In the field of comparative philosophy, Spinoza is a prominent representative of the West. The reason is not only that he practiced what he preached,⁽⁶⁷⁾ but also that he preached a doctrine which could be practiced. It is mainly on the latter point that he is compared with Buddha.⁽⁶⁸⁾ His doctrine is compared with that of Mahayana Buddhism⁽⁶⁹⁾ as well as with that of Wang Yang-ming⁽⁷⁰⁾ (1472-1529), an eminent idealist in Chinese Neo-Confucianism). No matter how fruitful these studies might be, they all center on a "part" of Spinoza's philosophy. For example, Spinoza's philosophy is compared with Mahayana Buddhism with regard to the practice of meditation, and with Wang Yang-ming's doctrine with regard to relations between knowledge and action. The conclusions of these comparisons are quite peculiar: the former contends that Spinoza has some ideas concerning "sudden" and "gradual" enlightenments,⁽⁷¹⁾ while the latter affirms that both Spinoza and Wang Yang-ming are "pragmatists".⁽⁷²⁾ The trouble lies in their failing to treat Spinoza's philosophy as a whole. A study of Spinoza cannot go far without touching his theory of Substance or God. To characterize Spinoza as a "God-intoxicated man" requires a complex explanation,⁽⁷³⁾ but to affirm God or Substance as his ultimate presupposition is nonetheless self-evident. By contrast, Substance for Buddhism is "empty" and for Wang Yang-ming it is "idealistic." The divergence on the doctrine of Substance inevitably leads to the undesirable comparisons referred to above.

However, if we take Lao Tzu (the author of Tao Te Ching which appeared around the fifth or sixth century B.C.) as the representative of the East to compare with Spinoza, the above difficulties will be reduced to a minimal level. In saying this, I am quite aware that Spinoza's masterpiece, Ethics, is one of the most systematically formulated works in the philosophical world, while Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching goes to the other extreme in being one of the most fragmentary and enigmatic works of philosophy. I am also aware of their remarkably different backgrounds in thought, culture, and society. My confidence in making this comparison consists primarily in that both Spinoza and Lao Tzu have contributed something to "perennial philosophy."⁽⁷⁴⁾ Like Spinoza, Lao Tzu can also be characterized as a naturalist (for him naturalness is the supreme virtue), a pantheist (or more adequately speaking, a panTaoist in that he believes that Tao generates all beings), a determinist (in that all beings are determined to return to their roots), or even a Tao-intoxicated man (in that Tao is his ultimate concern). Again, as in the case of Spinoza, all these titles are mere epithets which contribute little to understanding Lao Tzu's philosophy as a whole.

Basically, this study will follow the general sketch of Spinoza's Ethics save for some parts for which we find no correspondent discussion in Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching. Such parts are Spinoza's theory of attributes which is loaded with many preconceptions of the western tradition, and its consequent theory of the mind/body relation for which, once it occurs, there can be no satisfactory solution. On the other hand, Lao Tzu explicitly describes what Spinoza vaguely refers to as the "model of human nature" which involves direct impact on the theory of human freedom via human knowledge. Thus, the following discussion will focus successively upon four points: 1) the transcendent aspect of Substance and Tao; 2) the immanent aspect of Substance and Tao; 3) the power of knowledge; and 4) the freedom of human beings.

THE TRANSCENDENT ASPECT OF SUBSTANCE AND TAO

Substance, for Spinoza, means that which is in itself and is conceived through itself (El, Def3).⁽⁷⁵⁾ Thus, it must be self-caused (causa sui), for otherwise it would be an effect of something else and hence involve the latter in order to exist and to be conceived (El, A4), which fact would then contradict the definition of Substance. As self-caused, Substance necessarily exists (E1, Def1 & P7). It is also necessarily infinite (E1, P8), otherwise it would be limited by another substance of the same nature, which fact would also be absurd (El, P5). Being infinite, Substance must be an indivisible One (El, P12) which is called God (El, Def6 & P11, P14). Being infinite and selfcomplete, God can exclude nothing, for nothing exists outside God (El, P15). Accordingly, God must be all-encompassing; in him everything has its being and without him nothing can either be or be conceived.

The above argumentation leads to an apparent monism which obscures the transcendent aspect of Substance or God. To avoid this conclusion, Spinoza first affirms that there is something which is in another and is conceived through another (E1, Al). This is "mode" or the modifications of Substance (El, Def5). Mode is finite because its essence does not involve existence (El, A7). Taking man as an example, the finiteness lies in the fact that the being of Substance does not pertain to the essence of man (E2, P10). The discrepancy between a mode's essence and its existence seems to warrant the pure transcendence of Substance. This explication frees Spinoza from the accusation of monism and some kind of emanationism. However, a principle bridging the finite and the infinite is still needed; otherwise he would somehow fall back to a certain creationism which he disputes from the very beginning. Spinoza, then, revives a pair of terms "Natura naturans, Natura naturata" to solve this problem once and for all. We will return to this point later.

If the above understanding of Spinoza is acceptable, then Lao Tzu's doctrine of Tao shows a striking similarity.

According to Lao Tzu, the term "Tao" appears in the following way:

There was something undifferentiated and yet complete, which existed before heaven and earth. Soundless and formless, it depends on nothing and does not change. It operates everywhere and is never exhausted. It may be considered the mother of the universe. I do not know its name; I call it Tao (25).⁽⁷⁶⁾

We learn from this paragraph that 1) Tao existed before all beings (for heaven and earth indicate the beginning of all things); 2) Tao is the "One" which is undifferentiated and yet complete; 3) Tao is "self caused" (it depends on nothing) and eternal (it does not change); 4) Tao is infinite and all-encompassing (it operates everywhere and is never exhausted); 5) Tao is considered the "mother" of the universe.

To avoid the unnecessary repetition of original texts and my interpretation, I will put the latter in the parentheses directly following the sentence quoted. Lao Tzu says,

Tao is empty like a bowl. It may be used but its capacity is never exhausted (for it is infinite). It is bottomless, perhaps the ancestor of all things, (for it is self-caused). . . . Deep and still, it appears to exist forever (for its essence involves existence). It seems to have existed before the Lord of Heaven; I do not know whose son it is (for it is motherless or self-caused)" (4).

In the above quote I have italicized four terms, i.e., "like," "perhaps," "appears," and "seems," because they and their equivalents form an important function in understanding Lao Tzu's Tao. Tao, considered in itself, is an undifferentiated unity which can never be predicated. The same situation applies to Spinoza's Substance which cannot be conceived except through itself. Since man is not in a position to conceive Tao or Substance, Lao Tzu uses these indeterminate terms to symbolize the Tao in itself. Moreover, Lao Tzu writes, "Look at it but you cannot see it! Its name is Formless. Listen to it but you cannot hear it! Its name is Soundless. Grasp it but you cannot get it! Its name is Incorporeal. These three cannot be further inquired into, and hence merge into one" (14). This undifferentiated One sometimes reverts to "nothingness," but it is never pure nothing. Despite the fact that Tao is elusive, vague, deep, and obscure, we can still find in it form, things, essence, and evidences (21). These indefinite descriptions quite clearly manifest the transcendence of Tao. This way of expressing the absolute is functionally better than the "negative way" which leaves no room for human language.

However, the relation between the transcendent Tao and the all encompassing Tao needs to be clarified. The problems of creation and emanation also arise in Lao Tzu's mind though in a different context from that of Spinoza. First, concerning the relation between Tao and all beings, Lao Tzu talks about Tao as "the ancestor of all things" (4), "the root of Heaven and Earth" (6), "the mother of the universe" (25, 52). The metaphors of "mother," "ancestor," and "root" all express an intimate relation of "giving birth to." It seems that Lao Tzu deliberately gets rid of the "creation" theory. But what about the other extreme? Does not the term "giving birth to" strongly imply the "emanation" theory? Surprisingly enough, Lao Tzu also says something on this point in three steps:

First, Tao is regarded as "the principle of life" which does not give birth substantially. Lao Tzu says, "All things depend on it (Tao) for life" (34) and "The myriad things obtained the One (Tao) and lived and grew" (39). Secondly, Lao Tzu uses two metaphysical notions to symbolize the Tao in giving birth to all things. He says, "All things in the world are produced from being. And being is produced from nonbeing" (40). Thirdly, seeing that the above steps are not satisfactory at all, Lao Tzu faces the problem and declares, "Tao produced the One. The One produced the two. The two produced the three. And the three produced the ten thousand things" (42).

There is no consensus among scholars concerning the meaning of "the One, the two, and the three." They might indicate the natural causation rather than the personal creation or purposeful origination.⁽⁷⁷⁾ But this also shows that Lao Tzu tries to prevent Tao from directly producing things. Once the process of production is mediated by something or some principle (to an extent, Spinoza's "attributes" also mediate between Substance and modes),⁽⁷⁸⁾ the pressure of Tao's losing its transcendence is alleviated. Viewing Tao as the only existent, nothing can be produced except through it. Again, in affirming that Tao produces all things, Lao Tzu immediately adds, "Virtue fosters them. Matter gives them physical form. The circumstances and tendencies complete them" (51). Here, the "virtue" is of crucial importance. It is what everything gets from Tao or, in other words, it is Tao's embodiment in everything. Thus, the virtue of a thing is nothing but its nature or essence. This exegesis avoids the danger of emanationism and opens a way to the discussion of Tao's immanence.

To sum up, we will first return to Spinoza's theory of "nature naturing and nature natured" (nature naturans and natura-naturata). Taking nature as such, nature naturing and nature natured form one nature. However, since the maturing is not the natured, there necessarily exist two natures. Viewed from their relations, the maturing and the natured are an inseparable pair which once being separated will lose all their relevance and become meaningless. For Lao Tzu, the relation between Tao and all things is symbolized as that of "mother and child." Without the mother, the child cannot exist; without the child, the mother cannot be termed. For Lao Tzu, mother and child also form an inseparable pair without neglecting their difference and their ultimate unity. Thus, in retaining the transcendence of Substance and Tao, Spinoza and Lao Tzu come to similar conclusions through similar strategies. What, then, about their treatment of the immanence of Substance and Tao? We will now turn to this question.

THE IMMANENT ASPECT OF SUBSTANCE AND TAO

The immanence of Substance or God is self-evident for Spinoza, because "whatever is, is in God, and nothing can either be or be conceived without God" (Ed, P15). As immanent cause (E1, P18) God encompasses all things. But viewing it from the aspect of all things, what does this "immanent cause" mean? "Individual things," says Spinoza, "are nothing but modifications or modes of God's attributes, expressing those attributes in a certain and determinate manner" (E1, P25, Cor). On the other hand, Spinoza speaks of the mode not as a predicate of Substance but as a "sample" of Substance.⁽⁷⁹⁾ An effect necessarily expresses something of its cause, but is it a sample of its cause? The term "sample" implies two things: first, it is a reflection or imitation of the original; second, it can be conceived through itself (though it cannot exist through itself) at least to a large extent. The latter involves a discussion of the possibility of adequate and inadequate knowledge. But to conceive an effect as a "reflection" of its cause implies, at least at first sight, a static relation between them.

Nevertheless, this static relation cannot be justified since Substance is the "efficient cause" of both the existence and the essence of things (El, P25). From the viewpoint of the things produced by Substance, their essence does not involve existence (El, P24). Again, "the being of Substance" does not pertain to their essence (E2, P10). It follows that all beings are contingent which contradicts Spinoza's doctrine (Ed, P23). To avoid this dilemma, we have to deal with the relation between Substance and modes. For an understanding of this relation the key idea is the identification of God's power with his essence (El, P34). If God's essence is his power, and his essence involves existence, then God must be infinitely and eternally active. He is both the first cause (El, P16, Cor2) and the free cause (E1, P17, Cor2) in the absolute sense. This kind of cause, in turn, necessarily involves the effect. Therefore nothing is contingent; all things are necessary in following God's creative power in action.

The created world is nothing but the essential exercise of his power.⁽⁸⁰⁾ All things manifest the comprehensive self-activity of God's power or essence. That, again, "is immanent in each form, or is the dynamic exerting itself in their various (yet continuously progressive) ways."⁽⁸¹⁾ This theory culminates in the following sentence: "The more we understand objects, the more we understand God" (E5, P24). To conclude, we can say: 1) that the Substance is for Spinoza a dialectical whole,⁽⁸²⁾ 2) that the relation between Substance (nature maturing) and modes (nature natured) is dynamic; and consequently 3) that both the immanence and the transcendence of Substance are preserved.

For Lao Tzu, the immanence of Tao is also self-evident. After giving birth to all things, Tao does not retreat to its ultimate mystery. It remains the storehouse or inner-essence of all things (62). "The Great Tao is universal like a flood. How can it be turned to the right or to the left?" (34) Analogically, Tao in the world may be compared to rivers and streams running into the sea (32). All things by nature are Tao-inclined. They all esteem Tao and honor virtue (Te). "Tao is esteemed and virtue is honored without anyone's order! They always come naturally (or spontaneously)" (51). Here, "virtue" is the key concept to the understanding of Tao's Immanence. Virtue, as mentioned above, is what every individual being obtains or receives from Tao. In Chinese characters, the verb, "obtains," has the same pronunciation as the word for "virtue" and consequently is often used to denote virtue in its verb aspect. This is also similar to Spinoza's identification of virtue with power (E4, Def8), and power with essence (E1, P34, 36; E4, P53, Dem).

Thus, virtue is the nexus between Tao and all things, and at the same time it also constitutes the very essence of all things. Since Tao is an integral whole, the nameless One, all things need to obtain or receive something from it. What they have received from Tao exists in and with them and hence becomes the source of their being as they are. This participation is also dynamic. Lao Tzu says, "All things come into being, and I see thereby their return. All things flourish, but each one returns to its root" (16). The dynamic movement of "returning" manifests the secret of Tao's inexhaustibility. The action of Tao lies exactly in "returning" (40). Thus, Lao Tzu describes Tao's action as "great, functioning everywhere, far-reaching, and returning to the original point" (25).

This return is not a one-way movement, but is rather dyadic.

Progressively, the fundamental Non-being in the Tao gives rise to the Being of all forms in the world, whereas regressively, the immanent Being in the whole world depends upon the Non-being of the transcendental Tao for the performance of adequate function.⁽⁸³⁾

Once the Immanence of Tao is confirmed, the effect is magnificent: "One may know the world without going out of doors. One may see the way of Heaven without looking through the windows" (47). This is because Tao is everywhere and everything in its own being manifests the whole, i.e., Tao. This doctrine is developed by Chuang-tzu when he says, "To know one thing thoroughly is to know all.⁽⁸⁴⁾

Putting Spinoza and Lao Tzu side by side, we find that Spinoza justifies the immanence of Substance through its "infinite creativity" which belongs primarily to the nature maturing; while Lao Tzu emphasizes the "eternal return" of Tao which sufficiently expresses the dynamic process within and of the Tao. Both Spinoza and Lao Tzu in their theories leave no room for a purposeful world. Thus, we need to continue our discussion on human beings.

THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE

Before going into the discussion of human beings, we should consider the status of man in Spinoza's universe. While disputing the concepts of a personal God and a purposeful world, Spinoza also abandons the anthropocentric world-view. Man is not the center of the world, for "nature is not bounded by the laws of human reason. which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation." More than this, in the eternal order of nature, "man is but a speck."⁽⁸⁵⁾ His status in such a depersonalized world is expressed as follows: "We are in God's power live clay in the hands of the potter, who from the same lump, makes vessels, some for honorable, some for dishonorable use."⁽⁸⁶⁾ In this regard, Lao Tzu is not silent, but states, "Heaven and Earth are not humane, they regard all things as straw dogs.⁽⁸⁷⁾ The sage is not humane, he regards all people as straw dogs" (5).

The above statements, though not in man's favor, afford a chance to reconsider and reconstruct the theory of man. Logically these assumptions result in: 1) encouraging the autonomy of man (since man can depend on nothing but his own nature), and 2) emphasizing the intellect of man (since intellect is the only advantage he can have). The development of Spinoza's and Lao Tzu's philosophy will validate this logical implication.

On the other hand, this non-anthropocentric world-view is a prerequisite for the disinterested scientific mentality. It is primarily through the perception of this world-view that Spinoza is described as a scientific optimist⁽⁸⁸⁾ and Lao Tzu is estimated as a pioneer of natural science in ancient China.⁽⁸⁹⁾

While focusing on human beings, we find that the problem of knowledge becomes conspicuous. Without clarifying the interrelations between "to know", "to act", and "to be", man will get confused in the search for happiness. Spinoza deals with this problem thoroughly in his Ethics. To begin with, three statements can be taken to explain the origin of the knowledge problem.

1) The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (E2, P7).

7) The human mind is the idea itself or the knowledge of the human body (E2, P13).

3) The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body (E2, P24).

We learn three things from the above quotations: 1) The order and connection of the human mind is the same as that of the human body; 2) therefore the correspondence or coincidence of mind and body is theoretically possible and this constitutes man's adequate knowledge; 3) however, mind does not have the knowledge of each part composing the human body, the knowledge of which only exists in God. The discrepancy between mind and body makes falsity possible (E2, P35). In other words, falsity comes from opinion or imagination which Spinoza calls the first kind of knowledge (E2, P40, N2). Reason and intuition, as the second and the third kinds of knowledge, not only are necessarily true (E2, P41) but also teach us to distinguish the true from the false (E2, P42).

The power of knowledge does not come from outside. Rather, it has something to do with human nature. First, by identifying intellect with will (E2, P49, Cor) we can affirm that to know is to desire, which by definition pertains to the essence of man (E3, Dem1). Secondly, this desire, whereby a man strives to persist in his being, is also called "conatus" (E3, P6). The "conatus" of man causes all actions which tend to his self-maintenance; it covers the whole range of human self-affirmation.⁽⁹⁰⁾ Thus, we can agree with Spinoza in saying: "When the mind contemplates itself and its own power of acting, it rejoices, and it rejoices in proportion to the distinctness with which it imagines itself and its power of action" (E3, P53). It is clear that to know is to act (in the sense that passion is transformed into action) (E5, P3), and is to be since reason demands nothing which is opposed to nature (E4, P18 N).

Therefore, the guidance of reason goes in line with the conatus of man which, being the strife of human self-preservation, necessarily tends to the good and avoids the evil. Since man is not born free, the only way for him to be free (that is to say, for him to have only adequate ideas and hence no conception of evil and good) (E4, P68), is to live according to the dictates of reason alone (E4, P67). In other words, to strive for more rationality for its own sake "is to realize oneself, and would not mean anything outside the realm of our fundamental endeavor."⁽⁹¹⁾

We will reserve the discussion of freedom for the next section: for the moment, it suffices to say that "there is no modification of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception" (E5, P4). This affirms the power of knowledge and makes human freedom an attainable goal. In this regard, Spinoza is successful. Hence, the only way leading to human freedom can be sketched as follows: 1) Man's essence is his conatus which dynamically tends to self-preservation; 2) Self-preservation means the transformation of passion into action, and this transformation cannot work without man's knowing its adequate cause; 3) "To know" in this sense means to live according to the guidance of reason which corresponds to nature and results in human freedom.

The Chinese character "Chih," which means "to know" or "knowledge," appears frequently in Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching.⁽⁹²⁾ Since no relevant discussion concerning the relation between mind and body can be found in this work, we will pass by such questions as the extent to which the discrepancy between mind and body affects the nature of knowledge.⁽⁹³⁾ Rather, we will go directly into the contexts of this character and classify its different meanings. Three kinds of knowledge can be discerned in Lao Tzu's work. To avoid confusion, I will put them in the following way.

1) To know is to discriminate. Knowledge 2in this sense naturally results in distinguishing the good from evil, the beautiful from the ugly, and the true from the false. All these are relative judgments. Lao Tzu says wittingly, "When the people of the world all know beauty as beauty, there arises the recognition of evil" (2). For Lao Tzu, knowledge as discrimination will disturb the people's hearts and lead to undue desire, which is the origin of disaster (3). This kind of knowledge is thus discarded by Lao Tzu (19). He warns, "Those who are the first to know have the flowers of Tao but are the beginning of ignorance," (38) and more rigorously, "He who rules the state through knowledge is a robber of the state" (65). This seemingly anti-intellectual attitude is not without positive implication. The relative value-system issued from an anthropocentric world-view must breakdown in order to be transcended. The happiness of man cannot really be found except through the correct understanding of man's status in and his relation with the whole of Nature.

2) To know is to do away with evil. Here, "evil" is used to mean that which diminishes, hinders, threatens, or destroys the happiness of the self-preservation of man. This understanding of evil, though it sounds like Spinoza's usage, is actually in Lao Tzu's mind. This will be shown along with the following discussion. 1) For Lao Tzu, "to know" always involves "to act" (28, 70). This is emphasized by him to the extent that he claims, "He who knows does not speak. He who speaks does not know" (56). 2) Knowledge as action has as its primary goal the self-preservation of man. Lao Tzu deeply concerns himself with the following things: to be without reproach (8), to be without trouble (13), to be companions of life (76), to be preserved whole (22), to last long (9), to exist forever (7), to be beyond wearing out and renewal (15), etc. In the process of attaining this self-preservation, that is to say, in the process of knowing, man naturally does away with evil. 3) This kind of knowledge exerts a great effect in human life. The point is that knowledge in this sense is none other than knowledge "about" the self. Lao Tzu says, "To know you have enough is to be immune from disgrace. To know when to stop is to be free from danger" (44). The phrase "to be free from danger" appears in many other contexts (e.g., 16, 25, 32, 46, 52) but the most significant point is that it is used also to describe Tao. In the latter case, this phrase means "to be never exhausted" (25). If by "to be never exhausted" is meant the eternity of Tao as we have indicated in the first section of this paper, then, when applied to man, does it also imply man's immortality? The answer seems positive.⁽⁹⁴⁾ But we get no definite information concerning the nature of this immortality to which the third kind of knowledge is directed.

3) To know is to be enlightened. Knowledge in this sense is first of all knowledge "of" the self or self-knowledge. Lao Tzu says, "He who knows himself is enlightened" (33). To make this sentence clear, we find another saying: "To know the eternal is called enlightenment" (16, 55). Could we thus conclude that to know oneself is to know the eternal? To answer this question, we have first to understand what Lao Tzu means by the "the eternal" (16), and "to know harmony is called the eternal" (55). It then seems that "to return to destiny" is equivalent to "to know harmony". Here, harmony and destiny manifest two aspects of Tao. Thus, it can be affirmed that to know is to return. "Returning" is exactly the magnificent movement of Tao (40), and is consequently the real way of all beings. But, what does this return mean for human beings? It means to return to the state of infancy. Since the infant possesses eternal virtue (28) or virtue in abundance (55), a man while returning to it naturally restores his enlightenment (52). For a man, the state of infancy is both original and eternal; it represents both harmony and destiny. Therefore, to know oneself is to know the eternal, and knowledge in this sense involves enlightenment. This knowledge as enlightenment has much to do with man's immortality. We read Lao Tzu's words:

He who knows the eternal is all-embracing.

Being all-embracing, he is impartial.

Being impartial, he is universal.

Being universal, he is one with Nature.

Being one with Nature, he is in accord with Tao.

Being in accord with Tao, he is everlasting

And is free from danger throughout his lifetime (16).

THE FREEDOM OF HUMAN BEINGS

For Spinoza, all events are determined (E1, P29). But this determination is not opposed to, or incompatible with, freedom. "For this is the sort of determination by which God freely produces his creatures and the sort of determination by which man frees himself from the tyranny of desire and the turmoil and bewilderment of conflicting passions."⁽⁹⁵⁾ As a matter of fact, the chief concern of Spinoza's Ethics is to enlighten the way leading to freedom in a world of necessity. For this purpose, knowledge of the third kind, i.e., intuition, plays a crucial role. As for how this knowledge functions and what the freedom thereby attained means, we can discern the following points.

1) The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things (E2, P40, N2). The first import this knowledge conveys is that since necessity pertains to the attributes of God, it must then pertain to the essence of things. Therefore, the more the mind understands all things as necessary, the greater power it has over the emotions (E5, P6). To have power over an emotion means to form a clear and distinct idea of it (E5, P3). This, again, is to strive for man's self-preservation. We can then infer that to understand the necessity of things is to preserve one's being. To know is to act. Through intellect man conceives the necessity of things and is consequently free from passions (E5, P10).

2) The validity of the above inference (which takes necessity as a medium) should be traced back to the idea of God as its ultimate ground. It is to the idea of God that the mind should "cause all the modifications of the body or the images of things to be related" (E5, P14). Once a man succeeds in doing this, he forms nothing but clear and distinct ideas. He then rejoices (E3, P53) and his joy is attended with the idea of God. Therefore, "he loves God, and (by the same reasoning) loves Him better and better as he understands himself and his emotions" (E5, P15). There is no discrepancy here between knowledge and love which is defined as "joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause" (E3, Dem6). In other words, this is the intellectual love of God (E5, P32, Cor).

3) The intellectual love is eternal (E5 P34, Cor), and the third kind of knowledge is always attained "under the form of eternity" (E5, P29), or "through the essence of God" (E5, P30, Dem). This knowledge as love is thus the sovereign remedy for the ailments of the mind.⁽⁹⁶⁾ It brings the highest possible peace to mind (E5, P27). The repose of mind is man's salvation, or blessedness, or freedom (E5, P36, N).

Moreover, man's immortality lies in this state of mind,⁽⁹⁷⁾ which is at the same time a union with God.⁽⁹⁸⁾

4) The union with God is not without practical meaning. Since God or Substance is the absolute whole which encompasses all things, union with God then explicitly indicates union with others. With this conviction, Spinoza maintains "universal fellowship" and, still more inclusively, "that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were, one mind and one body" (E4, P18, N). This conviction manifests the ideal model of human nature and makes "ethics" a comprehensive law of Nature.

For Lao Tzu, knowledge as enlightenment results in human freedom. Instead of describing abstractly the content and effect of this freedom, Lao Tzu presents a living model of human nature, namely, the sage. The work of Lao Tzu is in fact a meditation record of the enlightened sage. Throughout the whole work there never appears the term "you," nor is any person's name mentioned. It is Lao Tzu's own monologue: the term "I" appears 37 times and is obviously referred to "the sage" which appears 31 times. Putting these two terms, "I" and "the sage," together to represent one subject, we find that its frequency is second to that of "Tao" (76 times). Adequately speaking, the sage is the embodiment of Tao. Thus, the best way to understand Lao Tzu's theory of human freedom is to contemplate the sayings and activities of the sage.

The sage is an enlightened man because he knows himself (7); besides this, he likes to show how he knows (4, 21, 43, 51, 57). He thinks his doctrine very easy to understand and very easy to practice, but "none in the world can understand or practice it" (70). Therefore, he embraces the One (Tao) and becomes the model of the world (22).

The sage treasures the Tao and follows the way of Heaven. "The way of Heaven is to benefit others and not to injure. The way of the sage is to act but not to compete" (81). "It is precisely because he does not compete that the world cannot compete with him" (22, 66). "He never strives for the great, and thereby the great is achieved" (34, 63). He thus becomes the leading official (28).

What does the sage do as a leading official? Not much. The answer is beautifully expressed in the following paragraph:

The sage has no fixed (personal) ideas. He regards the people's ideas as his own. I treat those who are good with goodness, and I also treat those who are not good with goodness. Thus goodness is attained. I am honest to those who are honest, and I am also honest to those who are not honest. Thus honesty is attained. The sage, in the government of his empire, has no subjective viewpoint. His mind forms a harmonious whole with that of his people. They all lend their eyes and ears, and he treats them all as infants (49).

What he does is merely to help people return to their own nature.

Therefore the sage says,

I take no action and the people of themselves are transformed. I love tranquility and the people of themselves become correct. I engage in no activity and the people of themselves become prosperous. I have no desires and the people of themselves become simple (57).

The result is magnificent: "No action is undertaken, and yet nothing is left undone" (48). What the sage does for his people is exactly what Tao performs in the universe (37).

However, before the people can say that "they simply follow Nature"(17), the sage still has to face the actual world. Three points can be summed up from his preaching.

1) Tao is the good man's treasure and the bad man's refuge. Even if a man is bad, Tao never rejects him. "Those who seek shall have it and those who sin shall be freed" (62).⁽⁹⁹⁾

2) As the follower of Tao, the sage is always good in saving men and consequently no man is rejected; he is always good in saving things and consequently nothing is rejected (27).

3) The good man and the bad man should be concerned with each other. The former is the teacher of the latter, while the latter is the charge of the former (27). Finally, "The way of Heaven has no favorites. It is always with the good man" (79).

Thus, it is obvious that the highest effort or virtue of the sage is to enlighten the people and make them all sages. Once the people all return to their original state, complete harmony will be reached (65). This is also called "profound identification" (56), which can be expressed as follows: "When human beings do not lose their purity and are all at ease with themselves, follow their nature and preserve the principle underlying it, they will be merged with profound Tao."⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

With the same conviction, Chuang-tzu, the great successor of Lao Tzu, states, "Heaven and earth are produced at the same time with my being born; all things are in oneness with me."⁽¹⁰¹⁾ "Leveling up, I will freely fly with the Creator of all things; leveling down, I will accompany with those who are beyond life and death and without beginning and end."⁽¹⁰²⁾

Spinoza and Lao Tzu, though living in different times and places and belonging to different cultural traditions, attain similar insights so strikingly close as to have been evolved from the same school. If there really existed such a school it should be termed the "perennial philosophy." No other concluding comment on the comparison of their thought seems necessary.

National Taiwan University

Taipei