CHAPTER XII

THE HUMAN BEING AND SOCIETY: IDENTITY AND CONCERN FOR

THE ECO-ETHICAL SPHERE

TOMONOBU IMAMICHI

THE PRIORITY OF PERSON AND SOCIETY VIS A VIS

            THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY

            Human beings belong to society, but society consists of human beings. Regarding the problem of identity this raises an interesting question, namely, which is prior; human being or society? The question may be restated in the following form, "Which is more im-portant for us, personal or social identity?" In response I would like to think about the linguistic form of self-presentation for instance, at the beginning of a meeting, using the most ordinary expressions of self-identity in accord with the conventional linguistic formulae of a certain cultural tradition.

            In an Occidental culture circle, this can be simply: "I am John Doe, Professor at the Washington University in the United States of America." If the time is extremely limited, one may say, simply, "I am John Doe, Professor," so that everyone can know, his full name and his profession. This is indeed very convenient and effective and hence seems to be the formula of self-presentation used throughout the world.

            But in an Oriental cultural circle the normal traditional formula of self-presentation is quite the opposite. For instance in Japanese Mr. Doe must say in the following way" "Watakushi wa America Gas-shukoku no Washington Daigaku no Kyôju Doe John desu." It is quite the same content as the previous English example of self-presen-tation. But I would like first to translate that Japanese sentence entirely word to word into English and then point out the essential meaning of the linguistic difference between the two.

            (1) A word-for-word verbatim translation would read: I of Ame-rica United States, at Washington University, Professor, Doe John am. Everyone perceives the quite opposite order of the same words between the two language formulas. If the time of self-presentation for a person is extremely limited, in the case of Oriental tradition, according to Oriental custom Mr. Doe may say "Watakushi wa America no Washington Daigaku no Doe desu," that is to say in English, "I am Doe, at Washington University in America". But here everyone must perceive that his personal name is omitted. Sometimes in the Orient one omits one’s personal name in self-presentation although there is plenty of time to do so, namely, one stops with the family name. And although there may be only a minute for it, still in the Orient one makes an effort to say first the name of the society to which one belongs. What is the essential meaning of this drastic difference?

            (2) An interpretation of the opposite linguistic order in iso-fun-ctional self-presentation: The fact that the personal name is clearly an-nounced first in the Occident indicates that there personal identity is prior to social identity. As the society to which one belongs may be changed through one’s decision or by an accident, the most important factor for individual duration is personal identity. In the Occident, as its etymological origin "socius" suggests, society is an organization of comrades constructed on the basis of a certain common interest. Thus in the Occident the term "society" has no original mythological prin-ciple; it is a variable existent, not a fatal datum. There, social identity may be a functional identity through which each member of the society can realize the common aim more easily than without that organi-zation.

            In contrast, the fact that in the Orient the name of the society to which one belongs is clearly announced first means that there social identity is prior to personal identity. This tendency goes further so that the personal name may often be omitted in the usual formula of self-presentation. The Japanese word for society is shakai. It is not an original Oriental term, but a translation of the English word society which Yukichi Fukuzawa invented through Chinese characters. Sha-kai in Chinese means cult-assembly. The reason he chose this word is not clear, because the translator himself did not write the reason. But every authentic group in the Orient normally is made by a higher power, such as Heaven, the gods, the emperor or a hero. Its origin is mythological and religious; it is almost a fatal datum for the person who belongs to it. It is then no mere variable condition whose components can change according to present needs.

            Hence, Shakai as a religious cult-assembly is therefore an ap-propriate translation for society in the Oriental world, because almost all authentic groups in the Orient are mythological in origin. In contrast, this translation is never appropriate for society in the Occident, be-cause it has no nuance of a construction by comrades.

            From the point of view of a comparative study of philosophy the above reflexion is interesting with regard to the relation of the indivi-dual to the group in general. In the Orient where social identity is far stronger and more important than personal identity, there is always the danger of a totalitarianism whether national or domestic. Each presup-poses a pathetic and passionate consciousness of group identity. In this context the highest society as the fated group is the national state as fatherland, thus, the totality does not mean here universal humanity but only national domesticity.

            The greatest identity is national identity supported by mytho-logical fatalism as antiquity in the epic stage of the historical world process. This is the reason why very often in the Orient nationalism is seen as compatible with socialism or communism, and also why Ja-panese economic imperialism and protectionism are carried out without control from the side of Japan as a group. The problem "Man and Society" must be thought through with a consciousness of the definition of society. What then is society; is it still a societas which consists of sociis who are the subjects with individual liberty?

            In sum, etymologically society in the Occident is the manmade variable group of comrades (socius -- societas). On the contrary, in the Orient shakai means a religious assembly for a local deity and hence may be authoritative. Therefore, whereas in the Occident individual identity is prior to collective identity, in the Orient collective identity is prior to individual identity. The principle of the stronger self-identity in the Occident is God as Creator of the individual; in the Orient the Deity is the mythological centre of local unity.

            In both the Occident and the Orient the consciousness of mem-bers is generally speaking almost the same. As consciousness is an inner temporality, all the members are iso-chronique and in such a society the aretological principle is subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In the Occident the subjectivity is of the individual person as an ontolo-gical point, and intersubjectivity is a contractual relation as mutual aid. In the Orient the subjectivity is being subject to the higher as a moral attitude, and intersubjectivity is the moral basis as reciprocal concern.

THE QUESTION OF THE DEFINITION

            If then we must think afresh about the definition of society be-cause of philosophical reflexion on the present human situation it is important to reflect also upon the definition of the human being, in order to enrich the range of the problem. This is the question of the word "man". Even without introducing feminism, a theme such as "Woman and Society" would introduce the sexual dimension of social conditions. In the anti-war movement it normally is helpful to have many feminine voices, and many difficulties concerning family or mar-riage could also be thought from new angles than in the past. But here I would like to think about the term "man" as a representative word for human beings, namely, as an ontological term.

            Society today is no longer the comradely organization of socii living "facie ad faciem" to each other, but now is enlarged to great scale. "The Human Being and Society" must be restated as "The Human Being and Institution." The transmutation of society as a group of socii to the institution as an organization of members can be observed even in the case of our philosophical societies in the course of these 50 years. Almost all the societies had articles of incorporation in terms of Gesellschaft, but were societies of philosophers as socii in the atmosphere of Gemeinschaft. Nowadays they are all institutions as Gesellschaft. So every society is now a society as institution.

            This means that the human being as individuum is a priori incorporated in an institutional society of which the representative example is the state with authoritative power to control every indivi-dual. Institutional society gives to its subordinate individuals special guarantees in compensation for its authoritative control which seems always to be an obstacle to the freedom of individuals. As an insti-tutional society the modern state no longer has a mythological origin or any spiritual authority, but it has legal power of predestination.

            Like religious predestination, the legal power of a state imposes upon its subordinate individuals its acceptance as the principle of their social activity. As soon as we are born, almost a priori we at once are incorporated in such an institutional totality. It is by fate that we are born in a particular state. Except for some people who exercise power or passionate patriots who were educated in the nationalistic ideology, most people wish to liberate themselves from such legal restrictions as military conscription, heavy taxation, or the political intervention of state power in all domains of culture, education or religion.

            Thus "Man and Society", which in the present situation is "Indi-vidual and Institution", very often is transformulated into "Revolu-tionary and Ancien Régime". Although we know that we have guaran-tees from the institutional society or state, we cannot be satisfied, for example, with national policies which seduce to war in order to place a moratorium upon ethics. This is the real shame of humanity which leads individuals to be "revolutionary," desire a borderless society and stateless world.

            In sum, when society which was group in the original mode develops it must transform itself into society as institution. Such a society has been sought in modern times; in its typical form as state it has been a fatal a priori datum for human beings. As soon as one is born without one’s approval, one must be incorporated as a member of the institution that is the state and without one’s approval.

            In the Occident, through its long universalistic tradition, the society as institution can be organized as a legal system, so there is a possibility of democratic discussion for some adjustments. Neverthe-less before the fatal power of the state as institutional society the pro-ponents of a borderless society appear as "idealistic" revolutionaries.

            In the Orient, through its domestic tradition, the state as institu-tional society can more easily be combined with nationalism. As this is convenient for local prosperity and for local policy the domestic con-cerns serve to justify this nationalist pressure. But most intelligent people feel a suffocating agony under this pressure and seek a border-less society.

            Such a society as institutional system has a Gesellschaft cha-racter which presupposes the equality of humans and their rights, with no priority or posteriority. Hence, temporality as consciousness is syn-chronique; without historicity this sychronique structure becomes the sign of a universality which transcends the borders. In such a society the legal authority of the state is regarded as higher than moral au-thority and orders a moratorium on morality. If borders are visible limits on human conduct, one wishes a borderless society.

THE NEW IDEAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

            As is well-known, the borderless society of one world was once clearly declared by Christ when he said, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God, and his righteousness", but since Patristic times this has been interpreted as a spiritual world. Thus, the truly borderless society through a collapse of institutional society and state which is sought on an international scale by "intellectual revolutionaries" is indeed a new ideal in our modern time. The international Court of Justice, the Lea-gue of Nations and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-tural Organization (UNESCO) were the beginnings of a modern move-ment for a borderless society. But these trial so-called international projects presupposed the existence of nationality as the essence of the state as an institutional society. Hence, the real borderless society has been realized, not through the conscious spiritual movement for an ideal world, but unconsciously and rapidly through the marvelous effects of technology.

            Technological universalism has change and is changing all the material conditions of the old elements of society as institution. For instance, revolutionary technology, even in transportation through the popularization of air travel, reduces the meaning of borders between states almost to naught. The diffusion of information through the elec-tronic media universalizes and standardizes people’s common out-look regarding secular life in its material dimension. The effective and hence broadly used language in the technological sphere is composed of arithmetic numbers or alphabetic letters. Thus technological ne-cessity renders the world universal and borderless and thus the new ideal in modern times is half-realized.

            At least at first this seems to be so. But under the shadow of te-chnological identity there now arises the problem of nostalgic dif-ference which prepares for the revival of an intensive spiritual na-tionalism. Such a cultural nationalism is a compensatory form for the superficial technological universalism. It is like a faint voice of the spirit of a tree in woods which now are being destroyed by technology for its civilization. Cultural nostalgia is a form of expression of the human spirit which is not satisfied by the informational extension of the spirit or by the material convenience gained through technological pro-gress.

            The new type of nationalism of cultural nostalgia must not be passed over as harmless. It calls for support because human beings must desire not only adventurous progress, but nostos or return. This is the beginning of a retreat into oneself or of the return to one’s origins. Hence the desire for return as nostalgia is very important for the human being. In the present situation of technology without spirituality, cultural nostalgia now extends its support. Sometimes this cultural nostalgia is utilized by political nationalism, which wishes to find a cultural apology in its national mythology. Hence, we must have cultural nostalgia in the context of a technology which lacks true culture, but we must not return to nationalism. What should we do?

            In sum, the archetype of the borderless society was once declared in human history by Jesus Christ’s "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and its righteousness." Since Patristic time this has been interpreted as a spiritual world. It was left to the marvelous affectivity of technology to realize an authentically borderless society as the technological dimension of life. This dimension which really is internal, borderless and universal has absorbed the world into its technological identity.

            In the shadow of this material identity there now emerges a special nostalgia for one’s cultural distinctiveness. Nostos as return is necessary for human beings because self-consciousness as reflexive knowledge is possible only through nostos to the inner-world. Cultural nostalgia is one of the steps toward the self-identity which is the point of departure for the itinerarium to one’s ontological origin of oneself. No period in history has so lacked a nostalgic cultural dimension, as does our technological dimension without culture. As a result cultural nationalism is often combined with political nationalism.

            Hence we must create not only the material borderless dimen-sion that is the technological world, but also a spiritual borderless world. In addition we must give to the nostalgic desire of culture new spiritual support.

THE DESIRE FOR AN ECO-ETHICAL SPHERE

            AND THE NEED FOR AN ECO-ETHICA

            Eco-Ethica is a new philosophical term. Eco comes from a Greek word oikos which has two meanings, namely, a house in the narrow sense of the word, and then a life sphere or cosmos in which humankind lives. Here we use "eco" in its widest sense so that Eco-Ethica means the ethics for human beings in the cosmic sphere. Our times are no longer national, international or simply global, but really intersideral or cosmic.

            We can no longer be satisfied with our old system of ethics which was valid at a time in which human beings lived only in nature. Through the telephone, society in its technological dimension has changed the concept of a neighboring person from the numerically limited, visible and spatially near person whom we know, to the numerically unlimited, invisible and spatially unconditioned person whom we do not know. This means the end of ethics facie ad faciem in nature, and the begin-ning of a new eco-ethic for the technological dimension. But as a philo-sophical discipline, eco-ethica has its own spiritual sphere and must propose for humanity a new possibility for spiritual nostalgia which is an actual movement for the inner return to self-identity.

SUMMARY

            This paper has the title "Man and Society", of which the subtitle is "Identity and the Desire for the Eco-ethical Sphere".

            It is divided into four parts, namely: 1. The question of priority with regard to the problem of identity. This considers society as group of socii (comrades) in the comparative perspective between Occident and Orient. 2. The question of the definition. This treats society as institution. The representative form of such institutional society is the state as a legal organization. It is a fatal datum a priori to the individual. 3. A new ideal and its result. This considers society’s technological standardization with regard to material conditions. 4. The need for an eco-ethical sphere. This considers the need for an entirely new effort for human morality in the technological dimension, that is to say, an eco-ethica.

            Each part has four moments of reflection, namely, a) the com-parative perspective, b) the problem of identity, c) the nature of tem-porality as existential consciousness, and d) an aretological tendency.

Tokyo University and

            The International Center for the Study