When John Dewey (1859-1952) came to China in the early l920s, he exercised an undeniable influence on Chinese intellectuals. His idea of democratic education is no longer strange. His disciples are still promoting it today and, as expected, it has made a significant contribution to the organization and the form of the present Chinese educational system.1  However, it seems that the change brought by Dewey’s ideas in the substance of our education is minimal indeed. Better said, Dewey’s democratic education, like Rousseau’s idea of autonomous education, could not grow in Chinese soil. It meets an invisible, quiet and forceful resistance from traditional Chinese education which is authoritative and politically motivated. In a word, it has no chance against the ideology of the nation, namely, Confucianism. Note that even Communists, with a strong propaganda "apparatkit" and a no less authoritative educational system, could not destroy Confucianism. The so-called Cultural Revolution (l966-1976) planned by Mao Dze-dung (1893-1976) to put an end to Confucianism ironically confirmed Mao himself as not a Marxist but a Confucian. The Marxist Chin Kwan-tao thus complained that there is de facto no genuine Marxism in China but rather a Confucianized Marxism.

In Chapter II above and previous works,2  we warned that, ideological education, by its very nature, does more harm than good, and we urged Chinese authorities to reconsider their educational systems. We also advocated a free, democratic, and less ideological education. The warning signs (the increasing crime rate, the explosive, uncontrollable orgy of materialism) are more or less the tip of an iceberg with which we cannot deal by means of violence, authority or political power. A rational revolution in education is called for: only through a radical break with traditional ideological education can we survive. We would then introduce communicative dialogue, dia-logics and openness into education replacing the monologue, mono-logics and closedness of Confucian education. Political earthquakes in China have not changed much. The tragedy of Tienanmen and the subsequent military and political curricula in Mainland China3  confirm our pessimism that ideological education still reigns and terrorizes education. In Taiwan the students sleep, dreaming of the paradise promised by nationalist ideology. So far only a handful of intellectuals and students have dared to challenge such a rigid education.4  With military officer cadres of the ruling party on campus, the government plays effectively the stick and carrot game of promising jobs, giving privileges and securing order (maintaining at the same time the police system). This paralyzes the academic curriculum by stuffing it full of ideological courses, military tactics and strategies, and so on. They enforce these and make them compulsory for all kinds of examinations, promotions, or job-selection. In a word, even though challenged by the students on both sides of the strait, the governments still stick to their ideological education.

First, the main doctrines are drawn from the main works of Confucius, such as the Analects, the Doctrine of the Mean, the Mencius and the Great Learning. These texts, the Four Books, are considered sacred. All educators are requested to accept them as fundamental and to faithfully learn them by heart. The main doctrines can be grouped in the following categories: (1) humanism, (2) righteousness, (3) filial piety, (4) order, (5) rectification of names (6) sincerity, (7) love, (8) following the way and other categories related only indirectly to education such as ceremonies and music, (10) literature and arts, (11) mean and harmony.5  In our discussion, we will concentrate on the doctrines which directly influence present education.

It is true that Confucianism is fundamentally a humanism. But the meaning of humanism must be understood in a much broader sense of anthropocentrism. It is a theory centered on the human world with very little place for the divine. Confucius’ main concern is how to regulate people harmoniously in a society, and how to keep such a society in order. He paid little attention to the question of individual happiness (in contrast to Aristotle and in sharp contrast to the hedonism and utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). In this context, his idea of education rests on those categories of order, rectification of names, loyalty, obedience, filial piety, propriety, and righteousness (2,3,4,5,6). As he clearly stated: "The Way of learning to be great (adult education) consists in manifesting clear character, loving the people and abiding in the highest good."6  He then explained what he meant by "manifesting clear character": "Young men should be filial when at home and respectful to the elders when away from home. They should be earnest and faithful."7  Confucius’ disciple, Tseng Tzu (505-? B.C.) confessed:

Everyday I examine myself on three points: whether in counseling others I have not been loyal; whether in intercourse with my friends, I have not been faithful; and whether I have not repeated again and again and practiced the instructions of my teacher.8 

 

Since the doctrines are considered sacred and inviolate, it is clear that they function as dogmas. There is no question or debate on their validity and legitimacy. The rest is simple: we just follow or respect them. The quoted passage of Tseng Tzu tells us that the best method of education is repeating again and again the teachings of the teacher (Confucius), and then applying them in our life. That means that we do not need invention or creation, and that the idea of critique is rather a taboo in education. True enough, the Confucians highly respect this kind of method of memorizing the texts, faithfully following their literal meaning and, of course, practicing them. One may raise objection to my one-sided interpretation by citing the case of Neo-Confucians who have interpreted Confucianism in their own ways. We will not delve into this problematic here. It is sufficient to say that, even if their interpretations are different in meaning, it does not suggest that they used different methods. Their difference comes rather from their conflicting interests. In fact, they all emphasized the same method of uncritically obeying, repeating, memorizing. Since we have proved in our earlier works that this kind of method is part of ideology,9  we will pay more attention to the ideological factor in our presentation.

Our present education bears in its very substance the Confucian ideology. It even appears in different forms and uses modern technology. Instead of pure moral teachings, the state adds political doctrines, say patriotism, or nationalism. The police and party-cadres replace the Confucians in handling these courses. In the place of the emperor, one finds the leader. Instead of Confucian teachings, one substitutes those of the leader. The Mao-bible, the President’s (Chang Kai-chek, 1887-1975) thoughts are the stuff required for all students and of course for all citizens, especially for the bureaucrats.1 0 At bottom, one discovers nothing new but the same "moral" requirements such as loyalty to the leader, absolute obedience to the party and the state, sacrifice for the nation and respect for the order (of the state or the party). We need to present some of the practices in the schools to show that these laws and methods are part of an ideological training.

- At the elementary school level, all students are asked to master all requirements prescribed in the textbooks called Civic Education and Moral Education1 1 without a discussion and strangely, without an understanding of the subject. On top of this, the only method preferred by the authorities is "learning by heart" all subjects. The students have no need to understand why they should respect the leader, obey the elders and teachers, love the nation and so on. Needless to say, the important thing to the state is whether or not the students learn at all. In a word, the authorities downgrade or dismiss the creative capacity and incentive of the students, for that could be dangerous for the leader or the state.

- At the middle school level: The same contents are presented in a colorful and concrete way by selecting the political and cultural examples which can be used to prove the relevancy of the material. Added to the traditional moral teaching are the decrees and patriotic documents of the leader, which the students are required to memorize for examination. To cope with the unrest of young students, these subjects are taught not by ordinary teachers, but by cadres or military officers. These "teachers" often use a military manner to carry out their jobs. The students are also encouraged to report to the authorities all "non-patriotic" or "anti-patriotic" acts of teachers and fellows students. In Mainland China, the main criteria for the selection of bureaucrats, cadres, and even university or college students are curiously Confucian such as obedience, loyalty to the leader (party) while in Taiwan these "moral acts" decide the future of a young man or woman. It is often reported that someone is not qualified for a job, or that a student is expelled from his school, or disciplined simply because of their "amoral" acts.1 2

- At the college level: Even in this stage, ideological education is still rigorously executed. The freshman (or woman) is required to take 8 credits of military training and the junior has to add 8 credits of ideology (thoughts of the leader), while the junior and senior have to digest almost 30 credits of general education (mostly laws, constitutions). In effect, out of 120 credits in a bachelor degree curriculum, one third is spent in ideological education. For some time, at Peking University, freshmen spent their first year in boot camp. The presence of a military force on campus intimidating academicians and students had become the norm. In 1983, I was invited by Soochow University in Taipei to give a lecture on Marx’s concept of praxis. I found before me, in the first row of the lecture-hall, a dozen officers ranging from lieutenant-colonels to two-star generals in full uniform. I could see the anxiety of the chairman of the department who begged me not to present sympathetically, but savagely to criticize Marx’s idea. The poor professor might have lost his career had I refused to comply with his request. Such an incident, as far as I know, is so common that no one takes note of it.1 3

We have argued elsewhere1 4 that ideology by its genetic development bears a double character, positive and negative, and that its process is dialectical in nature. We are against Marx’s view of ideology as pure reactionary, static, idealistic norms and forms designed by the rulers to defend their interests. We opt rather for Paul Ricoeur’s view that ideology functions first as a positive force representing a common view of a group, a society or a state.1 5 We share Clifford Geertz’s understanding of culture as a form of ideology.1 6 However, we contend that even the most solid culture, the most ideal norm has to be changed too. Because human beings are in development and therefore need new norms, they create new forms of culture. Thus, we may conclude that ideology would lose its positive effects once society changes. It will become negative if it tries stubbornly to resist this change. Correlatively, we may say that there is no absolute ideology of universal and necessary (as religions might hold, or as Kant might defend in the name of transcendentalism). Such an ideology would be either utopian1 7 or absurd. Only a dictator or a dreamer would believe in such an ideology.

Third, these two kinds of ideology do not of course satisfy the knowledge we have about our world. Our view is that we understand our world and ourselves not in terms of truth or reality, but in the process of human self-realization.1 8 Human beings are in a process of self-genesis, and from this comes our knowledge about the world, about our community and about ourselves. The more man develops, the more abundant and complete is his knowledge. The more one deals with the external world, the better one’s image of reality and experience. That means there is neither a fixed, total, external truth, nor a simple fact that we call reality. Everything that appears first as a real fact will change in accordance with our capacity of perception, our experience and understanding, and even with our position (physical or social). In a word, we seem to be in a permanent process of self-realization.

Consequently, the second claim would be a belief in the inertia of man: man is as he is. Human development is understood not in the sense of Darwin’s theory of evolution or Piaget’s cognitive and psychological development, but in terms of growth of moral awareness (which is immovable). It is true that Confucius himself advocated learning, and that through learning man is more perfect.1 9 It is also correct to say that Mencius devoted himself to character development,2 0 etc. But these facts do not wipe out the naturalistic, deterministic essence of their theories. Mencius, for example, clearly insisted: "Those who follow the greater qualities in their nature become great men and those who follow the small qualities in their nature become small men."2 1 He made clear that all the moral laws are based on the mandate of Heaven: "There is nobility of Heaven and there is nobility of man. Humanity, righteousness, loyalty, faithfulness and the love of good without getting tired of it constitute the nobility of Heaven, and to be a grand official, a great official and a high official this constitutes the nobility of man. The ancient people cultivated the nobility of Heaven, and the nobility of man came naturally to them."2 2

The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives.2 3

However, the people are often "capricious," or weak in morals, and as such they may be an easy target of manipulation. They need to be protected, namely by means of education, especially moral and ideological education. But a moral education is not much different from an ideological training. The people were taught to believe in the absolute power of the emperor and the state, blindly to obey laws and to be patient, not to revolt, and so on. The rulers were empowered to invent new laws, to interpret Confucianism in accord with their interests, to administer and to police the system. The rulers played both the role of legislator and administrator, of watchman and judge. Hence, the aim of education was to make the people conscious of this fact, and aware of the danger of not fulfilling their required tasks. It is true that Chinese traditional education consists of learning moral laws and of learning the art of ruling. Legalists like Han Fei-tzu (280-233 B.C.) argued passionately that penal laws are natural, that laws are the best instrument to control society. Actually, another legalist, Lord Shang (d. 338 B.C.) had his own reason to proclaim the absolute role of laws: he was worried about people’s inclination toward their own interests which might jeopardize the rulers’ interests: "the tendency of the people to pursue their interests is like the tendency of water to flow downward."2 4

The spirit of Confucian and feudal ideological education is kept intact in our present education. Its methods are slightly upgraded by introducing new techniques. Since we have discussed this problem in Chapter II above,2 5 here we need only emphasize the character of self-deception in such an education.

1 See for example John Dewey, Democracy and Education (The Macmillan, 1916), and Kao K.Y., "Pragmatism in Current Education" in The Main Currents of Present Education (Taipei, 1988), pp. 51 ff.

2 Cf. Tran Van Doan, "Ideology, Interests and Morality" in Proceedings of the International Conference on Philosophical Foundation of Moral Education (Taipei: Fujen University Press, 1988); "Ideological Education and Moral Education," in Tran Van Doan, Vincent Shen, George F. McLean, eds., The Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1991) chapter 7; reprinted as chapter 2 in this volume; "Reflections on the Nature of Ideology," in The Asian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.2, No. l (1989); reprinted as chapter 1 in this volume.

3 The Tiananmen incident refers to the brutal suppression of the movement of liberation by the Communist rulers in June 1989. Most of the participants in this movements were intellectuals or students from leading universities in Mainland China.

4 In March 1990, a similar movement to the Tiananmen took place in Taipei. The students occupied the Chang Kai-shek Memorial Hall to protest the conservative policy of the Kuomintang, and to demand for a totally new Congress. Ironically, this movement was tacitly supported by a faction of the Kuomintang, with a certain political motive. After this "success," the Taiwan faction of the Kuomintang gained the upper-hand. However, they were blind to the demands of the students. A few months later, a similar protest was independently organized by the students, but died dramatically and very quickly.

5 See for example the text-books prepared by The Ministry of Education: Civic Education (1985 ff.); Citizen and Morality (Taipei: National Institute of Compilation, 1985).

6 The Great Learning, chap. 17.

7 The Analects, 1: 68.

8 The Analects, 1: 49.

9 Tran Van Doan, "Ideological Education and Moral Education," op. cit., p. 220.

10 Up to 1990, all bureaucrats or public officers were required to study the thoughts of Dr. Sun, President Chiang, etc. Even in the university, faculty members were "encouraged" to study and write reports. Some incentives in form of prizes (first prize, e.g., being a sum of NT.50.000) has been set up to make the study more attractive.

11 Tran Van Doan, "Ideological Education and Moral Education," p. 189.

12 It is well known that a special task force is set up in every department of the bureaucracy and schools. The so-called "Bureau in Charge of Personal Affairs" had a final say in the engagement or discharge of employees. This Bureau, due to the protest of the opposition and intellectuals was abolished in 1990, though its ghost still haunts academic circles.

13 The year of 1993 could be counted as the year of emancipation. The incidents unreported in the past - the so-called white terror - are now widely reported.

14 Tran Van Doan, "Ideological Education and Moral Education," op. cit.; "Reflection on the Nature of Ideology," op. cit.

15 Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, op. cit.

16 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, op. cit.

17 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (1943).

18 Tran Van Doan, Reason, Rationality, Reasonableness (1989), republished by The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (Washington, D. C., 2001).

19 The Great Learning, chap. 1; The Analects 1:1. English translation of Chan Wing-tsit in: Chan Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961). Hereafter as Chan.

20 Mencius 6A:13; Chan, p. 59.

21 Mencius, 6A:15; Chan, p. 59.

22 Mencius, 6A:16; Chan, p. 59.

23 The Great Learning, Chapter l ; Chan, p. 86.

24 Cf. Shang Chun-shu, 23:38; Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 331.

25 Tran Van Doan, "Ideological Education and Moral Education." Chapter 2 in this volume.