"What is value?" is a difficult problem to explicate. "What is the basis of Value?" is even more difficult, yet, it is a hot topic in our time. here we shall discuss the phenomenon that theoretically value is both a hot and a difficult problem. As all know, axiology was not a separate discipline until one and a half centuries ago, though there is much that is relevant in ancient writers. The rise of axiology is modern, especially Neo-Kantian times. It is after World War II that the discussion concerning value gained unprecedented intensity. No one would conclude that our ancestors were not living with values or that they lacked the awareness of values, nor have we reason to say that the way of life and social structure in ancient times were unchangeable, so that our ancestors would not have had the occasion to change and renew their ideas of value, for that was not true in history. What we can assure ourselves is that, due to the development of technology, the way of life in our time has changed at so rapid a pace that the idea of value itself varies as never before. That is to say, the pluralization of value is one of the remarkable characteristics of our time.

Pluralization of value means the co-existence of various criteria for valuation in the same time and the same place. One thing that should be made clear here is the distinction of pluralization from diversification. We can list all kinds of value, as that of the economy, of ethics, of art, of law, of science, etc. Diversity of value is just the description of these many sorts of value in different areas. In contrast, by plurality of value, we mean that the criteria by which people make all kinds of evaluations are differentiated, so that people cannot evaluate the same thing with a unitary criterion. In daily life, people usually use such words as "good", "benefit", "beauty", etc., and such contraries as "bad", "evil", "ugly", etc., which are the fundamental words to evaluate some persons or things. If it happens that people do not evaluate the same person or thing with the same criterion, for instance, if some say the same thing or person is good or beautiful, while others say it is evil or ugly, then obviously what the words "good" and "beautiful" mean for the two sets of people is different. Such various criteria of evaluation are what we mean by pluralization of values; and an axiology which holds that pluralization is the only reality and denies the necessity and possibility of a unity of value is what we call value pluralism.

In short, in a time of value pluralism, on the one hand, all kinds of cultures and interests strongly claim their own rights and appeal for respect so that social life is now more active and varied in style than ever before; even in pursuing modernization, and aim shared by the most developing countries, people still make a clear distinction between modernization and Westernization. On the other hand, people also are puzzled by value pluralism. The initial motive is to respect each sort of value. Being sad when even only one person is displeased, people would like to accept or tolerate the other’s idea of value. But what of the opposite value? Even if the conflict between opposed values does not take place in public life, it must be inside people’s minds so long as the opposite values are not integrated into a higher and more universal ones.

From my point of view, namely, that the weak and the less favored should not be neglected, the substitution of pluralism for monism is progress. But theoretically, value pluralism is a relativism, for it recognizes the legitimacy of only the concrete, separate and relativist values, while neglecting or denying the universal aspect of value. What we mean by universal value is the ultimate good, the most beautiful; in metaphysical language, it is the most perfect being. In the above sense we also call universal value absolute value. The absolute value represents the human being’s supreme requirements, as well as its fundamental interest. Without absolute value, there would be no lasting criterion for pluralistic, relative values. In time their own ground of existence would be lost for lack of an ability to resolve the conflict among them.

In this paper I would like to treat the same issue from another angle, that is, how the absolute or the most universal value is necessary for unifying the various relative values. This is a way of history and theory. But how could one use the way of history in times that lacked value pluralism? My answer is that, to lack the theory of value pluralism, is not to say there were no different values in old times, for the difference between individual and social value is universal to all times. To work out how our ancestors integrated individual and social value might throw light on our issues.

It is not difficult to distinguish individual value from social value, for the stress of each is different. If the two really need to be integrated into one universal higher value, we might use the case to indicate also the need for a unity of pluralistic values. In dealing with the problem, I shall take Chinese history as an example.

In history, Confucianism and Taoism are two of the most influential doctrines prevailing in China. One of the reasons for this is that neither of them dodged the contradiction between individual and society, but tried to find a way to harmonize the two.

Confucianism was the main trend in the past. As the leading force it put more stress on social value. The famous saying of a politician in the Song Dynasty, Fan Zhongyan (989-1052 A.D.): "Care first for what the empire cares, enjoy later what the empire enjoys" could be taken as a typical attitude of Confucianism towards social value. It does not mean that Confucians do not care about their own interest. In fact, they knew very well that if their will came true and they obtained some position and power through the imperial examination system, at the same time they would gain wealth and reputation. This was the way for Confucians to harmonize individual and social values.

In contrast to Confucianism, the attitude of Taoism towards life is generally considered rather negative. Taoists always tried to transcend secular society, and though they were actually clever and excellent persons, they did not like being mentioned by contemporaries. This does not mean that they did not have their own evaluation towards social life, or dodged the problem of unifying individual and social values, but their way of doing this is really different from that of Confucianism. First of all, Taoism maintained that society was then in troubled times. Zhang Zhi’s many descriptions of the disabled show that penalties at that time were very cruel. Under the circumstances, Taoists, especially Zhang Zhi, naturally took survival as their fundamental aim. Compared with survival, they thought that reputation and wealth was not worth pursuing. Going further, they even thought that the pursuit of reputation and wealth would do harm to one’s body and mind, and even involve one in fighting which might cause death. In order to escape fighting, they tried every means to eliminate the distinction between right or good fame and wrong or ill fame.

The difference between Confucianism and Taoism is obvious. Each has its own way of integrating individual and social values with the difference that Confucianism stresses social value more and Taoism individual value more, or more accurately the fundamental value of survival in society. Since both have a unity of the individual and society, either of them could be accepted and put into practice by the people.

What is more noticeable is that, despite the difference of the two great doctrines, Confucianism and Taoism co-existed in China over the long past, and later mingled more with each other. It seemed that the two doctrines united in a higher level which formed the main trend of the cultural spirit of China, especially after the Song Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.). We find from history evidence that intellectuals in China actually took Confucianism and Taoism as two legs in their practical life. When a person succeeded in his cause and was satisfied, Confucianism would encourage him to better and greater success; when one failed or even fell into a very difficult position, one could take Taoism to distract oneself and live in solitude with tranquility. The successes were admired, the recluses were also respected. The latter might not be understood by the Westerners, but an intellectual walking on these two legs could in some sense live with a difficult situation and would always adjust well whether advancing or retreating. As a result, people with different careers could all feel at ease and justified, and could find positive meaning in different ways of life. The above situation reflected the unity of the Confucian and Taoist views of value against a broader back-ground. The unity of the two was not the result of a theoretical elaboration, but of a choice of life. In fact, an individual might be full of honor or disgrace, good luck or bad luck throughout life, but as a person he should live out in society whatever happened to him. On this ground one could harmonize and integrate pluralistic values. Actually, included in the integrate value horizon of ancient China were not only Confucianism and Taoism, but also Buddhism, which would be the subject of another paper.

The above demonstration is focused on the harmony and unity between social and individual values. Could this also be the reason for the unity of pluralistic values? Pluralistic values also means for many the values of different regions, countries and peoples, in short, the values of different groups or communities with common interests. But if one fully analyses "group value" one finds that it also could be divided into different values which in the final analysis are specialized into the various concrete values of individuals. At base then, value pluralism is essentially value individualism. So we maintain that the unity of pluralistic values is the unity of individual and social values.

The need for a unity of pluralistic values lies in the need for a unity of individual and social values because there are no sheer individual values for the human person in its essence which includes sociality; the unity of individual and society is grounded in the human essence. What man’s essence had been supposed clear, but human possibilities have been extended greatly in our time and seem not to be covered by the previous universals. Hence, universals have been criticized strongly, or even totally denied, to be replaced by relativism in all fields. Therefore it is necessary to raise theoretically the problem of the human essence and its unity of individuality and sociality.

Many authors have dealt with this unity, and above all the essence of the human being; usually people would ask the question "what is a human being’s essence", by which the questioner expected in answer a certain fixed "whatness". But if a man’s essence were exactly "who he is", he would be a different "who" in different circumstances, that is, a professor, a friend, a father, a son, a kind person, a lucky person, a respectable person, and so on. So he is never a fixed "whatness".

A further question naturally concerns the origin of the relation-ship between man and his circumstances. Part of the relationship is given to a person without his own choice, such as when and where one comes into the world, to whom one is son or daughter, etc. Part of the relationship is established separately or cooperatively with others. For instance, when there are several possibilities one will be what one chooses to be, but in many in other cases, one cannot choose separately, as in the case of marriage. In daily life most probably one should always act together with the others. Even when one acts without a second person beside one, for the most part one should be aware of the existence of others. For instance, when one picks up a purse, whether one hands it to the police or conceals it, it must remind one of some other person as the owner.

We can understand that the everydayness they unfolded from the structure "Being-in-the-world" in the way of "Being-with" is one’s very sociality. If Dasein is a way of "Being-with", then sociality is the unfolding of Dasein, i.e., sociality is everyone’s own intrinsic character. If so, the unity of sociality and individuality is not a problem, for the two are integrated originally in Dasein. On the contrary, pure individuality is a problem, for the pure individual is only a theoretical abstraction. Because we cannot live outside the world, we cannot but live as Being-with.

People might argue that, Heidegger distinguishes "authentic" from "inauthentic", taking the former as the positive way of life and the latter as negative. But "because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, `choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only `seem’ to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic — that is, something of its own — can it have lost itself and not yet won itself."

It is clear that every person is both himself and "they" (from other’s point of view) in so far as he lives in society. Of course that does not mean that there will be no difference among persons, for the proportion of "self" and "they" united in one person is different. But it is enough for us to maintain that individuality and sociality must and should be united or integrated into one — into a universal value. Everyone could recognize this if only he reflects upon his own personal experience, rather than according to the logic of theory.

As pluralistic values are particular forms of social value, they also should be unified into one that is higher and more universal.

A. Due to the development of technology, communication among people throughout the world is more frequent, which means that for each person the world has enlarged. But since there has not been sufficient time for people to harmonize and unify the pluralistic values of the different parts of the world, we are in a situation of value pluralism.

B. Though for its own reason value pluralism arises in our time, it is a temporary phenomenon. It is not the ultimate reasonable case; sooner or later it will be integrated. We should pursue such universal value actively for the sake of establishing a new inter-national order and uniting people all over the world.

C. A more urgent task is for us to pursue the ultimate and most universal value, not only because value pluralism strongly prevails, but because this does not help to resolve the conflicts among different nations and peoples.

D. The development of communication among people is necessary in order to harmonize pluralistic values; for this each person and group could accept the newly opened world as their own world. This will be the new stage for all of humanity to compromise various values.

1. "The priority of fair opportunity, as in the parallel case of the priority of liberty, means that are must appeal to the chances given to those with the lesser opportunity." Furthermore when John Rawls presents his "two principles of justice", he writes: "First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." He sums up the General Conception as: "All social primary goods — liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect — are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored." See John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), par. 46.

2. The paper was presented in a colloquium co-sponsored by The Institute of Philosophy, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, August, 1996.

3. The Works of Mencius, 13.26, tr. James Lege (Hunan Publishing House, 1992).

4. "The words of Yang Zhu and Mo D fill the empire. If you listen to people’s discourses throughout it, you will find that they have adopted the views either of Yang or of Mo." The Works of Mencius, 6.9.

5. The Works of Mencius, 13.9.

6. The Confucian Analects, 15.20.

7. The Great Learning, tr. James Legge, see The Chinese/English Four Books, pp. 3-5 (Hunan Publishing House, 1992).

8. Book of Change, tr. James Legge (Hunan Publishing House, 1993).

9. Lao Zi, ch. 78, tr. Arthur Waley (Hunan Publishing House, 1994).

10. Ibid., ch. 26.

11. Ibid., ch. 36.

12. Ibid., ch. 48.

13. Ibid., ch. 73.

14. Ibid., ch. 81. The first sentence in this translation could be read also as: "For Heaven’s Tao is to benefit without injuring."

15. Karl Marx, An Outline about Fenerbach, 6. My English translation, from the Chinese.

16. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).

17. Ibid., p. 164.