CHAPTER V

RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL NATURE OF THE HUMAN BEING

JIN XIPING

            One would suppose that as an object of research the human being would be easier to grasp than other kinds of objects, but in reality it is the contrary. To know the real nature of an ordinary object, observation is the only feasible way. This is the fundamental material for such other scientific acts as induction, deduction, abstraction, mathematization and the stuff of which the different kinds of theories are constituted. I must design experiments according to those theories and carry them out in order to prove whether or not those theories are relevant, This is the normal method for the sciences, and it has been very successful. By scientific methods we acquire much clear and valid knowledge, enough for our daily life in the common sense world.

            But if I philosophize, this method does not function for such question as: what do natural objects really do in their movements; or is there any purpose in their doing so? Such kinds of problems cannot be solved by the scientific method because we cannot be within the objects to observe and experience their real interior acting; there is always some distance between the object and the observer.

            Further, if we take human beings, namely ourselves, as the object of our research, we find that my Self is quite within this object. I am quite clear and sure of what and how I am, and of what, and why and how I have acted in the past and am doing so now.

            It should be easier to know the what, why, and how I am, but we have spent more than years to acquire some clear basic knowledge about our Self. Even now we have quite different understandings, interpretations, doubts and criticisms. We do not hold identical views about the basic idea of a human being, as would natural science. What is the cause of the phenomenon?

            The main cause is that in research concerning the human being the object is too close to ourself, we are too internal or too immanent to our object. In order to observe some object it is necessary that there be some distance between me and the object. For example, I cannot see the spot on my glasses which I am wearing, because they are too close to me. If I want to know whether my glasses are clean, I must take them off and observe them at some distance. If I want to know what my face or nose look like, I can only do so with the aid of a mirror which places some distance between my face and nose in the form of a reflective appearance; otherwise I would not be able directly to see my face and nose. When the human being is myself, it is much closer to me than my face and nose. In order to place the human being in a field of observation, we must find a mirror for it, namely find a way which can help us put some distance between the human as an object of my observation and my real ego in daily life within the common sense world.

ARISTOTLE ON THE SOCIAL NATURE OF THE HUMAN BEING

            More than 2000 years ago our predecessors began to think about the nature of human beings, but they did not find a suitable me-thod, for they used the same method as for natural objects. Philoso-phers in ancient times did not have a clear idea about the methodo-logical problem of research regarding the human person. Only in mo-dern time has a clear consciousness of the methodology arisen and a conscious application of appropriate scientific methods to research on humanity. For example, the English philosopher and sociologist John Stuart Mill claimed that "The backward state of the moral sciences can only be remedied by applying to them the methods of physical science, only extended and generalized." This did not remedy the chaotic state of research regarding the human being.

A Biological Basis

            That by nature human beings are social beings (Zoon politicon) was not unknown in ancient times, but they could not find its real foundation. Over 2000 years ago Aristotle had noted that "without friends no one would choose to live, though he have all other goods."1

Hence, it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity [a beast or a god], he is like the ‘tribeless, lawless, heartless one,’ whom Homer denounces--the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war. He may be compared to an isolated piece in droughts.2

            For Aristotle sociality is of interest only to the State. He tried also to find a foundation for human sociality in the natural relationship between human persons:

The friendship between husband and wife appears to be a natural instinct since a man is by nature a pairing creature even more than he is a political creature, in-asmuch as the family is an earlier and more funda-mental institution than the State, and the procreation of offspring a more general characteristic of the animal creation. So whereas with the other animals the association of the sexes aims only at con-tinuing the species, human beings cohabit not only for the sake of begetting children, but also to provide the needs of life. For with the human race division of labor begins at the outset, and man and woman have dif-ferent functions. Thus they supply each others’ wants, putting their special capacities into the common stock. Hence the friendship of man and wife seems to be one of combined utility and pleasure. And the children and common property "holds people together".3

In this text, Aristotle does not find a special method for research on human beings, but takes the daily life experience as raw material and interprets it in order to induce some basic principles about the nature of the human being. Thus he takes the sexual relationship between man and wife as the foundation of sociality: the human is interpreted as a pairing creature. Upon this foundation the family, lineage, cities and states are explained. This can be called the biological interpretation of the sociality of human being.

            A similar idea is found in David Hume:

But in order to form society, ‘tis requisite not only that it be advantageous, but also that men be sensible of its advantage and ’tis impossible, in their wild un-cultivated state, that by study and reflexion alone, they should ever be able to attain this knowledge. Most fortunately, therefore, there is conjoin’d to those necessities, whose remedies are remoter and obs-cure, another necessity, which, having an apparent and more obvious remedy, may justly be regarded as the first and original principle of human society. This necessity is no other than that natural appetite betwixt the sexes, which unifies them together, and preserves their union, till a new type takes place in their concern for their common offspring. The new concern be-comes also a principle of union betwixt the parents and offspring, and forms a more numerous society.4

            For Aristotle the human is an animal, but a special animal--the best animal with such special characteristics as language and politics. Modern philosophers can hold Arnold Gehlen’s contract thesis ac-cording to which, compared with other kinds of animals, the human appears as a "deficient being": "From a biological point of view, in comparison to animals, the structure of the human body appears to be a paradox and stands out sharply."5 This too is a possible hypothesis, just as good or as bad as Aristotle’s. Under this hypothesis, the human is incomplete and unfinished in nature, not yet determined or firmly established. Therefore one’s existence is a permanent challenge and one needs to develop an interpretation of oneself. The human is free and has plasticity, and hence the capacity to develop oneself; one is not adapted to a specific environment as are animals, but must transform nature in order to survive by creating a human, cultural world and constituting a second nature. Praxis or work is the only means for this purpose.

Individualistic

            The other important, but not necessarily correct point in Aris-totle’s theory of human being is that one’s relation to society is similar to that of "an isolated piece at draughts". He had no idea of the value of the individual, nor of the general dignity of a human being. Re-garding the individual he said, "The state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part."6 The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficient, but like a part in relation to the whole." For him the virtuous person will act often in the interest of his friends and of his country, and if need be, will even die for them. One will surrender money, honor, and all goods for which the world contend, reserving only nobleness for oneself. This is true of one who lays down his life for another.

            It is not that Aristotle was a mistaken in emphasizing that sociality is very important. His only mistake in this theory is that he overlooked the principle of the individual in constituting sociality. He did not say how sociality is constituted or provide a sufficient des-cription of its genetic structure. His sole argument is the relationship between the whole and the parts where the whole is the political ins-titution, interests or benefits. The interests or benefits of the individual are sacrificed for the political whole.         

            In fact, the purpose or the task of society, namely the state, is to enable the citizen to live a virtuous and happy life. Hence, it is not correct to claim only that the whole is prior to its parts, namely that the state is prior and superior to the individual, families and village communities. Individualism is the foundation of every kind of group or society; this principle is as important as the principle of sociality. The nature of sociality can be explained only by a detailed and concrete study of the shapes and forms of the action of the individual.

            But Aristotle had no idea of the dignity of the human being in ge-neral. This does not mean that in ancient times there were no philo-sophers who had such an idea as can be seen from his own Politics. In criticizing his opposites he mentioned that "others affirm that the rule of master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists only by convention and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust"7; that all slavery is "a violation of nature"8. Aristotle did not mention the names of his opponents, and his report about them is too concise to be able to draw any clear picture about their theory of human nature. It is unfortunate that more material about them cannot be found. Aristotle did not accept that there is something like a dignity of the human being in general. He affirmed that there are two kinds of human beings, one is "intended by nature to be a slave" and the other a ruler: that "some should rule and others be ruled is not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth some are marked out for subjection, others for rule." "The male is by nature superior and the female inferior, the one rules and the other is ruled; this principle of necessity extends to all mankind", for "in all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to light . . . . Such a duality exists in living creatures originating from nature as a whole."9 His arguments for this terrible idea are only pseudo empirical ones. The opinion about the relation between the whole and parts is not from the things themselves, but from an idea outside of things. For Aristotle, however, it seemed to be evident and therefore he thought, "There is no difficulty in answering this question [namely, refuting the positive assertion of the dignity of human nature in general] on grounds both of reason and of fact."10

RESEARCH ON HUMAN NATURE

Ancient Discoveries

            Aristotle’s example shows how different our ideas of the human being and its sociality are from our predecessors. The image of the nature of the human being changes continuously in the development of a society, the change of social structures, and the history of different nations and societies. Here are two extreme cases.

            Historical Chinese culture generally is held to be a civilized culture which was developed very early and is well-known for its cour-tesy and etiquette. Before 500 B.C., Mo Ti and Confucius advanced the theory of humanity or kindheartedness. But the discoveries of the archaeologists show us that 500 or 600 years before Mo Ti and Confucius, in the Shang Dynasty (c.16th--11th century B.C.), human sacrifices were being made to petition god and the souls of dead ancestors for blessings, good fortune, rain and so on. In excavating some ancient tombs of the Shang Dynasty many tombs have been found with human sacrifices--in some more than 300 to 400 human skeletons. According to records of the time in the form of inscriptions on bones and tortoise shells discovered at the same ruins, more than 1000 men together with 1000 oxen were offered in one sacrifice.11 In the excavations of 1959 and 1976, 1179 human skeletons were found. But, according to the 1992 oracle inscriptions on the 1350 pieces of the inscription bones, 13,052 men and women were used in human sacrifices. Furthermore, there are 1145 oracle inscriptions recording human sacrifices but without exact numbers12. We cannot say that all the records about human sacrifice have been discovered. Similar cases of human sacrifice are found in the history of the Western countries, for example in Greece and Rome. This discovery was a great sensation, even a shock, for intellectual circles in China and led to heavy debate.

            In the Shang Dynasty a highly civilized culture had already been developing; it was not a barbarous society. It had a very organized state with more than 100 different kinds of offices; it had penal law and regular troops with war chariots; there were highly developed agricul-ture and handicraft industries for bronzeware, textiles and silk; it had a written language. But the people in that time still used men as offerings to the Gods because they had no developed idea about the human being in general. Slaves, prisoners of war and the people from such barbarous nations as Qiang were not held to be human at all, but as Aristotle said, "a kind of instrument", "living possession", "instruments for instruments". Therefore they used the slaves and the people from other nations as well as such other kinds of living instruments as oxen in sacrificial ceremonies. This was no crime at all, but a sacred and ne-cessary activity to them, because it was necessary to pray to the gods for blessings and defense of state and nation, against illness and ill luck, for rain, good harvests and victories in war. For them this was natural, whereas it is obviously terrible and impossible for us. This means that at the outset of human history the individual was an offering or victim of sociality. We find no vestige of the dignity of the human being, but only of kings and nobles, special races and citizens.

Research in the Macroperspective

            Are there any inexorable laws or structures in the process of the development of the social order and the change of ideas regarding human beings? The answer is positive and on two levels of related re-search: the macro and the micro-perspective. On the macroperspective the research is directed to finding the macrostructure or the general principles of the process of the development of society as a whole. A typical and successful example is the Marxian theory about the development of human society, namely dialectic-historical materialism. Marx tried to offer a scientific account of sociality and to find the laws by which it was governed.

            Historical materialism seeks "the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historical events in the economic deve-lopment of society, in changes in the modes of production and ex-change." Marx contends that the economic structure of society, constituted by its relations of production, is the real foundation of so-ciety, from which arise the legal and political structures and a corresponding ideology. The social relations of production themselves correspond to stages of development of material productive force, or are defined by it. In this manner the mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. In producing to satisfy our needs, we develop new powers and capacities and in the process, human nature itself develops.

            Human nature is then not a permanent character of humankind, an absolute and trans-historical principle or structure. By acting on the external world and changing it, one at the same time changes one’s own nature in order to correspond to the stages of the development of the material productive force. When the historical conditions were inhumane or degrading, the corresponding idea of the human being, if there was something of the sort, would be inhumane. This theory can explain the reason for human sacrifice and racial, class and cultural discrimination.

            Modern industry and science have created the possibility of developing the idea of the dignity of the human being in general. Marx said, "Industry . . . is the open book of the essential powers of man" and "has prepared the conditions for human emancipation."13 Therefore historical transformation is a progressive process of the growth and development of human powers and needs, and of human nature gene-rally. The standards of human nature and needs are inescapably histo-rical, relative and ideological.

            By the development of electronics, the computer industry, and communication technology the horizons of daily life in which human beings live has been extended and the field of empathy for foreigners and strangers widened:

A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and more deeply on the cons-ciousness of contemporary man. The demand is in-creasingly made that men should act on their own judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by coercion, but motivated by a sense of duty. This demand for freedom in human so-ciety chiefly regards the quest for the values proper to the human spirit.14

This shows clearly what a great influence industry and science have on shaping human nature.

            What Marx discovered is not the surface structure of the deve-lopment of society, but its substructure. This means that the principles of historical materialism do not appear in daily life. In normal cases, one in a definite society, in one’s action, is not conscious of these prin-ciples, for the structure or aim of the development of the society do not constitute the motivation for daily life and political behaviors. But the apparent purpose of a personal act or the aim of a political movement or an historical event is not the real aim of the development of society. The relation between the two aims is dialectical and generally con-tradictory.

            Marx knew this well. A typical example is Marx’s attitude toward English imperialism in India in the nineteenth century. On the one hand, he evaluated it dialectically in a positive manner:

These small stereotype forms of social organism have been to the greater part dissolved, and are dis-appearing, not so much through the brutal interfe-rence of the British tax-gatherer and the British sol-dier, as to the working of English steam and English free trade. . . . English interference having placed the spinner in Lancashire and the weaver in Bengal, or sweeping away both Hindu spinner and weaver, dis-solved these small semi-barbarian, semicivilized communities, by blowing up their economic basis, and thus produced the greatest, and, to speak the truth, the only social revolution ever heard of in Asia.

            England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan, was motivated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny without a foundational revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.15

            Even though someone has understood the principles and aim of development and is willing to do everything following the principles in order to realize that aim, as experiences in socialist countries show us, things always go contrary to his or her will and motives, because the principles of historical materialism can be effective or show their effect only over the long period of the development of history. This is similar to the case of the principles of evolution in biology. The miscarriages of the socialist movement in some socialist countries cannot be con-sidered to falsify the Marxian discoveries in research regarding society; they falsify only the understanding of the practical application and of the expectation of the short-time-effects of Marxian discoveries in daily life and surface political issues.

            Politics, as Lenin said, is art or skill. It has nothing to do with the objective, neutral law of the development of the history of human society and the principles of historical materialism. Political activities have their own principles; personal daily life follows other principles.

The Microperspective

            Research in a microperspective regarding the human and society would not seek the structure of the society by observing so-ciety as a whole for the departure point and the foundation of the microperspective is not society as such, but individuals as the basic elements of society and their intersubjective practice.

            Phenomenological research about the sociality of individuals is one of the examples of research done from the microperspective. It does not intend abstractly to reflect or speculate on the nature of human beings as individuals as many philosophers have done in his-tory. Rather its essential contribution is a detailed and concrete des-cription of the mechanism of the individual’s thinking, understanding and acting and of the attempt to discover the real structures and prin-ciples in the constitution of social relationships in the everyday life. Concrete research in this direction has been done by Husserl in his investigations of intersubjectivity, and by Heidegger in Being and Time, and in his early Freiburg and Marburg Lectures, which can be found in Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe16

            This is not the place to recapitulate Husserl’s and Heidegger’s work. I wish only to point out that Marxian historical materialism and the foundational phenomenological, investigations from the micro-perspective are really quite different. Precisely for this reason they can complement each other in the continuing investigation of the human being and his or her sociality, as did the theories of Newton and Einstein in physics.

NOTES

            1. Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 1155a, 5.

            2. Politics, 1253a.

            3. Nicomachean Ethics, VIII 1162a, 17-30.

            4. A Treatise on Human Nature, Part II, Sect. II, p. 486 (Ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 1980), Book II.

            5. Man: His Nature and Place in the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 13.

            6. Politics, 1253a.

            7. Politics, 1253b, 20-23.

            8. Politics, 1254a, 19.

            9. Politics, 1254a.

            10. Politics, 1254a, 20.

            11. Wu Hao Kun and Pan You, The History of the Chinese Inscriptions on the Bones and Tortoise Shells, p. 280.

            12. Idem, p. 40.

            13. K. Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," in Early Writings (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 355.

            14. The Documents of Vatican II, translated from the Latin by J. Gallagher, p. 675.

            15. The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. by Robert C. Tucker, pp. 657 and 658.