CHAPTER IX
THE
ROLE OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
WOO KUN-YU
HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS
The
concept anthropos conceived as an abstract term does not bespeak any
human relationship, whereas the notions of "a human being" or "an
individual" bespeak various dimensions of interpersonal relationship. A
concrete human being always is twofold, namely, an individual and community with
others. The former forms oneself as an independent person, the latter creates
society in which every one who is independent by nature is dependent on others.
This independent-dependent person constitutes a homo ethicus beyond mere homo
naturalis.
Like
any living creature, human nature in its concrete form consists of male and
female, man and woman. In ancient Greece, philosophers like Plato emphasized
that neither man nor woman alone possess the whole of human nature, each is only
a part of the ideal human being.1 According to Plato, love (eros) between
man and woman is a natural tendency in which the parts of the original anthropos
seek one another2.
Thus, the act of eros is a reunion of the human being which in its
original status (namely, in the world of ideas) was one. It was divided into two
parts only because of the incarnation of the human soul into the sensible world,
like one condemned to a prison or entombed after death.3 Hence,
the primordial sense of interpersonal relationships as interpersonal love
between a man and a woman.
In
the Middle Ages, when Christianity became dominant in the West, people
understood that according to the Old Testament woman was a part of man.4
Hence, marriage was elevated to a sacrament in which the couple received the
blessing from God through the Church.
Where
the philosophy of Plato saw "eros" as the way back to
primordial human nature, Jesus Christ gave his disciples "charity" as
the greatest commandment.5 "To love one another" was to be the sign of Christians6 and interpersonal relationships would be the
essential way to perfection for all believers.
In
China, although there was neither a Platonic theory about man and woman nor any
religious sacrament for marriage, never-theless the origin of man and woman was
discussed thoroughly in the Book of Change: "Chi’en-Tao
accomplished man, whereas Kun-Tao accomplished woman."7
The
ancient Chinese sages sought the archetype of both man and woman in the
primordial substance of Tao; it is only Tao’s different attributes that make
the difference in human nature. Tao is the fullness of life; the re-union of man
and woman participates in the same living force, which is "the generative
act-process without end."8
But
a man and a woman alone do not constitute a family in the full sense -- this
lies in their having "numerous heirs". As in Hebraic cul-ture, the
Chinese saw begetting numerous children as a blessing from heaven. The ordinary
transition from the individual to society is me-diated through the family. Here
natural and consanguineous relations play an essential role, but the primary
significance of family lies in inter-personal love.
In
Chinese traditional culture, the family system has been ac-cepted and respected
throughout most of history. The natural binary force, Yin and Yang, signifies
not only a generative dynamism, but also the prototype and example for the human
couple: husband and wife. Begetting numerous children symbolizes a virtuous,
happy life and is a divine blessing. In ancient China society cannot be
understood apart from the notion of family with its consanguineous relations.
Once
when Mencius was asked about humanity and the dif-ference between a human and a
brute he said:
Between
father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and minister,
righteousness; bet-ween husband and wife, attention to their separate function;
between old and young, a proper order; and between friends, fidelity.9
For Mencius
interpersonal relationships reveal the essence of hu-manity; thus he defined
humanity, not from the substantial standpoint, but from that of interpersonal
human relationships.
The
virtues of interpersonal human relationship, namely, affec-tion, righteousness,
attention to their separate functions, proper order, and fidelity, are often
proclaimed by the today’s neo-Confucians:
Benevolence,
righteousness, propriety, and knowledge are not infused into us from without. We
are cer-tainly furnished with them.10
The remote condition for
creating these virtues obviously is inter-personal relationships, without which
they cannot be realized.
Though
the moral subject is without doubt the cause of any vir-tuous act, without human
relationships as their remote condition there can be no virtuous thoughts, and
consequently no virtuous acts. Men-cius’ theory of interpersonal relationship
seems closer to the Platonic and Christian traditions than to Kant’s Critiques.
ALIENATION AS A
DISTORTION OF
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
After
the division of Christendom through the Reformation, there followed a spiritual
and religious collapse leading to a rapid secu-larization marked by
individualism and egoism. The natural sciences swallowed up all the myths, while
individualism undermined all au-thority, both religious and political. When the
final goal of human life was placed in doubt, the value system appeared
questionable. In rejecting ecclesial community Martin Luther’s "sola
fide"11
supported an individualistic personal autonomy.
Though
the constitution of society is founded on families, tribes, folks and nations,
etc., its most fundamental elements are individuals and their families, of which
society is constituted. But as society stands much higher even than family, one
must leave home and country be-cause of social, agricultural, commercial and
technological changes. In a commercial society consanguineous feeling diminishes
leading to anguish and insecurity.
Even
without the effects of modernization there would still be alienation from a
sense of family, neighborhood and country.12 But on entering modern society the individual
faces a change from inter-personal contacts to mass-group activities. This has a
number of mo-dalities.
First,
the technological succeeds the agricultural, so that mo-dernization seems almost
equivalent to technologization with its impli-cations for development and
progress. Thus, the advent of science and technology not only created commercial
cities, but brought about an alienation of the sense of family and of the rural
sense of belonging, which had perdured since distant ancestors. Living in a
crowd deprives one of his or her sense of self-identity.
The
resulting confusion of values, doubt regarding tradition, and general
helplessness in life recall not only Nietzsche’s "um-wertung",13 but the many behavioristic theories. These
maintain that there is no psychological difference between a human being and a
brute, but that all is determined by environment, and hence is deeply influenced
by science and technology14.
This denial of human freedom is the cancer in modern spiritual life.
(Indeed,
the alienation of interpersonal relationships may be worse in China than in the
Western world. The latter developed tech-nological and commercial society in a
gradual manner: one can trace its origin to the Olympic games. In contrast, as
China had stressed agriculture and despised commerce,15
modernization came so sud-denly that people were not psychologically or
technologically prepared to make appropriate adjustments.)
In
the Renaissance and the Enlightenment many thinkers had addressed problems of
the cosmos and of human beings, but over-looked the most important philosophical
problem. They paid great attention to sense experience and to the empirical,
from which they built up as their Welt-anschauungen: the three stages of
knowledge of Auguste Comte16 and the theory of evolution of Herbert Spencer.17 Auguste Comte’s positivism denied traditional
philosophy and religion, and maintained the importance of natural science.
Scientism not only reacted passively against traditional spiritual values, but
employed logical processes to separate "ought" from "is" (Sollen
and Sein), thereby tearing asunder the whole fabric of traditional culture. Karl
Popper’s Open Society18
is a typical example: Parmenides’ insight that "Thinking and being are
the same’19 is neglected and Mencius’ theory is considered
false.20
Second,
in the political order thinkers like Nicolo Macchiavelli21
and Thomas Hobbes22 stressed external power and neglected the
interpersonal love which binds people together. Thus, though the dis-tortion and
decline of interpersonal relationships is caused mainly by technological
development, it reflects also changes in socio-political constitutions such as
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social contract theory.23 In such self-alienating modernization, democratization can-not find
a higher point in which to harmonize or attenuate the contrast between interior
anguish and exterior changes.
Thirdly,
individualistic thinkers could not accept that the primary goal of marriage was
the generation of children. Hence, the concept of family became narrower: filial
piety and parental love lost their function or were narrowed in scope.
Inner
alienation creates a conflict between the individual in him-self and his
relationship to others. In concrete social life it must be asked how a modern
human being can possess simultaneously a two-fold nature, i.e., independent
individuality, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, dependence on others?
This question, which long disturbed human history reached its modern apogee in
the twin deve-lopments of extreme individualism and of extreme collectivisms;
their cold war could confrontation marked the end of the twentieth century and
probably the end of modernity as an adequate paradigm for future progress.
SOLIDARITY
Recently,
solidarity has been proposed as a promising com-promise. This would not leave
human nature in its original, naive status. The relation between the individual
and others should not be left to natural impulses, not should an artificial
mixture of the two be attempted. Rather, solidarity would raise persons above
the stage of nature, beyond merely naive impulses and enable them by
intelligence and freedom to select what is a duty (or "ought") in
accord with the moral law and its obligations. From the viewpoint of solidarity
this higher stage is the place not of the homo naturalis, but of the homo
ethicus. Here the phenomenological epoch would be very useful in bracketing
naturalistic intuition in favor of the moral categories. This does not mean that
the homo ethicus dares to act against the natural law, but that he stands
above nature and builds a moral world that goes beyond the merely natural and
secular.
This
special, higher status fits well with the Chinese ethical culture which often
rises about the law of objective nature. In Chinese daily life, especially in
conversation, logical criteria often do not fun-ction; subjectivity plays a much
greater role than objectivity in Chinese linguistic usage. Thus the Westerner
would be surprised in speaking with a Chinese not to receive a positive answer
to the question: "Are you not a Chinese?". This illustrates that
Chinese take the person to whom they speak as the Gegenstand, rather than
the objective Tatsache: hence, "Yes" follows only a positive
sentence, while "No" follows negative sentences. This shows the
interpersonal relationship to be much more important than any objective truth or
logical rules.
In
western philosophy objective truth is the main concern of epistemology. Before
the birth of Husserlian phenomenology any sub-jective concern was considered
ideological, or even empty or non-sensical. In China, however, because of its
moral orientation, sub-jective sincerity weights always more heavily than
objective truth. It has been said that "Sincerity is the way of heaven. The
attainment of sincerity is the way of man."24
In
daily conversation it would be often asked, "What is your noble name?"
instead of the simple question "What is your name?" If your name
actually is noble or great due to your ancestors you still have to answer in the
following form: "My humble name is Chen." Wit-hout doubt the family
Chen is a very great and famous family in China; that is an objective fact. The
moral virtue of "sincerity", however, forces you to humble yourself.
In the same sense if asked, "From which great city do you come?" the
answer should be "I come from the small city of Shanghai," though this
is contra-objective. When your age is asked, you should answer, "I live 40
years in vain."
The
interpersonal relationship is therefore neither scientific nor objective, but
belongs to "Li" (Ritus), which is the norm and rule for any
interpersonal relationship. Here "Li" means also sincerity as the way
of heaven and of humans. "Li" stands over all science, logic and
epis-temology; it is metaphysical and exists originally in the world of ethics.
One who lives with "Li" is called Chun-tzu as an individual, and
Shen-jen as a member of society. He is homo ethicus, in contrast to homo
naturalis; obviously he is a homo supernaturalis.
It
has been said, "When accomplishments and solid qualities are blended
equally, we have Chun-tzu (the man of virtue)."25 Here the accomplishments belong to the cultural
sphere, whereas the qualities belong to self-cultivation in a moral sense. Both
are the qualities of "Li".
"Li"
remains in a spiritual milieu in which sincerity takes the place of truth and
makes life an art. The act of conversation like "My humble name is
Chen" or "I come from the small city Shanghai" decorates vulgar
expression with cultural quality; it is a thing of beauty. Moreover, all the
virtues which come from the interpersonal relationship, such as benevolence,
righteousness, piety, love, fidelity, etc., are good in a moral sense. Here
sincerity, beauty and good meet together (verum, bonum, pulchrum convertuntur).
VIRTUES
The
various traditional virtues which come from "Li" are not con-trolled
according to modern logical norms. In all sectors of philosophy the logical
distinction between "is" (Sein) and "ought" (Sollen)
has come to mean that "is" is real whereas "ought" is ideal;
the former has a sound foundation in existence, but not the latter. Hence, if
the moral problem is dealt with according to the epistemological rules of true
and false, right and wrong, moral values would be reduced and ultimately lose
their bases. Mencius’ theory about virtues, which comes from the various
interpersonal relationships, is grounded, however, not only on "ought"
but also on the fact that all human beings by nature possess the archetype of
such virtues. This archetype is a fact with both "is" and
"ought" in its innermost core.
Benevolence,
righteousness, propriety and knowledge all come from this innermost core and are
used by Mencius to express hu-manity:
Anyone
who lacks of the feeling of commiseration is not human; and who lacks the
feeling of shame and dislike is not human; and who lacks the feeling of mo-desty
and complaisance is not human; one who lacks the feeling of approving and
disapproving is not hu-man.26
According to Mencius,
humanity and virtues which come from the interpersonal relationship are one and
cannot be divided.
Given
this two-fold human nature, Mencius and all ancient Con-fucians did not deal so
much with the individual alone, but paid much more time and effort to the
discussion of interpersonal relationships. The communal or social dimension of
human nature is the main problem for their philosophizing.
In
comparison with homo naturalis, homo ethicus can be called the
"ought". But homo qua homo is prior to such division into a
two-fold human nature. The logical division of "is" and
"ought" is posterior to human nature which per se consists of
both the individual and one’s relation with others. To lack either would
render the human being imperfect.
CONCLUSION
The
understanding of ships by Plato or Christianity does not come fundamentally
under the logical division of "ought" from "is". But in
philosophical history interpersonal relationship has been much less challenged
than has the individual, which has been attacked vehe-mently by both materialism
and atheism. They denied not only the existence of God, but also the existence
of the human soul. They agree only on the material, and do not accept any
supermaterial sub-stance; hence they consider human individuality and
independence to be illusory. Consequently, all spiritual values are diminished
and perish, leaving humanity equal to brutality. When human nature is no longer
human, then human relations are no longer personal and all the virtues of
interpersonal relations are nonsensical. Thus the moral, religious and artistic
values must all be cancelled.
The
materialistic orientation of the Western world attacks human relationship not
directly, but more deeply on the metaphysical ground of personal individuality.
In response it is necessary to awaken the arch problem of the spiritual. In the
very beginning when all matter was still in chaos, the spiritual force was
already immanent within the cosmos.
This
may be mythos, but mythos is the friend of philosophy, as Aristotle once said.
No matter how much modern people believe in science, the fact of freedom remains
undeniable and freedom in hu-man consciousness gives witness to the existence of
a soul. More-over, in the epistemological experience of abstraction one should
feel a spiritual dimension in one’s intimate life.
Man
is human because of his intelligence. Its development progresses step by step
beyond the body matter and into the spiritual sphere. In interpersonal
relations, which are oriented mainly towards spiritual intersubjectivity, the
spiritual life of human existence created the history of humankind. This
includes not only the natural sciences through which all the necessities of
man’s daily life such as food, clothes, home, and transportation advance day
by day, but morals, arts and religion which also flourish. All social
constructions are under the control of morality for in them human nature is more
than a process of scientific technology: artistic and religious feelings lift
human nature from the natural to supernatural life.
Thus,
through solidarity and its social and political aspects the human being awakens
within him or herself self-conscious to inter-personal relationships. In this it
is not only that the individual exist for society, or society for the
individual. Rather through interaction from both sides one is not only an
individual, but also as a member of the society.
National Taiwan
University
Taipei
NOTES
1.
Plato, Timaeus, 69c.
2. Ibid.,
91a.
3.
Plato, Symposium, 179b.
4. Genesis
II:21-23, Adam’s exclamation: "bone from my bones, and flesh from my
flesh" symbolized the unity of man and woman.
5. John,
XIII:34.
6. Ibid.,
35.
7. I-king
(The Book of Change), Appendix.
8. Ibid.
9.
Mencius, Bk III, Pt. I, ch. IV.
10.
Ibid., Bk. IV, Pt. I, ch. VI.
11.
Martin Luther used sola fide to say that one was saved by faith alone,
that is, gratuitously by God and not by one’s love or good works.
12.
Cf. Kun-yu Woo, "The Modernization of Confucianism--A Discussion on the
Cultural Change from Consanguineous-feeling to District Concern" in Symposium
on Confucianism and Modernization, edited by Joseph P.L. Jiang, (Taipei:
Freedom Council, 1987), pp. 111-120.
13.
Friedrich W. Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, III.
14.
Behaviorism quite flooded the psychological and sociolo-gical sphere. B.F.
Skinner’s Beyond Freedom and Dignity is a typical example.
15.
Lu-shi Chun-chiu, "The Superiority of Agriculture" and Hou Chia-chu,
"The Development of Economical Value", papers presented at the
"International Conference on Values in Chinese Societies: Re-trospect and
Prospect", The Center for Chinese Studies, The National Bibliothek, May
23-26, 1991, Taipei.
16.
Auguste Comte (1798-1857) in his three stage theory of the development of human
knowledge maintained that theology and philo-sophy are now surpassed by the
natural sciences.
17.
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) in his ten volume System of Synthetic Philosophy
(1862-96) maintained that everything possesses a tendency to develop and
progress through a process of evo-lution.
18.
Karl Popper (1902- ), Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledeg
& K. Paul, 1962).
19.
Parmenides, cf. Diels/Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Band I, 12
(Zurich: Weidman, 1966), 28 B 3.
20.
Huang Chin-ming, An Enquiry on the "To Be" and "Ought To
Be" (Taipei: Oh-Hu 1985), pp. 5-6.
21.
Nicolo Macchiavelli (1469-1527) maintained that the state is power.
22.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) saw human beings as wolves to other humans (homo
homini lupus).
23.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) in his Social Contract maintains that
the society is for the individual.
24.
The Golden Mean, ch. 20.
25.
The Confucian Analects, Bk. VI, ch. XVI.