CHAPTER XII

PROLOGUE

This paper has three themes: 1) the crisis of metaphysics 2) the crisis of human morality in the technological urbanity 3) the inventive spirituality of eco-ethica. These themes are in logical and structural connection and therefore systematically constitute one philosophical perspective. Hence, I would like to reflect on them not separately but as interrelated.

Doubt about the Equality of Metaphysics with Ontology

First of all I would like to point out the general decline in the identification of metaphysics with ontology. In my opinion this is the first symptom that the theoretical authority of metaphysics recently has been brought into doubt. In another words the metaphysics as ontology is now facing universal suspicion. We can think on this in two ways, namely, from de facto and de jure.

a) De facto: The works of Heidegger or Sartre are generally regarded as modern metaphysical researches, but actually their original attempts sometimes are not directly ontological, because their principal theme is not always being or as subject of ontology, but just the contrary "the negation of being" or µ or Nichts Al Nichten in the later writings of Heidegger, or le neant or neantisation in the case of Sartre. Because the goal of many modern thinkers is not being but nothingness or bottomless as in the case of Keiji Nishitani, or the absolute Nothingness as Negativity as in the case of Kitaro Nishida, in the place of ontology nihilology now is becoming gradually the principal theme of metaphysics. Moreover thanatological or moriological thought (Morior ergo sum.) is thriving among many existential philosophers. Death as the principle of thanatological retrospective historicity is no doubt the end of life as phenomenality, which signifies in many thinkers the limit of the being. Now the limit of the being is either the beginning of "the nothingness" or the beginning of "the Beyond the being ( )", which latter is more than "the real being ( )"; that is the name of God in the last half of this century as in Levinas or in my calonological theodicee. So, in the place of ontology and in the direction opposite to nihilology metaphysics has been installed as de-ontology, as supra-ontology or better, meontology as hyperontology. So, between nihilology and hyperontology traditional ontology regrets its past insufficiency, beyond which metaphysics now is changing into either nihilology or meontology.

Comparative Reflexion of Language Concerning the Verb for Being

We have considered only the de facto problematic decline of the identity of metaphysics with ontology, but as indicated this must be thought about also de jure.

b) De jure: One of the most enduring bases for the primacy of ontology is the linguistic character of the Indo-european language, namely, the equivocation of the verb "to be", namely "To on legetai pollachos" the formal identity of the sign for existence as ontic verb and the sign for the copula as categorical verb. This equivocation was considered universal, as indicated by Aristotle's saying " " (Being is spoken of in many senses) and by Thomas Aquinas' "Ens dicitur dupliciter" (being is said in two ways). But these propositions as starting points for discovering the logical possibility of the so-called analogia entis should not be regarded as universal in the sense of being general characteristics of all human languages. The linguistic support of the analogia antis found in the equivocation of the verb "to be" is no longer universal in view of the comparative study of philosophy. I repeat, one of the most important ontological principles in the classical metaphysics in Occident is analogia antis standing on the linguistic ground. The equivocation with the use of "to be" ("Ens dicitur dupliciter") is only a parochial grammatical phenomenon of the Indo-european language-family. In the Chinese language, for instance, there is no grammatical necessity to have a copula and so there is no possibility for analogia entis in the sense of Aristotelian thought. Also in the Japanese language, in an entirely different way from the Chinese language, "To be" can not be said in two ways; "to be" is classified in a more complicated manner in the Japanese view of the world.

Here is a professor. Kokoni Kyoju ga iru.

Here is a box. Kokoni Hako ga aru.

He is a professor. Kare wa Kyoju (de aru).

He is black. Kate wa kuroi (without copula).

Here is God. Kokoni Kami imasu (owasu).

In the indo-european languages the signs for existence, for the categorical copula and for the existence of the superior are entirely the same

In the Japanese language the signs for existence are usually tripliciter, because the be-verb for living existence and for the lifeless are different, and more-over the be-verb for the superior being like God, the emperor and respectable persons is also different from the be-verb for the normal being.

Therefore there is no grammatical basis for the philosophical possibility of the analogia entis in the oriental language. On the contrary there are two very interesting grammatical equalities concerning the linguistic form, namely there is no difference between the single object and the plural objects concerning the form of the be-verb, and there is no difference in the negative form for the verb, that is to say, one always uses "Nai" after the positive form. There may be "analogia of nihil" or "analogia negationis" in almost all the languages in the East.

Metaphysics as First Philosophy

The original name of the Aristotelian manuscripts concerning "being as being" and the supreme Being as the first cause was, as is well known: or first philosophy. According to this traditional authority, metaphysics always has been identified with the first philosophy. For this reason, ontology as metaphysics has been regarded as first philosophy. But as we have seen in the previous section, metaphysics is now separated from ontology by various philosophers. Metaphysics was first philosophy, because as ontology it treated the first being. But gradually the metaphysics is leaving ontology. Thus in the course of time metaphysics is losing the authority of the first philosophy. We can reflect on this problem also de facto and de jure.

a) De facto: Husserl's "Erste Philosophie" can not be exactly regarded as ontology or metaphysics. If we want to maintain the word metaphysics, it is at most metaphysics of cognition and exactly this "Erste Philosophie" is Phänomenologie as the principal methodology of Erkennen. In the case of Levinas the first philosophy is ethics. If I may touch upon my own philosophy, the first philosophy is calonology which is to say axiology of beauty or philosophy of beauty. Moreover I am now searching out the possibility for meta-technica instead of metaphysics. Many and various first philosophies are found among the many thinkers and the name of first philosophy is being separated from metaphysics.

b) De jure: Philosophical interests are concentrating more and more on human existence, human culture and human activities. Therefore instead of in nature as physis history takes place in the authoritative dimension as the primary object of philosophical reflexion. As is well known, as early as in Hegel nature is but one stage of the processive history of the movement of the spirit (Geist). Hence, Hegel's so-called metaphysics was indeed not metaphysics but meta-historia.

Metaphysics as Theologia Naturalis?

As every person knows the name other than "prote philosophia" for the nameless Aristotelian manuscripts which later came to be named as "ta meta ta Physika" was theologike of which the perfect form was episteme theologike which is different from theologia as mythological history. Aristotelian theologike is translated in the latin Christian tradition into theologia naturalis, because it was performed through lumen naturale as natural reason and not through revelation. Perhaps the Thomist can dare today to say that the demonstration of the existence of God is really possible through traditional metaphysics even in view of modern research in the natural sciences. But who would dare assert its possibility in view of the technological construction and destruction in nature? In my opinion, as Vico says, theologia civil is as theologia historica must take the place of the old theologia naturalis. We can comment in two ways on this problem as well.

a) De facto: Since Fabro there have been many projects to discover the dynamic Platonic elements in Thomistic metaphysics, that is to say, to eliminate the character of theologia naturalis from the Thomistic system. Scheler's theodicée from the sentiment of regret (Reue) has already prepared the diminution of the old authority of theologia naturalis.

b) De jure: Lumen naturale has its logics, but the logic is not only the syllogism of the "Organon", but also the dialectics invented by Hegel as the logic of history. In the Orient there are some other types of logic as in Laotse or especially as in Tschuang-Tschou, who could demonstrate the One beyond being (having) and nothingness as the supreme Transcendent. (Cf. my work: Betrachtungen uber Das Eine, Kap. VII-XI. S. 82-130.)

Metaphysics is Meta-Physica, It is the Reflexion of the World

Metaphysics in its concrete form is widely and strictly criticized as seen above. Metaphysics as ontology, as reflexion of the analogia entis, as first philosophy, and as theologia naturalis, all are criticized from the standpoints of many serious modern thinkers. We must here pose a question: what really is the essence of metaphysics. It is meta-physica; it must be philosophical meta-noesis of nature as physis. Metaphysics must retain its essential form, that is to say, it must be philosophic peri tes physeos, not in the sense of a science of nature as physica but in the sense of "philosophy of nature."

Fundamental Reflexion on Nature

a) The word nature as physis is in my opinion a strictly Greco-roman tradition revised by the Judeo-Christian faith. The authentic Chinese word for translating nature is astonishing. It is not dzizen ( ) which is used as the translation of nature, but (Heaven). As every one knows in the Occident Heaven is the word for the transcendent God in post-Hellenic terminology. It is the symbol of the Super-natural as opposed to nature, which according to the Judeo-Christian tradition is created by the Super-natural. So in the Occident there is a vertical contrast between the Supernatural and nature.

b) What is the opposite concept to the nature as (Heaven) in the Orient, where the Super-natural as Super-Heaven is impossible, namely, where the Supernatural does not exist in general. In order to respond to this question, one can not nominate the earth as the opposite, because sometimes Heaven-and-Earth as the cosmic whole have same semantic value as Heaven. What is then the opposite to the Heaven or Heaven-and-Earth as nature in the Orient? To respond to this question we must bear in mind a second word translating nature, namely (so by self, a certain situation by itself). It is the natural situation of a being and also cosmic totality, to which the artificial or the technics, namely the man-made is the opposite. Therefore in the Orient there is a horizontal contrast between nature as (Heaven) and the manmade as the technical. In Japanese myth, namely in "Kojiki", we can discover in the time of gods their co-existence in the contrast between kuni (land) or Hera (field) as in external nature and yahirodono (a large palace, ya=8, hiro=arm's span, arm's length, dono=tono=palace; and so, yahirodono means literally the hall whose area is 8 arm's length square) as, technically, where the gods work and respond.

c) I must remark here that in the authentic occidental tradition there is no such contrast between nature and the technical, which latter belongs to nature in the Occident. As witness I cite the first line of the famous and first metaphysics, namely that of Aristotle. "Pantes anthropoie tou eidenai oregontai physei (Omnes homines scire desiderant naturaliter)". This means that all persons wish to know by nature. Therefore every sort of knowledge is a form or extension of natural desire. The technical ( ) is also a part of human knowledge, which belongs to nature. After this line therefore, he enumerates many sorts of knowledge to which techne belongs. The technical belongs to nature. Therefore, in the occidental tradition, the technical is a variation of nature.

d) Both in the Occident and in the Orient there is a theory of two worlds. In the Occident there are the phenomenal world of nature and the sphere of the Super-natural to which the dimension of idea or of essence belongs. Phenomenology must be interpreted here either as a voyage of the Spirit or as its reduction to essence, both of which are semantic nostalgia for the Super-natural.

In the Orient the two contrasting worlds are composed by the phenomenal world as nature itself and by the phenomenal technical dimension as man-made. Both are external phenomenalities and phenomenology, as conservation of phenomenality, is required. For instance some buddhistic philosophers say the phenomenon is itself truth, that is to say, the phenomenon itself is essence. The most important value is not always the internal universal structure but the individual external phenomenon such as a beautiful face. Here the exteriority as phenomenon is itself a value. Interiority is a unique value only for human morality; otherwise, for natural phenomenon or for technical phenomenon what is important is exteriority. Also in the case of morality there are natural phenomenon such as one's physical attitude; therefore sometimes even in the moral dimension exteriority must be regarded as an important value.

e) Today, in human experience the two types of theory of the two worlds no longer are parochial but broadly human. As a daily fact we must take for granted that there are two worlds: nature and technological structures as external environments. If metaphysics as metaphysis (metanatura) is necessary, there must be a need for metaphysics as metatechnica.

WHAT IS METATECHNICA?

"What is metatechnica?" is not yet an authentic question, which requires that any thinking about metatechnica demonstrates its logical possibility. We must think about meta-technica from the beginning; we must ask the question of its object. It must be technica, as our second environment as human beings. The first step of the thinking act as environment is description, which requires the possibility of classification. In order to have a principle of classification for technical world we must reflect, "what was the principle of classification of natural world?" This was the form as shape and hence principle of specification. In the natural world the form of a thing shows its function, as the pointed thing with thorns sharply piercing, and so the form can be a decisive principle of classification. In such a way morphology is very important in natural science. In Greek the keyword eidos, or idea, means form. Does the form have this function of specification in the technological environment? In our technological world there is too much iso-morphic and hetero-functional apparatus for form to retain its meaning of classification. Metatechnica now raises a critique of traditional philosophy, thought out in terms of nature. In technological structures, not form but function is the principle of classification. In nature cats and birds which belong to the animal realm are in the same category as human beings which also belong to the animal realm. But in the modern metro station the automatic ticket machine is by its function of selling tickets in the same category as human beings, whereas cats and birds are entirely excluded from this functional identity or category. Therefore the animals, which in nature are familiar to the human beings now in the technological dimension are alienated from this natural familiarity and are relegated to the category of non-ef-fective things like broken tools, far more remote from the human beings than are a lifeless machine which makes function according to human plans. Hence, meta-technica is realized in a way similar to the self-consciousness of mankind about its world.

Change of Character of Techne

Techne was pragmatic knowledge or skill in both Greek and Chinese antiquity. But in the course of the centuries it has been incarnate in matter and has come to evoke, besides knowledge, the image of various efficient tools for human activity. Moreover, since the invention of machinery in the industrial revolution, techné has been incarnate principally both in metal as matter and in internal energy like steam and electricity as the invisible force. But in order to make such internal energy real and effective we must have an engine as a system constructed by scientific knowledge.

From that date on techne as the technical has been called technology. It has spread extensively throughout the world as the most effective power for facilitating human life. Nevertheless, techné as technology always has been considered an effective tool, which is to say that technology remained only a means until about 1950.

In this second half of the 20th century techné has been changing in character into something entirely different from the means relating humanity to its aims. Technology is now our environment, our circumstance. Like Nature in the past, this new context has its own aims, independent of humanity, and as an ontic and integrated mechanized whole sets its own course.

Informative Society and Change in Memory

The technological structure has its own semantic communication system whose general components are alphabetical signs and numbers, e.g., daily communication in business is possible only through telephone numbers or telex numbers; in order to enter our own house equipped with an electronic safety system, we need a key number. Without knowing the code-number for a certain function we cannot do anything even with our own things. Not our name but the number of our passport and our I.D. at our place of work are our means of identification and recognition.

As such a situation requires memory for the series of numbers or alphabetical signs in order to participate in the social activity, memory has changed its nature. Formally, memory was directed to the past, historical perspective, to classical texts and elemental principles for mental activity; the content of memory had its own sense and significance. The function of memory for the culture was to bring to life the images or meanings which we could not see or touch concretely at the moment, In our present situation in society, however, memory has no relation to the culture. It has operative power to open the door with a key number or to make conversation possible in our daily life with telephone numbers. In the gigantic technologically integrated system the memory of a secret key number has decisive and effective powers for extremely good or extremely bad deeds, even remotely. Number is a personal operator in our age; our age is guided by numbers.

Language as Communicative Sign

Language as communicative signs is a public good. There was no theft in language itself without plagiarism regarding linguistic composition. Through recording machines and bugs one can steal the conference or meeting through its language; as public goods it is also the object of theft in the technological society. Operative language such as key numbers in the technological structure is not a public good but a private tool in the techno-operative dimension. There is therefore the danger of theft of the private memories of such numbers or signs. A new internal type of theft is thus possible in our urban circumstance. This seems similar to plagiarism, but there is an essential difference. Plagiarism is the mental theft of a public good, whereas theft of memory is a mental theft of a private power. This is a new type of crisis in urban technological morality. We can enumerate many other important crises in this category.

To Automaton (to automaton) and the Automat

In the text of Aristotelian "Ta meta ta physika" there is one enigmatic word, "to automaton". Many scholars have been perplexed by this word. W. D. Ross thought that it was an automatic mechanical doll, a toy. It is a wonderful little tool with which a rich child plays and there could have been only a few, even in the prosperous state of Athens, because Aristotle writes about it as a wondrous miracle for people.

In our urban environment there are many automats or vending machines which enable us to obtain a certain desired object such as a drink or cigarettes through inserting coins and pushing an operative button; everyone now uses them without wonder. According to the report of the ministry of industry there are over 5,500,000 of these in Japan including the ticket-automat in traffic stations. As the total Japanese population is approximately 120,000,000, proportionally about 20 persons have one automat. At least in the urban centers, the number of automats is greater than that of any big trees. That symbolizes the fact that the technological structure is our environment. I am almost sure that at least in some part of the urban dimension we encounter more automats than trees.

"To automaton" of Greek classical antiquity gave the human being wonder and joyful consolation, because "to automaton" was an exceptional tool. What does the modern automat of our technological megalith give us? Our automat presents us with convenient and effective things for daily life. It functions according to the needs of the mechanical structure. Normally there is no wonder concerning the automat; wonder arises only if it does not function when we insert coins and push the right button. Therefore our automat is not only the symbol of the fact that our environment is a technological edifice, but also the symbol of technological operations. It is the idol of mechanical necessity, the mirror of technological function, the technology in miniature.

When we get the desired thing from the automat, who of us would say thank you or at least "thanks". It is not necessary that we need say thanks: because we gave the coin and pushed the button the desired thing must come out. If the desired thing does not come out, we complain about it. So linguistic activity related to the automat in our time is not to thank, but to complain.

In our automat-time we can get what we desire without the word "thanks": the more automats, the less thanks. This is a very remarkable contemporary spiritual reaction concerning objects of desire. We forget to thank because there is no direct human relation face-to-face on the occasion of receiving the desired object. Its implications extend to religious spirituality. Today in every religion the essence of prayer is regarded as the request for something directed to God or Buddha, whereas originally in every religion the principal element of prayer was thanks. That means our spiritual attitude has changed itself through the technology whose symbol is the automat. This socio-psychological phenomenon is very important in the domain of pedagogy from the viewpoint of the eco-ethica, which must assume the function of moral education for the future. If this situation proceeds, in the course of years, a generation will come into existence which has never known the feeling of saying thanks in response to obtaining a daily necessity. Such persons must be educated in a different manner from that which presupposes the old mentality. This too is a task of eco-ethica.

Instead of the Accusative, the Dative!

In the inter-subjectivity of daily life the lack of a "dative-relation" and the monopolizing inclination of an "accusative-relation" to the other accelerates this lack of thanks, because the thanks evoked by someone's act of giving to me presupposes a "dative-relation" of the nominative other to me.

We must be sure that there is another type of influence of technology than that of the classical terminology of alienation. We are not alienated from the machine by technology, but we are internally transformed to some degenerate existence through the invading of the power of technology. That is the predominance of the accusative-relation, the two-term relation of inserting a coin (accusative) and pushing a button (accusative) as the act of the person (nominative) who wishes to have a desired thing (accusative). In this relation the machine seems to appear in the form of dative, this is not the original dative but the locative. So the importance of the nominativedative-relation in intersubjectivity must be recognized, because "to give to" and "thanks be to" are principles of the ethical act.

International Institute for Philosophy and Aesthetics

Tokyo, Japan

In Japanese we say thanks with the dative, as in Latin gratias tibi ago. But in modern European languages one uses the accusative with thanks like "thank you" or "Je vous remercie." But in these languages there is no difference between accusative and dative with respect to form. In German one uses the dative like Ich Danke Ihnen. So we can say that the "you" of "thank you" or the "vous" of "Je vous remercie" are half-dative. In any case, without dative-relation there is no act of giving to a person. In order to make clear this importance of the dative relation, I use here "thanks be to".