CHAPTER XIII

 

JUST WAR:

CHINESE AND WESTERN PERSPECTIVES

 

EDMUND RYDEN, S.J.


Traditional Chinese Philosophy has a theory of Just War that is to be compared with Christian theories of just war. The present paper is part of a longer work discussing the subject. Its focus, on the Christian side, is the just war theory of Thomas Aquinas and Alexander of Hales, on the Chinese side, it is the Huainanzi as well as pre-Han such texts as the Mozi and Laozi. Comparison is also made with the Geneva Conventions regarding conduct in war as these illustrate the norms of ius in bello. In both fields, ius ad bellum and ius in bello, the Chinese texts display concerns and norms similar to those evidenced in the later Western texts.

 

 

Warfare is a matter of great importance for the State. It is the ground of life and death, the way to success and failure. It may not be studied. (The Art of War)1 

 

The sage’s use of warfare is like using a comb on hair or a hoe on crops. What is removed is slight but its benefits are great. (Huainanzi)2

 

In previous works I have discussed the notion of "just war" in early Chinese philosophy (6th Century B.C.– 1st Century A.D.).3  That work was carried out from the viewpoint of Chinese philosophy and with no relation to the Western treatment of the same issue. This work takes a different tack, presenting the Chinese material within the framework of the Western discussion, noting differences and similarities. From the Western tradition I will focus on the works of Alexander of Hales and Thomas Aquinas. For a more complete discussion of the topic in the Western tradition, I refer the reader to my work, Nonviolent Resistance.

The present essay presents a preliminary study of the context of just war discourse in Christian philosophy and Chinese culture and then examines the respective just war traditions point by point, firstly with respect to two medieval Christian philosophers and then with respect to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

 

THE CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE ON WAR

 

Aquinas and the scholastics addressed the question of war under the heading, Utrum bellum sit semper peccatum, Whether war is always a sin? (Aquinas) Utrum bellum sit intrinsece malum. Whether war is intrinsically evil? (Suarez). This negative formulation of the question is not without its modern critics. What it does do, however, is face the reality of sin in the world. The world is not yet paradise; sin is present. In the Chinese tradition, we obviously do not find the Hebrew notion of sin, but we find that the context for the discussion of war is one that takes account of conflict present in the world.

Chinese texts present a legendary history of the world typically centered around the virtuous figure of the Yellow Emperor.4  The Yellow Emperor is a paragon of virtue and yet he is credited with inventing or at least using weapons. This creates a paradox and thus initiates a discussion as to whether it would be possible to eliminate all warfare. The answer, based on this use of the legendary origin, is that in the real world in which we live, this would not be possible. In an ideal world, it may not be so.

 

Warfare is never judged as a good in itself: Weapons are instruments of misfortune and not the instruments of a gentleman.5

 

Three evils: The first is liking evil instruments; the second is promoting a rebellious spirit; the third is being led astray by the lusts of the heart. These are called "the three evils."6

 

Thus while the language is not theological in the Judaeo-Christian sense, the parallel is very strong. War, warfare, weapons (the same Chinese word bing covers all these uses) are intrinsically evil. Yet their use cannot be completely forbidden:

 

The Yellow Emperors, Tang and Yu, were the most glorious emperors. They possessed the entire realm and its control lay in the hands of a single man. Yet [even] during this time armed forces were not dispensed with.7

This situates the question in a legendary past, which we may take as a philosophical device for discussing the abstract proposition of how these evil weapons relate to justice. The same idea is presented in the Lushi Chunqiu in a discussion of King Hui’s desire to disband the army:

 

King Hui of Zhao asked Gongsun Long, ‘I have wanted to disband the army for over ten years without success. Is it that the army cannot be disbanded?’ Gongsun Long replied,’the idea of disbanding troops comes from a heart which seeks to love the world impartially. Loving the whole world impartially cannot just be empty words. It must have practical effects.’8

 

Gongsun Long argues that the disbanding the army is an unrealistic ideal; war is a fact of human life.

At this point, it is worth noting that many contemporary discussions of war and justice do not even mention the reality of sin or evil. There seems to be a tendency to think in terms of ideals without sufficient awareness of practical realities. The ancient Chinese and the medieval people shared our desire for a peaceful world without war, but they were also aware of the reality of evil. Indeed, this element is even further emphasized in Chinese discourse, as will be pointed out.

 

MEDIEVAL CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY AND ANCIENT CHINESE TEXTS ON WAR

 

Alexander of Hales’ Summa is more detailed than the corresponding one of Aquinas. It seems to have attained its final form some 10 years or more after Alexander’s death.9  This would bring it to 1255, a time when Aquinas was teaching in Paris. Alexander’s work may be seen much more as a textbook of knowledge, rather than an attempt to think creatively with regard to the tradition.

Alexander’s work is notable for its elaboration of six conditions for assessing the justice of a war. The first three are objective: (1) The first considered here is meritum (desert), which is concerned with evaluating the way in which an injury should be dealt with.10  (2) Authority is the question of who can declare war. (3) Alexander demands that the soldiers be secular, not clerical, and uses the Latin term conditio to refer to this. There are three subjective grounds for war which present both the purpose of the war and the way in which war is conducted: (4) causa, the purpose of the war, (5) affectus, the way in which the soldiers fight, and (6) intentio, the way in which the war is conducted.

 

Meritum. The Western tradition justified war on the grounds that it upheld the civilised order. In the post-medieval period this became equated with national sovereignty. The ancient Chinese tradition arises in a different political context. Nominally the King, or later the Emperor, claimed authority over the whole known world. This authority was thus greater than that assumed even by the Roman Emperor, who was always aware of other civilizations, for instance, Greece, Persia, and Egypt. The claim to universal authority by the Chinese monarch meant that war could always be seen as a form of rebellion and, hence, war carried out by the monarch would be seen in terms of punishment. This motive was present in Alexander but has been gradually eliminated from the Western tradition, perhaps because no nation-state could ever pretend to universal authority.

War is a form of punishment and the removal of evil. At least eight early texts repeat this message in words similar to those given below:

 

Punish tyranny and disorder and prevent unrighteousness.11

 

Hence, the values that are being upheld are those of an ordered and just society.

Even when the context is not that of the universal monarch, the idea is still that what exists should be preserved. The Heguanzi describes the role of the just minister as preserving the dying and maintaining the line of rulers with no issue, to save the weak and punish tyranny.12

This idea is taken up in earnest by the Mohists. They are generally credited with being anti-war, but this is to misread their position. The relevant chapter in the Mozi is entitled Against Aggression.13  The opposition is not to war as such, but to aggressive warfare. Indeed, the Mohists were organized so as to defend the small states that existed in 6th to 4th century China under the nominal auspices of the Zhou King. A large part of the Mozi is devoted to the topic of making ballistic devices that can be used to defend towns under attack. The Mozi presents attacks on these small states as a case of theft or murder. Just as these states merit punishment as crimes, so too does war, which causes even more people to suffer. The following passage comes in the Mozi, but is perhaps not to be ascribed to the direct Mohist tradition:

 

To kill one person is said to be unjust and for this the murderer must be executed. Extrapolating from this, to kill ten persons is ten times more unjust and demands that the ten murderers be executed. To kill a hundred persons is a hundred times more serious and requires that the hundred murderers be executed. Now, when all reasonable men know something to be wrong they say it is unjust. Yet when it comes to the great injustice of attacking states they do not acknowledge it as unjust.14

 

One of the three schools of Mohism applies this idea of punishment to the wars, which it approves. In these, heaven is said to give signs and speak clearly ordering an attack:

 

Three gods spoke to [King Wu] in a dream, saying, now that we have submerged Zhou of Yin in wine, you go and attack him. We will surely let you destroy him. . . . Speaking of the work of these three sages [Yu, Tang and Wu], it is not to be called attack but punishment.15

 

Thus, war of this kind is preserving the established order, whether on a large scale or on a small scale.

To this should be added another purpose of war, namely to stop war. This is set out in the opening paragraph of the Sima Fa. Government is seen as best achieved by the Confucian virtue of benevolence, ren, combined with justice yi:

 

In antiquity, taking benevolence as the foundation and employing justice to govern constituted ‘uprightness.’16

 

When this combination, based on consensus and harmony, was unable to achieve its objective then resort to political authority based on military might may be employed. Thus, the text states:

 

For this reason, if one must kill to give peace to the people, then killing is permissible. If one must attack a state out of concern for the people, then attacking is permissible. If one must stop war with war, although it is war, it is permissible.17 

 

We may also put the question of meritum in a negative way: If war is not waged, what will be lost? The Huainanzi is quite explicit on this point. Failure to go to war simply enables tyrants to go even further in their cruelty. It is better to nip the evil in the bud than allow it to proliferate:

 

There is no greater disaster than killing innocent people or sustaining an unjust ruler. There is nothing more abysmal than appropriating the wealth of all under heaven and apportioning it to the wants of one man.18

 

The passage goes on to relate how if Jie of the Xia and Zhou of the Yin Dynasties had been stopped, then they would not have barbecued people. A further two rulers who were also not stopped early on are mentioned.

 

These four princes all committed small faults but since none disputed them they went on to possess the whole realm and harm the common people. By giving free rein to the evil of one individual, they brought misfortune to all within the oceans. This is something that First Principles cannot allow.19

 

The term translated as "First Principles" literally translated is "Heaven’s Reasoning" (Tian lun). It might well be considered an equivalent of the term "Natural law." According to the Huainanzi, the wrongdoer should be removed just as the otter must be taken out of the fish pond or the wolf out of the pens of chickens and flocks of animals.20  The purpose of war is thus seen as protection of the innocent.

 

Authority. The Mozi is exceptional in Chinese tradition in speaking so approvingly of popular religion, but it shares with the whole tradition a belief that heaven alone had the authority to command war. The Sima fa describes the ceremony in the temple prior to going into war:

 

They then announced it to August Heaven and to the sun, moon, planets and constellations. They prayed to the gods of earth, the spirits of the four seasons, mountains and rivers and at the great altar [of state]. Then they offered sacrifice to the former kings. Only thereafter would the Prime Minister charge the army before the feudal lords, saying, a certain state has acted contrary to the Way. You will participate in the rectification campaign on such a year, month and day. On that date the army will reach the [offending] state and assemble with the Son of Heaven to apply the punishment of rectification.21

 

This formal ceremony indicates that the rulers sought celestial authority for their wars in combination with the Zhou King, the Son of Heaven.

The state of Yue, which engaged in war with Wu after having first been defeated, did so on the advice of Fan Li, who argued that the King of Yue needed to wait for the approval of heaven, in the form of famine in Wu, and the support of the local population of Wu in the form of resentment against their ruler.22  Thus authority is seen as coming from outside, whether from above or from the appeal of the people of the enemy state. Authority is never seen as proceeding legitimately from the ruler himself.

 

Conditio. Aquinas discusses the question whether clerics and bishops may fight. His conclusion is that they may not. For this he produces two arguments: one general and one particular.23  The general argument states that clerics are ordained to a life of prayer for the people, and anything which would disturb this contemplative life is to be shunned, whether it be business affairs or war. The second reason is to do with killing. All clerics are ordained to the ministry of the altar where the passion of Christ is present in sacramental signs. Since on this altar they remember the blood Christ shed for us, it would not be fitting for them to kill others and shed others’ blood, rather they themselves should be more ready to give their blood for Christ. In other words, they may be martyrs but not soldiers.

 

Causa. The question of just cause is one that also receives treatment in the Chinese tradition. It is found in the characterization of the possible motives for war, which are typically given as three or five possible descriptions of troops. Of these categories, only two out of five or one out of three are approved.24  We may list them according to source as follows:

 

 

Category/Source Wuzi Wenzi and Han History Jing

 

1. Just War 1 1 2

2. Self-defense 2 2 -

3. War of anger 3 3 3

4. War for gain 4 4 1

5. War of rebellion 5 5 -

 

 

The last three categories in this table are all objectionable; only the first two merit approval. The second, for instance, is said to lead to victory by the Wenzi. It is the first, however, that gains the most attention. The tradition is that just wars are possible. Their purpose is stated negatively as preventing tyranny and disorder and removing evils, and positively, as rescuing suffering people, the weak, and rulers whose line is threatened with extinction. The negative role is summed up in the beautiful metaphor of the Huainanzi placed at the head of this chapter: war is like a comb or a hoe.

As I have shown elsewhere, the dominant image in Chinese thinking on just war is, however, that of water. War is designed to clear out the weeds in the pool and so to purify the water. Once this is done the pond will become peaceful and calm. Simply letting the water be is not sufficient; the weeds must be removed first.25 

While the military works are all unanimous on the role of the just war, there are other voices in Chinese thought. The Mencius, in reviewing Chinese history, decides that there have never been any just wars:

 

In the Spring and Autumn Annals there are no just wars. Instances there are only of one war better than another.26

 

This statement should not be seen as denying the need to assess wars in terms of justice, because it supposes the concept in order to make the judgment. What it does do is use the criterion of just cause to examine historical examples.

The statement of just cause given by the Huainanzi deserves special mention for its similarity to that of Alexander:

 

support of the good, coercion of the bad and peace for all. (Alexander of Hales)27

 

The sage emerged and rose up and disputed with the strong and tyrannous, pacified a confused world and leveled out dangers, removing dirt. (Huainanzi)28

 

Affectus. Affectus refers to the state of mind of both the soldiers and the person responsible for declaring war. As Nordquist points out, Augustin required "a mournful mood" as a condition for war, but in modern discourse this mental prerequisite is omitted, or perhaps, better, is converted into a legal and objective assessment.29 In ancient Chinese tradition it is an important aspect. As noted above, war motivated by anger is condemned in all military texts. This applies not only to the inception of the war, but even to its continuation. A war might have begun with good affectus, but if it is carried on too far then it may be self-defeating and unjust.

The Daode Jing describes the victorious general as weeping for the slaughter of so many persons.

 

When victorious, he does not think this a good thing
Because to do so would be to delight in slaughtering people.

At the slaughter of such masses of people,

He weeps for them, mourning and lamenting.

When victorious in battle,

He takes his stand as at a mourning ceremony.30

 

This brief phrase is expanded in the Huainanzi, which describes the traditional way in which the Chinese general would go to war. He dresses as a corpse and leaves by the gate reserved for the dead. Whereas some earlier texts suggested that he returns in glory, this one declares the opposite. The general comes back full of apology, in the very mournful mood that will be described later by Augustin.31

 

Intentio. Intentio rules out fighting for booty or from cupidity. In the Chinese context, this is called fighting for gain or profit. The Jing gives a certain degree of approbation to this motive:

 

What is meant by profit is, the ruler sees [the land is suffering] famine, the state is not at rest, superiors and inferiors are at odds with one another, yet the ruler raises an army and thus causes misery. Although there is no great profit, there is no great harm either.32

 

The Huainanzi does not share even this qualified support:

 

One who wages war for land cannot become king of that land; one who wages war for himself cannot establish his merit. If one undertakes affairs for others then all will help one; if one undertakes affairs for oneself then all will desert one. When all come to help then even what is weak will be strong; when all desert then even what is large will be lost.33

 

The one who acts for profit, thus, will ultimately lose whatever gains are made. The Purist version of the Mozi holds that aggressive warfare aroused enmity in surrounding states and, thus, was ultimately responsible for the destruction, sometimes total, of the original aggressor:

 

It was due to offensive wars that Ju perished between two great states. And it was due to aggressive wars that in the south Chan and Cai were extinguished by Wu and Yue. And it was due to aggressive wars that in the north Bu Tu He perished among Yan, Dai, Hu and Mo.34

 

The passage goes on to relate how King Fu Chai of Wu attacked Qi and then Yue and won control over all of China, but because of his pride, Yue was able to invade and totally wipe out the kingdom of Wu.

If war for profit and out of anger are to be ruled out, the Chinese tradition reserves its greatest disapproval for wars of rebellion. In the Western tradition, rebellion and regicide are also discussed with similar disapproval in the majority of cases. However, since these kinds of armed conflict do not fit the narrower definition of war that has been chosen as the object of this study, I will not enter into greater detail. In fact, from the point of view of philosophical reasoning about war, rebellion may be seen as a particular application of the norms of "just war theory."

 

Conclusion: Last Resort. This criterion is upheld consistently in all military texts. Only when it cannot be avoided is warfare to be engaged in:

 

He [the gentleman] uses them [weapons] only when unavoidable.35

 

This same statement is repeated in other texts. For instance, the Jing after listing the three different causes of war adds a fourth paragraph explaining the circumstances in which war is to be engaged in:

 

The use of them [weapons] in conformity with the

Way is only when unavoidable.

If used when unavoidable

Then success is unlimited.36

 

The belief that success will be achieved when warfare is consistent with the Way reveals a basic metaphysical assumption of most Chinese reasoning: Only conformity to the Way brings success. In this sense, the military formulation is simply the application of a general rule.

 

IUS IN BELLO

 

Under this heading, we shall look at the way in which warfare is conducted and the limits imposed. Before considering equivalents of the principles of discrimination and proportionality, it will be good to draw attention to a constant theme in all Chinese military texts, namely, that the best kind of war is one in which there is no warfare:

 

A hundred engagements, a hundred battles, is not the best. To overcome the others’ troops without any fighting, this is the best.37

 

The truly just army acts in the same way, not shedding any blood:

 

The coming of the just army is to manage to reach a state of not fighting and then stop.38

 

Thus, in all these texts, we find the essential norms of the Geneva Conventions that govern international norms for conduct in time of war. To bring out this point in greater detail, we will examine the Conventions alongside the relevant Chinese texts.

 

Treatment of Victims and Civilians. There are six documents relating to norms for the conduct in war. The first two deal with the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of the armed forces. The third and fourth deal with prisoners of war and civilians, respectively, whilst the last two are additional protocols relating to the protection of victims in international and noninternational armed conflicts.39 Naturally, the details of a modern legal document go far beyond what can be found in any of the Chinese philosophical texts, but the essential principles are the same.

The Four Geneva Conventions state how noncombatants and those who have laid down arms are to be treated:

 

Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.40

 

The Second Protocol states that civilians and objects indispensable to their survival are not to be attacked:

 

The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations. . . . It is . . . prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless . . . objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.41

 

Turning to Chinese philosophical texts, we find that these same principles are all observed. Thus, the Prime Minister and other officials deliver the following command to the army before it invades an adversary’s state:

 

When you enter the offender’s territory, do not do violence to his gods; do not hunt his wild animals; do not destroy earthworks; do not set fire to buildings; do not cut down forests; do not take the six domesticated animals, grains, or implements. When you see their elderly or very young, return them without harming them. Even if you encounter adults, unless they engage you in combat, do not treat them as enemies. If an enemy has been wounded, provide medical attention and return him.42

 

The Huainanzi repeats this section adding prohibitions against the burning of stores and the digging up of tombs. The Liu Tao adds the further stipulation that captives are not to be slain whilst the Xunzi forbids making prisoners of any who willingly surrender.43

Respect for tombs is also set out in the Geneva Conventions:

 

They shall further ensure that the dead are honorably interred, if possible according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged, that these graves are respected, grouped if possible according to the nationality of the deceased, properly maintained and marked so that they may always be found.44

 

Regarding the treatment of civilians, the Huainanzi explicitly mentions care for orphans, widows,and the poor:

 

They [the invading army] support orphans and widows, cherish the poor, empty the prisons and reward the virtuous.45

 

In the Fourth Geneva Convention, we find:

 

the Parties to the conflict shall endeavor to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel and medical equipment on their way to such areas.46

 

Ruses and Perfidy

 

One principle that is common to all Chinese military texts is that ruses should be employed. The Sunzi puts it bluntly: "Warfare is the way of deception."47  The hero of the novel The Three Kingdoms, Zhuge Liang, is famed for his ability to use ruses.48 Aquinas also permits the use of lying in war. However, perfidy is to be condemned. The First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions makes a distinction between the two:

 

It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy.

 

Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly, but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law.49

 

An example of perfidy would be to pretend to surrender, but once the opposing troops were close by to then open fire, or again, to kill prisoners of war. Ferguson shows how during the First World War, atrocities of this kind happened on both sides partly owing to a lack of trust.50  The holding power might fear that prisoners would break trust and open fire and hence, they would kill the prisoners first. Tension and resentment could also lead to such acts of perfidy. Ruses, the use of moving machines, dummies, camouflage, and other activities are what make Zhuge Liang such an exciting general. Here it is a question of skill and intelligence, rather than of trust.

Hence, from this brief study it is clear that the basic principles enshrined in the Geneva Conventions were already present some 2,000 years previously in ancient China.

 

THE SORROW OF WAR

 

While there is no basis in the Chinese tradition for pacifism as a counterweight to the theory of just war: there is, nonetheless, a constant poetic theme of regret for war and the sorrows it brings. The theme of being parted from friends and from loved ones is particularly poignant. For much of Chinese history, the major danger of war has always come from the north where the nomadic peoples known as Huns, Mongol, or Manchus were adept at riding in the saddle and sweeping down on the civilised areas of China. War was thus a disruption of normal life as the following poem makes clear:


The Ballad of Longxi

Oath-bound to sweep aside the Huns, without caring for their own lives,

Five thousand soldiers with fur-trimmed coats died in the dust of the frontier.

O, the pity of it! These bones by the banks of the inconstant river are yet men

in the Spring dreams of their wives.51

 

Liu An, the Prince of Huainan appeals to these kinds of sentiment when he condemns a proposal to send an army to subdue barbarians in southeast China. He points out that the climate of the region is such as to engender cholera, yellow fever, and other epidemics. Geographical obstacles such as mountains and rivers all add to the difficulties, just as the vast deserts of the north make combat difficult. In a previous study of Liu An’s argument I also noted that he has other reasons, related to his theory of humanitarian intervention, which rule out attack.52

 

CONCLUSION

 

The Chinese texts discussed here show remarkable parallels to the Western texts. There is a similar assessment of the evil of war, a recognition, though, that in an imperfect world, it may be used but only subject to moral conditions that bear striking resemblance to those in the Western tradition. Norms of proportionality and discrimination are designed to guarantee the safety of civilians in the same way as do the Geneva Conventions.

Naturally, the comparison is not perfect, especially because the Chinese texts considered are all over 2,000 years old while in the West we were looking at a much more recent history, noting how ethical discussion developed over the centuries. But these historical developments were not seen as engendering a fundamental shift in the way of thinking. Even the extreme case of applying the proportionality or discrimination arguments to rule out war is by definition precisely that: a use of these arguments.

 

Director

John Paul II Institute for Research into Dialogue for Peace

Fu Jen Catholic University

Taipei, Taiwan