Since this monograph aims at a critique of ideological education, it makes no attempt to work towards a new kind of ideology, nor to find a definite solution to the problem. It tries to stay as objective as possible (but it does not claim to be fully neutral), even at the risk of falling into the trap of rationalism. Thus, it would be difficult to arrive at a conclusion. This postscript takes the place of a conclusion with a double aim: to respond to the critiques raised by a great number of friends, colleagues, interested scholars and students on some major issues on ideological education, and to express our own feeling about our present education system.

Work on this monograph began at a time when there was no hope for a democratic, humanist and rational education in sight, when such an idea existed only in Western textbooks, and when most educators preferred to side with the ruling class or to play safe by hiding in an ivory-tower. Some chose the Taoist way by burying their heads in utopian schemes and dreaming of being butterflies. This work was written, chapter by chapter and unsystematically, in fear and despair. The span of years since then is marked by scars of dread, despair, joy, hope and euphoria as history started to change, either moving forward or retreating backward into the tunnel of darkness.

It seemed that spring finally came, and that the hirondelles returned singing Beethoven’s Ode to Joy when martial law was lifted some years ago, when the iron curtain imposed by Mao and his comrades fell and when the gate to freedom was opened up at Peking University. All educators shared the feeling of the peasant dancing and praising the return of hope after the tempest in the Pastoral.

However, the euphoria was extinguished just before reaching its climax, and died prematurely before we were aware of the significance of such an event. The brutal massacre in Tiananmen and the continuing violent round-ups of those who seek freedom testify that ideological education is not yet dead, but still arrogantly imposes its terror and dogmatism on the whole people. On both sides of the Straits, the authorities continued to rely on it, trying harder by inventing new techniques and by building up the myth of ideas. They make sure that the students will love their "nation" and worship their "leaders." They will take care of the so-called prodigal sons by brainwashing them, and stuffing them with all kinds of patriotic slogans. Thus, any action or reaction which may endanger the authority of ideology will be severely punished.

However, my hope is not yet shattered, for there are many reasons to believe in a revolutionary change for the better in education. Against the wish of the rulers, the tragedy of Tiananmen will encourage the young intellectuals to wake up from the "dream of the red chamber" and to take their fate in their own hands. The growing political openness will be followed by an openness of mind; economic liberation will be accompanied by a certain emancipation of mankind. Thus, I firmly believe that a critique of ideological education could play a significant role in breaking the ice of dogmatism and naivete, in challenging authoritarianism and traditionalism, and in opening our minds to a newly self-consciousness world.

This monograph is far from complete or perfect. Even before its publication, some of its ideas have been subjected to criticism and challenge. I am certainly grateful for such encouragement. In the following lines, I wish to reply to some criticism which I consider helpful for an understanding of ideology in general, and ideological education in particular.

Replying to my talk in Seoul on the crisis of values in a Confucian society and to my suggestions of using the economic model to understanding social crisis, Professor Alain Touraine of the University of Paris, as well as Professor Noah Samuel Eisenstadt of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, were more skeptical of the economic approach. They found in the economic model the danger of reductionism, which is not only incomplete, but dangerous in understanding the complexity of society. I agree with them that the economic model reflects only basic human activities, and that the economic laws solve only the problems arising from the conflict of such activities. However, I still stress its basic structure—of course, not totally as does Marx—because I share Giambattista Vico’s view that it is the economic activity which can solve the most basic human needs and hence its basic problems. In other words, I discover in the economic model a certain form of ideology with its positive elements. Consequently, I could not wholeheartedly accept the Marxist interpretation of ideology as some negative, false instrument or fabricated consciousness by the dominant class due to its one-sidedness. That is the reason for my revision of the first chapter on the nature of ideology with the intention of implementing Marx’s understanding of ideology. This chapter was revised after my three presentations of its version in Hongkong (The Chinese University), Taipei (Academia Sinica) and London (Institute of Education, University of London). I learned with agreeable surprise from colleagues that my idea is very close to those of Clifford Geerzt and Paul Ricoeur.

Of course, this chapter is not immune from criticism, friendly and hostile. Professor Richard Knowles of Duquesne University reminded me of the difficulty in demarcating the correctness from the incorrectness of ideology. Actually, I followed Kant’s method and tried to construct a list of criteria after the version of Kant’s table of categories, and applied them to distinguish right from wrong ideology. I found later that such a rationalist approach tends more to confuse than to clarify the ambiguity of ideology. It is of less use than Kant might have believed for understanding human problems.

The most ardent and constructive critique came from Professor Vincent Shen of the National Chengchi University, now of the Lee Chair of Chinese Philosophy and Culture at the University of Toronto. His critique of my earlier understanding of ideology (when I was influenced by Marx) has helped me to reflect on Marx’s own position and to discover Marx’s mistakes. Though I still cling to my old view that most ideologies tend to be conservative and therefore reactionary, I have to admit that even ideology has constructive elements in itself. My study of Hans-Georg Gadamer confirms the view that ideology cannot be abolished, simply because it forms a part of tradition. Thus, what we can do is to implement or transform it. Man cannot afford to live without ideology, just as man could not be human without tradition, i.e., memory of the past.

I learned a great deal from Professor George F. McLean of the Catholic University of America, who improved my work with his critical remarks. On occasion, he would indirectly remind me of my dubious stand with regards to the metaphysical foundation of education. I am aware of the fact that my strong objection to any form of determinism, and my inadequate dealing with the metaphysical foundation of education would make this work less fruitful. With Professor McLean, I believe in the factor of freedom as the meta-foundation overcoming determinism. I see this as metaphysics, the recognition that reality is primarily free within which is found the material and determined. Human beings are bound by all kind of interests, among them is the interest in freedom. That is what differs man from animals, and helps man to become God-like.

There were other criticisms in London, Toronto and Kyoto, which I took to heart. There were invaluable suggestions and corrections from my colleagues and friends during my first years of apprenticeship in Innsbruck. Dr. Hanjo Sauer spent precious time polishing my first article on education, which was later published in one volume in Munich. I shall never forget Dr. Hermann Gmeiner, the founder of the SOS Kinderdorf International, with whom I worked for a short time in Austria. His idea of giving children a sense of human dignity still impresses me today.

This monograph is certainly not immune from mistakes and its suggestions may become irrelevant in the future. Likewise, the business of ideological critique may have a long way to go, just as our ideological education will not easily fade away. Yet in this tumultuous period of rapid change, I believe such efforts have a valued role in exposing destructive ideologies and promoting human solidarity.

Tran Van Doan was born 1949 in Viet Nam and educated in France, Italy, Germany and Austria. He is currently a Professor of Philosophy at the National Taiwan University and the Editor-in-Chief of The Asian Journal of Philosophy. He serves as a visiting professor in many universities in Asia, Europe and U.S.A.

Publications: Nihilisme de Nietzsche - Essaies sur la metaphysigue nietzscheenne (1975), Kritik der Marxschen Dialektik (1982), Marx and Nietzsche on Morality (1989), Reason, Rationality and Reasonableness (1989), Politics and Morality (1998); Collected Essays on Viet-Philosophy (2000); The Idea of a Viet-Philosophy - The Formation of Vietnamese Confucianism (2001), Collected Essays on Confucianism (2002), and over 50 research-papers written in French, German, Chinese, Vietnamese and English. He is working on The Method and The Way of