The contrasting situation between scientific rationality and hermeneutic reasonableness shows not only the relation between natural sciences and human sciences, but also, in some sense, exemplifies the contrast between Western culture and Chinese culture. Scientific rationality, as a well-structured procedural control over phenomena manifested through the interaction between empirical experiments and logico-mathematic formulations, is embodied in Western modern natural science and technology, especially in their success and efficacy for the explanation and technical control natural phenomena. The demand for reasonableness, especially in the hermeneutic activities of the human sciences, requires that the human mind refer to some kind of totality, either that of the experience of our self or that of existence. This is characteristic of Chinese culture and its main systems of thought such as Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. Both have their cognitive and their practical implications which must be taken into consideration in the educational process.

Now we are witnessing a deepening world process in which, as F.S.C. Northrop said, "The East and the West are meeting and merging. The epoch which Kipling so aptly described but about which he so falsely prophesied is over."¹ On the other hand, the interaction and the balance between the natural and human sciences is much emphasized in the intellectual milieu and in the educational process. A key to the mutual understanding between Eastern and Western culture and to the formation of a kind of complementarity between natural sciences and human sciences consists in exploiting the nature and dynamism of both scientific rationality and hermeneutic reasonableness. The consequences of this for education will be considered at the end of this article.

SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY COMPARED WITH

CHINESE LEARNING

Cognitively speaking, scientific rationality envisages a systematic broadening of our knowledge through control procedures of circumscribed validity. For example, in the case of the natural sciences, theories are presented either through steps of generalization or as outcomes of creative imagination, and are then extended to new domains of experience. But, since the main theoretical instrument of the natural sciences is theoretical language, the progress of natural sciences depends much upon the construction and development of theories whose validity it is also important to control. This is normally done by the procedures of experimentation which consist of identifying a specific phenomenon in order to gain what K. Popper called either corroboration or falsification of the theory in question.

Since the above procedures are operational in nature, the cognitive side of scientific rationality is very related to its practical side and is deeply involved in action. The formal reasoning and even calculation of the logical structure of theories have transformed the abstract structure of meaning in language, just as operations during experimentation change the organization or state of affairs in space and time. Generally speaking, the practical side of scientific rationality could be analyzed by the mutual relationship between means and end, under the constraint of calculation and experimentation. This kind of rationality could be termed, on the one hand, strategic rationality, when in calculation it envisages logical connections between possible actions. On the other hand, it could be termed instrumental rationality, when in experimentation it judges the problem of whether one action is rational or not according to the efficiency of a certain means to attain its end.

Generally speaking, the development of Western modern sciences, especially natural sciences, is based on the interaction between scientific theories and controlled experiments, both conceived as human constructs, the one as rational constructs, the other as empirical constructs. On its rational side, modern science is constituted by scientific theories which essentially are logico-mathematically structured propositions. On its empirical side, modern science is characterized by its well-controlled systematic experimentation. Both aspects go hand in hand to serve the advancement of science, but this interaction always must be checked by theoretical deduction and meta-scientific reflection. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seems to have grasped well the complementary interaction of these two aspects of modern science:

Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. . . . Only through their union can knowledge arise.²

In applying Kant's words to the case of scientific knowledge, the sensible object would refer to data gathered through well-controlled experimentation, while the intelligible concepts could be understood as constitutive of those logically structured scientific theories. Only their interaction could constitute scientific knowledge as such.

Compared with Western modern science, Chinese traditional science in general seems to be weak or even lacking in scientific rationality. First, it did not have a logico-mathematic structure for theory construction, nor had it ever reflected upon its own linguistic structure to the point of elaborating a system of logic for the formulation and control of its scientific discourse. Mathematics, although highly developed, was used only for describing data, not for formulating theories. Lacking in logical mathematical structures, Chinese quasi-scientific theories were presented principally through intuition and speculative imagination. This might have the advantage of being able to penetrate the totality of life and environment, but it lacked the rigor of logical control.

Second, empirical data in Chinese traditional science were established through detailed but passive observations, with or without the aid of instruments. But it seldom attempted any systematically organized experimentation or any active artificial control of perception. Finally, it did not have a tradition of epistemological reflection and philosophy of science, as was the case of European modern science.

Let us take, for example, the case of Confucianism. Apparently, Confucian learning seems to have emphasized the accumulation of empirical knowledge, on the one hand, and their intelligible unity, on the other. B. Schwarts is correct when he says, "To Confucius knowledge does begin with the empirical cumulative knowledge of masses of particulars, . . . then includes the ability to link these particulars first to one's own experiences and ultimately with the underlying unity that binds this thought together."³ But further reflection shows that this Confucian conception of interaction between empirical knowledge and its intelligible unity does not constitute a scientific rationality.

First, concerning the empirical side of Confucian learning, Confucius did not have in mind sensible data gathered by technically controlled process. What he stressed consisted rather in the concrete and factual knowledge of the institutions, the code of behavior, the achievement of an idealized culture (that of the Chou dynasty for example), and the components of the environment of our life. This extended from knowledge of names of birds, animals, and trees to that of the meaning of a religious rite. This empirical knowledge concerns mostly the meaningful world of man rather than the meaningless world of nature, which, in Confucius's eyes, was to be reorganized in terms of codes congenial to human nature rather than being controlled by mere technical processes.

Second, concerning the rational side of Confucian learning, there seemed to be no emphasis on a rigorous logico-mathematical structure for discourse. One thing Confucius did propose which was connected with the rationality of discourse was his emphasis upon correctness of names.⁴ This concerned mostly language and its relation to reality, but was not proposed by Confucius as a semantic theory for concerned terms in themselves, but only as used in human speech and actions. Therefore it had some pragmatic significance in the social rather than in the logical arena, for it referred to a social code of behavior, rather than to any concept of definition in the sense of Aristotelian logic.

Mathematics was never considered by Confucians to be the measure of rationality, not to mention taking it as necessary for constructing meaningful discourse. The only exception was perhaps Shao Yung who gave a very high place to number, seen by him as the manifestation of Tao; but this was a metaphysical rather than a scientific position. Anyhow, mathematics was not highly valued in itself, which may be explained by the primacy of a social orientation in Confucianism. As J. Needham suggests, "Mathematics was essential, up to a certain point, for the planning and control of the hydraulic engineering works, but those professing it were likely to remain inferior officials."⁵ This explains partly the unimportance of mathematical discourse in Confucianism. A more internal reason might be that mathematics was considered as a technique of calculation and an instrument for organizing and describing empirical data, not as the objective structure of reality and discourse.

Third, concerning the mode of interaction between empirical knowledge and the intelligible ground of its unity, Confucianism did not conceived an interactive relation in the mode of deduction/falsification or induction/verification. For Confucianism, the mode of unity was a kind of mental integration referring to the ultimate ground--Tao--through the process of ethical praxis. Praxis here was not interpreted as the technical application of theories to control concrete natural and social phenomena. It was understood rather as active involvement in the process of realizing what is properly human in the life of an individual and a collectivity. The status of science and technique must be reconsidered in the context of this ethical praxis.

From the above analysis, it becomes clear now that Chinese learning is not scientifically rational, though it is reasonable in an hermeneutic sense. To be scientifically rational, one must control the gathering of empirical data through technical process, formulate theories in logico-mathematical structure and establish their correspondence through interactive processes. But to be reasonable we must refer to the totality of our existence and its meaningful interpretation by human life as a whole. Confucianism and Chinese learning as a whole tried always to be reasonable, while neglecting their potentiality for scientific rationality.

HERMENEUTIC REASONABLENESS AND

THE HUMAN SCIENCE

Human sciences are hermeneutic in nature; the function of reason found there is that of reasonableness, rather than of rationality. Hermeneutic reasonableness has both cognitive and practical implications.

On its cognitive side, hermeneutic reasonableness concerns the dimension of meaning: the meaning of a literary or artistic work, the meaning of a behavior, the meaning of a social institution, the meaning of a certain culture, etc. The model of this cognitive activity is that understanding and interpretation are universal for mankind in that they could be extended to any form of relationship of man with the totality of the world. In understanding the meaning of a text, we have to refer to the totality of myself and the totality of the relationships I have with the world. In some sense, this has to begin from myself as the subject of my experience and understanding in order to reconstitute the meaning of a text. This echoes Husserl's position that the constitution of meaning refers inevitably to the intentionality of the one who understands.

The basic procedure of hermeneutics consists first of all in positing an interpretive hypothesis and then validating it by the text (or the work, the behavior, etc.) in question. The criteria of this hermeneutic knowledge is not that of falsification, as Popper would suggest, but rather of subjective saturation. In other words, the more an interpretive hypothesis can generate satisfaction in our heart concerning the meaning of a work of art for example, the more acceptable to us is this hypothesis.

On its practical side, hermeneutic reasonableness determines all actions concerned with subjective choice and subjective involvement in meaning, constituting, for example, those concerned with the creation and appreciation of works of art, with the realization and evaluation of moral intention, and even those political actions concerned with deciding the historical orientation of a certain social group.

The above first or cognitive aspect of hermeneutic reasonableness, although it refers to the totality of one's Self and the relation between the Self and the world, is nevertheless quite limited to human-centered orientation. But the second or practical aspect of hermeneutic reasonableness has a more speculative tendency for it concerns more the totality of Being, not limiting itself to the core of human subjectivity, human experience and human meaningfulness. Heidegger's Seinsdenken and Whitehead's speculative philosophy are of this kind. They refer to the totality of Being or of cosmic experience in order to reveal the ontological dimension of our meaning constitution. The most typical enterprise of this kind is Whitehead's speculative philosophy, which he defines as follows,

Speculative philosophy is the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted. By this notion of `interpretation' I mean that everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme.⁶

Up to this level hermeneutic reasonableness could be seen as the effort of reason itself to attain an integrated and integral understanding of itself, in which there are not yet the distinctions between theory and praxis, knowledge and action, thought and being, subjectivity and objectivity. On the contrary, all these distinctions must find their justification in this ultimate effort of reason itself and be considered as the self-differentiation of auto-comprehending reason. It is from this integrating and yet original self-comprehension that the most profound movements of Being are motivated. Starting from here we have the distinction between the cognitive and the practical aspects of reason, but the nature of self-comprehending reasonableness itself is both cognitive and practical.

Hermeneutic reasonableness, therefore, is caught in the tension between the reference to the totality of one's self and the reference to the totality of the realm of existence. On this level, Chinese philosophy is quite similar to Western philosophy in demanding a necessary reference to the totality in order to show the function of reasonableness in human reason. For example, Confucianism insists upon the need to refer to the totality of human existence, whereas Taoism points out the need to escape the "human, all too human" tendency of humanist philosophy and to refer rather to the totality of existence exemplified by the concept of Tao. Let us explain this point in more detail.

First, in contrast to the rationality of modern Western science, Confucianism is a system of reasonable ideas which refers ultimately to the totality of human existence and its realization as the horizon within which the meaning of human actions, and even that of natural phenomena, is to be determined. In the case of classical Confucianism, this system of ideas was constituted essentially of Jen ( ), Yi ( ) and Li ( ). Jen could be seen as the dynamic interconnectedness of one's self with other men, with nature and even with heaven. It is the ultimate ground and the transcendental foundation of men's ethical life. It is our subjectivity as well as our intersubjectivity, and is manifested especially in and through our moral awareness. From Jen, the Confucians derive Yi, which represents moral norms, moral obligations, moral judgements, or sometimes our consciousness of these obligations and even the virtue of acting always according to moral norms. From Yi the Confucians would derive Li which represents the code of behavior, religious and political ceremonies and social institutions.⁷

Both Yi and Li represent the "ought to be" of human existence, whereas Jen represents the Being of human existence. The rule-governedness of human nature is not to be understood in the light of natural laws, nor to be reduced to them. On the contrary, it is to be understood in accordance with the "to be" and the "ought to be" of human beings as expressed in the conceptual framework of Jen, Yi and Li. Even the laws of nature have to be reinterpreted by, and integrated into, the dignity of human nature as defined by these systems of ideas. Arthur F. Wright seems to have grasped this Confucian reasonableness when he says: "Confucianism of all ages viewed the natural and human worlds as an organism made up of multitudinous interconnected parts. . . . But man was the principle agent of both harmony and disharmony."⁸

Confucian reasonableness refers to the totality of the human agent and his or her relation with the world. But it is quite different with Taoism, especially that of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, which is a vehement critique of Confucianism. In the eyes of Taoists, Confucianism emphasizes deliberate actions taken with anthropocentric self-consciousness, and in so doing, it forgets the spontaneity of man and his roots in Tao. Lao Tzu proposes instead a mindless spontaneous creativity springing from Tao itself as the real solution. For him, without Tao's creative support and the spontaneous character of Teh, the Confucian system of transcendental philosophy--which grounded Li in Yi and Yi in Jen--tends to degrade and degenerate.⁹ Thus, Taoist reasonableness refers ultimately to the Teh, and to the source of all creativity, the Tao, as representing the totality of all totalities.

Lao Tzu pushed the meaning of Tao to its speculative extreme. The concept of Tao became, thereby, neither the ways followed by human beings, nor the way out of a social, political and even spiritual crisis, but the Way itself, the Ultimate Reality or the Being of all beings. Here the concept of Being differs from the negative connotation it has in Hegel's Logic (mere being-ness), as the most impoverished ontological determination, robbed of any positive aspect whatsoever. Instead, it represents something like Heidegger's self-manifesting Being. This is not even a concept, because treating Tao as a concept reduces it to a mere conceptual being, or ens rationis with ontic status. That is why Lao Tzu said, "The Tao that could be told of is not the eternal Tao; the name that can be named is not the eternal name."¹⁰

The case of Taoist philosophy shows that reasonableness, as the function of reason understanding itself in reference to the totality of being, is also an exploitation of reason to its limits to attain thereby self-understanding in knowing its own limitation. This is the ontological basis of all spirit of critical reflection. Taoist philosophy, as a philosophy referring to the totality of Being, and Confucianism, as a philosophy referring to the totality of human existence, exemplify two complementary aspects of hermeneutic reasonableness.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

The basic situation of our times could be characterized as one of dynamic tension between, on the one hand, the overwhelming influence of modern science and technology and the processes of universalization which they promote, and, on the other hand, the awakening of historical consciousness leading toward the uniqueness of each historical tradition and the concern for the meaning of human life. Under this global situation, the educational process, especially at the level of higher education, suffers many serious problems. To a philosopher, the most crucial of the problems appear as follows.

First, with the inevitable process of specialization and the operational character of modern science, scientists tend not to be aware of the philosophical meaning of what they are doing. The rationality of their research activities is not sufficiently understood and self-aware.

Second, under the overwhelming influence of modern science and technology, the human sciences suffer from the disadvantage of being forced to take natural sciences as the model of their scientific character, while having fewer resources for their own self-development and fewer opportunities to influence the public sphere of society.

Third, with the rapidly developing complexity of the problems which humankind now faces, interdisciplinary research and interdisciplinary training are necessary for today's higher education. But the philosophical meaning of the inter-disciplinarity, especially its relation to the function of our reason is not clearly defined.

From the first section above, we know that the operation and development of modern science depend much upon scientific rationality. Scientists must understand that this has both cognitive and practical aspects. Cognitively speaking, scientific rationality is an operationally controlled interaction between the theoretical construct as constituted in a logico-mathematical way and the empirical construct as constituted in the experimentation process. Practically speaking, scientific rationality is both strategic and instrumental in character; its limitations are also determined by this.

Our analysis in the second section seems to indicate that, in the educational process, natural science education must be balanced by education in the human sciences. These are historical in character in the sense that their goal is to achieve self-understanding through the study of textual objects given to us through historical tradition (for example, classical texts). Thus, Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist texts are means by which the Chinese people can come to understand themselves. The implication for education is that, on the one hand, the reading of essential textual objects in one's own cultural tradition, and their correct as well as creative understanding should constitute an important part of the educational process of each country. On the other hand, since the understanding of, and openness to, other cultural traditions and other ways of existence are essential to the development of reason, the reading of important texts of other cultural traditions also should be properly emphasized in the educational process.

Openness to different cultures and a comparative vision are important for education and even for research activity. This combination of self-understanding and mutual understanding must not be neglected due to a notion of incommensurability, for any one who wants to prove the incommensurability between two traditions or two different texts presupposes thereby that he understands both.

Finally, inter-disciplinarity in its essence aims at better coordination between different levels of rationality and between rationality and reasonableness. Every scientific discipline is involved in either one or both. An individual or a school, in undertaking this kind of coordination, has to realize both scientific rationality and hermeneutic reasonableness, cognitively as well as practically. This is especially important in the teaching process because sometimes interdisciplinary research becomes entangled as each concerned discipline becomes defensive of its own method and rationality. Sometimes too it is difficult to listen to and to understand the jargons of other disciplines. But in coordinated interdisciplinary teaching, each professor should explain clearly to the students the state of the art in his or her own discipline. Comparative work with a common audience helps bring different disciplines into mutual understanding, and thereby contributes to interdisciplinary research.

Today, both in education and in research, we face a common situation. On the one hand, teaching and research in the natural sciences, and even in some hard social sciences, overemphasize positive knowledge and recognize nothing but scientific rationality. This attitude has bad effects also on teaching and research in the human sciences. On the other hand, research in the meaning of literary works and works of art emphasizes more the subjective meaning/constructing process.

Both activities stand in opposition to such an extent that they constitute a separation as between two cultures. No one is concerned for the dimension of totality in order to prepare better grounds for the coordination of the rationality of the physical sciences and the reasonableness of the human sciences. The reform of education should endeavor to realize in each discipline self-understanding of its rationality, to penetrate through different levels of rationality and reasonableness, and to achieve self-understanding on the part of reason of all its possibilities. The function of reason must not be divided unknowingly, but must be self-understood in both its integrity and its integration.

1. F.S.C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West (Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press, 1979), p. 4.

2. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B75, A51.

3. B. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 99.

4. "Would it not be necessary to correct names? . . . If names are not correct then one's words will not be in accord (with one's actions). If words are not in accord, then what is to be done cannot be correctly implemented." Lun Yu, XIII, 3.

5. J. Needham, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), vol. II, p. 30.

6. A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 3.

7. Vincent Shen, The Rebirth of Tradition (Taipei: Yieh Chiang Press, 1992), pp. 37-39.

8. Confucianism and Chinese Civilization, ed. by A.F. Wright (California: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. ix.

9. Vincent Shen, "Tao and Communication: Lao Tzu versus Habermas," in China and Europe, Yearbook 86 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1986), pp. 194-195.

10. Lao Tzu. Chapter 1.