INTRODUCTION⁽⁶⁷⁾

I am fully aware of the fact that the comparative work between Lao-tzu, as a Chinese sage who lived two thousand and five hundred years ago, and Husserl, as a Western philosopher who flourished in the twentieth century, would face many insoluble difficulties. The main difficulty lies in the difference between the Tao-te-king and the Husserliana. The former was written in soliloquies and aphorisms from the mouth of a prophet, whereas the latter was the work of criticism and systematization by a scientifically-minded thinker.

Disregarding their distance in space and time, the difference in their modes of thought and in the roles they played in their times, I intend to compare Lao-tzu and Husserl through their similarities. It seems to me that as regards their "Wesensschau", both Lao-tzu and Husserl employ the same method of thinking to examine the epistemological assumptions on which they try to found their ontology, for through a methodological epoché both reach the starting point of epistemology and ontology. In this paper I will show that the two thinkers have a similar methodological approach from knowledge to existence and from epistemology to ontology.

This paper is divided into three main parts. The first part deals with the use of negative terms by Tao-te-king. I will show how Lao-tzu dominates the Chinese negative terms to demonstrate his idea about Tao, the Ultimate Being, as the directive principle for the human being, and about the meaning of life as the practical principle for human life.

In the second part, the Husserlian phenomenological method will be discussed, from his eidetic reduction, through transcendental reduction, to phenomenological reduction. Finally, the ultimate phenomenological residuum, i.e., pure consciousness, will be reached as the starting point of all scientific research.

The third part will deal with the comparison between Lao-tzu and Husserl. Here, the author will attempt a different approach to considering the above-mentioned three stages of negative terms by Lao-tzu and three stages of Husserl's method.

NEGATIVE TERMS IN THE TAO-TE-KING

Anyone well-versed with classical Chinese will find that in the Tao-te-king there are many negative terms used in different ways. But how or in what way these negative terms exactly will be used by Lao-tzu seems to be ignored, even by many sinologists and Taoist experts. Within almost five thousand words I found the negative terms more than 545 times. The modes of negation vary in different stages and grades from the frivolous and partial negation to the absolute and total. Further and deeper discussion is needed here from a philosophical point of view.

1) First, the frivolous and partial negations in Tao-te-king such as " " diminution, " " small, " " soft, " " weak, " " rare, " " few, " " still, " " formless, etc., manifest themselves in the following groups and manners:

a) as verb:

" " Empties their minds, weakens their wills. Chap. 3.

" " To diminish selfishness and to make rare the desires. Chap. 19.

b) as adjective:

" " They who know me are few. Chap. 70.

" " In a little state with a small population. Chap. 80.

" " How still and formless it was. Chap. 25.

c) as substantive:

" " We look at it, and we do not see it, and we name it the Equability. We listen to it, and we do not hear it, and we name it the Inaudibility. We try to grasp it, and do not get hold of it, and we name it the Subtlety. Chap. 14.

More numerous and deeper negations come to light as follows:

" " is not, " " do not, " " none, " " cannot, " " cease, " " renounce, " " disregard, " " put away, " " lost, etc.

" " The Tao that can be trodden, is not the enduring and unchanging Tao; the name that can be named is not the enduring and unchanging name. Chap. 1.

" " Not to value and employ men of superior ability is the way to keep the people from rivalry among themselves; not to prize articles which are difficult to procure is the way to keep them from becoming thieves; . . . not to show them what is likely to excite their desires is the way to keep their minds from disorder. Chap. 3.

" " He constantly tries to keep them in ignorance and apathy. Chap. 3.

" " Everlastingly without desire. Chap. 34.

" " In loving the people and ruling the state, can he not proceed without any knowledge? Chap. 10.

" " Heaven and Earth do not act from the impulse of any wish to be benevolent . . . the sage does not act from any wish to be benevolent. Chap. 5.

" " And when one does not wrangle, no one finds fault with him. Chap. 8.

" " When gold and jade fill the hall, their possessor cannot keep them safe. Chap. 9.

" " When the great Tao ceased to be observed, benevolence and righteousness came into vogue. Chap. 18.

" " Renouncing sageness and discarding wisdom . . . renouncing benevolence and discarding righteousness . . . renouncing artful contrivances and discarding profit . . . Chap. 19.

" " Renouncing learning there is not trouble. Chap. 20.

" " Hence, the sage puts away excessive effort, extravagance, and easy indulgence. Chap. 29.

" " When the Tao was lost, its virtue appeared; when its virtue was lost, benevolence appeared; when benevolence was lost, righteousness appeared; when righteousness was lost, rites appeared. Chap. 38.

2) The first stage of negation is oriented toward some objects which the people often desire and value, while the second stage of negation is objectless and simply demands that the subject avoid all acting. That is Wu-wei (no action therefore does nothing).

" " The Tao in its everlasting mode of Wu-wei. Chap. 37.

" " He diminishes it and again diminishes it, till he arrives at Wu-wei. Chap. 48.

" " I know hereby what advantage belongs to Wu-wei. There are few in the world who attain to the teaching without words, and the advantage arising from Wu-wei. Chap. 43.

" " I will Wu-wei, and the people will automatically be transformed. Chap. 57.

" " It is the way of the Tao to Wu-wei. Chap. 63.

" " The sage Wu-wei, and therefore does no harm. Chap. 64.

The Wu-wei of the Tao is the metaphysical foundation for the sage who practiced Wu-wei in imitating Tao. Hence, Wu-wei is the practical principle for the Taoists in all ethical and political situations. Wu-wei is also a general and comprehensive term of all the above-mentioned terms of both frivolous, partial negations, and deeper negations. There is an ontological series of Wu-wei. At the top of this series stand the Tao, which practiced its own Wu-wei. Immediately under the Tao lies nature, which in its everlasting mode practices Wu-wei. Then comes the sage, who practices Wu-wei in imitating the Tao. The sage is, however, the example for the people, just like the Tao is the example for the sage. When the sage practices his Wu-wei, the people will imitate and practice Wu-wei, too.

In this second stage of negation, all the activities of the subject would be excluded through "Wu-wei". The everlasting Tao remains in its own existence only, just as all the objective existence of the mundane world would be bracketed in the first stage of negation.

3) From Tao's action, or better, Tao's Wu-wei (no action), Lao-tzu invented the very essence of Tao which is called "Wu" (Non-Being). The term "Wu" would be used here as substantive. It is negation itself. Lao-tzu said:

" " Hence (the Tao is) always Wu (Nothingness), we try to contemplate its mystery. Chap. 1.⁽⁶⁸⁾

" " Therefore one does not take action in order to be available and be useful. Chap. 11.

" " Ten-thousand-things under Heaven are generated from Yu (Being), and Yu is generated from Wu (Non-Being). Chap. 40.

" " The Tao generates one, one generates two, two generates three, three generates ten thousand things. Chap. 42.⁽⁶⁹⁾

If we make a synthesis from Tao-te-king, chapter 40 and 42, we can easily find that the universe begins to exist through a process of generation. In the beginning was Tao, whose name was Wu (Non-Being). Wu generates Yu. Yu generates Ten-thousand-things under Heaven. According to Western Aristotelian philosophy, Yu (Being) is reality, while Wu (Non-Being) is nothingness. But in Tao-te-king Wu (Non-Being) is super-reality, it is the fountain of all beings, while Yu (Being) comes from Wu, and Yu generates ten-thousand-things. The fundamental difficulties in understanding Lao-tzu's Tao-te-king lie not only in its being brief, or in its obscure terminology, but also in its controversial and even contradictory usage of philosophical terms. According to Lao-tzu the Tao must be the very Being of all Beings in its ontological sense. But the expression of Being is called, by Lao-tzu, Wu (Non-Being), which is just like negation qua negation. The metaphysical and ontological Yu (Being) would be transformed into the epistemological and ethical Wu (Non-Being). This paradoxical use of terms in Tao-te-king played a role of meta-contradiction, which is called " ". The affirmative words seem to be expressed in their contrary forms (Chap. 78). Therefore, the term Wu (Non-Being) in its epistemological sense means controversially the ontological Yu (Being).

Furthermore, Wu-wei (no action) means in a contrary sense the Yu-wei (action), that is, "The Tao in its everlasting mode does nothing, but there is nothing which it does not do" (Chap. 37).

In this manner of reasoning all negative terms used by Lao-tzu have positive meanings. Hence, we can insist that although Lao-tzu verbally denied all things, yet beyond this negation there is a strong affirmation in which positive ontological content appears. Furthermore, the negation qua negation (Wu) is the essence of Tao. And the negation of all action (Wu-wei) is the attribute of Tao. In the ethical orientation by Lao-tzu, Wu-wei (no action) is the practical principle for nature and the human being, especially in the social and political situation, even in the ethical sphere. In consequence, all the frivolous, partial and even deeper negations play the role of the prae-ambula for the way of negation.

To sum up, for Lao-tzu's way of negation we have to emphasize that the frivolous and partial negation such as "diminishing selfishness and making rare the desires" (Chap. 19) or the deeper negation such as "the constant trials to keep them ignorant and desireless" (Chap. 3), denied only the objects of our knowledge, but not the action of the subject, still less the subject him or herself. That is the first stage of negation.

In the second stage, however, the action and even the activity of the subject would be excluded, i.e., Wu-wei (no action). The reason for Wu-wei lies only in the attributes of Tao, which practices Wu-wei. Tao's Wu-wei is an example for the human being, who has to practice Wu-wei, too.

The third stage of Lao-tzu's negative way of thinking is oriented not only towards human action, but also towards the Tao itself. According to Lao-tzu, the Tao in its very essence is Wu (Non-Being), because it cannot be trodden, and cannot be named (Chap. 1). Therefore epistemologically Tao is Wu. In a contrary sense, however, Wu (Non-Being) means in ontology the highest being. In the sense of Wu (Non-Being) as the very essence of Tao, Tao itself is excluded in the extreme sense. Lao-tzu's philosophy is therefore a negative philosophy in its epistemological orientation.

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

Earlier, I proposed that the Husserlian epoché developed through three periods, namely, the eidetic, transcendental and philosophical. According to his writings I emphasize also the following schema in the evolution of the term "epoché":

Starting point: Logical Investigation (1900/01)--conceives the law of epoche

Process: Rigorous Science (1910/11)--the use of epoché

End point.

Starting point: Ideas I (1913)--the law of epoché

Process: First Philosophy (1923/24)--system of epoché

Cartesian Meditations (1929)--correction of this system

End point: Crisis (1936)--mature use of epoché.⁽⁷⁰⁾

It is interesting to note that the process of the phenomenological method is almost equivalent to the chronological order of Husserl's writings. These can be divided into three periods:

Descriptive Phenomenology:

This first period begins with his dissertation Beiträge zur Variatirechnung (1882) and ends with the Logical Investigation (1900/01).

Transcendental Phenomenology:

This second period extends from 1900/01 to 1916. The main work during the period is without doubt the Ideen zu einer Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie (1913).

Constitutive Phenomenology:

This third period, from 1917 to 1932, has as its representative work the Cartesianische Meditationen (1929).⁽⁷¹⁾

The coincidence of these divisions implies the following issues:

1) In Book I of the Ideen I, Husserl applied his reduction step by step. He first refrains from affirming the being of the entire natural world with its spatio-temporal existence. He indicates there that his phenomenological method is carried out without suppositions or assumptions.⁽⁷²⁾ He then begins to point the way to this "assumptionless" philosophy through the method of epoché.

First of all, he puts the whole sensible world into brackets.

We place in brackets whatever it includes respecting the nature of being: the entire natural world therefore which is continually "there for us", "present to our hand", and will ever remain there; it is a "fact-world" of which we continue to be conscious, even though it pleases us to put it in brackets (Ideas I, 32, p.110).

This act of epoché is obviously an eidetic reduction, in which the empirical Ego plays the role of a subject. Since the empirical Ego must use abstract terms to transcend all sensible particulars, eidetic reduction leads the subject from the sensible world to the eidetic one. The eidetic act enables the epistemological subject to transform itself from the empirical to the transcendental Ego. This transcendental act has been very much discussed in the Logical Investigations where Husserl criticized psychologism and demonstrated the superiority of logic, especially the superiority and autonomy of pure logic (in the last chapter of the first part).⁽⁷³⁾

In the period of eidetic reduction the empirical Ego was discussed as the subject which puts the sensible world in brackets in order to show that the phenomenological method, from the beginning, has no assumption--especially that it is not negation. In the eidetic reduction the sensible world is reduced, but never denied. The effort of eidetic reduction is therefore a rejection of any empirical manner of encountering the world, and this leads us to attain absolute knowledge. Husserl criticized Locke as follows:

Locke and all the philosophers who believe in natural science make the same mistake, i.e., they presuppose the authentic existence of nature, but at the same time, they doubt its reality.⁽⁷⁴⁾

Of course, Husserl looked upon Locke not only negatively, but also positively:

Locke is the first philosopher who used the Cartesian cogito and tried to find a way into the center of cognition. From the point of view of philosophical research he is also the first one to put all knowledge into consciousness.⁽⁷⁵⁾

From criticism of Locke's empiricism Husserl went on to Cartesian rationalism. He accepted Descartes' method of doubt, which should somehow be equivalent to his own method of epoché, nevertheless, he criticized Descartes mercilessly. Descartes highlighted the cogito, which is acknowledged by Husserl as the inner consciousness; however, Descartes did not remain there but passed too quickly to the res extensa. To Husserl it seemed that Descartes was the first philosopher who used the phenomenological method. Indeed, he was the beginner but did not complete his work.

Kant is seen by Husserl to have made great contributions to the development and criticism of empiricism and rationalism, but he cannot escape critique. According to Husserl, Kant's dualistic view of human reason leads him away from his inner and unique consciousness and into inescapable error, for Kant cannot return to his own consciousness in order to carry out his reflections.⁽⁷⁶⁾ At the same time, in his critique of Kant, Husserl saw some positive accomplishment, namely, his transcendental mode of thinking. In the conclusion of First Philosophy he maintains that the contribution of transcendental philosophy lies in providing a foundation for all scientific knowledge.⁽⁷⁷⁾ Thus, beginning from empiricism and rationalism, Husserl came to his notion of consciousness, and beginning from idealism, he came to his transcendental method. The epoché of the empirical Ego could then begin.

If we take the Ideas I, 31c, as mentioned above, as a general description of the phenomenological eidetic reduction, the following passages must be its description of this. Husserl said:

Through this prior reduction it first became possible to focus attention on the phenomenological field and the apprehending of its data. The remaining reductions, as presupposing the first, are thus secondary, but by no means therefore of small importance. (Ideas I, 60)

"The remaining reduction" mentioned here should include all the transcendental things. "As we have suspended individual realities in every sense, so now we seek to suspend all other varieties of the `Transcendent'" (Ideas, 59). One step is to reduce all knowledge of sensible and transcendental things. "So, just as we disconnect the real nature of physical science and the empirical natural science we disconnect also the eidetic sciences" (Ideas I, 60).

2) The second stage of the phenomenological epoché proceeds beyond the contrast of the mystic-practical worldview and the theoretical worldview to pure consciousness (First Philosophy, Erganzende Texte, p. 252). The transcendental reduction brackets not only the sensible world, but the entire transcendental world. "As we have suspended individual realities in every sense, so now we seek to suspend all other varieties of the `Transcendent'" (Ideas I, 59).

The epoché of the empirical Ego goes as far as the eidetic sphere as its ultimate limit. Through and beyond this limit Husserl reached transcendental reduction, in which all concepts are also bracketed (Ideas I, 61). At this stage, Husserlian epistemology has at least two types of transcendental spheres: one is a reflection in the sensible world, which leads to eidetic efforts, the other is one of indirect transcendence through the law of causality. The subject who apprehends any of the above-mentioned stages achieves a transcendence beyond the empirical, reflective and abstractive milieus.

The second stage of the epoché is also the topic of the second period of Husserl's phenomenological studies which deals with all transcendental knowledge. "The second stage of phenomenological research would be precisely the criticism of transcendental experience, and then of all `transcendental cognition'" (Cartesian Meditations, 13).

In epistemological research every subject can go beyond the object through abstraction. The object transforms itself into Gegenstand in order to enter the consciousness of the subject, and through this understanding the subject transcends itself from the real to the ideal region. The ideal, which was transformed from reality, plays the role of freedom from the bond of the sensible world and unifies the subject and object. This effort is oriented according to a fundamental assumption, namely, that the object is conceived only as Gegenstand and is changed into essence within the subject; that is, the subject can transform the object into a part of the subject as an organism digests food and transforms it into its own flesh and blood. In this sense, the subject has no need to go out of himself nor to use any of his senses to apprehend the object, but need only use the modes of knowledge and reflection to conceive Gegestand, in order for the object and the subject to be unified in one.⁽⁷⁸⁾

The representative work in this second stage of epoché is obviously Ideas I. The credibility and trustworthiness of knowledge here at the beginning of this research faces some difficulties. One is an external element; the other is raised by the natural sciences. The external element lies in scientific authority which per se does not pertain directly to the philosophical, still less, the epistemological problem. However, it has such great influence on the process of learning that it is involved in most of our knowledge relating to it, especially transcendental knowledge at the higher stages, like religious dogma, or in the lower stages, like the natural sciences. Here Husserl gave a general response to all problems of authority, maintaining that all knowledge not constituted by the phenomenological method must first, by epoché, be put into brackets, which act of bracketing should continue until only pure consciousness remains, and nothing else.⁽⁷⁹⁾

Husserl was, of course, conscious of many other difficulties: for example, must natural science be bracketed, to which he gave the same answer and reason. From his phenomenological point of view, nothing can be presupposed except pure consciousness which possesses no knowledge content, but only the ability to produce knowledge. Step by step, Husserl puts all knowledge into brackets, till nothing remains in the consciousness except consciousness itself and we reach the stage of pure consciousness.

3) According to Husserl, pure consciousness cannot be reduced because it is the reducing subject, not the object being reduced. In Cartesian Meditations, Husserl borrows from Descartes' methodical doubt, insisting that every cogitation can be put into brackets, but the "ego cogito" or better the "ego dubito", must remain because the ego is the subject of doubt and of thinking. At the same time, the ego is the subject who practices epoché. We can doubt everything, insist both Descartes and Husserl, but we cannot doubt that we doubt.

That which cannot be put into brackets is obviously pure consciousness. Husserl called it the residuum of reduction or the phenomenological residuum (Ideas I, 33). This residuum is the ultimate remainder after all phenomenological epoché. At the same time, it is the first essence from which all things originate. It is therefore both the endpoint of the phenomenological epoché, and the arché of all knowledge and existence: it is the beginning of all epistemology and ontology.

Here, in pure consciousness, Husserl invents his foundation for epistemology and ontology; still more important, it is here that knowledge and being meet.

If we call the subject the same in the "empirical ego" of his Logical Investigations as in the "pure ego" of Ideas I, then the glory of the "transcendental ego" emerges in the Cartesian Meditations. The transcendental ego possesses all the functions of the empirical ego and pure ego, so it reflects all reductive acts in bracketing both the sensible and the transcendental worlds. Here, in the phenomenological epoché, however, the transcendental ego goes backwards and inwards in its own consciousness; the transcendental ego is its own consciousness, like the Aristotelian "noesis noeseos noesis" (Intelligentia intelligentiae intelligentia) (Met. XII).

As Husserl discovered his own consciousness, i.e., established the transcendental ego, he began to reconstitute knowledge which he had put in brackets during the process of the phenomenological reduction. In the light of pure consciousness, Husserl resolves all the bonds of epoché used to bracket all natural and transcendental knowledge. As the bonds are resolved, the constitution of knowledge and of phenomenology takes place. This is the third period of Husserl's phenomenological research in which all that had been put into brackets is reborn, constituting an epistemological and ontological system so that Husserl dares to say with Descartes not only "Cogito, ergo sum," but also "Cogito, die Welt ist."

A COMPARISON OF LAO-TZU AND HUSSERL

Husserl's phenomenological method should be much easier for us to understand than Lao-tzu's negative method, not only because of their distance in space and time or their different modes of expression, but also because of the logical and ontological difference between the Tao-te-king and the Husserliana. The chronological order of Husserl's works and thought is clear, while the order of Lao-tzu's thought in Tao-te-king is very obscure. One must spend much time to find out Lao-tzu's order of thinking in his very condensed and summary work. On the contrary, in Husserl's works we can follow the order of his thinking without much difficulty because his systematic thought ipso facto inspired its serial order.

Nevertheless, many essential points seem comparable in Lao-tzu and Husserl or, speaking more exactly, between Tao-te-king and the Husserliana. We can compare over-all the three stages of the thinking process by both thinkers:

Lao-tzu Husserl

General Negation....................Eidetic Reduction

(frivolous, partial

ever deeper negation)

Wu-wei.......................Transcendental Reduction

Wu.........................Phenomenological Reduction

Tao.........................Phenomenological Residuum

(pure consciousness)

1) From the epistemological point of view, both Lao-tzu and Husserl used "Wesensschau" in a very similar manner. Both thinkers maintain the thinking subject. Interestingly, in Lao-tzu's Tao-te-king there are not the pronouns "you", "he" or "she". The Tao-te-king used only the first personal pronoun "I", or the equivalent word, "Sage" and did so more than twenty-seven times. This is a quite evident symbol for his soliloquies. An emphasis on subjectivity dominates the entire contents of the Tao-te-king. Husserl emphasizes the subject of the "cogito", the phenomenological residuum, as pure consciousness. Lao-tzu's ego and Husserl's cogito seem equivalent as the thinking subject. The difference between the two is only in their expressive mode and personal status: where Husserl emphasized the awakened consciousness, Lao-tzu used the unconsciousness as Wu-wei.

The awakened ego of Husserl and the unconscious ego of Lao-tzu are controversial and differentiate East and West in metaphysical and religious affairs. On the other hand, as mentioned above, Lao-tzu's unconsciousness is the highest grade of conscious awareness; it has the same meaning as Husserl's consciousness from the ontological point of view. Of course, the real significance of Lao-tzu's unconsciousness lies in "Fasting of the Heart" (Chuang-tzu's Theory). This means doing nothing with one's own consciousness and letting the Tao work in the universe and at the same time in man's heart. In consequence, the working Tao elevates the human heart into Tao's realm so that the human being can unify with Tao in order to fulfill the philosophical purpose: transcendental, or more exactly, authentic subjectivity. Here, Husserl's concern is directed to personal intuition, while Lao-tzu's endeavor is oriented towards the impersonal Wu-wei.

Husserl's Wesensschau has two directions: one is the orientation of the subject towards the Gegenstand of the object grasping the essence, the other is the inward act of the same subject reflecting on its own essence. The essences of both the subject and the object gather themselves together in consciousness. These two directions are comprehended spatially as the "intention" and "retention" of pure consciousness.

The theory of intention is developed within Husserl's theory of the cogito which turns to his own consciousness to create subjectivity and, at the same time, turns outward to the cogitatum to constitute the objective world. Thus, the subjective and the objective of both epistemology and ontology are simultaneously created and constituted.

On the other hand, Lao-tzu's Wesensschau proceeds with his Wu-wei, forgetfulness of his own existence. According to Lao-tzu, Tao's work is mysteriously both in the universe and in the human being, so that the Wesensschau becomes the mysterious intuition about Tao. If we call the Husserlian method "enstasis", then the Lao-tzu method should be "extasis". Lao-tzu's reflective intuition finally processes outwards from its own heart to the mysterious Tao. This mysterious intuition towards Tao is characteristic of Lao-tzu and implies objective knowledge. At the same time, Lao-tzu's intuition proceeds inwards, back to his heart in which subjectivity is grounded; this assures subjective knowledge.

From the above, we can conclude that the theories of subject in Lao-tzu and Husserl are very similar, and that their theories of intuition, the initial act of the primordial subject in both thinkers, also are analogical. The Husserlian Wesensschau is almost equivalent to Lao-tzu's mysterious intuition.

2) A dualistic division of the object seems common to both Lao-tzu and Husserl. The former maintains the Tao as the ultimate reality of the universe, while Teh (Virtue), as the appearance of Tao, is realized in Ten-thousand-things. The latter reflects the difference between the noumenon and the phenomenon of all existence: if Tao is noumenon, then Teh should be phenomenon. Both thinkers follow the same methodological process in which the noumenon is reached through phenomenon, by the epoché, or in negative terms.

The three stages of epoché in Husserl are connected with this dualistic division of objects. In the first stage the empirical world is reduced so that the world appears as objective and its existence does not depend on any subjective apprehension: it belongs to the "Um-Welt-Ding". Phenomenological epoché puts the objective surroundings in brackets; this is the work of eidetic reduction.

In the second stage of epoché, Husserl puts the transcendental act in brackets. The "Gegenstand", which belongs to the object on the one hand and to the subject on the other, is reduced. The "Gegenstand" belongs to the "Welt-Ding" and transcendental reduction functions at once on both subjective and objective "Welt-Ding". When the "Welt-Ding" is reduced in the third stage, the world will disappear and what remains is subjectively pure consciousness and objectively "Ding" as essence.

Lao-tzu, on the other hand, used his negative terms step by step to exclude mundane affairs as his first stage of negation. In the second stage however, he denied the entire active function of the subject. Epistemologically he used the term "Wu", which is negation of negation, to predict the Tao, the absolute being in his last stage of negation. This process of thinking by both Lao-tzu and Husserl appears to be analogical.

Because of the difference between the phenomenological residuum of Husserl, i.e., consciousness, and the negative residuum of Lao-tzu, i.e., Tao, the world-pictures of both thinkers are not the same. Lao-tzu is oriented towards pantheism in which the Tao is immanent within world, while Husserl is oriented toward personalism, in which every individual plays a role in epistemology and in ontology. Here, Husserl used his "pure consciousness" in the same way that Lao-tzu used his negative term "Wu", which possessed infinite possibilities for creating and generating all that exists.

3) In Husserl, pure consciousness is synonymous with the Greek term "noesis" (cogitation), from which all noemata (cogitata) are manifested as creations. That the universe in its totality is a creation, which originated from the idea of the creator, is the utmost philosophical result of Western traditional thought: noesis or pure consciousness exists only because of its ideal mode of existence in the other world. Pure consciousness however, by participation, has received the creativity to realize all forms of consciousness, and is able to produce ideas that demonstrate all kinds of existence. Here, Husserl takes for granted that the Cartesian cogito is a fundamental truth proving the existence of the epistemological subject which, at the same time, is an ontological category. This ontic and epistemic subject is not only full of intelligibility, but also has infinite energy to create things.

By so doing, Husserl extends the Cartesian "cogito, ergo sum" to "cogito, ergo die welt ist" (I think, therefore the world exists"). Obviously, all the qualities of the ideal and the sensible worlds previously bracketed in Husserl's reduction are resurrected. In his constitutive phenomenology Husserl reconstructed the world of harmony, which had been disarticulated because of a methodical doubt regarding uncertain knowledge. The objective world is the same as the universe, but in Husserl's phenomenology the objective world is proved through subjective identification, especially through the method of reduction. By establishing the phenomenological method Husserl, on the one hand, found and grasped pure consciousness and used it to explain the epistemological order, which proceeds from the sensible to the ideal world, and ultimately to the noesis. On the other hand, he set up the ontological order, in which the noesis with its infinite potentiality creates the entire ideal and sensible worlds.

Thus, the phenomenological residuum--pure consciousness or noesis--is the last in epistemology, but the first in ontology. Husserl's basic intention is to found ontology upon epistemology.

Like Husserl's consciousness, which can produce all things ranging from the ideal to the material, so, too, Lao-tzu's Wu can generate all existence. The Husserlian positive expression "consciousness" is equivalent to the Greek "noesis", which is full of power to think, to produce thoughts, and to create things. In the same way, the ultimate reality "Tao" is omnipotent and is able to generate all things.⁽⁸⁰⁾

Thus we see that Husserl's "consciousness" and Lao-tzo's "Wu" are two central concepts in which the ancient and archetypal philosophical problems are discussed and resolved. Both "consciousness" and "Wu" are the cosmic center, which is like a source of light radiating in all directions and creating heaven and earth and Ten-thousand-things. This ontological result is based on an epistemological approach both in Husserl's phenomenology and in Lao-tzu's Tao-te-king; both use the same method of bracketing.⁽⁸¹⁾

CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion, I would note an interesting and surprising fact, namely, that Martin Heidegger, the disciple of Husserl, used a negative term, das Leerste (the void) as both psychological and ontological predicate to the consciousness.⁽⁸²⁾ Furthermore, Heidegger suggested the process of thinking should be "das Nichts nichtet" (not thinking of nothing)⁽⁸³⁾ in which the Hegelian hope would be fulfilled. He said, "das reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist also dasselbe" (clearly understood existence and clearly understood nothingness are one in the same).⁽⁸⁴⁾ The method of reduction of Husserl and Lao-tzu's negative method proceed together and meet each other; both thinkers found the ultimate foundation, whose name finally "can not be named".

Thus the Tao, the Wu, das Leerste, das Nichts, would be then the starting-point of the via cognitiva, and at the same time the end-point of the via ontologica. This would be a real coincidence and harmony between East and West.

National Taiwan University

Taipei, Taiwan