By "Classical Confucianism" I mean a trend of thought initiated by Confucius (551-479 B.C.), developed by Mencius (c. 371-289 B.C.) and Hsün-tzu (c. 313-238 B.C.), and finally culminating in the I-chuan and the Chung-yung. To appreciate the world-view, moral ideals, and religious beliefs of the Chinese people, Classical Confucianism is the first school to be understood. In the hope of advancing this understanding, the present chapter will focus on the theory of human nature as expounded by this school. It will argue that early Confucians maintained a theory of "human nature as tending toward goodness." The discussion will contain three parts: (1) the presentation of this theory by Confucius, (2) the demonstration of this theory by Mencius and the Chung-yung in a direct and explicit way, and by Hsün-tzu and the I-chuan in an indirect and implicit way, and (3) the consequence of this theory, that is, the fact that the above Confucians all emphasized the obligation to perfect oneself and to bring others to attain their perfect state.
THE THEORY OF CONFUCIUS ON HUMAN NATURE
Confucius' view on human nature was not clearly and distinctly supplied in the Analects. It is no surprise that one of his disciples complained that "one cannot get to hear his view on human nature" (A, 5:13).1 In two passages of the Analects, Confucius classified men as belonging to three groups: "upper, middle and lower," but as this classification was made according to man's "learning ability" it had nothing to do with the common nature of man.2 Another two passages expressed more directly Confucius' opinion in this respect.
(a) The Master said, `That a man lives is because he is straight. That a man who dupes others survives is because he has been fortunate enough to be spared' (A, 6:19).
(b) The Master said, `Men are close to one another by nature. They diverge as a result of repeated practice' (A, 17:2).
In passage (a), the meaning of "straight" (chih) is uncertain. Granted that it has moral implications, it shows only that one should follow the right way, but does not reveal what human nature is. Passage (b) informs us only that Confucius recognized that there exists a common human nature. Whereas many scholars readily connect it with goodness,3 the present essay will establish that Confucius had in mind human nature as tending toward goodness. It will argue that otherwise some key passages of the Analects concerning politics and morality become incomprehensible.
First, Confucius described the marvelous effect of the virtuous man in the field of politics as follows:
(a) The rule of virtue can be compared to the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of stars without leaving its place (A, 2:1).
(b) If there was a ruler who achieved order without taking any action, it was, perhaps, Shun. There was nothing for him to do but to hold himself in a respectful posture and to face the south (15:5).
(c) Just desire the good yourself and the common people will be good. The virtue of the gentleman is like wind; the virtue of the small man is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend (12:19).
The above three passages would be pointless and meaningless if there were no common human nature and if this were not tending toward goodness. In other words, for Confucius the highest political ideal was the traditional ethiocracy which required that the most virtuous be the ruler because virtue was believed to be in line with human nature.4
On the other hand, Confucius narrowed down the issue by emphasizing the inner relation of man's self with virtue. He said,
(a) Is jen really far away? No sooner do I desire it than it is here (A, 7:30).
(b) The practice of jen depends on oneself alone, and not on others (12:1).
(c) Is there anyone who has tried to practice jen for a single day? I have not come across such a man whose strength proves insufficient for the task (4:6).
A discussion of Confucius' concept of jen would require a more extended treatment than is possible here, but for present purposes it suffices to say that jen means both "the way of man" and "goodness." The above passages state that jen is man's inner tendency and that it is within man's ability to practice jen. Thus, there is solid foundation for claiming that Confucius regarded human nature as tending toward goodness.
DEMONSTRATION OF THE THEORY
On the basis of Confucius' teachings, Mencius and Hsün-tzu developed philosophies which sometimes were considered mutually complementary. As regards the theory of human nature, however, Mencius and Hsün-tzu obviously held incompatible views. The following discussion will try to show that Mencius' theory of "human nature as good" is in fact a theory of "human heart as good," and Hsün-tzu's theory of "human nature as evil" is actually a theory of "human desire as evil." These two theories are not necessarily contradictory, since they share the same underlying idea that human nature tends toward goodness. To clarify this point, we will lay more stress on the works of Mencius and the Chung-yung which directly elaborated on this idea than on those of Hsün-tzu and the I-chuan which accepted this idea in an implicit way.
Mencius
Etymologically, human "nature" (hsing) comes from "birth" or "to be born with" (sheng). The common understanding of this word in ancient China can be formulated as follows: "The inborn is what is meant by nature" (M, VI, A, 3).5 However, this consideration of the origin of nature exhibits only what a thing has rather than what a thing is: it expresses at most the sameness rather than the difference of all things. In order to determine what a thing is, it is necessary to know its essence: the genus plus the difference of species. This rule, made familiar by Aristotle, was true also for Mencius.
First, Mencius was quite aware that in dealing with anything of the same kind, we must determine what this "same kind" means, and this is even more true when applied to man. Mencius said, "Now, things of the same kind are all alike. Why should we have doubts when it comes to man? The sage and I are of the same kind" (M, VI, A, 7). The wicked, however, also belong to the same kind. Thus, in determining the essence of human beings, we should find the difference of species. Mencius said,
Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses this distinguishing feature, while the gentleman retains it. Shun understood the way of things and had a keen insight into human relations. He followed the path of benevolence and righteousness. He did not need to pursue benevolence and righteousness (M, IV, B,19).
Clearly, the essence or the distinguishing feature of man must be understood through the "slight difference" between man and the brutes. The statement about Shun is an example that benevolence and righteousness are the interior path of man, following which will have a great effect. The implication of this whole sentence is probably that benevolence and righteousness belong to the "slight difference."6 Another paragraph will also help clarify the distinguishing feature of man. "A gentleman differs from other men in what he retains in his heart--namely, benevolence and propriety" (M, IV, B, 28).
Granted that the human essence of man can be described as benevolence, righteousness, propriety, etc., how can common people lose it? Can something be defined by a feature which can be lost? The key to the answer lies in the idea of "heart," which is to be understood here as neither bodily heart, nor soul, but mind with sensitivity. Concerning human nature, Mencius presents his famous theory of "the four germs of the heart," concluding as follows:
From this it can be seen that whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of right and wrong is not human (M, II, A, 6).
These four states of heart are named, in turn, the germs of "benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom" (M, II, A, 6) within man's heart, which forms the difference of human beings. Human nature must be defined through this heart: Mencius said, "That which a gentleman follows as his nature, that is to say, benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, is rooted in his heart" (M, VII, A, 21). Therefore the goodness of human nature resides in the goodness of the heart. A reservation, however, must be added, namely, that goodness exists only in the state of germ and needs to be retained, nourished, and developed. In this way Mencius demonstrated that human nature is tending toward goodness.
He did not stop at this point, but continued to examine the nature and origin of the heart. Mencius affirmed that there is a propensity for development within the heart which makes it an "evaluating heart." If this means an ability to be moral and human beings are moral agents,8 does not its propensity for development imply in some sense a "commanding heart"?9
It must be the case, then, that the evaluating heart is at the same time the commanding heart, for otherwise how could Mencius honor as gentleman those who "retain" it? Only with this understanding does it become meaningful to say that "there is nothing better for the nurturing of the heart than to reduce the number of one's desires" (M, VII, B, 35). Only if the heart does more than evaluate can Mencius say, "The sole concern of learning is to go after this strayed heart. That is all" (M, VI, A, 11).
On the basis of this double character of the heart, we can look further at the heart in itself. Mencius used one word "thinking" to sum up the function of the heart. He said, "The organ of the heart can think. But it will find the answer only if it does think: otherwise, it will not find the answer. This is what Heaven has given me" (M, VI, A, 15). By thus explaining the source of the heart, especially its function of commanding, he bridges the gap between Heaven and man. Therefore, instead of stating that Mencius substitutes "self-legislation" for "external divine command," we prefer to say that man's self-legislation is bestowed on him by Heaven.10 The relation between Heaven and man is another interesting topic in Mencius' thought, but is beyond the scope of the present essay. What we have established thus far is that the reason why human nature tends toward goodness consists in its relation with Heaven.
Hsün-tzu
Hsün-tzu regarded human nature as that with which man is born (H, 4:39; 16:274).11 He further claimed that "the nature is that which is given by Heaven; you cannot learn it, you cannot acquire it by effort" (23:290). This concept of human nature, based upon empirical observations, is of three kinds: the desire of sense organs, the ability of sense organs, and the plasticity of man's character.12 Hsün-tzu seems to take man's instinct as his nature and that this in itself is neutral. How then could Hsün-tzu also affirm definitely that "man's nature is evil" (H, 23:289)?
The reason is that if everyone follows his instinctive tendency without restriction, the result inevitably will be "strife and rapacity, combined with rebellion and disorder, ending in violence" (H, 23:289). Undoubtedly this result can be defined as evil if compared with an harmonious society. Though Hsün-tzu's theory of human nature as evil cannot be understood without its background of moral and cultural idealism,13 nonetheless, to define human nature through that which follows as a result is not the way it is usually defined or understood. Did not Hsün-tzu find a difference between man and the brutes, and if so why did he not use it to define the human essence?
According to Hsün-tzu, what makes the person truly human is the ability to make distinctions (H, 5:50), what makes the human person the highest being on earth is the sense of righteousness (H, 9:104). Thus, the ability to make distinctions and a sense of righteousness must belong to human nature. If well developed, there will result propriety (li) and righteousness (i), which are regarded as good. Had Hsün-tzu defined human nature through this approach, he would not have found any argument with Mencius.14 Far from doing this, however, Hsün-tzu considered propriety and righteousness to be the result of artificial activity, a virtue acquired by human effort. The question then becomes: How did Hsün-tzu bridge man's evil nature and his artificial activities? To answer this question, we must take account of Hsün-tzu's concept of "heart."
Hsün-tzu's use of the concept of "heart" is not always consistent. First, the heart constitutes one element of man's emotional nature. In this sense, the heart always tends toward profit, just as ears to sound and eyes to color (H, 11:137, 141; 23:291): "If a man has no teacher or law, his heart is just like his mouth or belly" (H, 4:40). Second, the heart is higher than other senses: "The heart occupies the cavity in the center to control the five organs. This is called the natural ruler" (H, 17:206). This sense of heart is quite similar to that of Mencius. "The heart is the ruler of the body and the master of its god-like intelligence. It gives commands, but it is not subject to them" (H, 21: 265). Thus, the heart appears to have the function of distinguishing and commanding.
Since the heart also belongs to human nature, why did Hsün-tzu still insist on the evil of human nature? Further examination will show that Hsün-tzu did not consider the heart itself to be the independent criterion of all things. He argued that in order to function, the heart must keep itself in a state of "emptiness, unity, and quiescence"; and that the condition for this is that the heart perceive the Way (tao) (H, 21:264). This third sense of the heart is central to Hsün-tzu's theory, whose key idea is that "the heart is the craftsman of the Way, and the Way is the foundation of good government" (H, 22:281).15 Thus, there must be a close relation between the heart, representing human nature, and the Way, representing goodness. It is not inconceivable to say that Hsün-tzu also had in mind a view of human nature as tending toward goodness.
The I-chuan
The I-chuan was designed to manifest how the sages exhibited the way of man by meditating on the way of Heaven. It focused upon clarifying the relation between Heaven and man and did not articulate any clear theory of human nature. What we may figure out in this regard is very limited. Under the 24th hexagram we read, "Do we not see in fu the mind of Heaven and Earth"? (T'uan, Fu, p. 233).16 To clarify this hexagram, the Master (who in this context must be Confucius) said of his favorite disciple Yen Hui that "If anything he did was not good, he was sure to become conscious of that; when he knew it, he did not do the thing again" (Hsi-tz'u, II, p. 393). Thus, the mind (or better, the will) of Heaven and Earth is manifested in one's returning (fu) to one's original state, by which one discovers what one should and should not do. Consequently, the I-chuan affirms that "returning" presents "the root of virtue" (Hsi-tz'u, II, 397) and we may easily perceive that human nature is in line with goodness.
What is called the way operates incessantly with the rhythmic modulation of dynamic change and the static repose, thus continuing the creative process for the attainment of the Good and completing the creative process for the fulfillment of Nature which is Life (Hsi-tz'u, I, p. 355).17
This statement is especially meaningful for human beings. Again the I-chuan emphasized, "The perpetual continuance of fulfilled nature in life is the gate of the Way and Righteousness."18 Therefore, it is understandable that the sages "exhibited the way of man under the names of benevolence and righteousness" (Shuo-kua, p. 423).
The Chung-yung
The Chung-yung dealt incisively with the nature of man. First, it did not regard human nature as good in itself. "Hui made choice of the Mean, and whenever he got hold of what was good, he clasped it firmly, as if wearing it on his breast, and did not lose it" (C, 8:1).19 If what is good can be held and lost, then it does not pertain to the nature of man.
Instead, human nature as seen by Chung-yung is always "tending toward" what is good, as is manifested in "knowing and practicing" the good. This includes the five duties and three virtues. The Chung-yung takes them as universal objectives of knowledge and action and relates them to the universal obligation of man:
Some (people) are born with the knowledge (of those duties); some know them by study; and some acquire the knowledge after a painful feeling of their ignorance. But the knowledge being possessed, it comes to the same thing. Some practice them with a natural ease; some from a desire for their advantages; and some by strenuous effort. But the achievement being, it comes to the same thing (C, 20:9).
This "same thing" at which human knowledge and action are aimed is goodness, which the sage "hits without an effort and apprehends without the exercise of thought" (C, 20:28). Thus, we may conclude that human nature is tending toward goodness.
The next question, whence does this kind of human nature come? The Chung-yung believes that human nature is conferred by Heaven (C, 1:1). The point of contact between human nature and Heaven is "sincerity" (C, 20:18): being sincere is the way of Heaven; becoming sincere is the way of man. To understand the implication of "becoming sincere," we need to ascertain what the Chung-yung thinks about the ordinary people. In dealing with the way of the gentleman, the Chung-yung notes that
Common men and women, however ignorant, may intermeddle with the knowledge of it (the way of the gentleman); . . . common men and women, however worthless, may carry it into practice. (C, 12:2)
In this passage two things are worth noting. First, to describe ordinary people as "ignorant" and "worthless" shows indirectly the dissatisfaction of the Chung-yung regarding the natural state of man. To be human, it is not sufficient simply to maintain one's natural life; one must follow the way of the gentleman by cultivating virtue (C, 13, 14, 15). Second, the undoubted capacity of ordinary people to know and practice the right way has something to do with our previous statement that human nature tends toward goodness.
Furthermore, if by "sincerity" is meant to be true to oneself, then the Chung-yung holds that when one is true to oneself one will find in one's nature "the tendency toward goodness." Instead of supplying any logical argument, the Chung-yung invites one to reflect upon oneself. Two passages are significant:
(a) There is nothing more visible than what is secret, and nothing more manifest than what is minute. Therefore the gentleman is watchful over himself, when he is alone (C, 1:3).
(b) He cultivates to the utmost the shoots (of goodness) in him. From those he can attain to the possession of sincerity (C, 23:1).
An inkling of mysticism can be perceived here. It seems that one is endowed with a "spark of light" in one's nature. Being true to oneself, one will naturally magnify this spark of light; thus, one carries out moral cultivation in order to be truly human.
Finally, it is impossible to repress "the expressions of sincerity" (C, 16:15). One is born with moral discrimination which distinguishes what is good from what is evil. This entails responsibility for ceaselessly "choosing what is good and firmly holding it fast." (C, 20:28) Once one possesses sincerity, one will not merely strive to complete oneself, but will extend this to other men and things (C, 25:3). This is the reason why the Chung-yung claims that when one attains the state of equilibrium and harmony, "a happy order will prevail throughout Heaven and Earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish" (C, 1:5).
CONSEQUENCE OF THE THEORY
Three consequences of this theory were acceptable to all early Confucians:
1. All are capable of becoming gentlemen (chün-tzu, the ideal personality set by Confucius). Confucius said that he never came across anyone whose strength was insufficient for practicing jen. Mencius expressly insisted that all can become a Yao or a Shun. Even Hsün-tzu, though without giving a satisfactory explanation, maintained that the person on the street can become a Yü. The I-chuan emphasized gradual cultivation which presupposes the possibility of perfecting oneself. The Chung-yung believed that if one chooses what is good and holds it fast, then "though dull, he will surely become intelligent; though weak, he will surely become strong" (C, 20:21).
2. All are obliged to become a gentleman. We perceive in Classical Confucianism an obligation which can be understood in terms of a "categorial imperative." To be human is to become virtuous; there is no other choice. The purpose of one's natural life is to realize one's moral ideal. Early Confucians all emphasized this categorical imperative. Both Confucius and Mencius held that man should sacrifice his life for the sake of jen or i (roughly, benevolence or righteousness). To our surprise, Hsün-tzu also declared, "A gentleman, though worrying about danger and misery, will face death for the sake of i" (H, 3:24). The I-chuan stated that a gentleman "will sacrifice his life in order to carry out his purpose (i.e., to follow the way of the sage)" (Hsiang, K'un, p. 325). The Chung-yung also claimed, "When bad principles prevail in the country, he (the gentleman) maintains his course to death without changing" (C, 10:5).
3. While becoming a gentleman, all are responsible for aiding others to attain
their perfect state. A famous saying of Confucius reads, "A benevolent man helps
others to take their stand insofar as he himself wishes to take his stand, and gets others
there insofar as he himself wishes to get there" (A, 6:30). Mencius traced this
responsibility back to Heaven, and announced,
Heaven, in producing the people, has given to those who first attain understanding the duty of awakening those who are slow to understand; and to those who are the first to awaken the duty of awakening those who are slow to awaken (MR, V, A, 7; V, B, 1).
Leaving the concept of Heaven aside, Hsün-tzu found no disagreement with Mencius's position that, "All creatures of the universe, all who belong to the species of man, must await the sage before they can attain their proper places" (H, 19:243). The I-chuan emphasized the status of the sages who "would give their proper course to the aims of all under the sky, would give stability to their undertakings, and determine their doubts" (Hsi-tz'u, I, p. 371). Finally, Chung-yung best expressed the highest ideal set for man by Classical Confucianism:
It is only he, being most truthful and sincere in all the world, who can completely fulfill his nature in the course of life. Being able to completely fulfill his own nature in the perfect way, he can, also, completely fulfill the nature of other men. Being able to completely fulfill the nature of other men, he can, furthermore, completely fulfill the nature of all creatures and things. Being able to completely fulfill the nature of all creatures and things, he can participate in the cosmic creation and procreation in the process of temporal transformation. Being able to participate in the transformation process of cosmic creation and procreation, he is a co-creator with Heaven and Earth (C, 22:1).20
National University
Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
1. For English translations, I will follow D.C. Lau, Confucius, The Analects (London: Penguin Classics, 1979).
2. These two passages are: (a) The Master said, "It is only the most intelligent and the most stupid who are not susceptible to change" (A, 7:3). (b) The Master said, "You can tell those who are above average about the best, but not those who are below average" (A, 6:21).
3. For example, see Takada Shinji, Shina shiso no kenkyu (Tokyo: Shunjyusha, 1942), p. 104; Hsü Fu-kuan, Chung-kuo jen-hsing-lun shih (Taipei: Commercial, 1977), p. 89.
4. Cf. Fu Pei-jung, "Shih-ching shu-ching chung ti t'ien-ti-kuan yen-chiu," Che-hsüeh yu wen-hua, Vol. 11, No. 7 (July, 1984), pp. 36-37.
5. For English translation, I will follow D.C. Lau, Mencius (London: Penguin Classics, 1970).
6. See Hsü Fu-kuan, p. 165.
7. Cf. Donald Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford Univ., 1969), p. 48.
8. Cf. D.C. Lau, "Theories of Human Nature in Mencius and Shyuntzyy," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 15, Pt. 3 (1953), p. 550.
9. I.A. Richards indicates that "the mind, for Mencius, is its own law-giver." See Richards, Mencius on the Mind (London: Kegan Paul, 1932), p. 79. This point is fully elaborated in Munro, p. 58f.
10. Lau, "Theories of Human Nature," p. 551. Furthermore, Julia Ching maintains that the heart represents both the symbol and reality of man's oneness with Heaven. See Ching, Confuciansim and Christianity (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1977), p. 91.
11. Here (4:39), the first number means the 4th chapter of the Works of Hsün-tzu, and the number of the page (39) is according to the edition of Wang Hsien-ch'ien's Hsün-tzu chi-chieh (Taipei: Shih-chieh, 1967). The English translation follows roughly Holmer Dubs, The Works of Hsuntze (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1928) and Burton Matson, Hsün-tzi, Basic Writings (New York: Columbia Univ., 1963).
12. Hsü Fu-kuan, pp. 230-32.
13. T'ang Chün-i, Chung-kuo che-hsüeh yüan-lun: yüan hsing pien (Hong Kong: Jen-sheng, 1966), p. 49. However, Ch'ien Mu suggests that Hsün-tzu's theory remains on a utilitarian level. See Ch'ien, Chuang-lao t'ung pien (Hong Kong: Hsin-ya yen-chiu-so, 1957), p. 263.
14. Munro, p. 81, analyzes Hsün-tzu's concept of mind from several points of view and concludes that "none of these points conflicts basically with the view of hsing in the Mencius."
15. I translate the term "kung-tsai" as "craftsman" according to its context; Dubs's "master-workman" is also acceptable, but Watson's "supervisor" goes too far.
16. For English translation, I will follow James Legge, The I Ching (New York: Dover, 1963).
17. This is Thomé Fang's translation. See Fang, Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development (Taipei: Linking, 1981), p. 110.
18. Cf. Fang, p. 111.
19. For the English translation, see James Legge, The Doctrine of the Mean, in The Chinese Classics, Vol. I (Hong Kong: Hongkong Univ., 1960).
20. This is Fang's translation, p. 113.