The ideal way to develop a phenomenologically based model of developmental psychology would be to gather a number of protocols or descriptions of experiences of human development, to bracket preconceptions regarding the experiences, and to conduct empirical, descriptive-structural research on these experiences. Eventually this would result in a tentative model of human development. A good beginning has been made already on this task at Duquesne University, yet its size will require many more years of time and effort. In the meantime it seems feasible to take a more modest approach which could serve as an intermediate step on the way to a phenomenologically-based model of human development.

Perhaps the major problem with natural scientific approaches to developmental psychology is the lack of unity which characterizes psychology itself (Giorgi, 1970, pp. 80-81). A cursory examination of textbooks in developmental psychology reveals the same confusion of multiple theoretical frameworks and empirical studies which seem to have little relation one to another. Obviously, some form of integration is needed, but it is unlikely that psychology can provide the necessary anthropology for this without reference to philosophical concepts. What seems to be called for is a new paradigm (Kuhn, 1962).

A second problem with approaches to developmental psychology is what I would call "the omission of the self." Although many facts are presented regarding physical, affective, cognitive and social development, little or no attention is given to those experiences which we would consider central in our lives and which transcend these limited categories. For example, the experience of commitment to a person, a group or a work in early adulthood both is an expression of a value and of the self, and involves a particular integration of various aspects of the person and the world. Nor can it be reduced to a simple cause-effect explanation, whether that explanation is focused on biological, emotional, rational or social categories. This particular experience of the self does not lend itself to natural scientific methods of investigation, but its structure can be approximated through a descriptive, phenomenological research approach. This is but one of a number of instances in development in which we experience ourselves truly as ourselves, which is usually omitted in natural scientific approaches.

ERIKSON AS THE STARTING POINT

In order to arrive at a starting point for a new paradigm for developmental psychology, we begin with an already developed and well accepted traditional theory of development. This should be more inclusive and integrated than the others, yet have some opening for the experiences of the self.

Such a theory is available in the work of Erik Erickson. His approach already represented a partial integration of various aspects of development, thus to some extent addressing the problem of the lack of unity in developmental approaches. It had extended the traditional psychoanalytic emphasis on the bodily aspect of human experience to the realms of the ego and the social, and in such wise that they are truly integrated rather than merely added. For example, his concept of trust includes bodily trust, trust as prediction, and trust as a social experience. In Childhood and Society (1963) he describes his threefold approach as follows:

A human being, thus, is at all times an organism, an ego, and a member of society and is involved in all three processes of organization. . . . We are speaking of three processes, the somatic process, the ego process, and the societal process (p. 36).

Omitted in this paradigm is the dimension of the self, which is critical from an existential-phenomenological point of view. (The distinction between the ego and the self will be detailed below.) However, it does provide the terminology for these experiences of the self, though they are presented as afterthoughts or by-products of the developmental crises. Hope, will, sense of purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care and wisdom are the terms he uses to describe strengths or virtues following upon the resolution of the various developmental crises. Erickson (1968) even equates these experiences with identity when he says, for example, "I am what hope I have and can give" (p.107). As these experiences of the self are included, if only in a tangential way, the work of Erik Erikson seemed a promising starting point for this intermediary step on the way to a phenomenologically based model of human development.

HEIDEGGER'S CARE STRUCTURE FOR

A BROADER PARADIGM

Despite these advantages Erikson's paradigm needed to be broadened further in order to do justice to the breadth of human experience. Since psychology itself could not provide the necessary breadth, it seemed natural to move to philosophy to derive a paradigm adequate to the task. The care structure, outlined by Heidegger in his work, Being and Time (1927/1962), seemed ideally suited for this purpose. Although Heidegger's project was not to develop an anthropology or philosophy of the person, and he objected to attempts to understand his work in this way, such psychiatrists as Medard Boss, Ludwig Bingswanger and others have found much of his work valuable in understanding human existence. Heidegger's major point, that human existence cannot be understood unless it is considered within the horizon of time, is particularly appealing to a developmental psychologist interested in a person's relation to time at different ages. It should be noted that there is, of course, a difference between a philosopher taking up Heidegger's ideas as a philosophical project and a psychologist using Heidegger's ideas as a paradigm for bringing unity to a fragmented discipline.

The care structure, which Heidegger considered the central structure of human existence, has three fundamental characteristics all of which are related to time (Heidegger, 1927/1962): "The fundamental characteristics of this entity (Dasein) are existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen" (p. 235):

The ontological signification of the expression "care" has been expressed in the "definition": ahead-of-itself, Beingalready-in (the world) as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within the world). In this are expressed the fundamental characteristics of Dasein's Being: existence, in the "ahead of itself"; facticity, in the "Being-already in"; falling, in the "Being alongside" (p. 293).

THE CARE STRUCTURE APPLIED TO

THE FIRST STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT

Rather than outlining the care structure and defining the terms "facticity," "fallenness," and "existentiality" in general, let us proceed to the crisis of Erikson's first stage of development and see the paradigm in relation to this specific stage. The first step will be to present Erikson's three-pronged approach to this stage and then to include this in the broader paradigm. (A disadvantage of beginning with this intermediate step involves assuming that development occurs in stages, which not all phenomenologists would accept).

Erickson names the crisis of the first stage of development (the first year of life) as one of trust versus mistrust. He sees trust in terms of the body, the ego and the social. Orthodox psychoanalysis had always seen development exclusively in terms of bodily existence. The term used for the first stage of development was "orality," a term which signified that the interaction between mother and child established patterns of gratification which would have determining effects on later life, especially on issues related to dependency.

Erickson accepts this psychoanalytic insight and extends the approach to include the ego and the social. He sees the crisis of trust versus mistrust as the first task of the ego (1963, p. 249) and describes its development in the infant in this way:

The experience of a mutual regulation of his increasingly receptive capacities with the maternal techniques of provision gradually helps him to balance the discomfort caused by the immaturity of homeostasis with which he is born (p. 247).

This primitive ego becomes the first foundation of a later sense of identity, a concept which is generally considered Erikson's major contribution to psychology.

Erickson also extends the definition of trust to include the social aspect of personal life. He describes the infant's first social achievement as "willingness to let the mother out of sight without undue anxiety or rage, because she has become an inner certainty as well as an outer predictability" (1963, p. 247). He points also to the relation between the individual and social institutions regarding the issue of trust. In promoting and endorsing a sense of trust, Erikson sees religious and cosmic schemes which order and give meaning to existence as being particularly relevant. He says, "All religious have in common the periodic childlike surrender to a Provider or providers who dispense earthly fortune as well as spiritual health" (1963, p. 250).

This three-pronged approach to the issues of human development represents an advance over traditional psychoanalytic thinking and over the more specialized psychological approaches which emphasize only one or a few aspects of development such as the cognitive, the cognitive-behavioral, the affective, etc. It's basic assumptions, however, remain tied to a psychoanalytic perspective, now broadened to a more inclusive neo-psychoanalytic perspective. It remains a specialized perspective on human development. An even more inclusive paradigm is necessary in order to do justice to the breadth and depth of developmental issues. Let us now consider Erikson's approach within the broader paradigm suggested by Heidegger's characteristics of facticity, fallenness and existentiality.

Facticity

Facticity (Being already in) refers to the person's finding himself or herself already in a situation, already within limits, having a past, and having been born into a certain tradition, family, social class, gender, etc. In sum, this characteristic refers to the limits within which the person may be free. Erickson (1969) seems to acknowledge this characteristic in his book about Gandhi:

For membership in a nation, in a class, or in a caste is one of those elements of an individual's identity which at the very minimum comprise what one is never not, as does membership in one of the two sexes or in a given race. What one is never not establishes the life space within which one may hope to become uniquely and affirmatively what one is (p. 266).

Facticity refers primarily to the past; but, for human beings, the past is not linear and set, but constantly being worked out along with the present and the future. Traditional psychoanalytic thinking has been aimed primarily at this characteristic of human existence and has illuminated many of the ways in which we are limited or, in their view, determined by our past. It is not without precedent to include the psychoanalytic perspectives within the broader notion of facticity. Ludwig Binswanger (1963) wrote of the psychoanalytic unconscious in these terms:

The thrownness of the Dasein, its facticity, is the transcendental horizon of all that scientific systematic psychiatry delimits as reality under the name of organism, body (and heredity, climate, milieu, etc.) and also for all that which is delimited, investigated and researched as psychic determinateness: namely, as mood and ill humor, as craziness, compulsive or insane "possessedness," as addiction, instinctuality, as confusion, phantasm determination, as, in general, unconsciousness (pp. 212-213).

With regard then to the issue of trust, orality as the first prong of Erikson's approach would be considered within the broader concept of facticity. The determinations resulting from the mother-infant interactions in the first year of life are one aspect of the person's facticity which provides certain limitations on the trusting experience. The influence of these determinations are especially pronounced in one who is fixated at this stage of development and considered an "oral personality."

Expanding the bodily pole of Erikson's approach to the notion of facticity allows also the consideration of influences on a person's development not attributable specifically to the unconscious processes described by psychoanalysis. For example, the experience of horizontality may be included at a first stage of development with reference to the issues of trust. In the first year of life the infant is in a horizontal position, which is one of vulnerability and dependency. Jagger (1971) points out that the infant in the horizontal position has an horizon in which the significant figure is the face of the mother. If an horizon is "that which calls us forth and invites us in" (p.213), then in the infant's helplessness, the degree to which he or she can be open, has much to do with the kind of welcome received. As Jagger puts it:

There is a reassuring quality in the motherly presence which stills a child's fears. . . . A child growing up around hard faces, closed expressions, rejecting stances, will find his access to the world barred. The face of the other is the portal through which we enter the world (1971, p. 215).

It is well known that in fear perception is narrowed and that in relaxation it is opened. Patterns of such narrowing and opening are being established as part of a person's facticity in the first year.

Fallenness

The second characteristic of the care structure to be considered is fallenness. This characteristic, which we would identify in ontic terms as the ego aspect of the person, means the typical way in which we are occupied by the daily events of life, our everyday tasks, and the way in which this involvement enables us to avoid confronting some very basic issues, primarily that of our own death. The temporal mode characterizing the state of fallenness is the present. The concern with everyday business, its strategies and techniques, often shapes an attitude that our present oriented concerns are the most vital issues. In this mode, which Heidegger describes as living a series of "nows", the future is seen merely as an extension of the present. What is not confronted by the person involved is the fact that these "nows" end, that we die.

Most of what traditional American psychology calls "personality" is concerned with this ego aspect. Habitual patterns of going about our everyday concerns as, for example, those measured by personality tests, are seen as measures of who the person is. In contrast, Heidegger identifies those patterns as inauthentic, as not being who we really are. Consistent with this view, we would identify this aspect of the person as involving the ego which is identified with cognition in the form of strategic and technical thinking. This is distinguished from the self or existential aspect which involves authentic modes of being in the world.

A problem of terminology now presents itself in integrating Erikson's ego crises within this framework because his definition of ego is the psychoanalytic one (id, ego, superego); it does not share the general understanding of ego typical of traditional psychology other than psychoanalysis. The ego crisis of trust versus mistrust, is tied to bodily experience and does not admit of the more conscious processes typical of other views of the ego. Because of this specialized treatment of ego, Erikson's ego crises are located somewhere between the tactical and the fallen in our framework. The figures at the end of this paper represent this placement graphically.

Despite the fact that the ego crises do not adhere to the category of fallenness, Erikson does provide a vocabulary for the more usual sense of ego at each developmental stage. For the first stage the term he uses is "consistency", mostly in the meaning of predictability. As the infant begins to experience life-preserving patterns of feeding and being cared for, a certain consistency or predictability is achieved on the ego level and the foundations of ego functioning are established. The infant can eventually begin to predict events and to have these predictions confirmed or not. It remains, however, primarily an issue of perception since the infant is in the horizontal position and does not yet actively effect the outcome of events.

Three Kinds of Trust

Understanding orality and horizontality as tactical aspects of the person, and consistency and predictability as fallen aspects, three kinds of trust will now be distinguished as an introduction to the existential or self aspect. Since infants are not able to verbalize, we will move to the adult experiences of trust in order to bring out these distinctions. Although the trust crisis occurs first early in life and is lived out bodily for the most part, the resolving of issues of trust continues to occur in later life and to become focal at critical moments.

As a basis for these distinctions, Caroly Gratton's (1975) research on the experience of interpersonal trust will be used. She asked people to describe experiences of trust they had and attempted to arrive at the common constituents revealed in these descriptions. One finding particularly relevant to this discussion was the discovery of three levels of trust. In the first, which we will describe as bodily trust, subjects experienced a prepersonal (unreflective) sense of bodily comfort with another person. They found themselves, their bodies, in a relaxed, nondefensive posture toward the other person without even thinking about it or being aware of it (until asked). This bodily aspect of trust we identify with the facticity of our existence; that is, due to my early bodily experience with others, particularly with my mother, it is a given that I feel comfortable and trusting some people and not with others. I find myself trusting or not trusting without the intervention of my ego or my understanding. This trust is prerational, prepersonal, nonreflective and constitutes for me the bodily aspect of the experience of trust. I am not responsible for it, and cannot take credit or blame for it; it is a fact of my history and development.

There was a second kind of interpersonal trust described by the subjects. In this kind the other person was trusted because he/she was consistent. This kind of trust we equate with the rational, calculative, or ego aspect. I trust because I can predict the other's response. Here we see evidence of a healthy ego, but there is also something disturbing. A distinction is made between using one's head in the service of a value and relying exclusively on one's calculations, the latter being described as neurotic or inauthentic.

In the third kind of trusting experience described by the subjects, there is a further difference. These subjects described experiences in which they were vulnerable, in which there was a risk involved, and in which they could not predict the other person's response. Yet they trusted anyway, chose to be vulnerable, and took the risk. We identify this kind of trusting with the existential aspect and call it hope in order to distinguish it from Erikson's more specialized meaning of trust.

We understand hope according to the care structure as follows: It is a fact that I am bodily predisposed to trust or not to trust and I am constantly falling into a form of socially sanctioned ego control with regard to my trusting. In the face of this, I am open to the other in a trusting way. Another way of stating this would be: My past and my bodily experience in the past limits and sets bounds to my trusting: my calculations in the present threaten to make my trusting exclusively a matter of prediction; in the face of this, I am still able to be open to a possible future, to horizons beyond horizons.

Traditional psychoanalysis points out, and correctly so, the influence of the bodily past on our capacity to hope. Erikson brings out the need to include the social and ego aspects in understanding hope. Phenomenology affirms these and integrates them into a structure which adds another aspect as central and integrative. This is the structure of the self, of possibility, a futural dimension which is always in dialogue with another or with something outside the self. Let us now clarify the existential dimension of hope in order to see how the other aspects may be integrated into this broader understanding.

EXISTENTIALITY AND BEING-WITH

In the preceding section the third characteristic of the care structure, existentiality, was introduced with regard to the first stage of development. In a broader sense, existentiality is the characteristic of possibility, of future, which in Heidegger's care structure has the highest priority (Gelven, 1970): "The future is the most determinate and significant of the three ekstases and Dasein's basic focus of meaning is future" (p. 189). Human existence is seen here not as pure possibility, but as factical possibility, that is, as embodied, finite, limited. As Gelven (1970) explains:

The awareness of death points out one of the most persistent doctrines of Heidegger's philosophy, that possibility means more than merely a future actuality. As a human being I live in the realm of possibilities--and it is in the realm of possibilities that authentic existence is realized (p. 157).

Authentic living is related most directly to the characteristic of existentiality. I am not authentic in merely surrendering to the facticities of my life, nor in calculating and busying myself in a fallen way, but in discovering and creating my possibilities. This characteristic of existence is generally omitted in developmental theories or, as in Erikson's case, is merely hinted at since it does not lend itself to the research methodologies of the natural sciences. In our approach this characteristic not only is included, but is seen as the most significant in integrating the experience of the various stages.

For example, hope has previously been described as the existential or self aspect of the first stage of development. The issues of dependency, vulnerability and calculative prediction are resolved in the experience of hope which integrates them in such a way as to strengthen the person and express his/her authenticity. Hope includes relaxation and openness of perception in the face of risk and danger. It is future-oriented and invites the person to involvement with the world and others. Those institutionalized infants described by Spitz (1945) and Bowlby (1952), who had higher rates of illness and death, would seem to be examples of those who were unable to hope and succumbed to despair. In later, extreme experiences of threat, such as illness and imprisonment, the crisis is reexperienced and the possibility of hoping is present.

The reflections of Gabriel Marcel (1962) lend support to this description of the experience of hope as he distinguishes it from optimism (pp. 33-34) and from calculation (p. 65), and as he describes the secret affinity between hope and relaxation in the face of fear (pp. 38-39). Ernst Bloch further emphasizes the importance of hope, an experience ignored by natural scientific psychology. David Gross (1972) describes his work as follows:

Let us begin by man hoping. As Bloch views him, man is not given man--not man as the sum of his current attributes-- but man-on-the-way to something beyond himself. He can be said to have an "essence", but the core of that essence is not static or "thick". In fact, it has not even been substantially defined as yet because it is an unfinished essence still on the way toward realizing itself. Man has not already been grasped and pinpointed; rather he is still open, still on the way to becoming what he potentially is. And the form this openness takes when man becomes his own project is hope: hope that he can become what he is not yet (p.116).

Developmental psychologists would do well to research the experience of hope since it is so central to the first stage of development and to life itself. In our descriptive-structural research on this experience using the subjects' descriptions, we have found initial support for most of the structural elements delineated above. In this proposed paradigm there is a similar future-oriented experience which integrates the issues of each stage and these also need to be researched and understood.

In the face of phenomenology's depiction of human existence as being-in-the-world, there is a certain contradiction in calling the existential aspect the self aspect. The self is not an autonomous self, but is always in relationship. In this paradigm Erikson's inclusion of the social in development is much in harmony with Heidegger's structure of Being-with. Gelven (1970) describes this Heideggerian structure:

To say that Being-with (or to be-with) is an a priori existential of Dasein means that one cannot be a self unless it is within one's possibilities to relate in a unique way with other Daseins. Hence to be Dasein at all means to-be-with (p. 68).

The concept of self is used in this paradigm in order to distinguish it from ego (fallenness); however, the self is always to be considered optically in relation to others and the world. In the first stage of development, for example, the infant has always to be considered in relation to the mother and not as an independent entity. Also, the relationship one has to others and the world is one of co-constitution; that is, one shapes the world and others just as one is shaped by them. The infant makes the mother be in certain ways, primarily by his/her dependency at the same time as the mother also makes the infant be in certain ways. Now that the main components of the paradigm have been delineated (facticity, fallenness, existentiality, being-with), we can present in figure 1 the paradigm as it relates to the first stage of development:

SUMMARY

In addition to providing an integration of the various themes of the individual stages, one of the advantages of the broader paradigm is that it opens up the self experiences listed under existentiality in Figure 2. These experiences, which are central in human life, have been excluded from psychological study because they have had to be defined in operational terms in order to conform to the natural scientific paradigm. The research approach of phenomenology, on the other hand, allows us to identify the essential constituents and structures of these experiences from descriptive protocols, and to understand them in a more holistic sense. The need for a psychology of hope and will has been pointed out by Leslie Farber (1966) as he describes a meeting with Martin Buber:

I had the good fortune to spend a few weeks with Martin Buber, when he came to Washington in 1957 to give The William Alanson White Memorial Lectures for the Washington School of Psychiatry. One evening, as we walked to the lecture hall, I idly asked him what he thought the future held for psychoanalysis or for psychotherapy in general. To my surprise, since he could not have known of my own preoccupation, he replied that he believed my profession needed more than anything else for its further development a psychology of will. . . . At a time when I was only beginning to investigate the disabilities of will, described in this volume, I learned that Father Lynch was simultaneously occupied with the privileges of will--or "wishing," to use his own term--as he formulated a psychology of hope (pp. vii-ix).

As indicated above, some beginnings have already been made in developing a psychology of hope. The work of W.F. Lynch (1974), Images of Hope: Imagination as Healer of the Hopeless, is one example of such an attempt. The work of Viktor Frankl (1959), From Death-camp to Existentialism, is a still earlier attempt to deal with the issues of hope and despair. Much more work is needed for a more complete understanding of this very significant life experience.

With regard to the experience of will, Farber's (1966) The Ways of the Will represented a new beginning in modern psychology, to understand how we go about willing our futures and the impediments to such willing. It is interesting and also a sign of imbalance that most traditional psychological studies emphasize the impact of the environment on the person and largely neglect the impact of the person on the environment. Perhaps the balance could be reestablished by psychological studies which deal also with the impact of individual and collective willing in social change.

The experience of the imagination also has been neglected by traditional psychology. Edward Murray's recent works (1986, 1987) have pointed to the centrality of the imagination in human existence and have considered the imaginative experience from a psychological perspective. Obviously, much more psychological research is necessary on this topic.

Robert White's work (1960, 1979), from a traditional psychological perspective, has done much to clarify the cognitive aspects of competence in human development. However, a more radical approach which treats competence as an experience of the self is needed. The traditional psychological paradigm of prediction and control will not suffice. A more popular author, Robert Pirsig (1979), points to the need for a new paradigm in approaching a topic such as competence which cannot be reduced to mere technique:

What you're up against is the great unknown, the void of all Western thought. You need some ideas, some hypotheses. Traditional scientific method, unfortunately, has never quite gotten around to saying exactly where to pick up more of these hypotheses. Traditional scientific method has always been at the very best, 20-20 hindsight. It's good for seeing where you've been. It's good for testing the truth of what you think you know, but it can't tell you where you ought to go, unless where you ought to go is a continuation of where you were going in the past (p. 273).

So little has been written about the experience of fidelity in psychology itself that it is necessary to refer to a philosopher, Gabriel Marcel (1964), for its structural understanding. He points to the difference between the ego mode of constancy and the self mode of fidelity:

It may at once be observed, however, that constancy, construed as immutability, is not the only element entering into fidelity. Fidelity implies another factor which is far more difficult to grasp and which I shall call presence. . . . I am constant for myself, in my own regard, for my purpose-- whereas I am present for the other, and, more precisely: for thou (pp. 153-154).

The adult existential modes (love, care and wisdom) are even more sparsely treated in psychology than the previous ones. There is a helpful structural treatment of care by Mayeroff which has relevance to earlier stages of development as well, but the need for empirical phenomenological studies of these experiences is great indeed.

One of the principles of the existential-phenomenological approach to the human sciences involves the primacy of the life world. The attempt here is to let experience shape theory rather than to fit experience into theoretical schemes. Broadening Erikson's approach to human development hopefully will allow for a greater range of experience. Still, the limitations of the broader model are such that it represents only an intermediate step on the way to a truly human-scientific developmental psychology. Cooperation in this search is welcome.

Duquesne University

Pittsburgh, Pa.

*This paper is based on the text: Knowles, Richard T. (1986). Human development and human possibility: Erikson in the Light of Heidegger. Lanham; M.D.: University Press of America.

Binswanger, L. (1963). Heidegger's Analytic of Existence and Its Meaning for Psychiatry. In J. Needleman, trans., Being in the World. New York: Harper and Row. pp. 206-221

Bowlby, J. (1952). Maternal Care and Mental Health. Geneva: World Health Organization.

Erickson, E.H. (1963). Childhood and Society. New York: W. W. Norton.

_____. (1968). Identity: Youth and Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton.

_____. (1969). Gandhi's Truth. New York: W.W. Norton.

Farber, L. (1966). The Ways of the Will. New York: Basic Books.

Frankl, V.E. (1959). From Death-camp to Existentialism. Boston: Beacon. Gelven, M. (1970). Commentary on Heidegger's "Being and Time". New York: Harper & Row.

Giorgi, A. (1970). Psychology as a Human Science. New York: Harper & Row.

Gratton, M.C. (1975). A Theoretical-empirical Study of the Lived Experience of Interpersonal Trust. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University.

Gross, D., & Bloch, E. (1972). The Dialectics of Hope. In D. Howard & I. Glare, eds., The Unknown Dimension: European Marxists since Lenin. New York: Basic Books.

Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans. New York: Harper & Row. (Original work published 1927).

Jagger, B. (1971). Horizontality and Verticality: A Phenomenological Exploration into Lived Space. In A. Giorgi, W.F. Fischer, & R. von Eckartsberg, eds., Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology: I. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. pp. 212, 235

Knowles, R., Lydon, J. & Pieritsch, J. (1990). List of Publications of DePartment of Psychology, Duquesne University. Pittsburgh, PA: Department of Psychology, Duquesne University.

Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lynch, W.F. (1974). Images of Hope: Imagination as Healer of the Homeless. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press.

Marcel, G. (1962). Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysics of Hope. E. Craufurd, trans. New York: Harper & Row. (Original work published 1951).

_____. (1964). Creative Fidelity. R. Rosthal, trans. New York: Farrar, Straus.

Mayeroff, M. (1971). On Caring. New York: Harper & Row.

Misiak, H. & Sexton, V. (1973). Phenomenological, Existential and Humanistic Psychologies: a Historical Survey. New York: Grune & Stratton.

Murray, E.L. (1986). Imaginative thinking and human existence. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.

_____. (Ed.) (1987). Imagination and Phenomenological Psychology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Pirsig, R.M. (1974). Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. New York: Bantam Books.

Smith, D.L. (1983). The History of the Graduate Program via Existentialphenomenological Psychology at Duquesne University. In A. Giorgi, A. Barton, & C. Mae, eds., Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. IV, 259-331

Spitz, R. (1945). Hospitalism. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1, pp. 53, 74.

Van Kaam, A. (1966). Existential Foundations of Psychology. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

White, R.W. (1960). Competence and the Psychosexual Stages of Development. In R. Marshall, ed., Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

_____. (1979). Competence as an Aspect of Personal Growth. In M.W. Kent and J.E. Roll, eds., Primary Prevention of Psychopathology. Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England.