As a candidate for a doctorate in philosophy I was puzzled how C.G. Jung could make a psychological interpretation of such ancient Chinese books as I Ching1 or "The Secret of the Golden Flower,"2 an esoteric Taoist writing. Since depth-psychology is not a Chinese invention, an interpretation of Chinese ancient texts in terms of depth-psychology seemed at least suspect, if not downright spurious.
Since that time I have rediscovered in Chinese philosophy the term "Hsin-shu,"a which is no less amazing. Literally translated it means "heart-technique," but its real sense is something like "mind-technique," or today's behavioral technology. Of course, "hsin" does not designate only the physical heart. Most of the time it comprises all "subjective" or psychic phenomena: thinking, feeling, controlling, deciding, having conscious or unconscious attitudes, etc. In this sense "hsin" means much the same as the term "Seele" of Wilhelm Wundt, namely, "the sum of psychic processes or phenomena."3 "Hsin-shu" means the way to regulate or influence all these psychic phenomena. If this concern was so lively two-thousand years ago, then it is no wonder that C.G. Jung could find such marvelous psychological insights in ancient Chinese texts.
Indeed, we could expect a fully developed Chinese psychology today. That this is not the case probably is due to an excessively practical orientation and the consequent lack of purely scientific interest, as well as to the lack of a differentiated psychological terminology. In fact, throughout more than two millenia the most frequently used psychological word is the term "hsin," whose vagueness necessarily posed limitations toward further elaborations. On the other hand, the undifferentiated use of the "hsin" perhaps has guarded Chinese from what could be called the psychological fragmentation and compartmentalization of the West. The Chinese experience just one psyche which has diversified functions; a differentiated psychological terminology would tend to fragment and compartmentalize this. Behaviorism has become a paradigm of this form of fragmentation by taking "hsin's" subordinate function of external sensation as the only one which counts.
In order to proceed step by step, we must choose some key-figures, who represent the psychological views of Confucianism regarding ethical problems, historically as well as substantially. These views were inspired, but not developed, by Confucius himself. Their development was by such followers of later generations as Menciusb (371-289 B.C.), Hsün Tzuc (314-238 B.C.), and the Ch'eng-Brothers, Ch'eng Haod and Ch'eng Ie, respectively (1032-1083 and 1033-1107). We have chosen just these four thinkers above all others because Mencius and Hsün Tzu were the first to elaborate key psychological concepts in treating moral problems and these concepts have been used throughout two millenia, while the Ch'eng brothers set the tone for Neo-Confucianism which has influenced Chinese thought ever since that time. This will become clearer as we consider each thinker individually.
MENCIUS
One of the Ch'eng Brothers extolled Mencius as the one who best discussed the "hsin-technique."4 Mencius not only was universally revered as a "holy man" second only to Confucius, but also was the first to treat "hsin" thematically. According to him, a fully actualized "hsin" would proceed to realize "hsing"f or properly human nature.5 Being seriously concerned to keep (ts'un)g and fully actualize (chin)h "hsin," Mencius was very interested in the "hsin-technique," though he never mentioned this term.
What precisely does "hsin" mean? As noted above, "hsin" literally means the physical heart. But curiously enough, in the more than two hundred times Mencius used this term, he meant it only in the derived sense of the very broad spectrum of subjectively experienceable phenomena from affection, attention and knowledge, up to the highest human aspirations. Mencius' example is followed mostly by later Chinese thinkers. Mencius especially used the term "hsin" to designate what he calls four innate and properly human aspirations: interhuman affection, righteousness, propriety and discernment of right and wrong.6 According to him these four propensities belong to the "greater part" of the human being and are known only through the thinking function of "hsin." In comparison to them, all other sensitive or bodily propensities, such as those for good taste, beautiful color, pleasant sound and smell, body comfort, sexual desire and hunger, belong to the "lesser part" of human nature.7 Since Mencius considers, among these four propensities of the "greater part," "hsin" to constitute true human nature, he does not hesitate to affirm the goodness of human nature.8 He did so not because he considered evil to result from a lack in one's cultivation and the subsequent loss of "hsin."9 In this strict sense the term "hsin" means exclusively the four noble and specifically human propensities. Using the term "hsin" mostly in this sense, Mencius thus invites one to actualize fully (chin), to keep (ts'un), to hold fast to (ts'ao),i to nourish (yang),j to extend (ch'ung),k not to lose (shih),l and, if lost, to search for (ch'iu)m the "hsin".10 Since "hsin" in this strict sense constitutes truly human nature, to lose it means to be alienated from one's own humanness.11
This point is extremely important in order to understand the "Hsin-Hsing-Science,"n which was developed later during the Sungo (960-1279) and Mingp (1368-1644) Dynasties. This "science" aims at keeping or recovering the "hsin" or truly human nature (the word "hsing" means literally "nature" or "innate nature"). Judging from later developments one would not see any distinction between "hsin" and "hsing," because both designate what Mencius would call "the proper hsin" (pen-hsing)q or "hsin" properly so-called. But originally there existed a subtle difference between these two terms: "hsin" designates originally every kind of subjectively experienceable phenomena, and "hsing" all human propensities, from hunger and sexual desire up to interhuman affection.
Mencius understood the thinking function of the "hsin" as intuitive rather than objective knowledge, since by exercising its function it knows automatically what belongs to the "greater part" and the "lesser part" of human being. He saw no need for discursive reasoning12 which was developed more by Hsün Tzu and, much later, by Chu Hsi.
Mencius insisted upon teaching how to keep "proper hsin" alive, i.e., on engaging in activities of intuitive thinking, on extending noble propensities from their original narrowness into ever wider spheres, and, last but not least, on having the fewest possible desires.13 Thus he was actually an excellent teacher of "hsin-techniques," as the Ch'eng Brothers called him.
In exercising "techniques" upon one's own "hsin," this is invested necessarily with a certain passive character. In this connection we can mention briefly the problem of "ch'i"r in Mencius and in later thinkers. According to Mencius, a human being achieves true greatness by actualizing his "greater part" and thereby obtains a "magnificent ch'i." The commentators of later times were confused in identifying "pure ch'i" (ch'ing ch'i,s as a source of cleverness and moral goodness, and "murky ch'i" (cho ch'i)t as a source of foolishness and moral evil.15 But this way of understanding which takes "ch'i" in a purely material sense has no basis in the text of Mencius, who considers "magnificent ch'i" as the effect of the upright conscience of someone who knows he does what he has to do: "Without such a conscience one becomes timid and weak."16 Hence, "ch'i" must be understood as the physiological effect of the activities of thinking and willing. Mencius makes a very subtle observation of psycho-physical interrelatedness in saying: "Whenever the will is unified it moves the `ch'i'; whenever the `ch'i' is unified it moves the will."17 He advises: "The will is the leader of the `ch'i'; the latter is an awakened state of the body. The will is dominant, the `ch'i' is subordinate to it. Therefore I say: Firmly maintain the will, and do no violence to the `ch'i'".18 In these wise and tactful words Mencius maintains the harmonious middle way between knowing and willing, on the one hand, and the autonomous, unconscious state of the psycho-physical system, on the other.
HSüN TZU
Very often Hsün Tzu is depicted as an antagonist to Mencius because he opposed Mencius's central teaching on the inborn goodness of human nature, affirming its inborn wickedness.19 But the antagonism is more one of surface than of substance. As noted above, for Mencius both the propensities of "greater and lesser parts" belong to human inborn nature, but only those of the "greater part," attainable only through thought, specifically and truly constitute human nature.20 In Hsün Tzu's view thought and knowledge acquire even greater importance in moral life, but they are regarded as pertaining to human industry, not as inborn nature. As Hsün Tzu sees it, human nature is made of cupidity and all sorts of lower, selfish desires; consequently it is wicked. Moral goodness comes only through human doing.21
In what exactly does human doing consist? Here "hsin" has a definite role to play. The word "hsin" is used by Hsün Tzu very often--more than 150 times--and in very different settings. Except in two cases, where it clearly designates the physical heart, Hsün Tzu's "hsin" comprehends the whole psychic sphere, as in Mencius. But there is a difference: Hsün Tzu stresses above all the self-reflective acts of the knowing, deciding and commanding functions of "hsin" in opposition to body (hsing).u Specifically the "hsin" commands the body, its five external senses and the whole psychic sphere including the knowing, deciding and commanding functions themelves.22 "Hsin" knows and decides accordingly what is right or what corresponds to Tao.23 If something is put in practice after the consideration and decision of the "hsin," Hsün Tzu would call it "human doing."24 "Hsin" and "human doing" (wei)v are put to one side, "human nature" is put on the other side. Hence his most stringent advice: "When nature and human doing are united, the world is well governed."25
In spite of Hsün Tzu's attack against Mencius, substantially they agree on the following issues. Both stress "hsin's" thinking and leading functions, both extol the role of education and human effort in giving precedence to the thinking and leading functions of "hsin." The difference appears when Mencius regards the four propensities of the "greater part," which are attainable only through the thinking function of the "hsin," as belonging to true human nature; whereas Hsün Tzu regards them as the results of human effort. This difference is of minor practical importance, all the more as Tung Chung-shuv (c. 179-104 B.C.), a leading Confucian of the West-Han Dynasty, found the following eclectic solution: Human nature (being) has good seed in itself, but cannot be called good because it still needs education and cultivation, just as the seed of rice is not the fully developed rice plant.26
Most likely it was due to the influence of both Mencius and Hsün Tzu that the "Great Learning" (Ta-hsüeh)w put great emphasis upon the investigation of things and upon knowledge in striving for a morally good life. But neither Mencius and the Great Learning nor any other Chinese thinker went so far as Hsün Tzu in extolling the discriminating, decision-making and commanding fuctions of "hsin": "It is master of body and mind, it commands and does not receive any command; it inhibits and commands himself, deprives himself and takes back, moves himself and stops."27 Hence his special "hsin-technique": not to try to do away with the natural desires (as did Lao Tzu), nor to diminish them (as did Mencius), but to cultivate the intellectual capacity of discriminating what is right from what is wrong, as well as to cultivate the capacity of deciding to do what is right in spite of many contrary desires.28 According to Hsün Tzu, virtue consists in acquiring a strong habit, so that the "hsin" would not even consider--still less choose--anything wrong.29
However, Hsün Tzu has also a Taoistic influence, although he criticized Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu with vehemence, as I have tried elsewhere to prove.30 His "hsin-techniques: are also Taoistically colored as he gives advice on "emptiness, oneness and stillness" (hsü-yi-erh-ching)x in order to sharpen the ability of "hsin" for knowing and deciding correctly.31 Without going into details it could be pointed out that, though he uses taoistic terms of emptiness and stillness, Hsün Tzu's "hsin-techniques" are essentially different because he strongly opposes any idea of eliminating or even diminishing human desires. Even in advising techniques of "emptiness" and "stillness" he always persues the aim of improving human nature through human action. Such an aim is considered preposterous by Chang Tzu, because doomed to "adulterate nature."32
Aside from metaphysics where Hsün Tzu went far left with Taoism, his psychological insights constitute a paradigm of a typically Chinese mind. He stressed the intellectual side of moral life without favoring intellectualism; he put strong emphasis on free decision-making without being voluntarist; he adopted taoistic views of letting nature go its own way without himself being fatalistic or passivist.
CH'ENG BROTHERS AND LATER DEVELOPMENTS
As Mencius and Hsün Tzu were the original thinkers in delineating psychological factors of moral life, we went into some details of their teachings. After this period the Sung Dynasty was the most important in producing the "Neo-Confucian" school, of which the Ch'eng brothers were key figures. It can be said without exaggeration that the Ch'eng Brothers set the tone and gave decisive direction to the "Hsin-Hsing-Science," which was designed to provide theory and practical techniques for achieving moral perfection.
The teachings of Mencius and Hsün Tzu include two basic features, for the manifold activities of "hsin" could be classified into two categories: the first plays an active, leading role in knowing, deliberating, deciding and commanding, while the other plays a passive role of being acted upon through "hsin-techniques."
While for Mencius the knowing function of "hsin" had a more intuitive character, it was definitely intellectual in Hsün Tzu where it was a matter of right knowledge as responsible for right deliberation, decision and action.
Though the younger brother Ch'eng I accepted and further developed the doctrine of the intellectual function of "hsin," the older brother Ch'eng Hao explicitly followed Mencius regarding the intuitive knowledge of "hsin," stressing its passive role and playing down its intellectual-objective aspect. Their different approaches gave birth to two different schools of "hsin-hsing-science": one of a more intellectual-active direction (Chu Hsi, 1130-1200) and the other of a more intuitive-passive direction (Lu Hsiang-shan, 1139-93 and Wang Yang-ming, 1472-1529).
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it must be said that both Ch'eng Brothers and their followers gave prominent place to the passive side of "hsin" in developing manifold "hsin-techniques." This probably was due in part to Buddhistic influences. Their copious dialogues with disciples bear the mark of spiritual directors towards their disciples and go into detail on particular situations. In other words, all neo-Confucian masters were convinced that "hsin" is changeable and that their techniques could cure moral, and even minor psychological disorders. In part this is the old tradition of Mencius and Hsün Tzu, reinforced through Taoism and Zen-Buddhism. In fact, those Neo-Confucian masters who stressed the intuitive and passive aspects of "hsin" were greatly inspired by Taoism and Buddhism, as were Chang Tsaiy (1020-77) and Ch'eng Hao.33 But other Neo-Confucian masters were also influenced by Taoism and Buddhism.34 Even Ch'eng I, who seemed more appreciative of intellectual knowledge, was found to be sitting with closed eyes.35 This practice was at least similar to the quiet sitting of Zen-Buddhism and the Taoistic "sitting and forgetting" (tsuo-wang).z There is an essential difference, however, because Ch'eng I's technique of "dwelling in reverence" (chü-ching)aa aims to make our mind "empty and silent," not through a real void in consciousness, but through the dominance of a unique thing (chu-i)ab so that our mind becomes dominated and filled by "heavenly order."36 Emptiness and silence of mind mean silence of things other than "heavenly order" and come about as a result of dwelling in reverence, not vice versa. As in the case of Hsün Tzu, Ch'eng I adopted somewhat Taoistic techniques and terminology while actually emptying himself of preconceived knowledge and concentrating himself in a single idea.37 The same was true of Ch'eng I.
A definitely anti-intellectual flavor is to be found in Ch'eng Hao. Since he was
concerned only with acquiring moral perfection, which he considered achieveable
only through virtuous action, the noetic aspect appeared negligible to him. Ch'eng
Hao still gave lip service to "ke-wu,"ac i.e., to reach or to research for things, but in
reality his search for knowledge is hardly distinguishable from virtuous action itself.38
His spiritual successors Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming spoke no differently:
Lu's only concern is with preserving the goodness of "hsin" in avoiding desires; his
search for knowledge is practically the same as "awareness of the good" (i.e., moral
consciousness).39 Wang Yang-ming's "ke-wu" is limited to research regarding a moral
"hsin" in rectifying wrong.40 In their view objective knowledge has nothing to do with
moral life. There is a definite anti-intellectual flavor, as Prof. Yü Ying-shih has
pointed out.41 This moral anti-intellectualism is rooted in part in the intuitive
understanding of "hsin" of Mencius and in part in Taoistic and Buddhistic influences.
However, in the Neo-Confucian tradition this passive-intuitive attitude is tempered by the emphasis upon intellectual knowledge from Ch'eng I, Chu Hsi and the scholars of the Ch'ing Dynasty. For Ch'eng I the "searching and reaching for things" extends beyond the human, moral domain; it includes also the rational search for everything knowable, not excluding the rational grounds of fire and water.42 Of course Ch'eng I separated "knowledge of hearing and seeing" from "knowledge of virtue."ad The latter, called "profound knowledge," would be dubbed "subjective truth" by Kierkegaard, namely, that which is inspired by a "passion of the infinite" and is effectively conducive to action.43 In view of this distinction the "knowledge of hearing and seeing" must be considered as something superficial, like somebody generally knowing the fierceness of a tiger but never having confronted or been bitten by one, whereas the one pursued by a tiger can be said to have a profound knowledge of it.44 Ch'eng I affirms that the knowledge of virtue does not result from hearing and seeing,45 because something more is involved. Certainly he did not repudiate the value of intellectual knowledge, indeed he rejected such a repudiation as a Taoistic or Buddhistic excess.46 For him a genuine and objective search after knowledge, whether or not it belongs to virtue, is always worthwhile.47 Chu Hsi, Ch'eng I's spiritual heir, further accentuates intellectual knowledge in moral life considering clear thinking and intellectual knowledge to be a conditio sine qua non of right action. Hence he criticizes Lu Hsiang-shan's reliance on a pure intuition of "hsin" as responsible for "reckless action" (hu-tso),ae though he stresses also "real insight" (shih-li)af in applying general moral principles to every case.48
THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF CONFUCIAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL INSIGHTS
The Present Significance of Confucian "Hsin"
Today the traditional Confucian insights about human "hsin" or psyché have very real significance. The Confucian "hsin," experienced both as passive-intuitive and as active-intellectual, occupies the middle road between the totally passive role assigned to it by Taoists and their followers, on the one hand, and the totally active role assigned to it by traditional Western psychology and philosophy, on the other.
As mentioned above, Taoists being concerned above all to keep nature "unadulterated," detest any human endeavor to "improve" nature.49 But despite Chuang Tzu's indignation about the term "hsin-technique" he developed his own "hsin-technique": like "hsin-fasting"ag (empty-mindedness) and "sitting and forgetting" (striving to achieve an unconscious state) in order to reach primordial nature.50 Today such techniques with their underlying philosophy enjoy great favor in the Western world as it reacts against excessive activism and an ever growing technocracy. Psychoanalysis and Zen-Buddhism have contributed to this same trend.
There is another over-active current which, paradoxically, extols an almost completely passive character of the human psyché, or, as they prefer to call it, of human behavior. Of course, according to behaviorists, human behavior (since words like "psyché" or "hsin" are banished by them as "meaningless") is completely dependent upon, and manageable through "behavioral engineering."51
All this happened in reaction against an earlier overconfidence when the human intellect and free will were considered almost all-powerful in their active and leading role toward moral decision and action. In fact traditional Western psychology and philosophy either exalted the leading role of intellect and free will altogether, or singled out either the intellect or free will as the exclusive or dominant factor, and favored different grades of intellectualism or voluntarism. Such disputes go back to the most remote antiquity. The most famous example of intellectualism is to be found in Socrates and Plato, for whom the morally evil act is just an intellectual error or ignorance.52 Aristotle was neither an intellectualist nor a voluntarist: he admits that at the beginning one becomes immoral (for instance in cases of injustice or intemperance) knowingly and voluntarily, and that after one has become so it is impossible for him to be otherwise.53 In the Middle Ages Thomists favored a rather mild form of intellectualism and the Augustinians preferred a temperate voluntarism: but both recognized the leading role of the intellect and free will together. There are many relatively recent examples of extreme form of voluntarism, from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to Heidegger and Sartre. Such extreme forms of voluntarism are prone to anti-intellectualism in extolling the dominant role of will or the "existential project."
The Confucian concept of "hsin" encompasses both the intuitive-passive and the active-leading characters of subjective experience, which constitutes the paradigmatic unity of contrasting and complementary, yin and yang, components.54 We will now see how the Confucian concept of "hsin," enhanced by the experiences and theories of other cultures, may provide a yet more comprehensive and adequate direction for future ethical theory.
The Need for Enhancement from Other Cultures
Moral Anti-intellectualism and Its Remedy. Though the Confucian concept of "hsin" points in the right direction for the future, it needs enhancement from other cultures. Mencius showed that the "greater part" in human life should play the leading role and that through the intuitive thinking of "hsin" the four noble propensities (interhuman affection, righteousness, propriety and discernment of the right and the wrong) are known. The intuitive approach of Mencius predominated through two millenia. The supervenient influences of Taoism, Zen-Buddhism and parts of Neo-Confucianism strengthened the conviction that in moral life intuitive knowledge prevails and there is no room at all for rational objective knowledge.
Within this historical context it is understandable that moral anti-intellectualism has some predominance among the Chinese. Even today, where a rational mode of thinking dominates the scene in every other domain, there still prevails among Chinese the conviction that in moral education no rationally founded philosophical knowledge is needed. This moral anti-intellectualism has grave consequences. Of course, a detached moral knowledge or conviction does not necessarily lead us to action. Nevertheless there exists a connection between knowledge and practice, especially when human life is involved. If, for instance, we maintain that the human being is no more than an animal, or just an instrument for economic development, such initially detached thinking will inevitably affect one's action.
In the religious sphere Chinese history teaches a good lesson. During the period of Warring States Confucians did not believe in the real existence of spirits, but nevertheless complied with sacrificial rites as in a farceah in order to attain political goals.55 Slowly their religious spirit vanished and the traditional religion, which was still followed faithfully by Confucius and Mencius, lost its significance and inexorably was supplanted by an imported religion, Buddhism. In the process a serious blow was dealt the Confucian virtue of sincerity (ch'eng),ai which, according to the "Great Learning," consisted in conformity between knowing and willing: "(The Ancients) wishing to be sincere in their wills, first tried to get knowledge." Confucius was sincere as he revered spirits, because he believed deeply in their existence;56 certainly he was not performing a farce as some today prefer to misinterpret the following text: "He did sacrifice to the spirits, as if the spirits were present."57 Confucius' willing was in accord with his knowledge and conviction. Mo Tzu (479-438 B.C.) gave the Confucians of his time good advice: either go to sacrifice with sincere belief or do not comply with things in which you do not believe.58 Unhappily, they did not take his alternative seriously and preferred a cheap compromise as solution. Having put up with insincerity in their worship, slowly a typically formalistic attitude set in which still persists today.59
The anti-intellectualistic trend is probably also the reason why in some forms of moral education no heed is paid to moral philosophy. The comic-tragedy lies in the fact that neglecting the role of moral philosophy gives to hedonistic moral philosophy a practical preference, which is inculcated through the modern novel, cinema, etc. Even within the circle of educational policy-makers, many still believe that moral education consists mostly in inculcating socially acceptable etiquette. Hsün Tzu's warning that "one who does not know the Taoaj would not approve and choose it, but instead approves and chooses that which is contrary to the Tao,"60 is largely ignored.
According to Chung-yung, a treatise widely attributed to Tzu Ssu, master of Mencius, human nature finds its metaphysical foundation in "the mandate of Heaven."61 For Hsün Tzu the Tao must have its foundation in itself. But all these problems are beyond the reach of a purely psychological concept of "hsin," and must be anchored in a solid metaphysics and epistemology. It is most unfortunate that today epistemology tends to be dominated by skepticism and scientism, and that such self-destructive epistemology has its followers among present-day Chinese philosophers. It is evident that with such an epistemology one cannot find the rational foundation for a solid metaphysics or ethics. Hence Chinese philosophy today must exercise discernment to separate the gold from the dross in the modern currents of thought.
Cultivation of Moral Judgment and Decision. Though Hsün Tzu defined magnificently the knowing and decision-making functions of "hsin" and their essential role in moral life,62 he was never taken seriously by the Chinese--much to their disadvantage. No wonder that Taoistic passivity and anti-intellectualism became more and more the general trait also among Confucians who seemed inclined to rely greatly upon such "hsin-techniques" as sitting quietly, being empty-minded and so on. There is no awareness that "hsin-technique" presupposes necessarily "hsin-leadership," since someone through their cognitive and deciding functions of "hsin" must take the lead in employing "hsin-technique."
Thus, the crucial point remains whether every individual through one's own knowledge and decision takes leadership of oneself or is manipulated by somebody else through media, social pressures or other "behavioral technologies." The latter predicament is common in many totalitarian or less developed societies, but in free and more developed societies it is absolutely necessary that everyone take their own leadership through appropriate judgment and decision. This means that we should cultivate "hsin-leadership" by improving its knowing, deliberating and deciding functions. In doing so "hsin-techniques" become, not useless, but all the more urgent.
As noted above, Aristotle admitted that whenever somebody becomes immoral, for him in that condition it is not possible to be otherwise. If such individuals take their own leadership seriously and wish to recover their moral integrity, they must use "hsin-techniques" in order gradually to transform themselves. Pascal said appropriately in this connection, that we are automata as much as spirits.63 Therefore Mencius advises us to "maintain firm the will and do no violence to `ch'i'." If we understand "ch'i" as psycho-physical state, it is obvious why "ch'i" is not manageable at command and why some "hsin-techniques are necessary here.
But even in terms of "hsin-techniques" Hsün Tzu developed a very practical
method for sharpening our moral judgment and acquiring the habitual power to
choose only what is in agreement with our right judgment, so that the "hsin" would
not even consider what is not right. Ch'eng I's method of "chü-ching" proceeds along
the same line and consists essentially in filling the "hsin" with "right attitudes inside"ak
so that there would be no room for evilness.64 Hsün Tzu's advice to cultivate right
judgment is followed also by Chu Hsi, though he makes no mention of Hsün Tzu.65
Our generation should not be afraid of old experiences and insights provided their efficiency is verified in China as well as in the West. Such constant exercises of moral judgment and choice would very much enhance the power to do what is morally right, provided the active role of judgment and free choice are not excessively inflated, as occasionally has been the case in the West. But within its limits and right proportion, the active and leading function of "hsin," both in intellectual knowledge and in free decision, must be given a prominent place in moral education.
Personal Dignity. A final important value could be improved upon through judicious comparison with the Western tradition, which consistently gives high priority to personal dignity. Boethius (480-525) defined the person as an individual substance which is rational in nature. Aquinas asserted without hesitation that Person means that which is most perfect in all of nature.66 The person is considered to be of absolute value because of freedom and moral responsibility.67 In China Mencius saw the close connection between moral action and personal dignity: he regarded moral qualities as "Heaven's nobility" in opposition to the "nobility of man."68 The "Great Learning" stresses the "cultivation of the person" (hsiu-shen)al as an essential precondition to the fulfillment of social duties. Mencius further clarifies that true human greatness and dignity lie in absolute faithfulness to moral duty. Here the two great traditions, Chinese and Western, really go hand in hand.
National Chengchi University
Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
1. I Ching or Book of Changes. The Richard Wilhelm translation rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes; foreword by C.G. Jung (New York: Pantheon Books, 1950).
2. The Secret of the Golden Flower, trans. and explained by Richard Wilhelm; European Commentary by C.G. Jung; translated into English by Cary F. Baynes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950).
3. Georg Anschütz, Psychologie: Grundlagen, Ergebnisse und Probleme der Forschung (Hamburg: Meiner, 1953), p. 486.
4. Chu Hsi, ed., Opera Omnia of Ch'eng Brothersam (Taipei, 1979), 2-19b.
5. Mencius 7A1.
6. Mencius 2A6, 6A6.
7. Mencius 6A14-15, 6A4, 7B24.
8. Mencius 6A10, 2A6, 6A6, 7A21.
9. Mencius 6A8.
10. Mencius 7A1, 7A18, 7B35, 6A11.
11. Mencius 2A6.
12. Mencius 6A15.
13. Mencius 7B31, 2A2.
14. Mencius 6A14-15, 2A2.
15. Opera Omnia of Ch'eng Brothers, 19-32b, 23-2ab, 19-77b.
16. Mencius 2A2.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Hsün Tzu, Book 23.
20. Mencius 6A15, 7B24.
21. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu (Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 22; Taipei, 1966), 23/5.
22. Opus cit. 5/3.
22a. Op. cit., 17/12, 21/44-46, 22/60-62.
23. Op. cit., 21/32.
24. Op. cit., 22/4.
25. Op. cit., 19/77.
26. Tung Chung-shu, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals,an (Taipei, 1974), chapters 35 and 36, especially pp. 207-208, 212, 217-18.
27. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu, 21/44-45.
28. Op. cit., 22/60-62, 69-70.
29. Op. cit., 1/47-48.
30. Thaddeus T'ui-chieh Hang, "Hsün Tzu, His Key-position in the History of Chinese Philosophy and His Contribution Today" (in Chinese), Universitas Monthly, IX (1982), 794-96.
31. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu, 21/34-41.
32. A Concordance to Chuang Tzu, 10/39-40, 16/5.
33. Huang Tsung-hsi (ed.), Philosophers of Sung and Yuan Dynastiesao (Taipei, 1975), 5/5, 6/2.
34. Hsiung Yuan, A Study on Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism of Sung-Dynasty (in Chinese) (Taipei: Wen-ching Press, 1985), chapters 2 and 3.
35. Philosophers of Sung and Yuan Dynasties, 5/50.
36. Opera Omnia of Ch'eng Brothers, 16-9a, 19b.
37. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu, 21/36-38.
38. Opera Omnia of Ch'eng Brothers, l2-8a, 15a, 20a.
39. Opera Omnia of Lu Hsiang-shan (Taipei: World Book Co., 1959), pp. 242-2.
40. Opera Omnia of Wang Yang-ming (Taipei: Cheng-chung Book Co., 1955), pp. 5, 21, 63.
41. Yü Ying-shih, Historical Science and Tradition (in Chinese) (Taipei: Shih-pao Press, 1982), p. 111.
42. Opera Omnia of Ch'eng Brothers, 19-9b, 20-1a.
43. Robert Bretall (ed.), A Kierkegaard Anthology (New York: The Modern Library, 1946), pp. 212-3.
44. Opera Omnia of Ch'eng Brothers, 19-9a.
45. Op. cit., 28-3a.
46. Op. cit., 16-35b.
47. Opera Omnia, 20-1a.
48. Li Ch'ing-teh (ed.), Classified Speeches of Chu Hsiap (Taipei, 1979), Book 18, pp. 630, 642, etc.
49. A Concordance to Chuang Tzu, 10/39-40, 16/5, 22/8.
50. Op. cit., 13/26, 4/26-28, 6/92-93.
51. B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).
52. Meno 77e; Protagoras 345b.
53. Nichomachean Ethics, 1114a 12-22.
54. T. T'ui-chieh Hang, "Unity of Yin and Yang, A Philosophical Assessment," Shu-hsien Liu and R.E. Allinson (ed.), Harmony and Strife (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1988), 211-224. Cf. Jolan Jacobi, Die Psychologie von C.G. Jung, (Zurich: Rascher Verlag, 1940), S. 39-40.
55. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu, 17/38-40, 19/122.
56. Confucian Analects, 2/24, 6/6, 8/21.
57. Op. cit., 3/12.
58. A Concordance to Mo Tzu (Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 21; San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1974), 48/41-42.
59. In spite of many official injunctions, most Chinese today go to funeral rites without much inner participation, and find special difficulty in remaining reverently silent. For a Chinese religious believer, however, a reverent silence before a defunct person seems fitting because of the sincere belief that a dead person is just passing from this to another world.
60. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu, 21/30.
61. Th. T'ui-chieh Hang, "Vom himmlischen Mandat zum Fatum - Aspekte der chinesischen Religiosität," a paper delivered at "Wittgenstein-Symposium," Kirchberg/Wechsel, Austria, August 1983, Forschungen für Anthropologie und Religionsgeschichte 21 (1985, Saarbrücken), 29-47.
62. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu, 21/30, 46, 22/60-61.
63. Pascal, Pensées (Paris: Garnier, 1951), n. 252.
64. Opera Omnia of Ch'eng Brothers, 16-35b, 16-36a.
65. A Concordance of Hsün Tzu.
66. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, 29, art. 3. c. (Torino: Marietti, 1940), I, 207.
67. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Stuttgart: Philipp Reklam Jun., 1961), S. 120, 233, 252.
68. Mencius 6A16.