ORGANIZATION

One of the blind spots of the scientific community is organization. This can have a number of meanings:

- the formal constitution of a university,

- the relationship of science with the state,

- the management of a research project,

- the management of further education,

- the formal modes of communication and cooperation in science,

- the relationship of science and the public,

- the representation and organization of knowledge, etc.

Here, by "organization" I mean not only the product, but especially the shaping of structures and processes.

Scientists dislike organizing principally because it is, in the view of almost all scientists, a prerequisite for science to have a subject matter, whether nature, history, society, computers or so on. In a natural way, this provides a structure for investigating as well as for representing and teaching the resulting knowledge. Secondly, the main criterion for science is truth; this is beyond organization, overcoming even bad management, and lies in the subject matter itself. A third assumption of many scientists is that the individual researcher is able to grasp this truth, and that a good researcher can work even in a bad organization, at least if he has enough freedom.

These beliefs remain strong, even though many results from the sociology and history of science report that the social situation, whether, of society, of science or of the individual scientist, have a strong influence in determining the subject matter, how it is investigated, and what is produced thereby. In other words, they strongly influence what truth is considered to be. Though more and more scientists know this, in their daily work and effective beliefs they give it almost no credit. The same is true even of the researchers who present such results, for often they claim a naive truth for their own results. More importantly, the results remain mostly on a descriptive level of what is and what has been. As there are almost no suggestions on how to organize scientific work, the results are not constructive and therefore are hardly efficient. What is needed is a connection between the sociology of science and its management.

But, of course, this too is not enough, for we need also an adequate epistemology and philosophy of science. The following, based on the concept of argumentation, will present a general definition of science that is partially descriptive and partially normative. It will note some consequences (or suggestions) for organization and at the end will relate this concept of science to the "constructive realism" in Part IV, with which it is compatible but not identical.

SCIENCE IS ARGUMENTATION

The first point is that science produces something. More patently, this is the texts which appear as books or journals, projects (e.g. in architecture), patents, prototypes, etc. Behind this there are ideas, concepts, theories, algorithms, models and so on which also are produced. On both levels science produces a reality. Some reject this experience in favor of saying that at best science describes reality, for they fear that equal status will be attached to "real" reality and to what science produces.

Nevertheless I chose the word "produces" of four reasons":

- What science produces is so manifold that it requires a very general term.

- For conscious human action it is the description of a "real" reality which is effective, not the "real" reality itself.

- As noted by many epistemologists, the connection between "real" reality and the products of science is not that simple--it is not linear and direct in the sense of a subject-image relation--and therefore the products of science have a certain self-identity.

- There is an important claim of totality in this terminology which may cause fears. But it would be wrong to reduce these fears by reducing the pretension of science. Rather the limitation of science must be done by adequate organization (the simplest form of which is not to give it too much money).

How does science produce reality; what is its method? The answer should be acceptable for all disciplines, for medicine as well as for mathematics, for ethnology as well as for economics, etc. It is that the most general method of science is argumentation. Though, for a beginning, most will accept this terminology, there are immediate critics for whom "argumentation" seems to be very general, not expressing anything, while for others it is too restrictive.

Before proceeding to analyzing the notion of argumentation I would repeat what has been said so far, namely, that science produces reality by argumentation. Even without a further explanation of "argumentation", this statement tells us that there are other possibilities for producing reality which are different from the way science does so. Every craftsman produces reality, e.g., a joiner produces a table, this is even "real" reality, but his method is not, at least primarily one of argumentation. Of course, he has to argue in explaining an offer to a costumer or something to an apprentice, but this is not his main activity. In contrast the main activity of the scientist as such is precisely reasoning or argumentation. In consequence, the product is a network of arguments. This is so not only for fundamental research, but also for more application-oriented products: the arguments must be delivered with the products, or at least subsequently if requested, whereas there is no need for the joiner to do so.

A first set of consequences for the organization of science is that argumentation needs freedom. Therefore, scientific institutions need a certain autonomy. Further, the only way science is allowed (and obliged) to deliver its products to society, especially to students, is also argumentation. Therefore the organization has to secure freedom for both partners in the interaction science-society. "Learners" must have equal rights in the process of teaching and learning.

As argumentation is always addressed to somebody, if the method of science is argumentation then science is communicative. There are other fields of human activity, such as art, which produce reality by communication, but even a commonsense understanding of argumentation allows us to eliminate science from art. Art is not obliged to argue, whereas science is; an artist creates or presents a work and has an immediate effect. Of course, criticism of art or the history of art is a work of arguing; sometimes artists also engage in these activities, but they need not do this as artists. In contrast, science is principally obliged to argue: to reject a question is not allowed, particularly it is scientifically inadmissible to say that a question is unscientific.

A further clarifying distinction which can be made by the above thesis is that between science and jurisdiction. A judge produces reality by his judgements. Though he has also to argue, finally and especially in the last resort he produces reality because he is the judge, i.e. because of his charge. (There is a similar situation with priests.) If somebody is sentenced to prison, he can argue against the judgment, but he must go to prison. Sometimes the argumentation of scientific experts plays an important role at the court, but the last word is had by the judge.

There are other fields where argumentation is important, but it is science that is restricted to argumentation, which is the only way science can produce reality. Thus, it is not allowed for a scientist to say: since I am an expert, this is so and so and you have to believe me and to act correspondingly. One who does so is not acting as an scientist. A judge is allowed to, indeed he has to say that precisely because I as judge say so and so, you have to go to prison; science, on the other hand, has to renounce such a power.

A further insight from the comparison of science and jurisdiction is that the regulations of jurisdiction, especially the fixing of terms and the stages of appeal, require that a decision be made, whereas the process of science does not secure that a decision be made. Indeed, in principal its process of argumentation without end and its real product is a network of arguments, not a decision; any termination is arbitrary.

A second set of consequences for the organization of science is that there is an inability on the part of (pure) science to make decisions. This is a further reason why science is not good in organization, because to organizes means always to make decisions. Practically, the problem is solved in two ways. First, as scientists are not only scientists, but also people with private wishes, non-scientific opinions, interests, political opinions, etc., they are able to come to decisions. Either one scientist is the head of a department and makes the decisions not as a scientist, but as the head of the department, or there is a certain democracy in the university where the scientists decide by voting. Both ways share the same problem (the first way has many additional problems): how to secure that the decision is good for the development of science, that science is not suppressed, e.g., by personal interests if only non-scientific factors are used in coming to a decision? This may play a role when decisions about qualifications or careers are made. A third method for coming to decisions is to delegate this problem o people outside the scientific system, to administrators or politicians, but this is problematic because of the reasons just mentioned; additionally it comes into conflict with the autonomy postulated above.

Hence, we have a difficult organizational problem. We need autonomy for both scientists and learners. We need decisions, and therefore we need the "environment" of the scientific system, whether the non-scientific part of scientists or people who are not scientists. As pure argumentation does not come to decision, we need democratization. But an interest-oriented, collective will conflicts with knowledge-oriented argumentation. Hence, we need mechanisms to bring all these partially contradicting aspects into a functioning whole. Before this, however, we need consciousness on the part of scientists with regard to this organizational problems which has no simple solution.

Returning now to the definition of science and summing up what has been said to far: science produces reality by argumentation; it is obliged to argue, and is not allowed to reject questions or to appeal to (its) authority; it has to renounce power. In contrast to other areas where reality is produced with assistance of argumentation, science is restricted to argumentation as its only method; in pure science this leads to argumentation without end.

ARGUMENTATION IS INTERWEAVING AND REFLECTION

What then is argumentation as the general method used by all disciplines? Argumentation is interweaving and reflection.

Interweaving

Firstly: the most general form for presenting an argument for a proposition is to establish its connection with something else which is not directly contained in the proposition, such as a passage in the literature, a scientific authority such as Aristotle, an observation, the result of an experiment, a more general proposition which implies the present one, a generally accepted axiom, an analogous situation, etc. In all cases the other with which a connection is established is assumed to be more familiar to the person to whom the argumentation is addressed. This concept of argumentation is more extensive than "logical reasoning", even if observation and experience are added; "rational discourse" too could be interpreted more narrowly, for even "I do not like this" could serve as an argument by establishing a connection with one's own, say, aesthetic emotions.

There are also such other ways as meditation to become convinced of something which cannot be described by the metaphor "interweaving". In meditation "truth" is experienced, by entering more deeply into the proposition, not by establishing connections with other propositions, observations, experiences, etc. Of course, one could say that meditation means to establish a connection with oneself, as with the "argument" "I do not like this," but such a connection would not be explicit and therefore not communicative, whereas if somebody says "I do not like this" I can ask: "Why?"

As already noted, this concept of argumentation is rather comprehensive, containing logical deduction as used in mathematics as well as analogies, reference to observations and experiments in the natural sciences, reference that something functions, e.g., a machine, the citation of parts of a scientific tradition, references to primary, secondary and other sources, etc. Critical cases of argumentation exist when it is not obvious what the connection is, or why the "other" should be an argument for (or against) something. Here one has to explain, which again is done by establishing a connection with something else (a third or perhaps a general rule) where an essential connection and therefore a compelling or at least convincing argument does not exit.

A third set of consequences for the organization of science is that science is a social enterprise. Beyond some small complexity, interweaving cannot be performed by one single person, but is necessarily communicative. One single person cannot be a scientist, though he may be an inventor or an author or a very bright human or an artist; he becomes a scientist by being interwoven into the scientific community, by relating himself to others, and by others referring to him. This, rather than that he knows very much or that he uses a scientifically accepted method, is the essential point.

This can be stated also about the various disciplines of sciences: none of them is scientific by itself, but all become science by being interwoven with other disciplines, at least potentially. It must be possible to establish connections, to refer to other disciplines. In principal this is always possible, at least if results are published, but by organization it can be fostered to a greater or lesser degree.

More concretely, there are different philosophies for the organization of a university. According to one, there are many departments, e.g., biology, mechanics, history, German literature, etc., each of which are to do good research and teaching. But they have nothing to do with each other except to fight for money, though they have much to do with the corresponding departments in other universities. According to another philosophy the departments must have something to do with each other, e.g., they have to establish a general study programme, they have jointly to develop responses to actual societal problems, they have to present themselves jointly vis-a-vis the public. Whichever philosophy is chosen has consequences for organization: the first philosophy would give autonomy to the departments; the second, which is compatible with the concept of argumentation as formulated in the present paper, would give autonomy only to larger complexes of scientific units.

Reflection

To return to argumentation, interweaving does not tell the whole story. As already stated, there is no general rule which tells us that a connection has compelling force. Further, no interweaving is complete; at least we never know how complete an interweaving is for we never can be sure that all (relevant) relationships have been established or that new phenomena providing new arguments for consideration will not arise. The history of science provides an abundance of examples: even in mathematics, a discipline appreciated as most certain, it has occurred again and again that "evident" theorems had to be re-considered and re-formulated, sometimes with specific limitations. It is necessary for argumentation therefore permanently to pose such questions as: which (relevant) connections have not yet been considered; what has been excluded; what is the relevance of the connections which have been establish? I call efforts to deal with questions of this kind "reflection".

Reflection must be done with a view to the whole, but, as already mentioned, "the whole" does not exist in science; no interweaving is complete. Precisely this fact has to be kept in consciousness by reflection which again and again must pose the question: what has not been considered?

Another aspect of reflection is that the acceptance of an argumentation always is a decision, individual or collective, conscious or unconscious. These decisions are influenced by conditions which are not known in their totality. Therefore the process of science has to make efforts to investigate the traces of the decision; this too is reflection. The process of interweaving has to be accompanied by a process of reflection and for this reason decision in science must not be definitive: its argumentation is endless.

Reflection means observing the process of production of reality, asking what has not been considered, looking at the conditions under which it works and how they may influence the product. This can an should be done within science, but it seems necessary to get help in this from outside science, namely, from students, the economy, the media and politics.

A fourth set of consequences for the organization of science is that firstly, the postulate that disciplines must have something to do with each other, which follows from the concept of interweaving, now emphasizes that the disciplines need each other for reflection. Hence, their organization should be shaped in such a way that this is fostered, not hampered. Secondly, science needs its environment not only for decision-making but also for reflection. Three examples indicate the implications of this, for organization.

First it is necessary to strengthen the students institutionally. Their role as individual consumers is too weak, compared with the organizational power of science. Usually, they are not equal partners, but could become "more equal" if they could organize themselves along the lines of themes, interests--scientific, political, etc. They should be rewarded for doing so, e.g., if they define a project they should get a teacher and other resources.

Secondly the task of providing programmes for further education should be an essential part of what a university has to do, and such programmes should be used for feedback to science. In order to make this possible some should be organized differently than present study programmes: as in strengthening the role of students, one should use the fact that "students" in further education often are organized, for instance as members of a firm, an association, etc. Contracts with organizations interested in further education could yield strong partners for science and could be used for reflection.

Thirdly, the role of the public, represented by the mass media, should be strengthened, not primarily by presenting more results of research in newspapers or television, but in such a way that confrontation with the public--with good journalists--could help reflection. Equally for interaction with students and interested partners in further education programmes this means that science has to offer starting points for reflection, e.g., contradictions. If science presents only an abundance of information, the student or the public has no chance to relate this to their own fundamental views, hence science has no chance to learn from them. Science has the task of presenting again and again the fundamental questions, and it must provide an opportunity to its environment to observe science dealing with these questions.

ARGUMENTATION NEEDS CONTRADICTION

As argumentation is interweaving and reflection, no argumentation is complete, but always contains decisions. Reflection is the way to discover these deficiencies and decisions. The motor for this process of interweaving and reflection is contradiction. This is an old principle of science, well-known as skepticism, criticism, the duty to doubt, etc. It is necessary for science to provide space for contradiction--even within itself--which can refer to observed data, interpretation and theories, axioms, and even to science as a whole: all must be possible. In some sense, contradiction complements interweaving. The latter establishes connections and builds a network, thus giving security. In contrast, contradiction separates, destroys connections, and makes one feel insecure, which of course is a starting point for new connections.

In one sense, the general postulate of stressing, or at least making room for, contradiction could be said to be fulfilled for we have freedom of thought and speech, everybody can say what he likes, and especially everybody can contradict. Attack and defence, thesis and antithesis are central elements of the process of science. Skepticism with regard to unproved statements, the permanent examination of methods and results--all these are aspects of contradiction in the system of science.

However, and this is the point here, whereas the principle of contradiction is indeed realized as individual freedom, it has almost no influence in the organization of science. The organization of science, that of both scientific knowledge and cooperation among scientists, has to be free of contradictions. We postulate both that the final result of research, a grand theory published in monographs, etc., is free of contradictions, and equally that the hierarchical organization of universities, based on the principle that those with more competence in an established science have more power, suppresses contradictions or makes them inefficient by reducing them to mere differences between disciplines. (A good method for avoiding contradictions is to invent a new special discipline.)

Certainly the hierarchical contradiction-avoiding form of organization has been relativized within the last 20-30 years in Western Europe by introducing some elements of democracy within universities, offering rights of co-determination to assistants and students. But these measures have no constitutive influence on the process of science itself. Indeed, one must doubt whether anybody ever thought that they should have, since the co-determination is designed to be "graduated according to qualification". This means that especially with respect to questions of science in the narrower sense, e.g. research, the regulations provided for the predominance of more competent persons, i.e. persons who as a rule do not stand against established science. Were the principle of contradiction to be regarded as really serious, then for basic questions of science rather than for its details, non-scientists would have to be involved in the process of argumentation.

A consequence of the fact that the principle of contradiction is not a principle of organization of science, is that contradiction in science is of small dimension, even essentially individualized. Usually it is individuals or at best small groups which bear contradiction; there is no organization of contradiction which could have a chance against the large organization of science. Thereby contradiction in science has been tamed into serving as merely a method used in small groups. Even more, one can say that small-dimensioned contradiction, expressed through a skeptical attitude with regard to colleagues and through academic fault-seeking, prevents contradiction of larger dimension, which presumes the possibility of solidarity.

A psychological excursion: Non-organized contradiction of small dimension and realized by individuals has more of a chance because it causes less fear. Though contradiction always causes fear, if the form is kept, i.e., if the organization is not touched, the contradiction can be endured. Also a contradiction of small dimension is processed within communication between a few people, which always takes place on different levels so that the objective as well as the emotional aspects can be taken into account. Except for murder no contradiction among a few people is total; the context of interconnection softens many problems. This may suggest that in introducing the principle of contradiction at a larger scale it could be worthwhile to organize systematically different fields of communication such as informal spaces, parties, joint travel, etc.

Another set of consequences for the organization of science concerns suggestions as to how the principle of contradiction could be anchored organizationally in science:

- Dialectical constitutions. There should be created a structure for appeal of contradiction in the constitution of each scientific organization. Like "democracy" or "truth", contradiction should be given a positive image. This, of course, cannot be attained by mere legislation; educational activities, for instance, are necessary. One consequence of such a principle could be that in arguing for concrete measures, such as team-teaching or anti-researching (see the following) one could appeal to this principle.

- Establishing anti-activities. Larger enterprises, say a research project or the foundation of an institute, could be accompanied by an anti-enterprise whose task would be to process the contradictions to the larger enterprise. Its formal principle could be that a fixed proportion of the amount of money provided for some (e.g., high-tech) research must be provided for critical research with respect to that same topic.

Variable size of contradiction. One factor which keeps contradiction small is the organizational, mostly bureaucratic, control applied to science by the state with the intent that the system should be free in content. In contrast the size of organizational control should itself be consciously controlled according to experiments in organization. As the main parameters for control are time and money, an institute or a scientific project could be equipped with money for some time without detailed regulations for organization. This would require generally not a massive government control organization, but only a proportionately small organization to control and evaluate the process. The larger the enterprise the larger the organization for evaluating success. Some enterprises will be of such size that their success can be evaluated only through a process of permanent communication with the scientific or general public.

- Fostering groups. As already mentioned, as in present science contradiction is supported by individuals this yields only small contradictions. Hence, there is need to foster group activities in science and to give them legal status. By this is meant not groups with elected members and charged with fixed rules and tasks, but groups arising informally which are given the meas for action. Both groups should be fostered and should have some rights. Similarly, the termination of groups should be facilitated.

THE PRODUCT OF SCIENCE

Regarding the definition of science, it has been developed thusfar that science is the (collective) production of a reality by argumentation, that is by interweaving and reflection. The motor of this process is contradiction; the product of this process is an "interwoven reality with questions". This then is neither a unified science offering a uniform view of the world, nor is it the mere coexistence of different constructions of reality, nor is it something static. The "interwoven reality with questions" is a dynamic network of pieces of knowledge, between which there are potentials for connections which consist primarily in such questions as: what has the one to do with the other; what do they have in common, which are the similarities, differences and contradictions; and which alternative arrangements (of knowledge) are imaginable? Such questions belong systematically to the product of science.

Such a view differs from a unified science, which as a rule would be thought to be hierarchical, as can be seen in the schemes for scientific libraries. In a unified science there would exist general super-sciences and special subsciences. For such a network of pieces of knowledge a restricted concept of argumentation, that of deduction, would be appropriate.

The term "production of reality", and still more the term "construction of reality", point to the role of freedom in this process, but do not mean that the constructions of science are arbitrary, for interweavings have to be established. It is there that the "real reality" becomes involved as our constructions are related thereto by experiments, experience, machines, etc. which do or do not function; in this sense constructions founder upon "real reality". The "real reality" becomes involved in the process of science partly by the fact that constructions already exist which have not so far been wrecked on real reality and which can be interwoven with new constructions. Thus, the everyday view of things is a limit to the freedom for construction. For instance, physics is not allowed to state that during the night all bodies become free of gravity. When it does state something that is in contradiction of everyday experience, e.g., that the acceleration of all falling bodies is equal, it has to explain this.

SMALL PRODUCTS--THE RELATIONSHIP WITH

CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM

Fritz Wallner describes the activities of most scientists as the constructing of micro-worlds or models, i.e., limited constructions according to five rules, whose main criterion for success is that they must function in some sense. These micro-worlds can be theories about nature or society, machines, concepts, etc. As soon as these constructions are published, they become common property and are dealt with by other scientists who work out application, the public, etc. (They can be thought of as elements of World 3 in the sense of Sir Karl Popper.)

In contrast to the above description of the product of science as an "interwoven reality with questions" Wallner points to the "small products", or the pieces of knowledge to be interwoven as elements of the process of science. Whereas the above description of science begins with science as a whole, Wallner starts with science as divided into small groups or even individual researchers. Thus he separates science as a set of disciplines and sub-disciplines, on the one hand, and overall science with which he is concerned, on the other.

The "small products" are limited: they have no claim to totality or to be interwoven with everything else. Thus, they can be presented, or in some sense sold, to colleagues or some public; others can inspect and investigate them, join them together with other products, change them, etc. The presupposition for this is a certain stability of these small products--in contrast to a "dynamic network". The main cause of this stability is that usually they are materialized primarily in the form of a text or, more generally, represented through media, the most general medium being language, though mathematical symbolism or the special techniques of the disciplines also are media in this sense. As these media are more general constructs with an higher degree of stability, the small products derive stability therefrom.

A further phenomenon related to products being represented by media that they have a kind of self-reliance. Often they are more than the producer realizes. Often the producer does not know all the implications or attributes of the product, but as soon as it is "thrown" onto the "market" others discover what he or she has not seen or do something with it that the producer did not intend: it is a common good. That we do not know everything about our products has to do also with the fact that we have no total knowledge of the media by which they are represented.

A final aspect of the process of production of the small products is that often there are general rules called methods and special aims which remain fixed during this process and serve as criteria for judging the quality of the products. These production processes and small products are interrelated through being offered on the market of science, where others take them, produce new small products, etc.

Though one could say that this is the process argumentation, i.e. of interweaving and reflection, defined in the above definition of science, as it really takes place today this process is not sufficient. Firstly, the concentration on small products prevents the production of large products--and "products" of reflection, for instance, would be large products. Secondly, as every scientist must produce new products as quickly as possible he is prevented from really dealing with the products of others. Thirdly, the producers are interested in finding buyers, but it suffices to have some buyers; it is not necessary to come into contact with scientists far away with regard to contents and methods. Therefore the same channels of exchange are used repeatedly and the process of interweaving, reflection and contradiction is essentially shortened. Lastly, nobody is really responsible for this process; it is delegated to a kind of "invisible brain" of the scientific community analogous to Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of the market.

Here constructive realism in the sense of Fritz Wallner states that while it is, of course, appropriate, for scientists or small groups of scientists to create their "small" products according to the principle of division of labor--and partially in competition with each other--the common responsibility for reflection or interpretation is indivisible and must be given more effort. The main method he suggests is to put the small products into a different or strange context in order to investigate them. This, of course, could be successful only if there are corresponding organizational measures. Here it is necessary to distinguish between what is or can be done by individuals or small groups and what is the collective responsibility and how this can be fulfilled. This is a strategic difference that the above, working in terms of the concept of argumentation, does not take into account.

The formulations of Wallner can be used also to shed light upon some discussions about science and the university which today have political relevance. Some see interpretation as primarily the task not of the scientific community, but of the outside consumers of science: students, enterprises, the government, the public, etc. The small products, appropriately prepared, have to be delivered to a market outside the system of science, and there prove effective, become used or not, applied, etc. In this process they are interpreted, to use the above metaphor, by the "invisible brain" of an enlarged market. Some say that study programmes and journalism are the places of inter-disciplinarity today. Some proposals for the organizational reform of universities are grounded on this philosophy, namely, that scientists should deliver good small products, and that the task of their evaluation, interweaving and reflection is the responsibility of a market whose participants are primarily outside the scientific system.

It is the thrust of the main body of this paper, however, that such a "market" approach would not be sufficient. To be sure, as stated above, the scientific system is unable to do the job alone and needs its environment for reflection and decision. But it is insufficient to delegate this task to an invisible brain, whether of a market of scientists or of an enlarged market. Though this delegation sometimes is called euphemistically "democratic" or "pluralistic", it seriously limits the quality and efficiency of the performance of the task of orienting society as well as science.

As already stated, the aim must not be a unified science set up by some super-scientists, but a dynamic network of pieces of knowledge. Those not only co-exist and often are misunderstood mutually, but essentially require awareness of connections and contradictions. For this there is need of adequate organization within science and for cooperation with the environment. In sum, there is no natural limit for what we are allowed to think or must think about, with the rest being delegated to some "invisible brain".

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Pellert, A., Costazza, M., Hartner, P. (1990): "Vernetzung und Widerspruch". In: Lenz, W., Brünner, Ch. (eds.): Universitäre Lernkultur. Lehrerbildung--Hochschullehrerfortbildung--Weiterbildung. Bericht einer Arbeitsgruppe der Österreichischen Rektorenkonferenz. Wien-köhlau.

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