This paper concerns the relation between cultural heritage and hermeneutics.* Here heritage refers especially to the cumulative sense of human dignity and of appropriate social relations which constitutes the heart of our inherited culture(s). Hermeneutics refers to understanding the nature, application and critique of this heritage.
This raises a cluster of problems:
I. In what does a cultural heritage or tradition consist, that is, how is it constituted; on what basis is it a point of reference for human action?
II. Can this culture have new meaning for these new times, that is, how does it both live through time as a tradition and in each new age make relevant--even normative--contributions?
III. Can a culture critique the past which it inspired and be a guide to yet unknown pathways of peace, that is, what is the basis for a transforming critique which will enable the culture to be an authentically liberating, rather than an enslaving, force?
This paper will consider each of these questions in sequence.
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF A CULTURAL HERITAGE
It is characteristic of modern times--and possibly foundational to our problematic--that tradition has progressively ceded its standing to technique. This may be traced to Descartes who, at the end of the Renaissance, resolved to sort through its tumultuous accumulation of knowledge, new and old, in order to select and order that which was clear and distinct to the mind's intuition. Further, though a conclusion once clearly seen by someone did not have to be rejustified by that person each time it was used, this dispensation was non-transferable.1 Hence, the image of the thinker became that of a solitary hero working out the interconnections of ideas. That ideas are best conceived when one is in isolation while life is always lived with others forces one to ask whether this understanding of philosophy has not lost sight of the relevance of thought to life and vice versa--as Marx was keen to observe.
Correlatively, tradition, as arising from the community, providing an initial sense of truth, and thereby laying a foundation for insight and judgment--that is, heritage as fore-understanding or pre-judgment--gradually assumed the ever more pejorative connotations presently conveyed by the term `prejudice.'2 But if our heritage be useless, upon what are we to base our efforts humanely to evaluate, and to respond to, present issues?
It has become necessary therefore to rebuild the value, and to assure the reading, of tradition, in part through major critique of the rationalistic character of modern thought. This has been undertaken by Prof. Hans Georg Gadamer in continuation of the phenomenological work of Martin Heidegger. In Truth and Method, Prof. Gadamer undertook to reconstruct the notion of a heritage (a) as based in community, (b) as consisting of knowledge and free commitment developed in the process of living through time, and (c) as possessed of authority. Because tradition is sometimes interpreted as a threat to personal and social freedom I would like to focus especially upon the way our cultural heritage is a reflection of our life as free and responsible members of a concerned community.
Community
Autogenesis is no more characteristic of the birth of knowledge than it is of persons. Just as a person is born into a family on which he or she depends absolutely for life, sustenance, protection and promotion, so one's understanding develops in community. It is from one's family and in one's earliest weeks and months that one does or does not develop the basic attitudes of trust and confidence which undergird or undermine one's capacities for subsequent social relations. There one learns care and concern for others independently of what they have done for us or vice versa, and one acquires the language and symbol system in terms of which to conceptualize, communicate and understand.3
Similarly, through the various steps of one's development, as one's circle of community expands through neighborhood, school, work and recreation, one comes to learn and to share personally and passionately an interpretation of reality and a pattern of value responses. For the phenomenologist this implies that life in community is a new source for wisdom. Hence, rather than turning away from daily life in order to contemplate abstract and disembodied ideas, the place to discover meaning is life in the family and in the progressively wider circles into which one enters.
Time and the Building of Tradition
If it were merely a matter of community, however, all might be limited to the present, with no place for tradition, literally, for that which is "passed on" from one generation to the next. The wisdom with which we are concerned, however, is a not a matter of mere tactical adjustments to temporary goals; it concerns rather the meaning we envision for life and which we desire to achieve through all such adjustments and over a period of generations. Hence, contemporary interchange needs to be complemented by the historical depth of accumulated human insight predicated upon the full wealth of human experience. This has a number of layers.
First, the process of trial and error, of continual correction and addition in relation to the evolving sense of human dignity and purpose, constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive generations. In this laboratory of history the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated. Though this can be described in general and at a distance in terms of feed-back mechanisms, such language remains too abstract and limited to method and technique. What really is being spoken about here are free acts, expressive of passionate human commitment, as well as our sacrifice in responding to concrete danger, in building and rebuilding family alliances, and in building and defending one's nation. It is the cumulative result of this extended process of learning and commitment--and hence of values--which constitutes the content of one's tradition.4
Thirdly, the impact of the convergence of this cumulative experience and reflection is heightened by its gradual elaboration in ritual and music, and is imaginatively configured in epics such as the Mahabarata or in dance. All conspire to constitute a symbol system which, like a giant telecommunications dish, shapes, intensifies and extends the range of our personal sensitivity, free decision and mutual concern.
Tradition then, is, not simply everything that ever happened, but what appears significant. It is what has been seen through time to be deeply true about the life of a people; it is the values to which our forebears have freely given passionate commitment both in specific historical circumstances and progressively over time; it is the proverbs, works of literature and symbols whose worth has emerged progressively as a basis upon which character and community can be built. All of this constitutes a rich source from which multiple themes can be drawn, provided it be accepted and embraced, affirmed and cultivated. Hence, it is not because of personal inertia on our part or arbitrary will on the part of our forbears that tradition serves as model and exemplar. On the contrary, the importance of tradition derives both from the cooperative character of the learning by which wisdom is drawn from experience and from the cumulative free acts of commitment and sacrifice by which generation after generation has defined, defended and through time passed on their corporate life in community5; tradition then is the living embodiment of a people's creative freedom.
Authority
Perhaps the greatest point of tension between a sense of one's heritage and modern liberalism relates to authority: is it possible to recognize authority on the part of tradition and still retain freedom; could it be even that authority, rather than being the negation of freedom, is the cumulative expression and positive condition of authentic human freedom?
One of the most important characteristics of a human person is the capacity for development and growth. One is born with open and unlimited powers for knowledge and love. Life consists in developing, deploying and exercising these capabilities. Given the communitary character of human development and learning, dependence upon others is not unnatural. Quite the contrary! Within as well as beyond our social group, we depend upon other persons according as they possess abilities we lack, but need, for the process of our own growth and actualization. This dependence is not primarily one of obedience to their will, but is based upon their comparative excellence in some dimension, whether it be the doctor's professional skill in healing patients, or the wise person's insight and judgment in matters where profound, integral or balanced understanding is required. The preeminence of wise persons in the community is then not something they usurp or with which they are arbitrarily endowed; it is based rather upon their abilities as these are reasonably and freely acknowledged by others. All of these--the role of the community in learning, the contribution of extended historical experience, and the grounding of dependence in competency--all combine to endow tradition with authority for subsequent ages.
There are reasons to believe, moreover, that tradition is not a passive storehouse of materials simply waiting upon the inquirer, but that its content of authentic wisdom plays a normative role for life in subsequent ages. On the one hand, without such a normative referent prudence would be as relativistic and ineffectual as muscular action without a skeletal substructure. Life would be a mere matter of compromise and accommodation in any terms with no sense of the value of what was being compromised or of that for which it was compromised. On the other hand, were the normative factor to reside simply in transcendental or abstract vision, the result would be an idealism devoid of existential content.
In history, on the contrary, one finds vision which both transcends its own time and stands as directive for time that follows. The content of that vision is a set of values and of human and social goals which, by their fullness and harmony of measure, point the way to mature and perfect human formation and thereby orient the life of a person.6 Such a vision is historical because it arises from the life of a people in time and presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. It is also normative because it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged. The fact that humans do not remain indifferent before the flow of events, but dispute bitterly over the direction of change appropriate for their community reflects the fact that every humanism is committed to the realization of some common--if general--vision of perfection. Without this even conflict would be impossible for there would be no intersection of the divergent positions. A shared vision of what is desirable for life at least in some broad terms, is the condition of possibility for debate and even for conflict.
As the vision of what is desirable one's heritage or tradition is then not chronologically distant in the past and therefore in need of being drawn forward artificially. It lives and acts in the lives of all whom it inspires and judges; through time it is the timeless dimension of history. Rather than reconstructing it, we belong to it--just as it belongs to us. Such a tradition is, in effect, the ultimate community of human striving, for human understanding is implemented, not by isolated individual acts of subjectivity, but by our situatedness in a tradition. Fusing both past and present, it enables us both to determine the specific direction of our personal lives and to mobilize a community of consensus and commitment.7
This sense of the good or of value, derived from the concrete experience of a people through its history and constituting its cultural heritage, enables it in turn to appreciate the real impact of the
achievements and deformations of the present. In the absence of tradition as a cumulative lived experience of a people present events would be simply facts of the moment, to be succeeded by counter-facts. The succeeding waves of such disjointed happenings would constitute a history written in terms of violence. This could be reduced only be a Utopian abstraction built upon the reductivist limitations of a modern rationalism, but, eliminating all expressions of freedom past and future, this constitutes the archetypal modern nightmare, 1984.
This stands in stark contrast to one's heritage or tradition as the rich cumulative vision evolved by a people through the ages to a point of normative and classical perfection, as exemplified architecturally in a Parthenon or a Taj Mahal, it is embodied personally in a Confucius or Bolivar, a Lincoln or Martin Luther King, a Ghandi or a Mother Theresa. Superseding mere historical facts, as concrete universals they express that harmony of measure and fullness which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing, in a word, liberating.
The truly important fight at the present time is, then, not between on the one hand, a chaotic liberalism in which the abstract laws of the marketplace determine the lives of persons, peoples and nations and, on the other hand, a depersonalizing sense of community in which the dignity of the person is suppressed for an equally abstract utopia: victory by either would spell disaster. The central battle is rather to enable peoples to draw upon their heritages of shared personal vision, evaluation and free decision which have been elaborated through the ages in their various communities, as a basis for deliberation and the elaboration of their response to present circumstances. That these circumstances are often shifting and difficult in the extreme is important, but what is of definitive importance is that a people's response be truly theirs; that it be part of their history and not simply the automatic effect of someone else's, or--still worst--of abstract, impersonal and depersonalizing laws or ideals.
APPLICATION: HERITAGE AND THE PRESENT
There is a second set of problems regarding tradition. These concern directly, not its nature and origin, but its relation to the present. For, to the degree that we recognize the validity and even authoritative character of our heritage, we would seem to be in danger of diminishing the significance and even the freedom of present efforts to find answers to the new issues which arise in our personal and especially our social life. Indeed the very reality of novelty is at issue, for if our present life be but a simple repetition of what is already known, life loses its challenge, progress is rejected in principle, hope dies. Let us turn then from the construction and content of a cultural heritage to its application in our days through a dialogue which grows out of care and concern.
This is the correlative to the problem faced above, for just as a classical ideal is constituted from the concrete expressions of freedom in the past rather than as abstract depersonalized law, so the challenge of the present is how to understand the application of this ideal in a manner which promotes rather than suppresses our creative exercise of freedom.
Novelty and Application
To understand this we must, first of all, take time seriously, that is, we must recognize that reality includes authentic novelty. This implies that tradition, with its authoritative or normative character, achieves its perfection in the very temporal unfolding of reality. To take account of the freedom of persons in determining their changing social universe and its values, one must attend to the truly new elements introduced by historical acts of encounter in community.
As one's response to the good takes place in concrete circumstances, the guiding principles of human action, even in ethics as a science, must be neither purely theoretical knowledge nor a simple historical accounting from the past, but must provide help toward moral consciousness in one's concrete circumstances. This implies an important difference of ethics from techné. In the latter, action is governed by an idea as an exemplary cause which is fully determined and known by objective theoretical knowledge. Skill consists in knowing how to act according to a well understood idea or plan. When this cannot be carried out some parts of it are simply omitted in the execution.
In contrast, in ethics the situation, though similar in being an application of a practical guide to a particular task, differs in important ways. First, in moral action subjects make themselves as much as they make the object, for agents differentiate themselves by their actions. Hence, moral knowledge as understanding of the appropriateness of one's actions is not fully determined independently of the persons involved; the identity of a person or people as constituted through a past (or tradition) and through present free acts is a central factor in the determination of what is appropriate. This does not override what can be known in the general terms of one's specific nature; rather from within it specifies the implications of that nature for the actions of those involved.
Secondly, adaptations by moral agents in applying the law do not diminish, but correct and perfect it. In itself the law is imperfect for in a relatively unordered world the law cannot contain in any explicit manner responses to the concrete possibilities which arise in history. It is precisely here that human freedom and creativity come into play in shaping the present according to a sense of what is just and good. It is important to stress that they do so in a way which manifests and indeed creates for the first time more of what justice and goodness mean.
That the law is perfected by its application in the circumstances is driven home by the experience that a simple mechanical replication of the law works injustice rather than justice. If ethics is to be an instrument for realizing the good it must be not only knowledge of what is right in general, but also the search for what is right in the situation. For this epoché and equity are required in order to perfect the law and complete moral knowledge.8 This is particularly essential in situations of personal and structured inequality in which an ordinary application of general and abstract laws can be expected only to extend and deepen the injustice. Hence, special attention must be paid to the concrete circumstances of persons in their mesh of psychological, economic and social interrelations.
Concern for Others
The question of what the situation asks of us is answered in the light of what has been discovered about appropriate human action and exists normatively in the tradition. This is properly the work of intellect (nous) with the virtue of prudence (phronesis), that is, thoughtful reflection which enables one to discover the appropriate means in the circumstances. But to be appropriate the means must truly fit all who are engaged in the situation. Hence, it is essential to be finely tuned to others precisely as they are persons with their own freedom, feelings and understanding. Such an assessment of what is truly appropriate will require also the virtue of sagacity (sunesis), that is, concern for others, for in order adequately to appreciate the situation one must undergo it with the affected parties. Truly ethical knowledge can be had only by one who is united in mutual interest or love with the other. Such knowledge is profoundly social.
This goes notably beyond simply a concern for justice, that is, for rendering to others what is clearly due them by right. It is true that an ethical or moral situation cannot exist without justice. Nevertheless, as justice is based upon persons as distinct, it separates and even opposes one to the other in mutual contrasts of rights and duties: each party tends to look to their rights and to what others owe to them, rather than to their duties and what they owe to others. The result of a relationship based only upon justice is more likely to be strife than harmony and peace. This can be overcome and justice rendered only when concern for self is broadened to include concern for others as well, that is, when sagacity (sunesis) is added to prudence (phronesis).
In sum, the application of the heritage or tradition is not a subsequent or accidental part of understanding, but radically co-determines this understanding. Social consciousness must seek to understand the good, not as an ideal which is known independently and then applied to the circumstances, but as related to the concerns of all. In this light our sense of unity with others begins to appear as a condition for applying our tradition, that is, for enabling it to live in our day. Let us look more closely then at the hermeneutic process by which social understanding creatively articulates the meaning of one's cultural heritage in present circumstances.
HERMENEUTIC AS DIALOGUE OF HORIZONS
Horizon and Historicity
If one's horizon is the totality of all that can be seen from one's vantage point, then the application of a living tradition involves a dialectic of the horizons of different times or groups. One such dialectic is had in reading a `text' from the past--this could be a document, such as The Declaration of Independence or of the Rights of Man, or even the broad pattern of values which constitutes a tradition or cultural heritage. A similar dialectic of horizons is had in searching with others for the implications of such a `text' for appropriate social action in a time of crisis.
We do not enter upon this task of understanding with a blank mind as Locke supposed, or proceed to suspend all judgment under a pervasive Cartesian doubt. Instead, we summon up all of our resources to construe an initial or prior conception of the meaning of the document or of the words of the one with whom we are in dialogue. Gadamer terms this a `fore-understanding', or `pre-judgment', and hence `prejudice' in a non-pejorative sense. This is a tentative projection of the general meaning of our interlocutor. The content of this anticipation is not an objective, fixed content to which we come; but what we produce as we participate in the evolution of the tradition and thereby further determine ourselves. For our horizon reflects not only the content of the past, but the sensibility of the time in which I stand and the life project in which I am engaged. This pre-judgment is gradually corrected in the process of reading the text in detail until it corresponds to the meaning the text has in its distinctive relation to me. In this manner the
content of the tradition is creatively unveiled as it is brought progressively and historically into the present and, through the present, passes into the future.9
Time then is not a barrier or separation, but rather a bridge and opportunity for the process of understanding; it is a fertile ground filled with experience, custom and tradition. The contribution of time lies in opening new sources of understanding which reveal unsuspected elements and even whole new dimensions of meaning in the tradition.10
Horizons also are not limitations, but vantage points, for the mind as open or mobile is capable of being aware of its present horizon and of transcending this through the acknowledgement of my other horizons and of the horizons of others. Indeed, historic movement implies precisely that we not be bound by one horizon, but move in and out of horizons, for it is the very act of becoming aware of our horizon which establishes historical consciousness, puts our horizon at risk in dialogue with others, and thereby liberates us from the limitations of our horizon. When our initial projection of the meaning of the `text' or of the other will not bear up under progressive questioning we are justified in making needed adjustments in our projection of meaning and in the horizon from which we were thinking.
Questioning and Openness
It is important then that we retain a questioning attitude. Rather than simply following through with our previous ideas until a change is forced upon us, true openness or sensitivity to new meaning requires a willingness continually to revise our initial projection or expectation of meaning, that is, our horizon. This is neither neutrality as regards the meaning of the tradition, nor an abandonment of passionate concern regarding action towards the future. Rather, to be aware of our own horizon and to adjust it in dialogue with others is to make it work for us in our effort to discover the new and rich implications of our tradition which are required for our times.
Because such discovery depends upon the questions, the art of discovery is the art of questioning. Consequently, whether working alone or in conjunction with others, our effort at finding the answers should be, not to suppress a question, but to reinforce and unfold it. To the degree that its probabilities are intensified it can serve as a searchlight to bring out new meaning. This contrasts to opinion which suppresses questions and to arguing which searches out the weakness of the others' argument; as dialogue, conversation is a mutual and cooperative search for truth. Through eliminating errors and working out a common meaning truth is progressively unveiled.11
Further, it should not be expected that the text or tradition will answer but one question, for the sense of the text reaches beyond what even its author intended. Because of the dynamic character of being emerging into time, the horizon is never definitively fixed. At each step a new dimension of the potentialities of the text is opened to understanding, for the meaning of the text lives with the consciousness, not of its author, but of the many persons living in history and with others. This dialectic of our horizon with that of the others intensifies our ability to ask questions and to receive answers which are ever new.12
Finally, this openness consists not merely in receptivity to new information, but in a recognition of our historical, situated and hence limited vision. Real escape from that which has deceived us and held us captive is to be found not through those who are well integrated into our culture and social structures, for dialogue with those of similar horizons opens one only to a limited degree. Real liberation from our most basic limitations and deceptions comes only with a conscious effort to take account of the horizons of those who differ notably, whether as another nation, or as a distinct culture intermingled with our own, or--still more definitively--as living on the margins of all of these societies and integrated into none.
Finally, such openness is directed primarily, not to others as persons who are to be surveyed objectively or obeyed unquestioningly, but to ourselves. It opens our horizons, extends our ability to listen to others, and assimilates the implications of their answers for changes in our own positions. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that the cultural heritage has something new to say to us. The characteristic hermeneutic attitude of effective historical consciousness therefore is not methodological sureness, but openness or readiness for experience.13 Seen in these terms our heritage is not closed, but the basis for a life that is ever new, more inclusive, and more rich.
HERITAGE AND CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS
The relation between hermeneutics and social critique is dialectical. The social sciences provide an indispensable element of awareness and hence of emancipation in the world of increasingly technical and convoluted structures. But heritage and tradition must provide essential context and the basic principles for the critique to which these sciences contribute. Paul Ricoeur has attempted to codify some of the contributions of the tradition.14
First, critique is carried out within a context of interests which establish the frame of meaning. The sequence of technical, practical and emancipating interests reflects the emergence of man out of nature and corresponds to the developmental phase of moral sensitivity. Habermas studies Kohlberg closely on this and employs his work.15 To the question of the basis of these interests, however, no adequate answer is provided. They are not empirically justifiable or they would be found at the level of technical interests. Neither do they constitute a theory as a network of working hypotheses for then they would be regional and justified at most by the interest in emancipation, and trapped in a vicious circle.
The only proper description of these interests as truly all-embracing must be found in the direction of Heidegger's existentials and hence of being itself with its unity, truth and goodness. These are hidden only in being so present that they are in need of being unveiled by hermeneutic methods. Thus, Gadamer's hermeneutic project on the clarification of fore
understandings or `prejudices' and Habermas' critical work on interests by the social sciences, though not identical, share common ground.
Secondly, in the end, critiques of ideologies appear to share characteristics common to those of the historical hermeneutic sciences. Both focus upon the development of communicative action by free persons. Their common effort is to avoid a reduction of all human communication to instrumental action and institutionalization for it is there that manipulation takes place. The success or failure in extending the critique of interests beyond instrumental action to communicative action determines whether the community will promote or destroy its members. Such critique is unlikely ever to be successful, however, if we have no experience of communication with our own cultural heritage. For in a dialogue distortions can be identified as such only if there is a basis of consensus which must concern not only an empty ideal or regulative idea, but one that has been experienced, lived and shared. "He who is unable to interpret his past may also be incapable of projecting concretely his interest in emancipation."16
Thirdly, today communicative action needs more than a model to suggest what might not otherwise occur to our minds, for the rationalization of human life has become such that all of its aspects are controlled pervasively in terms of instrumental action. Whereas Marx could refer in his day to surplus value as the motive of production, this is true no longer. Instead, the system itself of technology has become the key to productivity and all is coordinated toward the support and promotion of this system; it is the ideology of our day. As a result the distinction between communicative action and instrumental action has been overridden and control no longer can be expected from communicative action.
This raises a new type of question, namely, how can the interest in emancipation be kept alive. Undoubtedly, communicative action must be reawakened and made to live if we are not to be simply subjects--indeed `slaves'--of the technological machine. But how is this to be done; whence can this life be derived if the present situation is pervasively occupied and shaped by science and technology as the new, and now all-encompassing, master? It can be done only by drawing upon our heritage in the manner suggested by Heidegger. We need to retrieve or reach back into our heritage--now as never before--in order to find the radically new resources needed for emancipation in an increasingly dominated world.
Finally, there is a still more fundamental sense in which critique, rather than being opposed to tradition or taking a questioning attitude thereto, is itself an appeal to tradition. Criticism appeals unabashedly to the heritage of emancipation it has received from the Enlightenment. But this tradition has longer roots which reach back to the liberating acts of the Exodus and the Resurrection. "Perhaps" writes Ricoeur "there would be no more interest in emancipation, no more anticipation of freedom, if the Exodus and Resurrection were effaced from the memory of mankind."17
According to the proper norms of communicative action, these historical acts should be taken also in their symbolic sense in which liberation and emancipation express the root interest basic to traditional cultures. In this manner they point to fundamental dimensions of being, namely, to Being Itself as the unique existent in whom the alienated can be reunited, to the logos which founds subjectivity without an estranging selfishness, and to the spirit through whom human freedom can be creative in history. Remembrance and celebration of this heritage provide needed inspiration and direction both for any in power who might be indifferent to the needs of the poor and alienated and for the alienated poor themselves. On this basis all can reach out in mutual comprehension, reconciliation and concern to form a social unity marked by emancipation and peace.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.
*For a more extended treatment of these themes, and of the work of critical hermeneutics, see the author's Tradition and Contemporary Life: Hermeneutics of Perennial Wisdom and Social Change (Madras: Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, 1986).
1. Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences, Parts I and II; and Meditations on the First Philosophy, Meditation I, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, trans. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1969).
2. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1975) pp. 241-45.
3. John Caputo, "A Phenomenology of Moral Sensibility: Moral Emotion," George F. McLean, Frederick Ellrod et al., eds., Act and Agent: Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Education and The University Press of America, l986), pp. 199-222.
4. Ibid., pp. 245-53.
5. Ibid. Gadamer emphasizes knowledge as the basis of tradition in contrast to those who would see it pejoratively as the result of arbitrary will. It is important to add to knowledge the free acts which, e.g., give birth to a nation and shape the attitudes and values of successive generations. As an example one might cite the continuing impact had by the Magna Carta through the Declaration of Independence upon life in North America, or of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in the national life of so many countries in Europe and Latin America.
6. Ibid., p. 254.
7. Ibid., p. 258.
8. Ibid., pp. 278-86.
9. Ibid., pp. 261-64.
10. Ibid., pp. 267-71, 235-44.
11. Ibid., pp. 325-32.
12. Ibid., pp. 335-40.
13. Ibid., pp. 324-25.
14. Jurgen Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976), pp. 72-73; Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon, 1971), pp. 196-209; Thomas A. McCarthy, Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1978).
15. Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," in T. Misbal, ed., Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York, 1971), pp. 151-236.
16. Paul Ricoeur, "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology" in J.B. Thompson, ed., Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 90-97.
17. Ibid., pp. 99 and 100.