CHAPTER II

DAOISM AS A SOURCE FOR DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

PAN HUNGCHAO, CEDRIC

WESTERN MODELS

            Aristotle said that he who lives alone is either a madman or a saint. This is not to equate the mad with the saintly, but to under-line that human nature is social. Indeed, human beings are able to be defined and understood only in the society within which they function and find their role and meaning. In turn, social rules and regulations shape and fashion one’s desires, thoughts and behaviour.

            Though it is impossible to overemphasize that humans are social beings, this can further be analyzed into its economic, cultural and historical aspects. But these must not be considered separately since they are intimately interconnected. It was not with-out cause then that Aristotle studied the histories of some 158 constitutions where he found the relations of human beings in society to be in-teresting and important, in particular the relation between the ruler(s) and the ruled.

            In Plato’s Republic, the relation of human beings and society is given a most detailed description with regard to education and politics. Over and against the structure of the Greek city-state of Athens, Plato envisioned an Utopia in which a philosopher is king, ruling over the people who were differentiated by their personal attributes, symbo-lized by gold, silver and bronze, into rigidly stratified classes of rulers, guardians and artisans, respectively.

            At first sight, this is an elitist dream come true: to each ac-cording to his needs and from each according to his abilities. How-ever, critics of Plato are quick to point out the implications of a closed society without mobility which they generally interpret as authoritarian, if not totalitarian. Should power fall into the ‘wrong’ hands, those in privileged positions could perpetuate their numerous special privile-ges and corruption would be rampant. This may be a case of bad philo-sophy leading to bad politics. But it should be pointed out if Plato was not an apologist for democracy, he was never an ideological dema-gogue; he held merely that the ideal society should have a place for everyone, and that no one should ever find himself in the wrong place in society. The agony of the person in modern society, namely, not knowing oneself and one’s role within a larger whole, would never hap-pen in Plato’s model of the hu-man being in society. It is the modern person in contemporary society who experiences to an extreme de-gree this perplexing societal anxiety.

            In a way, this utopian society is echoed by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in his aversion to the state of nature understood as chaos and disorder. For him, the ideal government is a strong government in which the individuals enter into agreement (contract) with an absolute monarch (ruler). He writes:

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them with all. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no com-modious Building; no instruments of moving and re-moving such things as require much force; no know-ledge of the face of the Earth; no account of time; no Arts; no Letters; no society and worse is of all con-tinual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.

            Individuals are seen by Hobbes to surrender their right to self-determination since this is necessary to control conflicting individual interests and desires, including political desires. Individuals must fore-go or suppress their desires in order to enjoy the benefits and survive in a stable and secure monarchial society.

            But in On Liberty, J.S. Mill wrote as follows:

But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their govern-ment. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all Mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, Mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing Mankind.

            This is, by and large, a liberal view of democracy which assumes that each individual has certain basic or ‘inalienable’ rights which are God-given or natural for him to possess or have. No one should have the right to abridge or deny one’s right to certain things and to taking certain courses of actions which are a basic requirement in order to function as a free person and a citizen in a popularly constituted democratic state.

            While Thomas Hobbes argues for a monarch with absolute power over all, and J.S. Mill argues for a liberal and tolerant democracy in which all individuals have equal rights, Plato’s position is more am-biguous and thus more difficult to render specific. There can be an utopia with ideal differentiation and stratification, but Plato generally is interpreted as arguing for an authoritarian form of government with un-questioning obedience to authority, or worse an autocracy in which one human being has absolute power. This is a kind of dictatorship or despotism whose legitimacy is justified only by its unlimited power over its people, and therefore is opposed to individual freedom, judgment and actions.

            As paradigms, we now put the authoritarian or autocratic society at one end of the political spectrum, and liberal democracy at the other. This suits modern consciousness for political bipolarity and is con-venient for the following discussion of possible grounds for genuine socio-political and economic transformations consistent with human dignity -- and are therefore non-violent -- which emerge from within the Chinese cultural heritage.

CONFUCIANISM VS. TAOISM

            Though the relation to Western influences has been historically problematic there have been sea changes in this century. Not the least of these is Dr. Sun Yat-Sen’s wholesale adaptation of the revolutionary principles, which in the West dated from the French Revolution, for the establishment of the Chinese Republic and, later, Chairman Mao Tze-tung’s innovation of Marxist-Leninism arising from the Russian Revo-lution. China had perhaps never changed so significantly in such a short period.

            There is nothing wrong or humiliating about borrowing ‘foreign’ or ‘alien’ ideas on democracy if they are good and serviceable to one’s country. But it can be argued that there is historical forgetfulness in the Chinese quest for tolerance of differing ideas and judgments. For there is theoretical justification for this basic trait of democracy within the Chinese heritage, and this can be more cogent and telling than a the-oretical justification culled from foreign sources and traditions.

            It would be a truism to say that Chinese political culture has been affected by Confucian orthodoxy. Though this suggests looking into ‘the ways of former sage kings and ruling as parents bringing up children’, there is to be found there also a latent individualism and even democratic principles. However, these are expressed more clearly in its intellectual and historical rival, Taoism, especially in the Taoism of Chuang Tzu.

            For a theoretical justification of Chinese individualism (more radical than in Confucianism), and a host of democratic sentiments if not principles, we need only refer to the dialectical opposition between Confucianism and Taoism. Though Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu in themselves do not provide an adequate comprehensive and system-atic basis for a political theory, we can locate there sources for Chinese democratic ideas based on a radical sense of individualism. As these ideas do not rely on the unfamiliar, ‘borrowed’ or ‘foreign’, but are familiar and homegrown, they should be more understandable and acceptable.

Family vs. Individual

            Confucian ways modelled themselves on dynastic imperial rule and affirmed the authoritarianism of the central government. While Confucian humanism takes the human being to be the center of all things, the individual is always taken, not as himself, but as immersed in the context of family, clan, bloodline and so on, up to being a mem-ber of the community. In this sense, one becomes a truly social being with social responsibilities and their attendant duties and demands. The five relations epitomize this concept of a human as a being who derives meaning only in the context of a family, society and state.

            Confucian individualism does exist, but it should be expressed only in familial and social context. One must function together with others and must be aware of the interests of others. In most instances, one is expected to sacrifice one’s own interests in deference to com-munal interests.

            One’s relations to one’s father, elder brother and the related feelings of love, filial piety, respect, reverence and guidance take on a special significance and meaning; this can be extended outside the fa-mily context to one’s emperor and superiors. The father knows best, and as parent he alone can do any good for the family, from bread-winning to education, choices in marriage, jobs, etc. As such, there is no development of democratic sentiments within the family, since the father’s will always prevails and his decisions alone steer the course of the family.

            In Taoism, especially in Chuang Tzu, we see the Taoist prefer-ence for naturalism or nature mysticism, and by derivation that the hu-man is the measure of all things. Both Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu have taken human beings away from their familial and social context, advo-cating the abandonment of the social for the embrace of nature. Though there are many interpretations of nature, however it may be interpreted, the individual is now liberated from social, political, and economic constraints and is set upon the path to freedom and happi-ness.

            These pursuits of freedom and happiness are the standard hall-marks of individualism and are emphasized also in democratic ideals. Of course, one may find happiness in the familial and social context, but the happiness upon which the Taoists have focused is strictly that of the self and is even egoistic. Though Taoists reject social responsi-bilities and contexts, they nevertheless presuppose them; their con-cern is to distance themselves from activism and the hustle of the mun-dane, generally to prefer transcendental reality. What is significant here is the radical individualism which negates the familial and social, opting instead for individual freedom and happiness, and thereby freeing humans from social and communal bondage. It is this sense of individualism which is akin to the individualism in democratic ideals.

Conformism vs. Difference

            In Confucianism, we observe also that built-in tendency towards conformism, reinforced by respect for the wen tradition, reverence for study and learning, and generally knowledge by which one can es-tablish oneself and offer oneself for service to one’s country. This is the program which defines, and conforms to, the Confucian Way.

            This uniformity in training and moral inculcation is supposed to be good for all reasonable humans who then can follow the way to be-come a gentleman-scholar, that is, a moral being willing and prepared to put himself at the service of others. The family and bureaucracy reinforce this by their rules, regulations and institutions.

            Here Taoists lodge their most forceful objection against con-formity through enforcement and persuasion by which certain things are deemed to be acceptable, desirable, and therefore good. Though these may well be the good from the viewpoints of parents and auto-cratic rulers, not only are they arbitrarily arrived at, but Taoists argue that, in view of the given natures of different things, there cannot be a single standard of good and bad which applies to all men. Though con-ventional judgments imply that such a standard exists, this is a dogmatic assumption.

            There is the this and there is the that; everything is what it is and does what it does. Therefore, we must accept and appreciate the dif-ferences of things and not impose uniformity. Individuals all have dif-ferent natures; only when these natural capabilities are realized can human beings be free and happy. An imposition of norms and con-ventions would block one’s free development and stifle the capacity for creativity; uniformity would be a disaster. Water is good for fish, but a human would drown in it. We must realize that there is no standardized form of value or good, and therefore allow for non-conformism be-cause of the different nature of things. It is important to note both the validity of this Taoist caveat against conformity and the possibility of creativity which can arise from non-conformity.

RULING BY NONACTION

            The Confucian governmental order is much like that portrayed in Plato’s Republic. Each one, due to his or her attributes, nature and training, functions in a niche. No one is supposed to move out of his or her own niche, much less change their life’s station: the emperor on his throne (ruling by example); the ministers and courtiers doing their work; the people tilling the soil, others engaging in crafts and com-merce; scholars learning with teachers; fathers doing their level best at parenting, caring for the family, and doing as much good for it as possible; the emperor caring for the people as a father for his children (benevolent paternalism), and trying to do as much good for the country as possible.

            Ideally, the social polity works as smoothly as clockwork and order is guaranteed. The sage-ruler has his reward in seeing the levia-than work such that everyone receives its beneficence. This is the Confucian hope, but the Taoist anathema!

            Whereas Lao Tzu still talked and gave advice to rulers, Chuang Tzu asserted that the best government is one which governs least, or not at all. For Chuang Tzu what is of human beings is perverted, while what is of nature is spontaneous, effortless, and provides for inner freedom and happiness. A streak of political anarchism is quite evident in both Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, but this may well be an over reaction and overstatement directed against the Confucian feudal sense of social order.

            It cannot be denied that the Lao-Chuang traditions routinely presuppose an organized social order so that their thoughts can be better grasped and they can have the luxury to practice the Taoist ideals in which they believed. The Taoist sage-ruler does not rule: he may set himself up as an example, but has no place for meddling and coercion. The sage-ruler just lets things be, by non-action, by doing nothing, and by not assuming that any good is actually good for every-one. Hence, one can come up with one’s own good and not suffer the indignity or agony of imposition. Anarchism develops into something resembling self-initiation and self-determination that are the subs-tance of democracy.

CONCLUSION

            My main argument has been that some Taoist ideas can serve as a homegrown source, foundation and theoretical justification for a Chinese form of democracy. This suggests moving from the dogma-tism or certainty of Confucianism to the skepticism or relativism of Taoism.

            Confucians are certain that theirs is the only way to achieve social order, and therefore peace and perhaps prosperity; it is uni-versal and can be accepted and practiced by all. But in the Taoist’s skepticism and relativism we find a sentiment essential to any type of democracy. This was reflected above as ‘Man is the measure of things’ and is stated specifically in the doctrine of the equality of things. All opinions, views, beliefs and judgments belong to someone who is a subject; there are no opinions, views, beliefs and judgments which do not belong to subjects. This is to say that all are subjective and as such also relative.

            Chuang Tzu seems to suggest that there is a certain blindness in all opinions and views, which renders them partial or at least not ab-solutely true. One view may engender its opposite, and then another view, and so on. There is an infinite regress in that no view can be affirmed or denied since there is no absolute criteria to endorse opinions, views and judgments so that they can profess to be unas-sailable. The gist of this skepticism affirms the relativity and equality of views, since the grounds which support them are no more and no less than subjective.

            This truth need not be belabored, since it can easily be grasped. We must see all views as relative, carrying no sacrosanctness, extra weight, or strict validity. All are equal and have to be entertained and tolerated. This recalls J.S.Mill, cited above: even if you vanquish me in argument or physically, it is no proof that you are in the right. Chuang Tzu too says the same. This tolerance of a plurality of ideas and action, and the rejection of violence are the essence of any future democracy for China.

National University of Singapore