This paper intends to treat the twofold functions of "hsin" in Confucian Philosophy, dating from the ancient period of Mencius and Hsün Tzu, until the so-called Two Ch'eng Brothers of the Sung-Dynasty. In Chinese philosophy the Chinese word "hsin" ( ) has always been taken to designate the active, leading function of thinking and deciding, but at the same time also signifying a rather passively inherited function, namely, the four inborn and properly human propensities, which were first proclaimed by Mencius (371-289 B.C.). But of these two distinct functions, Chinese culture and philosophy understood the passive role of "hsin" as more important and more essential, whereas Western culture and philosophy consistently retained the active function of thinking and deciding as the principal element. The present day may be characterized as what Heidegger called the "Europeanization of man and of the earth". Since the world needs the technology developed in these modern times by Western culture, it is understandable that peoples of East Asia also adopt a Western mode. The last part of this paper will discuss how Heidegger warns about this uncritical attitude. He sides with Chinese philosophy in underlining the importance of the passive role for essential human nature.
As a candidate for a doctorate in Philosophy, I was puzzled how C.G. Jung could make a psychological interpretation of such Chinese ancient books as the I Chingl or "The Secret of the Golden Flower",2 an esoteric Taoistic writing. Since depth-psychology is not a Chinese invention, an interpretation of ancient Chinese texts in terms of depth-psychology seemed at least suspect, if not downright spurious.
Since that time I have rediscovered in Chinese philosophy the term "Hsin-shu"c, which is no less amazing. Literally translated it means "heart technique". In a real sense it means something like "mind-technique", a little like today's behavioral technology. Of course, "hsin" does not designate only the physical heart. Most times it comprises all the "subjective" or psychic phenomena of thinking, feeling, controlling, deciding, having conscious or unconscious attitudes, etc. In this sense "hsin" means much the same as the term "Seele" for Wilhelm Wundt, namely, "the sum of psychic processes or phenomena".3 So "hsin-shu" actually means the way to regulate or influence all these psychic phenomena. If this concern was so lively two thousand years ago, then it is no wonder that C.G. Jung could find such marvelous psychological insights in ancient Chinese texts.
If this be so, we would expect a fully developed Chinese psychology today. But this is not the case, probably due to the excessively practical orientation and, consequently, the lack of purely scientific interest, as well as the lack of a differentiated psychological terminology. In fact, so far as psychology is concerned, throughout more than two millennia the most frequently used word is the term "hsin". Such a vague term necessarily posed limitations toward further elaborations. On the other hand, the undifferentiated use of the "hsin" perhaps has guarded the Chinese from what could be called psychological fragmentation and compartmentalization in the West. While the Chinese experienced just one psyche which has diversified functions, a differentiated psychological terminology would tend to fragment and compartmentalize it. Behaviorism is a paradigm of this form of fragmentation which takes "hsin"'s subordinate function of external sensation as the only one what counts.
In order to proceed step by step, we must choose some key figures, who represent the psychological views of Confucianism regarding ethical problems, historically as well as substantially. These views were inspired but not developed by Confucius himself, but by his followers of later generations like Mencius, Hsün Tzu (314-238 B.C.) and the Ch'eng-Brothers (Ch'eng Haod and Ch'eng Ie, respectively 1032-1083 and 1033-1107). The reason we have chosen just these four thinkers above all others, resides in the fact that Mencius and Hsün Tzu were the first to elaborate key psychological concepts in treating moral problems, and these concepts have been used throughout two millennia. The Ch'eng-Brothers set the tone for Neo-Confucianism which has influenced Chinese thought ever since that time. All of this will become clearer as we consider each individual thinker.
MENCIUS
One of the Ch'eng-Brothers extolled Mencius as the one who best discussed the theme of "hsin-technique".4 Mencius was not only universally revered as "holy man", second only to Confucius, but was also the first one to treat "hsin" thematically. According to him, a fully actualized "hsin" would lead to realizing "hsing"f, or properly human nature.5 As he was seriously concerned in keeping (ts'un)g nature and fully actualizing (chin)h "hsin", Mencius proved to be very interested in the "hsin-technique", though he never mentioned this term.
What precisely does "hsin" mean for Mencius? As noted above, "hsin" means literally the physical heart. But curiously enough, in the more than two hundred times Mencius used this term, he meant it only in the derived sense of subjectively experienceable phenomena. This had a very broad spectrum: from affection, attention, lower inclinations and knowledge, up to the highest human aspirations. Mencius' example is followed mostly by Chinese thinkers after him. Mencius especially used the term "hsin" to designate what he calls four innate and properly human aspirations: interhuman affection, righteousness, propriety and discernment of the right and the wrong.6 According to him, these four propensities belong to the "greater part" of the human being and are known only through the thinking function of "hsin". In comparison to them, all other sensitive or bodily propensities, such as those of good taste, beautiful color, pleasant sound and smell, body comfort, sexual desire and hunger, belong to the "lesser part" of human nature.7
Since Mencius sees proper "hsin" in these four propensities of the "greater part" which constitutes true human nature, he consequently does not hesitate to affirm the goodness of human nature.8 He said this, not because he was so unrealistic as to see only the good in real life, but because he judged evil to result from a lack in one's cultivation and from the subsequent loss of proper "hsin".9 In this strict sense the term "hsin" means exclusively the four noble and specifically human propensities. Mencius uses the term "hsin" mostly in this strict sense. Thus he invites one fully to actualize (chin), to keep (ts'un), to hold fast to (ts'ao)i, to nourish (yang)j, to extend (ch'ung)k, not to lose (shih).10 Since "hsin" in this strict sense truly constitutes human nature, to lose it means to be alienated from one's own humanness.11
This point is extremely important in understanding the "Hsin-HsingLearning"n which was developed later during the Sungo (960-1279) and Mingp (1368-1644) Dynasties. This "Learning" aims at keeping or recovering the "hsin", what is truly human nature (the word "hsing" means literally "nature" or "innate nature"). Judging from the later development one would not see any distinction between "hsin" and "hsing', because both designate what Mencius would call "the proper hsin" (pen-hsin)q or "hsin" properly so-called. But originally there existed a subtle difference between these two terms: "hsin" designated originally every kind of subjectively experiencable phenomena, while "hsing" designated all human propensities, from hunger and sexual desire up to interhuman affection.
However, Mencius took seriously another function of the "hsin", namely its active and leading role in thinking, as he affirmed that "the hsin has the function of thinking and with thinking gets it"--a literal translation of these words of Mencius. What then does the hsin get through thinking? Since Mencius was answering Kung-tu-tzu's question as to how the same human being could develop the greater or the lesser part of his nature, his answer meant in fact that through thinking the hsin perceives the greater part of the four propensities as his true nature, and through this perceiving the hsin leads the human being into the right path of activities. Therefore, "hsin" plays a leading and active role. Of course, Mencius understood this thinking as intuitive rather than objective knowledge, since by exercising its function it knows automatically what belongs to the "greater part" or to the "lesser part" in human nature. There is obviously no need for discursive reasoning.12 The latter kind of thinking is developed more by Hsün Tzu and, much later, by Chu Hsi.
Mencius insisted very much in his teaching upon how to keep "proper hsin" alive, namely, by engaging in the active and leading role of intuitive thinking, upon extending noble propensities from their original narrowness to ever wider spheres, and by having the fewest possible desires.l3 He was then an "excellent teacher of hsin-techniques", as the Ch'eng-Brothers called him. By applying these "techniques" to our own "hsin", it too is invested necessarily with a certain passive character.
In this connection we can mention briefly the problem of "ch'ir in Mencius and later thinkers. According to Mencius, a human being achieves true greatness by actualizing his "greater part" and thereby obtains a "magnificent ch'i". The commentators of later times were much confused in identifying "pure ch'i" (ch'ing ch'i)s as a source of cleverness and moral goodness, and "murky ch'i" (cho ch'i)t as a source of foolishness and moral evilness. But this way of understanding takes "ch'i" in a purely material sense. Nothing in the text of Mencius suggests such a confusing interpretation. Mencius' "magnificent ch'i" is said to be the effect of an upright conscience of someone who knows he does what he has to do: "Without such a conscience one becomes timid and weak".16 Hence "ch'i" must be understood as the physiological effect of thinking and willing activities. In fact, Mencius makes a very fine and subtle observation of psycho-physical interrelatedness, when he says: "Whenever the will is unified it moves the "ch'i"; whenever the "ch'i" is unified it moves the will."l7 His advice: "The will is the leader of the 'ch'i'; the latter is an enlivened state of the body. The will is dominant, the 'ch'i' is subordinate to it. Therefore I say: Firmly maintain the will, and do no violence to the 'ch'i'".l8 That is very wise and tactful advice: Mencius maintains the harmonious middle way between the activity of knowing and willing, on the one hand, and the autonomous, unconscious state of the psychophysical system, on the other.
HSÜN TZU
Very often, Hsün Tzu is depicted as an antagonist of Mencius because he opposed one of the important teachings of Mencius, namely, the inborn goodness of human nature. Hsün Tzu affirmed its inborn wickedness.19 But the antagonism is more on the surface than in substance. As said above, for Mencius, both the propensities of "greater and lesser parts" belong to human inborn nature, but only those of the "greater part", attainable only through thought, constitute specifically and truly human nature.20 In Hsün Tzu's view, thought and knowledge acquire even greater momentum in moral life, but they are regarded as pertaining to human industry, not to inborn nature. As Hsün Tzu sees it, human nature is made up of cupidity and all sorts of lower, selfish desires, and consequently is wicked. Moral goodness comes forth only through human effort.21
In what, exactly, does this human effort consist? Here "hsin" has a definite role to play. Of course, the word "hsin" is used by Hsün Tzu very often--more than 150 times and in very different settings. Except in two cases, where it clearly designates the physical heart, Hsün Tzu's "hsin" includes the whole psychic sphere, as does Mencius'. But there is a difference: Hsün Tzu stresses above all the self-reflective acts of knowing, deciding and commanding of "hsin" in contrast to the body (hsing)u. Specifically the "hsin" commands the body, its five external senses and the whole psychic sphere including the knowing, deciding and commanding functions themselves.22 "Hsin" knows Tao and decides accordingly what is right or what corresponds to Tao.23 If something is put into practice after the consideration and decision of the "hsin", Hsün Tzu would call it "human doing".24 "Hsin" and "human doing" (wei)v are placed on one side; "human nature" is placed on the other. Hence, his most stringent advice: "When nature and human doing are united, the world is well governed".25
In spite of Hsün Tzu's attack on Mencius, they agree substantially on the following issues. Both stress "hsin"'s thinking and deciding functions; both extol the role of education and human efforts in giving precedence to thinking and deciding functions of "hsin". The difference becomes manifest when Mencius regards the four propensities of the "greater part", which are attainable only through the thinking function of the "hsin", as belonging to true human nature, whereas Hsün Tzu regards them as the result of human doing. This difference is of minor practical importance, all the more as Tung Chung-shuv (c. 179-104 B.C.), a leading Confucian of the West-Han Dynasty, found the following eclectic solution: Human nature (hsing) has good seed in itself, but cannot be called good, because it still needs education and cultivation, just as the seed of rice is not the fully developed rice plant.26
It was most likely due to the influence of both Mencius and Hsün Tzu that the "Great Learning" (Ta-hsueh)w has put great emphasis upon the investigation of things and upon knowledge in striving for a morally good life. But neither Mencius and the Great Learning nor any other Chinese thinker went so far as Hsün Tzu in extolling the discriminating, decision-making and commanding functions of "hsin": "It is master of body and mind; it commands and does not receive any command; it inhibits and commands oneself, deprives oneself and takes back, moves one forward and stops."27 Hence his special "hsin-technique": not to try to do away with the natural desires (as with Lao Tzu), nor to try to diminish them (as with Mencius), but to cultivate the intellectual capacity of discriminating what is right and what is wrong, as well as to cultivate the capacity of deciding to do what is right in spite of many contrary desires.28 According to Hsün Tzu, virtue consists in acquiring a strong habit, so that the "hsin" would not even consider (still less choose) anything wrong. 29
However, Hsün Tzu has a Taoistic influence also, although he strongly criticized Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, as I have tried to show elsewhere.30 His "hsin-techniques" are also taoistically colored as he gives advice on "emptiness, oneness and stillness" (hsü-yi-erh-ching)x in order to sharpen the right knowing and right deciding ability of "hsin".31 Without going into details it could be pointed out that, though using taoistic terms of emptiness and stillness, Hsün Tzu's "hsin-techniques" are essentially different, because he strongly opposes any idea of taking away or even diminishing human desires. Even in advising techniques of "emptiness" and "stillness" he pursues always the aim of improving nature through human action. Such an aim is considered by Chuang Tzu as preposterous, because any such tentative measures would be doomed to "adulterate nature".32
Aside from his metaphysical position, in which Hsün Tzu went far left with Taoism, his psychological insights represent a typically Chinese mind. He laid stress on the intellectual side of moral life without favoring intellectualism; he put strong emphasis on free decision-making without being voluntarist; he adopted taoistic views of letting nature go its own course without being fatalistic or passivist himself.
CH'ENG-BROTHERS AND LATER DEVELOPMENTS
As Mencius and Hsün Tzu were the original thinkers in delineating the psychological factors of moral life, the above looked into their teachings in some details. After this period the Sung Dynasty was the most important in developing the "Neo-Confucian" School of which the Ch'eng-Brothers were key figures. It can be said without exaggeration that the Ch'eng-Brothers gave the tone and decisive directions to the "Hsin-Hsing-Learning", which was designed to provide appropriate theory and practical techniques of achieving moral perfection.
The teaching of Mencius and Hsün Tzu include the following basic features: 1. The manifold activities of "hsin" could be classified into two categories, of which the first plays an active, leading role of knowing, deliberating, deciding and commanding; the other one plays a passive role of being acted upon through "hsin-techniques". 2. While Mencius' knowing function of "hsin" has a more intuitive character, it is definitely intellectual in Hsün Tzu: it takes right knowledge as responsible for right deliberation, decision and action. 3. In spite of the widely spread opinion that Mencius and Hsün Tzu take human nature as good or evil, both Mencius and Hsün Tzu used the term "nature" in the meaning of "budding inclination". Such words as "shih-tuan"X1 or "ch'ing-hsing"X2 also point to this interpretation. Consequently, according to Mencius and Hsün-tzu, a human being has indeed God or evil inclinations, but he is morally good or evil only after his personal decision through the active and leading role of "hsin".
While the younger brother Ch'eng I accepted and developed more the doctrine of the intellectual function of "hsin", the older brother Ch'eng Hao explicitly followed Mencius regarding the intuitive knowledge of "hsin", stressing rather its passive role and playing down its intellectualobjective side. Their different approaches gave rise to two different schools of "Hsin-Hsing-Learning": one of a more intellectually active direction (Chu Hsi, 1139-1200) and the other of a more intuitive-passive direction (Lu Hsiang-shan, 1139-93 and Wang Yang-ming, 1472-1529).
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it must be said that both Ch'eng-Brothers and their followers gave prominent place to the passive side of "hsin" in developing manifold "hsin-techniques", probably due also to Buddhistic influences. Their copious dialogues with disciples similar to those of Catholic spiritual directors towards their disciples, went into the details of particular situations. In other words all Neo-Confucian masters were convinced that "hsin" is changeable and that their techniques could cure moral, even minor psychological disorders. In part this is the old tradition of Mencius and Hsün Tzu, but this tradition was reinforced through Taoism and Zen-Buddhism. In fact those NeoConfucian masters who stressed the intuitive and passive aspects of "hsin" were very much inspired by Taoism and Buddhism; so were Chang Tsaiy (1020-77) and Ch'eng Hao 33. But other Neo-Confucian Masters were also influenced by Taoism and Buddhism 34. Even Ch'eng I, who seemed to be more appreciative of intellectual-objective knowledge, was found to be sitting with closed eyes35. This practice was at least similar to the quiet sitting of Zen-Buddhism, and the Taoistic "sitting and forgetting" (tsuo-wang)Z.
There is an essential difference, however, because Ch'eng I's technique of "dwelling in reverence" (chü ching)aa aims to make our mind "empty and silent" not through a real void in consciousness, but through the dominance of a unique thing (chu-i)ab, so that our mind becomes dominated and filled by "heavenly order".36 Emptiness and silence of mind mean rather silence of things rather than "heavenly order"; they come about as a result of dwelling in reverence, not vice versa. As in the case of Hsün Tzu, Ch'eng I adopted somewhat Taoistic techniques and terminology while changing their spiritual content. Hsun Tzu espoused Taoistic terminology while actually emptying himself from preconceived knowledge and concentrating himself upon a unique knowledge37. Ch'eng I did the same.
A definitely anti-intellectual flavor is to be found in Ch'eng Hao. Since he was concerned only with acquiring moral perfection, which was believed to be achievable only through virtuous action, the noetic aspect seemed to him of negligible importance. Ch'eng Hao still gave lip-service to "ke-wu"ac, i.e., to reach or to research things, but in reality his searching for knowledge is hardly distinguishable from virtuous action itself38. His spiritual successors, Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming, spoke no differently: Lu's only concern is to preserve the goodness of "hsing" in avoiding desires; his search for knowledge is practically the same thing as "awareness of the good" (i.e., moral consciousness.39) Wang Yang-ming's "ke-wu" is limited to research regarding a moral "hsing" in rectifying wrong40. In their view objective knowledge has nothing to do with moral life. There is a definite anti-intellectual flavor, as Prof. Yu Ying-shih has pointed out41. This moral anti-intellectualism is in part rooted in the intuitive understanding of "hsing" of Mencius and in part due to Taoistic and Buddhistic influences.
However, in the Neo-Confucian tradition this passive intuitive attitude is tempered by the emphasis on intellectual knowledge from Ch'eng I, Chu Hsi and the scholars of the Ch'ing-Dynasty. For Ch'eng I the "searching and reaching for things" accompanies human and moral domains; it includes also a search on rational grounds of every knowable thing, not excluding the rational grounds of fire and water42. Of course Ch'eng I separated "knowledge of hearing and seeing" from "knowledge of virtue"ad. The latter is also called "profound knowledge" which would be dubbed "subjective truth" by Kierkegaard, namely, that which is inspired by a "passion of the infinite" and is effectively conducive to action43. In view of this distinction, the "knowledge of hearing and seeing" must be considered something superficial, like somebody generally knowing the fierceness of a tiger, but having never confronted or been bitten by a real one. Someone pursued by a tiger could be said to have a profound knowledge of it44. If Ch'eng I affirms that the knowledge of virtue does not result from hearing and seeing45, this is because something more is involved here than pure hearing or seeing. Certainly he did not repudiate the value of intellectual knowledge. Quite the contrary, he reproves such a repudiation as Taoistic or Buddhistic excess46. For him a genuine and objective search after knowledge, whether it belongs to virtue or not, is always worthwhile47. Chu Hsi, Ch'eng I's spiritual heir, accentuates still further intellectual knowledge in moral life: for him a clear thinking and intellectual knowledge is a conditio sine qua non of right action: hence he criticizes Lu Hsiang-shan's reliance on a pure intuition of "hsing" as responsibly for "reckless action" (hu-tso)ae though he stresses also "real insight" (shih-li)af in applying general moral principles to each case48.
THE PRESENT RELEVANCE OF
CONFUCIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL INSIGHTS
The Actual Significance of Confucian "Hsin"
Today the traditional Confucian insights about human "hsin" or psyche are invested with very real significance. The Confucian "hsing", which is experienced both as passive-intuitive and active-intellectual, occupies the middle road between the utterly passive role assigned to it by Taoists and their followers, on the one hand, and the purely active role assigned to it by traditional Western psychology and philosophy, on the other.
As mentioned above, Taoists are concerned above all to keep nature "unadulterated": therefore they detest any human endeavor to "improve" nature49. But despite Chuang Tzu's50 indignation about the term "hsin-technique", he developed his own "hsin-techniques" like "hsin-fasting"ag (empty-mindedness) and "sitting and forgetting" (striving to achieve an unconscious state) in order to reach primordial nature51. Today such techniques with their underlying philosophy encounter great favor in the Western world in reaction to too much activism and against an ever growing technocracy. Psychoanalysis and Zen-Buddhism both have contributed to this same trend.
There is another overactive current which, paradoxically, extols an almost completely passive character of the human psyche, or, as they prefer to call it, of human behavior. According to behaviorists, human behavior (since words like "psyche" or "hsin" are banished by them as "meaningless") is completely dependent on, and manageable through "behavioral engineering"52
This was a reaction against former over-confidence, when the human intellect and free will were considered almost almighty in their active and leading role toward moral decision and action. In fact, traditional Western psychology and philosophy either exalted the leading role of intellect and free will altogether, or singled out the intellect or free will as exclusive or dominant factors and favored different grades of intellectualism or voluntarism. Such disputes go back to remote antiquity. The most famous example of intellectualism is to be found in Socrates and Plato, for whom the morally evil act is but an intellectual error or ignorance53. We must acknowledge in this connection that Aristotle was neither an intellectualist nor a voluntarist: at the beginning one becomes immoral (for instance in cases of injustice or intemperance) knowingly and voluntarily, but once becoming so, it is impossible for him to be otherwise54. In the Middle Ages Thomists favored a rather mild form of intellectualism while the Augustinians preferred a temperate voluntarism, but both recognized the altogether leading role of the intellect and free will. Relatively recent examples of extreme forms of voluntarism are plentiful, from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to Heidegger and Sartre. Such forms of voluntarism are prone to anti-intellectualism in extolling the dominant role of will or of the "existential project".
The Confucian concept of "hsin" encompasses both the intuitivepassive and active-leading characters of subjective experience, which constitute the unity of contrasting and complementary Yin and yang components55. We will now see how the Confucian concept of "hsin", enhanced by the experiences and theories of other cultures, may provide a yet more comprehensive and more adequate direction for a future ethical theory.
The Need of Enhancement from Other Cultures
Moral Anti-intellectualism and Its Remedy. If even for Western psychology and philosophy, the Confucian concept of "hsin" gives the right direction for the future, nonetheless it needs enhancement from other cultures.
Mencius showed that the "greater part" in human life should play the leading role and that through the intuitive thinking of "hsin" the four noble propensities (inter-human affection, righteousness, propriety and discernment of the right and the wrong) are known. The intuitive approach of Mencius was predominant through two millenniums. The supervenient influences of Taoism, Zen-Buddhism and parts of Neo-Confucianism strengthened the conviction that in moral life intuitive knowledge prevails and that there is no room at all for objective rational knowledge.
Within this historical context it is understandable that moral antiintellectualism has a certain prevalence among Chinese. Even today when the rational way of thinking dominates the scene in every other domain, there still prevails among Chinese the conviction that in moral education no rationally founded philosophical knowledge is needed. This moral anti-intellectualism has grave consequences. Of course, though a detached moral knowledge or conviction does not necessarily lead us to action, nevertheless there exists a connection between knowledge and practice, especially where moral life is involved. If, for instance, we maintain that the human being is nothing more than animal or just an instrument for economic development, such initially detached thinking will inevitably affect one's action.
Chinese history teaches a very good lesson in the religious sphere. During the period of Warring States, Confucians did not believe in the real existence of spirits, but nevertheless complied with sacrificial rites just as a farce (wen)ah in order to attain political goals56. Hence, their religious spirit slowly vanished. The traditional religion, which was still followed faithfully by Confucius and Mencius, very soon lost its significance and was inexorably supplanted by an imported religion, Buddhism. Moreover, a serious blow had been dealt Confucian virtue of sincerity (ch'eng)ai, which according to the "Great Learning", consisted in conformity between knowing and willing: "(The Ancients) wishing to be sincere in their will, they first tried to get knowledge". Confucius was sincere as he revered spirits, because he believed deeply in their existence57; certainly he was not performing a farce as some today prefer to misinterpret the following text: "He did sacrifice to the spirits, as if the spirits were present"58. Confucius' willing was definitely according to his knowledge and conviction. Mo Tzu (479-438 B.C.) gave the Confucians of his time good advice: either go to sacrifice with sincere belief or do not comply with things in which they do not believe59. Unhappily they did not take this alternative seriously and preferred a cheap compromise as a solution. They put up with insincerity in their worship and slowly a typical formalistic attitude set in which persists to this day60.
The anti-intellectualistic trend is probably also the reason why in some forms of moral education no heed is paid to moral philosophy. The comic-tragedy lies in the fact that in neglecting the role of moral philosophy, a hedonistic moral philosophy is given practical preference. It is this philosophy which is inculcated through the modern novel, cinema, etc. Even within the circle of educational policy-makers, many still believe that moral education consists mostly in inculcating socially acceptable etiquettes. Hun Tzu's warning that "one who does not know the Taoaj would not approve and choose it, but instead approves and chooses what is contrary to the Tao",61 is largely ignored.
According to Chung-yung, a treatise widely attributed to Tzu Ssu, Mencius's teacher, human nature finds its metaphysical foundation in "the mandate of Heaven"62. For Hsün Tzu the Tao must have its foundation in itself. But all these problems are beyond the reach of a purely psychological concept of "hsin"; they must be anchored in a solid metaphysics and epistemology. It is regrettable that today epistemology tends to be dominated by skepticism and scientism. Such self-destructive epistemology has its followers also among present day Chinese philosophers. Evidently, with such an epistemology one cannot find the rational foundation for a solid metaphysics or ethics. Here the Chinese philosophy of today must exercise discernment in order to see what is gold and what is trash in modern currents of thought.
Cultivation of Moral Judgement and Decision. Though Hsün Tzu defined magnificently the knowing and decision-making functions of "hsin" and their essential role in moral life63, he was never taken seriously by the Chinese much to their disadvantage. No wonder that Taoistic passivity and anti-intellectualism became more and more the general trait also among Confucians who seemed inclined to rely very much on such "hsintechniques" as sitting quietly, being empty-minded and so on. There is no awareness that "hsin-technique" presupposes necessarily "hsin-leadership", because to employ "hsin-technique" is already a form of leadership: there must be somebody who, through the cognitive and deciding functions of "hsin" takes the lead in employing "hsin-technique". The crucial point remains, whether each individual through his or her own knowledge and decision takes leadership of him or herself or whether somebody else manages to manipulate him or her through the media, social pressures or other "behavioral technologies". The latter predicament is common in many totalitarian or less developed societies. But it is imperative for free and more developed societies that everyone takes his or her own leadership through appropriate judgment and decision. This means that we should cultivate "hsin-leadership" by better rendering its knowing, deliberating and deciding functions.
Both Mencius and Hsün Tzu would agree with this point; doing so renders "hsin-techniques" not useless but all the more urgent. As noted above, Aristotle admits that whenever somebody becomes immoral, in that condition it is not possible for him to be otherwise. If such an individual takes his own leadership seriously and wants to recover his moral integrity, he must use "hsin-techniques" in order to transform himself gradually. Pascal said appropriately in this connection, that we are automata as much as spirits64. Therefore Mencius advises us to "maintain firm the will and not do violence to 'ch'i".65 If we understand "ch'i" as a psychophysical state, or perhaps also as our unconscious part, then it is obvious why "ch'i" is not subject to management by command and why some "hsin-techniques" are necessary here.
But even in terms of "hsin-techniques", Hsün Tzu developed a very practical method in order to sharpen our moral judgment and to acquire the habitual power to choose only what is in agreement with our right judgment, so that the "hsin" would not even consider what is not right66. Ch'eng I's method of "chü-ching" is much along the same line. It consists essentially of filling the "hsin" with "right attitudes inside" so that there would be no room for evilness67. Hsün Tzu's advice to cultivate right judgment is followed also by Chu Hsi,68 though no mention is made of Hsün Tzu.
Our generation should not be afraid of old experiences if they are verified as regards their efficiency in China, as well as in the West. Such constant exercises of moral judgment and choice would very much enhance the power to do what is morally right, provided that the active role of judgment and free choice are not excessively inflated, as occasionally was the case in the West. But within its limits and right proportion, the active and leading function of "hsin", in its intellectual knowing as well as in its free deciding, must be given a prominent place in moral education.
Personal Dignity. A final important value could be improved upon through judicious comparison with the Western tradition, which consistently gives high priority to personal dignity. Already Boethius (480-525) defined the person as "naturae rationalis individua substantia". Aquinas asserted without hesitation that "Persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura"69. The person, consequently, is considered of absolute value because of his or her freedom and moral responsibility70. In China it was Mencius who saw the close connection between moral action and personal dignity: he regarded moral qualities as "Heaven's nobility" in opposition to "nobility by man"71. Though the "Great Learning" stresses the "cultivation of the person" (hsiu-shen)al as an essential precondition to the fulfillment of social duties, Mencius further delineates where true human greatness and dignity lie, namely, in absolute faithfulness to his true nature and to moral duty. Here the two great traditions, Chinese and Western, really go hand in hand. In a world torn by growing violence and contempt for the human person this seems the right message today.
ACTIVE AND PASSIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF
HSIN AND INSIGHTS FROM HEIDEGGER'S
LATER THOUGHT ON APPROPRIATION
As mentioned above, the Confucian concept of "hsin" has this peculiarity, that it encompasses both the intuitive-passive and active-leading characters of psychic, subjective experience, which constitute the unity of contrasting and complementary yin and yang components. Though the concept of hsin is factually biased toward the intuitive-passive side and therefore needs enhancement from other cultures, nevertheless it constitutes a very valuable contribution to a Western type of rationality and to the world at large, which undeniably is dominated today by Western culture.
Such was Heidegger's concern in his dialogue, On the Way to Language, with a Japanese interlocutor (1953-54). This dialogue is so suggestive that I think it appropriate to reproduce some lines:72
J (Japanese): . . . The temptation is great to rely on European ways of representation and their concepts.
I (Inquirer = Heidegger): That temptation is reinforced by a process which I would call the complete Europeanization of the earth and of man.
J: Many people consider this process the triumphal march of reason. At the end of the eighteenth century, in the French Revolution, was not reason proclaimed a goddess?
I: Indeed. The idolization of that divinity is in fact carried so far that any thinking which rejects the claim of reason as not originary simply has to be maligned today as unreason.
J: The incontestable dominance of your European reason is thought to be confirmed by the success of that rationality which technical advances set before us at every turn.
I: This delusion is growing, so that we are no longer able to see how the Europeanization of man and of the earth attacks at the source everything that is of essential nature. It seems that these sources are to dry up.
Now, what is this "everything that is of essential nature" (alles Wesenhafte)? It would be ridiculous to identify it with any concept of East Asian philosophy. It is a fact, however, that Heidegger dreamed of that day in which "European-Western saying and East Asian saying will enter into dialogue such that in it there sings something that wells up from a single source"73. From the constant concern of Heidegger (both in his Being and Time, 1927, and in his Time and Being, 1969) I think I can conclude rightly, that authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) in the early phase of Heideggerian thinking and "appropriation" (Ereignis) in his later thinking belong to his "essential" core. I shall try to show that the above mentioned "hsin" also belongs to this "essential" core.
In order to clarify what Heidegger is really about, may I cite here some criticisms levelled at him by Jürgen Habermas. He qualifies Heidegger's early thinking of Being and Time as "the decisionism of empty resoluteness", and "a process out of subjectivity of a will to self-affirmation", while the later Heidegger's thought is characterized by a "self-surrender to the destiny of Being". At this later phase of Heideggerian thought, "the temporality of Dasein is now only the cornice of a self-temporalizing dispensation of Being".74
While putting other things in "epoché", I want to concentrate on what Habermas calls the "self-temporalizing dispensation of Being" of Later Heidegger. It is supposedly "considered to the absolutely unmediated, just as it had been for metaphysics."75 It seems that this assertion comes from a misunderstanding, namely, due to the striking similarity between Heidegger and Hegel some conclude that they are the same. Though admitting a similarity, Heidegger denied categorically the sameness of their positions, and rightly so.76 Habermas shared the very common attitude of logical rationality, which constitutes the source of such misunderstanding, while Heidegger presupposes "the experience of the matter itself"77 as an indispensable precondition for understanding his lecture on Time and Being, and indeed his whole thought. From this completely different starting point Habermas' whole endeavor is doomed, for it misses the point.
It is true that the Later Heidegger often employs impersonal or seemingly redundant expressions, like: "It gives Being" (Es gibt Sein), or "Appropriation appropriates" (Ereignis ereignet), but he tries also to explain them. Being and time are for him not beings; together they belong to appropriation by standing within four-dimensional true time.78 At the end of the fifth session of the seminar on "Time and Being" a letter from Heidegger was read which was published as the preface to Richardson's book Heidegger: From Phenomenology to Thought.79 This preface points out among other things the continuity of Early and Later Heidegger: "Only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II."80 So you cannot understand the Later Heidegger without the concept of time, which is a little different in "Time and Being", but is in essential continuity with the earlier Being and Time. To think "the true time" without a Dasein or a man behind it is utterly nonsensical. Habermas' assertion about "a self-temporalizing dispensation of Being" or about a sort of blind destiny of an impersonal Being misses the point. As is known, Heidegger repeatedly states that Being is always in relation with human beings.
How can we understand properly such expressions of Heidegger as the following: "Appropriating has the peculiar property of bringing man into his own as the being who perceives Being by standing within true time. Thus Appropriated, man belongs to Appropriation," or "Being itself already names Appropriation."81 In my opinion the meaning is very simple: Being is not any single being, but is a process of human being toward the authentic (appropriate, ereignete: ereignen) openness (Erschlossenheit). This happens only through true temporality, namely through an authentic resoluteness, not through any logical thinking.
With this interpretation of Heidegger, the relation of his thought with the "hsin" of Mencius is obvious. As I have mentioned above, Mencius' hsin as essential human nature plays principally a passive role, whereas as a thinking function it has also an active-leading role to play. So while "Dasein" in the earlier Heidegger's thought, namely in Being and Time, plays more the active role of resolute decisiveness, "Being" and "Appropriation" play rather a passive role of being open to the essential unity of the four (Giviert): earth, heaven, mortal human beings and Divinities. Heidegger calls such openness "dwelling" (wohnen), the lack of which constitutes alienation, real housing shortages and homelessness.82
Moreover, in this openness and relation to Being resides true human nature; and the poets themselves reach into the abyss and find the way to their own nature.83 The "Excess of frantic measuring and calculating" of modern life makes us "dwell unpoetically", namely this maddening pace makes us incapable of what is appropriate for a human being84. So it is that we cannot think what is most worth thinking about, and we are blind to the "measure for all measuring", which is the godhead itself.85 Heidegger went so far as to say, with Hoelderlin, that kindness is that by which a human being can measure himself with the godhead:
As long as this arrival of kindness endures, so long does man succeed in measuring himself not unhappily against the godhead. When this measuring appropriately comes into the light (Ereignet sich dieses Messen), man creates poetry from the very nature of the poetic. When the poetic appropriately comes to light (Ereignet sich das Dichterische), then man dwells humanly on this earth".86
It seems from these sayings of Heidegger that he is very near Mencius, as he affirms that kindness puts the human being in a situation of measuring himself with the godhead. Heidegger's sayings seem to be the modern version of the old sayings of Mencius: "He who has fulfilled his hsin (i.e., four good propensities), knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows Heaven (i.e., Divinities)"7A1. Another of Mencius' sayings makes Heidegger sound even more like Mencius: "Jen is the high dignity appreciated by Heaven and the peaceful dwelling for human beings"2A2.
Here another question is worthy of note. Just now I have identified Mencius' "Heaven" as Divinities. My conviction is founded in Mencius' explicit statement: "The emperor can present a man to Heaven, but he cannot make Heaven give that man the empire." In this context Mencius mentioned the legendary ancient emperors Yao and Shüen: "He (i.e., Yao) caused him (i.e., Shüen) to preside over the sacrifices, and the hundred Divinities were satisfied with them; thus Heaven accepted him."2A2 Later on, at least since Hsün Tzu, many Chinese philosophers spoke just about Heaven, Earth and Human Beings, taking Heaven and Earth as the whole Universum. It is interesting, that the later Heidegger so forcefully underlined his Fourfold (das Geviert): Heaven, Earth, Mortals and Divinities. In his opinion human cultivation and construction of things are appropriate only through "presencing" the Fourfold into things.87 In other words things should be a manifestation of, and in correspondence with, the Fourfold. I am not sure whether Heidegger was aware of what Chinese philosophy says regarding Heaven, Earth and Human Beings, but in any case the comparison is interesting.
National Chengchi University
Taipei, Taiwan
1. I Ching or Book of Changes, the Richard Wilhelm translation rendered into English by Cary F. Barnes with foreword by C.G. Jung (New York: Pantheon Books, 1950).
2. The Secret of the Golden Flower, translated and explained by Richard Wilhelm with a European Commentary by C.G. Jung, translated into English by Cary F. Barnes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950).
3. George Anschütz, Psychologie: Grundlagen, Ergebnisse und
Probleme der Forschung (Hamburg: Richard Meiner, 1953), S. 486.
4. Chu Hsi (ed.), Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothersamam (Taipei, 1979), 2-19b.
5. Mencius, 7A1.
6. Mencius, 2A6, 6A6.
7. Mencius, 6A14-15, 7B24.
8. Mencius, 6A10, 2A6, 6A6, 7A21.
9. Mencius, 6A8.
10. Mencius, 7A1, 7A18, 7B35, 6A11.
11. Mencius, 2A6.
12. Mencius, 6A15.
13. Mencius, 7B31, 35.
14. Mencius, 6A14-15, 2A2.
15. Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers, 19-32b, 23-2ab, 19-77b.
16. Mencius, 2A2.
17. Mencius, 2A2.
18. Mencius, 2A2.
19. Hsün Tzu, Book 23.
20. Mencius, 6A15, 7B24.
21. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu (Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 22, Taipei, 1966), 23/5.
22. Opus citatum, 5/3
22a. Op. cit., 17/12, 21/44-46, 22/60-62
23. Op. cit., 21/32
24. Op. cit., 22/4; please note the similarity between "human being" and "actus humanus" (Summa Theologiae Ia-IIae, Qu. I, art. 1.
25. Op. cit., 19/77.
26. Tung Chung-shu, Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals an (Taipei, 1974). Chapters 35 and 36, especially pp. 207-208, 217-218.
27. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu, 21/44-45.
28. Op. cit., 22/60-62, 69-70.
29. Op. cit., 1/47-50.
30. Thaddeus T'ui-chieh Hang, "Hsün Tzu, His Key-position in the History of Chinese Philosophy and His Contribution Today" (in Chinese), Universitas Monthly, IX (1982), 794-796.
31. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu, 21/34-41.
32. A Concordance to Chuang Tzu (Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 20, Taipei, 1966), 10/39-40, 16/5.
33. Huang Tsung-hsi (ed.), Philosophers of Sung and Yuan Dynastiesaoao (Taipei, 1975), 5/5, 6/2.
34. Hsiung Yuan, Study on Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism of Sung-Dynasty (in Chinese), (Taipei: Wen-ching Press, 1985), chapters 2 and 3.
35. Philosophers of Sung and Yuan Dynasties, 5/50.
36. Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers, 16-9a, 19b.
37. A Concordance to Tsun Tzu, 21/36-38.
38. Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers, 12-8a, 15a, 20a.
39. Opera Omnia of Lu Hsiang-shan (Taipei: World Book Co., 1959), pp. 240-242, 245.
40. Opera Omnia of Wang Yang-ming (Taipei: Cheng-chung Book Co., 1955), pp. 5, 21, 63.
41. Yu Ying-shih, Historical Science and Tradition (in Chinese), (Taipei: Shih-pao Press, 1982), p. 111.
42. Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers, 19-9b, 20-la.
43. Robert Bretall, ed., A Kierkegaard Anthology (New York: The Modern Library, 1946), pp. 212-213.
44. Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers, 19-9a.
45. Op. cit., 28-3a.
46. Op. cit., 16-35b.
47. Op. cit., 20-la.
48. Li Ch'ing-teh (ed.), Classified Speeches of Chu Hsiap (Taipei, 1979), Book 18, pp. 630, 642, etc.
49. A Concordance to Chuang Tzu, 10/39-40, 16/5, 22/8.
50. Op. cit., 13/26.
51. Op. cit., 13/26, 4/26-28, 6/92-93.
52. B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).
53. Meno, 77e; Protagoras, 345b.
54. Nichomachean Ethics, 1114a 12-22.
55. T. T'ui-chieh Hang, "Unity of Yin and Yang, A Philosophical Assessment", a paper delivered at the "International Conference of Philosophy on Harmony/Strife," Hongkong, March 10-16, 1985. Cf. Jolan Jacobi, Die Psychologie von C.G. Jung (Zürich: Rascher Verlag, 1940), s. 39-40.
56. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu, 17/38-40, 19/122.
57. Confucian Analects, 2/24, 6/6, 8/21.
58. Op. cit., 3/12.
59. A Concordance to Mo Tzu (Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 21, San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1974), 48/41-42.
60. In spite of many official injunctions most Chinese of today go to funeral rites with not much inner participation. They find a special difficulty to remain reverently silent during funeral rites, while for a Chinese religious believer a reverent silence before a defunct person is congenial, because he believes sincerely that a dead person is just passing from this to another world.
61. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu, 21/30.
62. Th. T'ui-chieh Hang, "Vom himmlischen Mandat sum FatumAspekte der chinesischen Religiosität", a paper delivered at the "Wittgenstein-Symposium", Kirchberg/Wechsel, Austria, August, 1983.
63. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu, 21/30, 46, 22/60-61.
64. Pascal, Pensées (Paris: Garnier, 1951), n. 252.
65. Mencius, 2A2.
66. A Concordance to Hsün Tzu, 1/48.
67. Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers, 16-35b, 16-36a.
68. Classified Speeches of Chu Hsi, pp. 627, 629, 641.
69. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, 29, art. 3. c. (Torino: Marietti, 1940), p. 207.
70. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Stuttgart: Philipp Reklam Jun., 1961), S. 120, 233, 252.
71. Mencius, 6A16.
72. Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, translated by Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 15-16.
73. Op. cit., p. 8.
74. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. by Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), pp. 141, 151-153.
75. Op. cit., p. 153.
76. M. Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 48.
77. Op. cit., p. 51.
78. Op. cit., pp. 19, 23.
79. Op. cit., p. 51.
80. M. Heidegger, Preface to W.J. Richardson's, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. xxii.
81. M. Heidegger, On Time and Being, pp. 23, 43.
82. M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. and introduction by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 146, 149-151, 161.
83. Op. cit., pp. 93, 115.
84. M. Heidegger, Vortraege und Aufsaetze, Teil II (Pfullingen: Verlag Neske, 1967), S.77. There Heidegger says: "Das Dichten ist das Grundvermöegen des menschlichen Wohnens. Aber der Mensch vermag das Dichten jeweils nur nach dem Masse, wie sein Wesen dem vereignet ist, was zelber den Menschen mag und darum sein Wesen braucht.
85. M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 224-225.
86. Op. cit., p. 229.
87. Op. cit., p. 151.
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