word as "the Renaissance" is not exact, because it easily can cause the misunder-standing that modern Europe is the sudden return of ancient civilization. The real circumstance, however, is just the contrary; modern Europeans employ the slogans and costumes of ancient characters only to play the program of a new life. Here, Croce actually put forward a kind of "new-central-axis-era" theory radically opposed to Jaspers. It proposes that to avoid the mis-placement of the subject’s position on the ancient position, namely, the replacement of the contemporaries’ position by that of the ancients’, what is most important is to realize that the central axis lies in the contemporary from beginning to end. Henceforth, to apprehend the essential significance of the contemporary life-world where the subject lives is the prerequisite for keeping the subject independent and free. We should not retain the shallow common sense that "not to understand the past is not to understand the present," but should apprehend the much more profound truth that "not to understand the present is not to interpret the past."

Another preconceived idea which greatly effects us, even in our unconscious psyche, is "to worship chronicle time," namely the internationally current concept of time as the present. The 1990s, as we mentioned above, belongs to chronicle time, which in any case is inevitable for contemporary life. People unthinkingly take this idea of time into cultural research, especially comparative cultural research, thereby extending the faults of isochronalism. This is just one of the profound reasons that cause the peeling off of the subject’s historicity and the loss of the subject.

For example, the Chinese in the 1990s usually think that they are in the same time as the Westerners. In fact, the concept of isochronalism here has formal meaning only for chronicle time. To extend this to mean that they are isochronal in their cultural state of mind is an especially great mistake. In fact, contemporary Chinese live in two different kinds of time, one is the chronicle time mentioned above, according to which people arrange their lives and contacts, especially international contacts. Another I would call the time of the form of society, which is decided by the economic relations that hold the dominant status in social life and restrict the cultural state of people’s mind. For cultural research, especially comparative cultural research, only this time of the form of society is the radical premise. In accord with such an idea of time we can say that the Chinese in the 1990s are not at the same time as regards the cultural state of mind as are the Westerners in the 1990s; in other words, Western culture in the 1990s and Chinese culture in the 1990s are not isochronical. In this respect, we must not be misled by such exteriors as that there are color TVs, compact discs, thunderbolt-dancing and rock in China in the 1990s as in the 1990s West. Chronicle time may also intrude into the cultural state of mind to a certain extent in a stage of development of a society, but the impact produced by it is next to nothing in comparison with the time of the form of society decided by economic relations.

That is to say, the grounds on which to determine whether two kinds of culture are isochronical is fundamentally determined by the time of the form of society. Up to now, what people have and are undergoing is a pre-commodity economy and social form. Contemporary China is just entering upon the primary stage of commodity economy. Even if reluctantly it is put into the commodity economy or social form, still it lies in a different stage of development from contemporary Western society whose commodity economy has been highly developed. Thus, their cultural state of mind is not isochronal. The cultural state of mind of contemporary Chinese society still remains very deeply a brand of natural economy and planned economy. People often say that the Chinese walking and doing is either sluggish or unpunctual, whereas the Western is swift and punctual. This is just because contemporary Chinese society lies in a different state of time from contemporary Western society. Therefore, investigated from the point of view of the time of the form of society, the cultural state of mind of contemporary Chinese society rather more resembles, or to be more exact, is at the same time as the cultural state of mind of Western society in the 16th to 18th century. Contemporary Chinese society’s stress upon the use of transport and technology, it’s call for the consciousness of morality and right, it’s attention to civil society and social fairness, etc., are the past events which Western society has undergone in the 16th to 18th century. Cultural research, especially comparative cultural research that remains in chronicle time, necessarily leads to loss of the subject. As mentioned above, the subject’s misplacing his or her standpoint upon that of the Western modernist or post-modernist school, abstracts from their respective historical background and renders impossible any general comparison of the Chinese and Western states of mind. This research of similarities and differences of thoughts of such Eastern and Western cultural characters as Lao Zi and Heidegger, Zhung Zi and Derrida, Zhu Xi and Hegel proceeds by shallow insight in pursuit of superficial resemblances. All these are closely related to errors in time theory. In fact, comparative cultural research should be based on the foundation of the time of the form of society. If people are blinded to this foundation their research will have no scientific value.

After this de-covering or uncovering, we need directly to probe into the philosophical premises of cultural research. Such premises are ontologic hermeneutics — ontology in the existential sense. This kind of hermeneutics asks the cultural researchers to apprehend in advance their historicity, and grasp the essence of the life-world where they are situated, thereby setting a kind of objective value coordinate. When they do so, before beginning their research, researchers should have the courage to clear up their own subjective value orientation and avoid any misplacement or loss of the subject and disorder of values.