Contemporary existential philosophy, in trying to overcome the rationalistic tendencies of the past, aims to reverse the process of human knowledge by reaching truth not in objects, but in man himself. As such, it bases its search for truth in human subjectivity. Truth and Being can be found in subjectivity within one’s very act of human consciousness. The central theme of existential thought consists, then, in a search for the ontological foundation of the existential condition of one’s beingness.

Moreover, our own being is the proximate object for ourselves. Therefore, being ourselves in Being, we can search for the meaning of Being in ourselves, namely in our own selves. Consequently, the starting point for the ontological search for Being must be our own subjectivity.

Existential philosophy tries to find both the meaning and the ultimate foundation of Being in subjectivity. The search for Being in ourselves is not only an ontological problem, but a phenomenological investigation into man’s being. This search for Being in man’s being cannot be solely ontological, because not being outside of ourselves and being rather for ourselves, man cannot go beyond himself for other beings. The search for Being then must be phenomenological, because being embraced in himself, man by experiencing his subjectivity grasps at the same time the meaning of Being.

In searching for his own self, however, man is always facing the possibility of missing the very meaning of his subjectivity, and not being able to decipher the authenticity of his existence. This danger is not only ever present, but relate,s itself to both ‘meaning-content’ as homo natura, and ‘meaning-value’ as homo persona. Realizing his existential situation, man’s consciousness evokes a feeling of uneasiness as to the permanency and value of human existence as such namely, the feeling of absurdity.

The original Latin word absurdus means ‘harsh-sounding,’ and more generally, ‘contrary to reason’ or ‘inconsistent with truth.’ In philosophy this inconsistency with truth can be either logical or ontological. Generally speaking, logical and ontological absurdity consists in rejection of the principle of intelligibility. It means that truth is for us inconsistent with both the knower and the thing known. In other words, absurdity means disruption between mind and thing, and the negation of any conformity between intellect and being. In short, absurdity in both its logical and ontological senses, means the impossibility of knowing and understanding reality, that is, deprivation for the human intellect of the possibility of obtaining any truth.

Moreover, in man’s existence there is no definite goal to be obtained and there is no motive power for man’s ‘self-realization’ as such. As a matter of fact, any realization of the ultimate perfection of one’s self is impossible, because should there be any attainable final end at all, then it ought to be already reached. However, if it were reached. then there would be no change. But there is change in reality. Consequently, no final state has been reached, and therefore will never be reached.

Man not having any definite goal in his life becomes permeated with wasteful passions, and his subjectivity is subjugated to the useless and perpetual process of existential leaps through which man is always becoming something other than himself. In this constant and perpetual flux, man’s life becomes a habit rather than a creative disposition for self-realization.

The incomprehensible condition of man’s life as living without any reason for existence pertains to both meaning-content and meaning-value. The meaning-content of human existence is incomprehensible, since the very conditions of man’s life are constantly reshaping his spiritual as well as his physical self without any motive power. Motive power would have enabled the individual person to control the direction of his own self-realization and self-actualization. Not having any motive power for existing, however, human reality becomes senseless and is unable to convince man to continue to exist both in regard to his perceptions and his emotions.

Emotions thus understood are constructed by an infinite series of phenomena of objects which man’s consciousness can experience. But the infinite possible series of phenomena are undifferentiated and instantaneous, since, by their very nature they are not the property of consciousness but of their objects. In view of this fact our human consciousness is overflowing with an infinite number of things and their phenomena.

By being indifferent towards values, man suffers spiritual atrophy in regard both to his intellect and his will power. Man cannot overcome the emptiness of his existence, because any attempt to ‘transvalue all values’ would mean that it is possible to insert and posit into the things some purposive value and objective reality which could afterwards be revealed to our intellect. Even if there were a possibility of revealing such ‘objective reality’ in things, this insertive value posited on things would not be found in things, but in the human intellect. In this situation, however, man would deceive himself and his ‘transvaluation of all values’ would be pure fiction.

Moreover, it is impossible to escape from existential emptiness by will power and thereby fulfill and satisfy all desires of human consciousness. This also is an illusion, because it would mean that there is such a power in man’s will, which could penetrate the innermost reality of things. In his own words Pfänder says that:

A philosophical venture into the subjectivity of one’s own being can take different forms of expression of human consciousness, and various modes of human existence. In the search for his own

subjectivity, man must question his being, by raising the question of Being as such. The reason for this is that in order to be able to search for his own being and subjectivity, man has to realize that he is always both in and for Being as such.

However, before he can begin to search for the being of his subjectivity, man has to find a proper access to Being by establishing a specific relationship of his being to Being, and in this manner find a way in which human being will have something in common with Being as such. However, this element which human being has in common with Being is not the being of Being as such, but only the access to Being, namely, the very ways of human participation in Being. Consequently, we can provisionally describe man as a ‘being-who-participates-in-Being.’

However, in the order of being, values are determinate characteristics through which a thing is understood as something which is already done in the form of an objects product, artifact, deed. action, etc. In this order, a thing is invested with those values which appear as something which is accomplished, fulfilled, particularly as some actuality: praxis. Consequently, a thing in the order of being consists in ‘self-actualization.’

The ontological understanding of values as determinate characteristics of a thing point only to the entitative structure of being and becoming, mainly as a composition of potentiality and actuality. Things in their process of ‘self-realization’ and ‘self-actualization’ are found according to various modes of participation in reality. As applied to man, his participation in Being shapes his being in such a way that he is his own being and at the same time he is having something which is not as such his own. In other words, as a being ‘who-participates-in-Being,’ man is constituted of his own being as a unified inner-self from within; and having an access to Being for receiving something from without, he constitutes a diversity of outer possible selves. Therefore man is a ‘being-who-is-participating-in-Being’ both in regard to his own finite inner-self as unified from within, and as an infinite outerself as diversified from without.

The unified inner-self of man constitutes the actuality of human finite human being by a constant ‘self-integration’. The diversified potentialities of man consist of the infinite possibility of becoming himself by a permanent ‘self-separation.’ Man, then, as a ‘being-who-participates-in-being’ finds himself in a continuous process of ‘self-constituting-self’ by mutual separation from others and integration with his own beingness. This mutual and gradual separation and integration establishes various modes of participation of man in Being through which human beingness is shaping his own subjectivity.

As a ‘being-who-participates-in-Being,’ man is both a diversified unity of his outerself, and a unified diversity of his own inner-self. This diversified unity of his outerself and unified diversity of his inner-self conditions man to be a ‘self-divided-self.’ But this ‘self-divided-self’ as constituted from the unity and diversity of being and becoming, in the ways of participation in Being, indicates the way according to which man’s subjectivity is shaping his own identity

Man’s ‘self-divided-self as ‘self-constituting-self’ and ‘self-revealing-self,’ establishes a specific dialectic of ‘self-reference-co-its-own-inner-self’and ‘self-reference-to-its-outer-self.’ Man’s own inner- self is the immanent self given a priori to each individual and every particular human person. The immanent a priori given self which constitutes the individual human person, relates its own inner-self to the outer self in a twofold way: (1) vertically as ‘integrated self from within (‘inner-consciousness’) and (2) horizon-tally as ‘separated-self’ from without (‘outer-consciousness’).

The dialectic of man’s subjectivity, then, as being ‘inner-integrated-self’ and ‘outer-separated-self’ consists in an existential tension of the ‘self-creating’ and self-destructing’ power of man’s being. Creation and negation, therefore, are the natural conditions of human subjectivity. In this dialectic of human being, man’s subjectivity both projects itself to its own inner-self, and discerns its own inner-self apart from other seizes as such. The immanent a prior given self of individual man as both ‘self-integrated-self’ and ‘self-separated-self establishes a specific order of transcending; human existence through which man constantly creates and negates both the-inner-and-the-outer-self. ‘

Man’s subjectivity, conceived as ‘self-creative-self’ and `self-negating-self,’ reveals constant changeability of human existence, because in man’s search for his own a priori self he is always compelled to resign from his own self in order to create his new self. In addition, man renounces his own self over and against the infinite possibilities for ‘self-realization’ in order to obtain and realize some finite self by negating the totality of all other possible selves.

This ‘self-divided-self,’ as being both an integrated and a separated entity each with its own inner and outer self, reveals man as something in which his human inner-self and his outer self are found as belonging to each other in the way of participating in Being, particularly as something which is ‘self-opposed’ and ‘self-identified.’ But this ‘self-opposed’ and ‘self-identified’ entity of human subjectivity are both the ‘self-constituting-self and ‘self-revealing-self.’

Now, the ‘self-constituting-self’ of the inner and outer self of man consists in both human existence and human consciousness. Consequently, human existence and human consciousness are correlated with each other, primarily as the actuality of one’s own unified inner-self, and as the factuality of one’s own diversified outerself Therefore, human consciousness is the ‘self-revealing-self’ and human existence is the ‘self-constituting-self.’

The correlation of consciousness and existence is the basis of shaping man’s identity as both homo natura and homo persona. The human identity as a mode of participating in Being as a diversified unity of ‘self-constituting-self,’ results in ‘naturalization’ of man as a person, that is, by extending the inner-self towards the outer self. The human identity as a mode of participating in Being by unifying diversity of ‘self-revealing-self,’ results in ‘personalization’ of man as a natural being, that is, by integrating the outer self towards the inner-self.

Man as a material and spiritual being displays existential ambiguity between the possibility of saving life and the certainty of losing it between the needs of his body and the needs or his spirit; namely, an ambiguity between searching for being and finding nothingness.

In this ambiguity man realizes that his existence is both dependent as a material being, and independence as a spiritual being. In his bodily dependence man experiences the contingency of existence as a being among other beings, endowed with spontaneity in sustaining and developing his own existence. But in his spiritual independence, man realizes the necessity for form and solid ground for his existence as a being without certainty of his beingness.

In order to resolve this ambiguity as between a bodily and a spiritual being, man must transcend himself, find permanency in his existence, and fulfill his insufficient being. In this way, man’s ambiguity becomes a condition for ‘self-realization’ and the necessity for a total fulfillment for his existence by finding an authenticity of his individual life.

In the human consciousness, contemporary man realizes that in his being there is an existential tension between the need for stability and the factual contingency of his existence. Man is compelled to search for this necessity and stability, because otherwise he would exist without justification, thus becoming an ontological absurdity, in which ‘to-be’ would mean ‘not-to-be.’ In his search for Being man must find ultimate foundations for his quest, and for this reason he must live in a constant state of anxiety and dissatisfaction.

Man’s basic human need, then, is to gain what he does not have, that is, tranquillity within himself. But, if man is searching for inner peace, then by the same token he must have the hope of finding some solution, because otherwise his existence would be futile, that is, absurd. Consequently, in the very structure of searching for something which he is lacking, man has a hope for fulfillment of his existence.

The futility of man’s ‘self-realization’ as both a bodily and a spiritual being can be seen in two ways, that is, as they are opposed or related to each other. When considered as opposed to each other, body and spirit are insufficient, and when analyzed as related to each other they seem to be incompatible. This paradoxical situation of man cannot be resolved by the immanent order of human existence alone. The only solution of the paradox of human existence consists in the order of transcendence. In other words, in his immanent order, man’s being is insufficient and incompatible, but in the order of transcendence human existence can be fulfilled and completed.

The basic source of an existential ambiguity of man, under-stood as a lack of total integration of his own nature, consists in a tension between the immanent and the transcendent order of human destiny as both bodily and spiritual being. As a matter of fact, the contemporary man tries to reduce the transcendent dimensions of his existence into an immanent order of his human nature alone. However, lacking transcendence leads man either to believe that he is elevated to ‘superhuman’ reality or to realize that he is down-graded to a ‘sub-human’ level of his human nature.

Justification of human existence cannot be found in man’s immanent order, because of both the insufficiency and the incompatibility of his nature. But, being insufficient and incompatible in himself, man persists in being rather than in not being. Consequently, man is oriented towards being, and not towards nothingness. Since going into infinity to search for justification of his existence is impossible, there must be an ultimate fulfillment of man’s need for absolute resolution. Otherwise man’s existence would be futile, that is, absurd. ln other words, the immanent order of man’s existence requires that in his ‘self-realization’ man must transcend his limitations, and his human existence can be resolved only in/by the Absolute Being.

In the very act of transcendence through which man is oriented toward something which goes beyond his own existence, man experiences himself as being put into question as to the very authenticity of what and who he really is himself. More personally, with what can identify myself as myself? By putting myself into question as to my own authentic beingness, I experience that there is nothing in myself as such and all my reality is always what it becomes by an act of transcending in every possible way of fulfillment and completion.

In experiencing the problem of what I am to myself, I would have to raise the question as to who am I, to question myself on what I am. In answering this question I realize that I am insufficient in myself and in order to ultimately fulfill my existence I must realize the need and necessity for the other as the other. The resolution, then, of human existence can be realized only by the act of love.

Love is an existential disposition for ‘self-realization’ of my being through an act of recognition and affirmation of the other in the order of goodness. Love considered as an act of `self-realization,’ however, does not belong to the order of becoming only, but also to the order of being. As such it is based on a twofold type of diver-sified unity: unity with oneself and unity with others. This twofold orientation of love indicates that I am myself to the degree in which I am oriented to the other as my Thou.

The inter-subjective nexus of all beings in reality is the ontological foundation for establishing the ground of what and who I am. I am myself to the degree that I participate in others as my Thou. In this way the resolution of my existence consists in an orientation of myself to the others, and I am myself to the degree that I participate in Being and Transcendence.

1. Cf., Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1963), p. 12.

2. Louis Lavelle, L’erreur de Narcisse (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1939).

3. Cf., St. Augustine, Sermo 46, 27; CCL 41.

4. L’erreur de Narcisse, p. 53.

5. Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), p. 8.

6. Ibid., p. 3.

7. Ibid., p. 5.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 37.

10. Cf., Walter A. Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Pscyhologist, Anti-Christ (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 158.

11. The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 5.

12. Ibid., p. 6.

13. Jean-Paul Sartre, L’imaginaire, p. 18.

14. Ibid., p. 20.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 21, "Ma perception peut me tromper, mais non mon image. . ."

17. Ibid., Esquisse d’une théorie des émotions (Paris: Hermann & Cie, 1939), pp. 29-31.

18. Ibid., p. 49.

19. Alexander Pfander, Philosophie auf phänomenolo-gischer Grundlage (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973), pp. 128-129.

20. Ibid., p. 129.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 131.

24. Ibid., p. 130.

25. Ibid., p. 132.

26. Jean-Paul Sartre, L’être et le néant, p. 708.

27. Cf., Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, p. 19.

28. The Theater of Protest and Paradox (New York: New York University Press, 1967), p. 114.

29. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 93.

30. Ibid.

31. Philosophy (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), vol. III.

32. Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being (Chicago: Gateway, 1960), vol. 1, p. 53.

33. Ibid., p. VII.

34. Ibid., p. 59.

35. Idem, Man against Mass Society, pp. 67-68.

36. Idem, The Creative Fidelity (New York: Farrar & Strauss, 1964), p. 144.

37. Dostoevsky (Cleveland & New York: Meridian Books, 1962), p. 123.