As every civilization is shaped differently, it is neither necessary nor possible that each people develop all aspects of human civilization. Nevertheless, on account of the practical consequences for future developments in China and on account of the enormous prestige of modern science, this question of why Chinese civilization has not discovered modern science is often asked by the Chinese, as well as by such foreigners as Carl Gustav Jung in his foreword to the "I Ching".¹ Recently, probably because of a lessening of attention to Marxism-Leninism, there is much discussion about the relation of Chinese to Western culture, especially in mainland China. Of course, modern science continues to constitute one of the foci of discussion. The intent of this paper is to assess some related discussions in mainland China and to provide some complementary ideas which could be useful especially in the field of education.

RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM MAINLAND CHINA

Chen Xuanling ( ) translated J.P. Sartre's L'être et le neant (the Chinese edition of which was published first in the China mainland and then in Taiwan) and studied in Paris. In "On the Question of Transcendence in China," he claims that the principles of democracy and science are rooted in the belief in Christian civilization in the existence of a transcendent God as the origin and last end of mankind. Even today, though belief in God is no longer alive in the minds of many Western men and women, the notion of some ideal beyond reach which serves as a transcendent end is still much alive. Chen claims, however, that there is no idea of a transcendent being in traditional Chinese culture and that there are no idealists in China. Because there is no such thing as a passionate search for a "transcendent" ideal in traditional China, the Chinese not only are unable to discover modern sciences or democracy, but in fact find difficulty even in learning about them from Western civilization.²

Chen's criticism of Chinese culture has its merit in stressing the importance of the ideal. But this is at best only one of the factors in answering the question as to why Chinese civilization has not discovered modern sciences. With regard to the role of Christianity, astrophysicist Fang Lizhi sent an article, "Religion and Science," to a friend in Hong Kong (published in November, 1990).³ He did not deny unhappy conflicts between religion and science in Europe, but points out the positive influence of Christianity upon modern sciences. According to him, while Chinese astronomers were more interested with extraordinary and irregular appearances in the heavens, the Western astronomers took pains to explain these irregular appearances, because as Christians they believed that the whole universe was created by one intelligent God. They readily accepted the Aristotelian presuppositions that everything is intelligible and that there is uniformity in the universe. Fang thinks that Chinese Taoists also believe in the uniformity of nature because the "Tao-te-ching" says, "Tao begets two, two begets three, three begets ten thousand things," but that unfortunately Taoism never constituted the dominant current in China.⁴

This role of Christianity in modern sciences was pointed out by Joseph Needham:

If the conception of a single `personal' creator deity is firmly held (`liberating the mind', as one of the Fathers said, `from the tyranny of ten thousand tyrants'), the nature of Nature is as much an indication of God's rationality as is the nature of Man. . . . Europe had perhaps no parallel to the Confucian phenomenon, the refusal to look at Nature, and hence no parallel to the Taoist phenomenon, the disinclination to trust reason and logic⁵

It is true that Taoists distrust reason and knowledge, but Fang's opinion seems not to be quite accurate when he asserts that Taoists believe in the uniformity of the universe. Instead, Taoists readily admit as normal anything prodigious. For Chuang-tze, for instance, there was no difficulty in believing that Ch'ing-ning ( ? ) produces the leopard, which produces the horse, which, in turn, produces human beings ( ).⁶ For him the Tao is unfathomable, indeed everything is possible through Tao's power. Thus Wang Ch'ung, who criticized Confucius and Mencius mercilessly, could not critique the pretended prodigies from the reign of the saintly Han-emperors which prodigies were simply "the spontaneity of the heavenly Tao" ( ).⁷

In the congress organized by the University of Munich (July 22-26, 1991, Tutzing), He Zhao-wu ( , Ts'ing-hua University, Beijing) read a paper on the "Chinese Intellectual Tradition and Modern Science" which was more comprehensive than any previous attempts. First, he did not adopt the Marxism dogma, still spread widely among mainland scholars, that the productive forces in China were seriously restrained by the old productive relations, for such inadequate explications are circular.

Rather, he noted that the emergence of modern science during the Renaissance required specific social and intellectual prerequisites, including: (1) that the interest of the dominant social class be in urgent need of sciences; and (2) that science be encouraged by the existing social and political orders so as to be capable of drawing most of the best minds to its cause. Unhappily, the only avenue open for an intellectual in traditional China was promotion through becoming an official with the so-called eight-legged compositions ( ).

Among the intellectual prerequisites for the development of science, Professor He cited: (1) an idea of the universal laws in Nature; (2) systematic experimentation; and (3) a mathematical model for constructing a scientific theory. However, in China there was never an idea of natural law (here he invokes the authority of Joseph Needham). China had some preliminary ideas with regard to experiments and mathematical models, but did not develop them.

Moreover, Professor He sees three contrasts in the specific cultural background of China and the West: (1) From its outset Western culture was intellectualistic and sought knowledge for its own sake, whereas Chinese culture primarily sought virtuous action; (2) while as a religious faith Christianity is incompatible with reason, as a search for the infinite it is akin to the spirit of science; (3) moreover, Professor He contends that atomism and mechanicism are prerequisites for modern science, but that neither existed in China.

He also raises the following question: If China never had any contact with the West, would Chinese civilization ever have found modern sciences by herself? Though Professor He does not answer this question directly, he agrees with Joseph Needham that in the future the sciences may become holistic and organismic as did Chinese philosophy. But, as natura non facit saltum, he thinks that science in China must first develop in a Western, mechanistic manner, for science in China cannot undergo any abrupt change.

Though, on the whole Professor He's presentation is comprehensive and correct, some points seem rather questionable. First as regards an alleged incompatibility between Christian faith and reason, though there have been conflicts between some theologians and scientists on account of human failures on both sides,⁸ the question is so complex that to assert an incompatibility is too simplistic. Second and more importantly, is it true that no idea of universal laws of Nature existed in China? These two questions will be the concern of the next part of this paper.

RELATED NOTIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

IN CHINESE CULTURAL REGIONS

The Perception of Science as Antithetic to Religion

After the May Fourth cultural movement of 1919 China decisively took the path toward modernization. This was of Western origin, but it was perceived in a one-sided way as anti-traditionalist and anti-religious. While the Chinese tradition has come once again to be treated with honor, the anti-religious spirit still persists. This is especially so in speaking about the scientific spirit which routinely is inculcated in our schools in terms of overcoming superstition, with which religion very often is equated. This mentality is manifest when Professor He affirms the incompatibility between Christian faith and reason which reflects an inveterate anti-religious bias. This is all the more regrettable with respect to Christianity, because in part the discovery of modern sciences is indebted to Christianity. This not only is admitted by Fan Lizhi and Joseph Needham,⁹ but also has been brought to light in recent studies.

As one of such studies shows, Twelfth Century Christian Europe, which first instituted universities in the modern sense, had great confidence in the progress of science. Thus Adelhard of Bath wrote about "Quaestiones naturales" at the beginning of twelfth century:

I do not detract from the power of God, for all that exists does so from him and by means of His power. However, this is not to say that nature itself is chaotic, irrational, or made up of discrete elements. Therefore it is possible for men to achieve an understanding of this rational order inherent in nature, an understanding as complete as the extent that human knowledge (scientia) progresses. . . . Consequently, since we do not turn pale before our present state of ignorance about nature, let us return then, to the method of reason.¹⁰

This reflects the outlook of Europeans in the Twelfth Century, namely, that since God is supremely rational, men might properly assume that nature as His creation obeys logical principles.

The discovery of modern sciences during the Renaissance is thus a logical continuation of the progress of human knowledge, as Adelhard of Bath at his time already recognized. In 1612 Thomas Tymme wrote that "the Almighty Creator of the Heavens and the Earth . . . hath set before our eyes two most principal books: the one of nature, the other of his written Word." For an author such as Tymme, science and the observation of nature were a form of divine service: in a real sense natural research was a quest for God.¹¹ The same was affirmed by the followers of Paracelsus although they rejected what they called the "logico-mathematical method". But those who turned to quantification might also have referred to the Biblical words that God had created "all things in number, weight and measure."¹²

Certainly, it was no wonder that in 1638 Galileo Galilei could write the famous volume on "Mathematical Discourses and Demonstrations Concerning Two New Sciences". For Galileo, who experienced some difficulties in his relationship with the theologians of his time, there was no difficulty in believing the world to be the work of God.¹³ By the Eighteenth Century science at last was established as "Newtonian" in that it was experimental and was characterized by quantification and the use of mathematical abstraction in the description and clarification of natural phenomena.

This being the historical fact, there is no ground for affirming that modern sciences are incompatible with religious or Christian faith, and in education everything untrue should be carefully avoided.

Ancient Chinese Recognition of Laws of Nature

Professor He thinks that the ancient Chinese had no idea of natural laws. In this he probably follows Joseph Needham, who stated, "The de-personalization of God in ancient Chinese thought took place so early and went so far that the conception of a divine celestial lawgiver imposing ordinances on non-human Nature never developed."¹⁵

Since I have already discussed this theme extensively elsewhere,¹⁶ here it is enough to give a resume. According to Hung-fan, in an historical document written well before the birth of Confucius, there are nine categories of the Great Norm (the literal meaning of "Hung-fan"):

- The first and fourth describe the order of Nature concerning the five necessary means of human subsistence (water, fire, wood, metal, and earth) and the heavenly phenomena (the year, the month, the day, the stars, planets, zodiacal signs, and the calendaric calculations).

- The third, fifth and sixth categories are rules of political life.

- The seventh deals with divination.

- The second enumerates five ethical norms and the eighth tells how the ethical and natural orders belong together.

- The last category describes forms of happiness and misfortunes to which every human being is subject.

It is noteworthy that the first and the fourth categories of the Great Norm concern the order of Nature; they are the laws of Nature. Moreover, all nine categories are said to derive their existence from Ti or T'ien whom the ancient Chinese, since the times of the Oracle Bones at about 1324-1123 B.C., unanimously and consistently believed to be the supreme ruler over all natural and human orders.¹⁷

If this be the case, why did not the ancient Chinese endeavor to make further research about specific laws of Nature. As I hinted in the article cited above, this probably was because the Chinese subsequently lost their faith in a just and mighty God in heaven and identified the natural course of events with heaven itself. By disconnecting nature's autonomous functioning from the divine will, the "heavenly way" ( ) was emptied of any implication of a transcendent God.¹⁸ Finally the Tao-te-ching introduced the conception of a universal and impersonal "Way", the "Tao" ( ) or the "internal dictates" of everything.¹⁹ As Needham states, "The Taoist philosophers did not trust the reason, but believed in the random character of natural events and thus did not have the fervent zeal of Christian researchers to read the book written by God."

The Danger of Ideological Scientism for Any True Scientific Spirit

In China the ideology of scientism came almost at the same time as modern sciences themselves. As D.W.Y. Kwok says rightly in his study on "Scientism in Chinese Thought 1900-1959", scientism assumes in general that all aspects of the universe are knowable through the methods of science. Moreover, it has the tendency to use the respectability of science in areas having little bearing on science itself. Because, at the time of the Opium War (1839-42), the weakness of China was perceived as a weakness in technology, the desire for national growth always was associated with the learning of science and technology. Since the May Fourth cultural movement, the ideology of scientism has been firmly established in China and, through Ch'en Tu-hsiu ( ), Hu Shih ( ), Ting Wen-Chiang ( ) and others, influenced practically all Chinese intellectuals.²⁰ This influence remains quite alive.

Paradoxically, this overconfidence in science is damaging to the true spirit of science. This can be seen by a concrete example of the decision of the seventh People's Congress of China in 1992 to construct the big dam of San-hsia ( ), in spite of many momentous counter-arguments. Though the voices of dissent can be silenced, not the voices of Nature, for Natura non vincitur nisi obediatur. Hence, it is more scientific--and also much safer--to allow all voices to be heard rather than to listen only to those voices one is happy to hear. Sen-hsia is a typical but fateful case, where the ideology of scientism deafens people. Both Carnap and Popper seem guilty of scientism in laying down an experimental standard (of verifiability or falsifiability) for all philosophical rationality.

The eagerness of all Chinese peoples to promote science and technology is good.²¹ But real scientific progress has nothing to do with the ideology of scientism; on the contrary it is a serious obstacle to true progress. It would be more modest, more humane and more true to see modern science as man's artificial construction of a micro-world for a definite purpose.

1. C.G. Jung, Psychology and Religion: West and East, translated by R.F. Hull (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), p. 590.

2. , 1990/4.

Chen Xuanlian, "Zur Frage der Transzendenz in China", China heute, IX (1990), s. 73-76.

3. , 1990.11.1 ( ), p. 20-21.

4. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol. 2, History of Scientific Thought (London: Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 163.

5. Chuang Tzu, Chuang Tzu, Mystic, Moralist, and Social Reformer, translated from Chinese by Herbert A. Giles (2d ed., rev.; Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1926), chapter 18, pp. 214-215.

6.

7.

8. Juan Casanovas, "An Evaluation of Galileo's Case" in Matteo Ricci: International Conference on Religion and Culture, Fujen Catholic University, Hsinchuang, Taipei, March 27-28, 1992.

9. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol. 2, p. 163.

10. Tina Stiefel, The Intellectual Revolution in Twelfth Century Europe (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 44-45.

11. Allen G. Debus, Man and Nature in the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 14.

12. Op. cit., p. 23.

13. Op. cit., pp. 109-115, 96.

14. Op. cit., p. 141.

15. Joseph Needham, pp. 79-580.

16. Thaddeus T'ui-chieh Hang, "The Historical and Philosophical Import of Hung-fan," The Asian Journal of Philosophy, I (1987), 1-16.

17.

18.

19. Joseph Needham, p. 582.

20. D.W.Y. Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

21. T.B. Tang, Science and Technology in China (London: Longman, 1984).