After Heidegger introduced the concept of "Ab-grund" in his lecture, "The Principle of Identity" given in 1957 on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the University of Freiburg, the importance of this concept has remained relatively neglected.¹ In my "Heidegger and T'ient'ai Buddhism", I attempted to compare this concept with that of "nondwelling ground" in T'ien-t'ai Buddhism.² With the recent publication of Heidegger's Beitraege zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), we now have a new textual basis for understanding this concept.³

In this chapter, we shall deepen our dialogue between Heidegger and T'ien-t'ai Buddhism. The aim here is basically twofold: first, to determine the finitude of "momentary mind" in the T'ien-t'ai Buddhist sense, and second, to illuminate the central role played by "Ab-grund" in Heidegger's later thinking.

MOMENTARY MIND IN T'IEN-T'AI BUDDHISM

One major characteristic of Chinese Buddhism lies in its stress upon the centrality of mind. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of cittamatra has dominated the whole development of traditional Chinese Buddhism. Even within the less popular school of vijnanamatra in China, it was the idealistic trend represented by Hsuan-tsang which had occupied the orthodox position. In addition, it is well-known that the Northern School of ZenBuddhism held a doctrine of pure mind. Indeed, it is no wonder that Ta-cheng ch'i-hsin lun has been regarded as the first Buddhist text written by the Chinese. According to this famous text, "pure mind" is the transcendental ground of the whole world.

Historically speaking, the rise of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism can be regarded as a reaction to Ta-cheng ch'i-hsin lun. In opposition to the "pure mind" of the latter, Chih-i, the founder of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism, introduced a "momentary mind". The "momentary mind" is also called a "momentary mind of ignorance and Dharmata".⁴ Obviously, such a "momentary mind" is of a paradoxical nature: it is equipped at the same time with ignorance and Dharmata. Accordingly, the Buddha-nature is paradoxically complex. Both ignorance and Dharmata constitute the ontological structure of Buddha. In contrast to the pure mind, a "momentary mind" is a "dirty mind" in its first appearance. Precisely for this reason, Chih-i also identifies it as a mind of conspiracy or of trouble. In spite of its dark aspect, a "momentary mind" is the autonomous capacity for attaining Nirvana.

This paradoxical nature of the "momentary mind" can be illuminated by an appeal to Heidegger's Dasein-analytic. In opposition to Husserl's strict distinction between the transcendental and the empirical subjectivity, Heidegger claims that both the authentic and the inauthentic modes belong to the Being of Dasein. In Being and Time, Heidegger explicitly says, "Not-Being-it-self (Das Nicht-es-Selbst-sein) functions as a positive possibility of that entity which, in its essential concern, is absorbed in a world."⁵ For Heidegger, "Falling is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself."⁶ Namely, as Seinkoennen, Dasein is not separated from "falling". We can now clearly see that the "momentary mind" in the Buddhist sense shares the same paradoxical structure with Dasein in the Heideggerian sense.

Moreover, Chih-i claims that the "momentary mind" is equipped with the whole world of Dharmas.⁷ This thesis by no means implies any subjectification of the world. Chih-i would agree with Heidegger in saying that "Ueberall jedoch bleibt hier kein Platz fuer die Deutung des Menschen als 'Subject' weder im Sinne des ichhaften noch im Sinne des gemeinschaften Subjects".⁸ Indeed, what Chih-i asserts is merely that there is no "momentary mind separated from the world and there is no world separated from the momentary mind". Like Heidegger's identification of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, Chih-i would regard the whole world of Dharmas as a Spielraum for the "momentary mind". Here the whole world of Dharmas also signifies a limit for the "momentary mind". That is to say, the "momentary mind" has to open itself to the world of Dharmas. It is due precisely to this openness to the world that the "momentary mind" is determined to be finite.

Secondly, in distinction from a pure mind, a "momentary mind" can never be totally transparent. Namely, both darkness and trouble belong to the "momentary mind" as its ontological possibilities. Indeed, the intrinsic possibility of falling not only distinguishes the "momentary mind" from the pure mind, but also prohibits it from being infinite. Finally, according to T'ien-t'ai Buddhism, a "momentary mind" is not a "ground" for the possibility of the world, but rather functions as the non-dwelling ground of all beings.⁹ When the "momentary mind" is said to be equipped with the whole world of Dharmas, this means merely that all beings must originate in the letting-be of the "momentary mind". But to say that the "momentary mind" lets all the beings be implies that all beings emerge from the "non-dwelling ground", for the "momentary mind" is nothing but a "concretization" of the "non-dwelling ground". This is also the reason why Chan-jan later prefers to say that Being itself is equipped with the whole world.¹⁰

T'ien t'ai Buddhism would accept Heidegger's following statement: "Der Mensch solchen und erst kuenftigen Wesens 'ist' als Seiender nicht urspruenglich, sofern nur das Seyn ist."¹¹ Certainly, a "momentary mind" is not just a passive and mastered by Suchness (Being). In letting beings be, the Suchness needs the cooperation of the "momentary mind". In order to stress this point, Chih-li says: "Insofar as all the beings are of the same Being, they are gathered by a momentary mind."¹² That is to say, there is an interdependence between the "momentary mind" and the Suchness. Insofar as such an interdependence belongs intrinsically to the Being of the "momentary mind", the "momentary mind" has to remain finite.

It should be noted that the finitude of the "momentary mind" is not a negative, but rather a positive characteristic. Indeed, among all beings, it is only the human being that can have such an intimate relationship with Suchness. This relationship can also be explained in terms of the Heideggerian formulation: "Das Dasein ist die Gruendung des Abgundes des Seyns durch die Inanspruchnahme des Mensch als desjenigen Seienden, das der Waechterschaft fuer die Wahrheit des Seyns ueberantwortet wird."¹³

AB-GRUND IN THE LATTER HEIDEGGER

For those who are familiar with Heidegger's early writings, the appearance of the concept "Ab-grund" is not easy to follow. In fact, it is rather such contrasting terms like "ground" (Grund) and "grounding" (Begruendung) which play important roles in Being and Time. One also recalls that "Vom Wesen des Grundes" is the title of his contribution to Husserl's Festschrift (1929). However, "The discussion of ground is given up after having been explicitly worked out."¹⁴ According to Otto Poeggeler's explanation, "The meaning of Being as the `ground' which remained unthought in metaphysical thinking, can perhaps be thought as an `abyss-like ground', but in the final analysis cannot really be thought of as a `ground' at all."¹⁵ It should be added that the turning away from the early doctrine of "ground" and the introduction of idea of "Ab-grund" precisely constitutes the Kehre of Heidegger's thinking. Namely, this shift is exactly the dividing line between the early and the later Heidegger.

First of all, we must note that for the later Heidegger "Ab-grund" is basically a positive term. In fact, the term "Ab-grund" has already appeared in "Vom Wesen des Grundes". Here, after Heidegger discerns the three-fold meaning of "Gruenden" as (a) "Stiffen"; (b) "Bodennehmen"; (c)"Begruenden"; and identifies "Begruendung" as "Ermoeglichung der Warumfrage ueberhaupt", he jumps into the speech of "die Freiheit der Ab-grund des Daseins" and "Abgruendigkeit des Daseins".¹⁶ However, here "Ab-grund" appears merely as a "negative concept". One can conjecture that it is not until 1936, when Heidegger begins to write his Beitraege zur Philosophie, that a positive conception of "Ab-grund" comes to his mind.¹⁷ This conjecture is first of all supported by Heidegger's own words in Identity and Difference which was published during his life time: "dieser Ab-grund ist weder das leere Nichts Noch eine finstere Wirmis, sondern: das Er-eignis."¹⁸ Now, in the posthumous publication of Beitraege zur Philosophie, we can find a proper articulation of the positive doctrine of "Ab-grund". Here Heidegger begins to claim decidedly, "die Abgruendigkeit des Ab-grundes zu denken".¹⁹ In answering the question: "Wie der Ab-grund gruendet?", Heidegger works out the following major characteristics of "Ab-grund":

(a)"Der Ab-grund ist die urspruengliche Wesung des Grundes."

(b)"Der Ab-grund ist die urspruengliche Einheit von Raum und Zeit."

(c)"Der Ab-grund ist aber auch zwar das urspruengliche Wesen des gruendes, seines Gruendes, des Wesens der Wahrheit."

(d)"Allein, der Ab-grund ist als Wesung des Gruendes kein blosses Sichversagen als einfacher Rueckzug und Weggung. Da Ab-grund ist Ab-grund."

(e)"Ab-grund ist die zoegernde Versagung des Grundes."

(f)"Der Ab-grund ist die erstwesentlich lichtende Verbergung, die Wesung der Wahrheit."²⁰

With this positive characterization of "Ab-grund", one can discover that "Der Ab-grund ist so wenig `negativ'" for the later Heidegger.²¹ Indeed, the later Heidegger also points out that in "Ab-grund" we can find "Das urspruengliche Nicht, Das zum Seyn selbst und somit zum Er-eignis gehoert." Hence, it is no exaggeration to say that "Ab-grund" occupies a central position in Heidegger's later thinking.

Nevertheless, one can wonder what causes Heidegger to turn to a positive conception of "Ab-grund". Moreover, how can one understand the exact role played by "Ab-grund" in Heidegger's Kehre?

Regarding the first question, it is natural that Heidegger himself does not provide any answer, for he consciously distances himself from any question of "why". We also believe there is no connection with Schelling's idea of "Abgrund". Here, an appeal to T'ien-t'ai Buddhism might shed some light on Heidegger's way of thinking, though it does not imply any factual connection between Heidegger and T'ien-t'ai Buddhism.

First of all, T'ien-t'ai Buddhism is famous for introducing a distinction between the "distinctive religion" and the "perfective religion". In order to illuminate this important distinction, Chan-jan appeals to a pair of contrasting concepts: "dwelling-upon-itself' and "dwelling-upon-other". In A Detailed Commentary on "Vimalakirt-Nirdesa-Sutra" Chan-jan states, "that trouble and Dharmata are of different Being implies that trouble and Dharmata dwell separately. So each is considered to be independent. In other words, there is Dharmata in separation from trouble; Dharmata is the other of trouble. It can be said also that Dharamta is self-contained. On the other hand, there is trouble in separation from Dharmata: trouble is the other of Dharmata. As a consequence, a doctrine which allows these two to be totally separated from each other cannot be a perfective religion, for here trouble must become a hindrance, and the stripping away of hindrance is the only way to reveal the Truth. On the other hand, in the case of dwelling-upon-other, both trouble and Dharmata are mutually dependent upon each other. Since they are of the same Being, their interdependence can be considered to be an identity relationship."²² One can clearly see that though both the distinctive and the perfective religions employ the same conceptual pair of "self" and "other", their ways of employing them are different.

Furthermore, the distinction between these two types of religion can be shown in their ways of answering the following question: "Are trouble and Dharmata of the same Being?" While a positive answer will point to the perfective religion, a negative answer will point to the distinctive religion. Indeed, following Chan-jan, Chih-i announces: "While the doctrine of dwelling-upon-itself defames the distinctive religion, the doctrine of dwelling-upon-other defines the perfective religion."²³ In addition, the distinction between these two types of religion can be explicated in terms of the ways of conceiving Buddha-nature. While the distinctive religion identifies Buddha with pure mind, the perfective religion identifies Buddha with momentary mind. Accordingly, for the former, Buddha is a world-less subject; for the latter, Buddha is equipped with the whole world. It should be noted that the perfective religion would not strip away any evil Dharmas in revealing the Buddha-nature.

Hubert Dreyfus has listed five theses that the later Heidegger had abandoned after the publication of Being and Time. The last, but not the least, is stated as follows: "By a double use of the hermeneutical circle, hermeneutic phenomenology strips away our disguises and makes manifest the pre-ontological understanding of Being as unheimlich which is hidden in the previous awareness and in our public practices, thus revealing the deep truth of our condition."²⁴ Obviously, such a thesis of positing a hidden, deep truth is contrary to the ontological structure of Dasein which includes inauthenticity as its existential possibility. In terms of the distinction between the distinctive and the perfective religions, such a thesis would lead Heidegger to the distinctive religion position. Namely, Dasein would become a pure mind which would imply that inauthenticity and authenticity are not of the same Being. Only authenticity would belong to the Being of Dasein; while as the other of authenticity, inauthenticity would have to be stripped away from the Being of Dasein. Naturally, Heidegger cannot accept such a consequence.

In order to correct such a misleading articulation, it is necessary for Heidegger to take seriously the "paradoxical identity" between the authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein. First of all, it is meaningless to say that authenticity is deeper than inauthenticity. Secondly, he cannot accept that only authenticity is the truth. Finally, the essence of truth is not to be identified as "grounding". As Heidegger later states, "Deshalb bedurfte es im Versuch der Ueberwindung des ersten Ansatzes der Seinsfrage in Sein und Zeit und seiner Ausstrahlungen (Vom Wesen des Grundes und Kantbuch)...Desbalb bedurfte es der Bemuehung, von der `Bedingung der Moeglichkeit' als eines nur `mathematischen' Rueckganges freizukommen."²⁵ The only way out then for the "paradoxical identity" between authenticity and inauthenticity is to admit that both authenticity and inauthenticity are "abgruendig". That is to say, insofar as authenticity and inauthenticity are "abgruendig", they can be of the same Being. Here Heidegger would agree with Chan-jan's thesis: "Dharmata is identical with ignorance, Dharmata is non-dwelling; ignorance is Dharamata, ignorance is non-dwelling."²⁶

Moreover, if Being is to be identified as "ground" and the truth of Being is to be understood as "grounding", then Being would be the "ground" of all beings and its relation to the whole world would be "grounding". This would imply that the whole world of beings and Being itself are of different Being. For this would mean that Being itself can well dwell upon itself and, insofar as the whole world of beings is the other of Being itself, Dasein would became a world-less subject. Obviously, Heidegger cannot accept such a consequence, for it is contrary to his fundamental thesis in Being and Time: "Dasein is essentially being-in-the-world".

From the standpoint of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism, the only way for Heidegger to avoid such undesirable consequences as the distinctive religion is to develop a positive concept of "Ab-grund". Negatively, the introduction of a positive idea of "Ab-grund" will prohibit the absolutizing of Dasein as well as of Being itself; positively, such an introduction will enable inauthenticity to belong to the Being of Dasein. To be sure, Dasein should become authentic, but such a move does not imply any stripping away of inauthenticity from the ontological structure of Dasein. Here Heidegger would agree with T'ien-t'ai Buddhism in asserting that apart from inauthenticity, there is no authenticity.

Now let us turn to the second question. In Beitraege zur Philosophie, one can see that the later Heidegger does not entirely abolish the concept of "ground". Rather, "der Grund" is now displaced as "das Sichverbergen im tragenden Durchragen ."²⁷ On the other hand, "Ab-grund" is identified as "das Ausbleiben, als Grund im Sichverbergen, ein Sichverbergen in der Weise der Versagung des Grundes."²⁸ This reinterpretation of "Grund" points to a cooperative relation between "Grund" and "Ab-grund": "Im Sichversagen bringt der Grund in einer ausgezeichneten Weise in das Offene, naemlich in das erst Offene jener Leere, die somit eine bestimmte ist. Sofern der Grund auch und gerade im Abgrund noch gruendet und doch sich eigentlich gruendet, steht er in der Zoegerung ."²⁹ From the perspective of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism, what is implied in these statements is something like its own slogan: "all beings emerge from the non-dwelling ground."

Moreover, the positive character of "Ab-grund" is clearly stated in Beitraege zur Philosophie: "Ab-grund ist nicht das Nein zu jeden Grund wie Grundlosigkeit, sondern das Ja zum Grund in seiner verborgenen Weite und Ferne."³⁰ From the perspective of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism, what is implied in these statements is quite similar to its own motto: All beings emerge from the non-dwelling ground! Heidegger also states, "Der Abgrund ist so die in sich zeitigend-raeumend-gegen-schwingende Augenblicksstaette des `Zwischen', als welches das Da-sein gegruendet sein muss."³¹ This indeed recalls another thesis of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism: that all beings emerge from the momentary mind means that all beings emerge from the non-dwelling ground.

CONCLUSION

In the face of Heidegger's subtle articulation of the finitude of Dasein in terms of Faktizitaet and temporality, T'ien-t'ai Buddhism can well be enriched by adopting Heidegger's existential-ontological analytic. Indeed, the fact that both momentary mind and Dasein share a non-moral character can facilitate such an enrichment. Nowadays, T'ien-t'ai Buddhism is no longer active in China. A dialogue with Heidegger would not only shed some light on understanding its significance, but also bring to it a richer conceptual framework--so that one could expect its second spring in the future.

On the other hand, T'ien-t'ai Buddhist characterization of the perfective religion is helpful in revealing the significance of "Ab-grund" in Heidegger's later thinking. The early Heidegger insists that "Being well exists (west) without beings."³² But the later Heidegger rejects this thesis and declares that "Being never exists (west) without beings."³³ Such an essential change can be regarded as a consequence of his adoption of a positive doctrine of "Ab-grund".

Here Heidegger would agree with the T'ien-t'ai Buddhist thesis that it is merely the sickness, but not the beings, which should be stripped away. That is to say, it is merely the "attachment to beings", rather than beings themselves, which should be stripped away. The ontological difference points only to overcoming the "attachment" to beings. As this does not imply the elimination of beings, the later Heidegger emphasizes, "einmal mit dieser Unterscheindung zur ersten Klaerung einzusetzen und dann doch gerade diese Unterscheidung zu ueberspringen."³⁴ Namely, "ihren Ursprung selbst und d.h. ihre echte Einheit zu fassen."³⁵ Moreover, the T'ien-t'ai Buddhist account of the origin of beings in terms of the nondwelling ground helps us to understand why the later Heidegger still has to maintain that "there must always be some being in the open, something that is, in which openness takes its stand and attains its constancy."³⁶

Tunghai University

Taichung, Taiwan

1. One possible exception is Otto Poeggeler. However, even Poeggeler does not put "Ab-grund" into a central position in later Heidegger's thinking. Cf.: Otto Poeggeler, "Being as Appropriation", trans. by R.H. Grim, reprinted in M. Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern philosophy (New York: Yale, 1978).

2. Chan Wing-cheuk, Heidegger and Chinese Philosophy (Taipei, 1986), pp. 136-155.

3. Heidegger, Beitraege zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt, 1989).

4. Cf. Mou Tsung-san, Buddha-Nature and Prajna (in Chinese), 2 vols. (Rev. ed.; Taipei, 1979).

5. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962), p. 220.

6. Ibid.

7. Chad Wing-cheuk.

8. Beitraege zu Philosophie, p. 488.

9. Chad Wing-cheuk.

10. Mou Tsung-san, p. 793.

11. Beitraege zur Philosophie, p. 488.

12. Mou Tsung-san, p. 807.

13. Beitraege zur Philosophie, p. 490.

14. Poeggeler, op. cit., p. 127.

15. Ibid.

16. Heidegger, Wegmarken (Zweite, erweiterte und durchgelesene Auflage) (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978) pp. 162-163; p. 172.

17. Beitraege zur Philosophie, p. 512.

18. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. by J. Stambaugh (New York: Philosophical Library, 1969) p. 104.

19. Beitraege zur Philosophie, p. 381.

20. Ibid., pp. 379-380.

21. Ibid., p. 388.

22. Mou Tsung-san, op. cit., p. 693.

23. Ibid., pp. 692-693.

24. Hubert Dreyfus, "Beyond Hermeneutics: Interpretation in Late Heidegger and Recent Foucault", in G. Shapiro and A. Sica (eds.), Hermeneutics (Amherst: Univ. of Massachuset Press, 1984), p. 73.

25. Beitraege zur Philosophie, p. 251.

26. Mou Tsung-san, op. cit., p. 685.

27. Beitraege zur Philosophie, p. 379.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 380.

30. Ibid., p. 387.

31. Ibid., p. 384.

32. Heidegger, "Nachwort zu `Was ist Metaphysik?'", in Wegmarken, p. 304.

33. Ibid.

34. Beitraege zur Philosophie, p. 250.

35. Ibid., p. 250.

36. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper, 1971), p. 61.