INTRODUCTION

The crisis of Chinese education is no longer a myth, even if the authorities try to conceal it. Their noisy, interminable discussions about solutions to the present crisis in education contradict their ideology. Nowadays, the call for a radical change of educational system no longer belongs only to radical intellectuals. Even bureaucrats who make educational policy in the atmosphere of the Ministry of Education begin to show concern for present education. Paradoxically, they are the most "noisy" advocates for a change of the present educational system. The example of Lee K. Y.'s Singaporean government, which pushes for a more traditional education, has been taken as a model for Taiwan. Bureaucrats begin to discover the disaster of an overemphasized technological education through the Singapore policy rather than by a thorough examination of their Taiwanese system.

Nowadays, we discuss fervently the need to return to our roots, namely, to our Confucian ideology, and we seem to be as certain about its positive value as we have been confident about technology. Intellectuals, caught in the fever of nostalgia about a lost ideology, appear to be willing to go along with the bureaucrats. Even if they still cast doubt upon the claims of Lee or the Confucian scholars, they are generous in giving the green to experiments with such "new" ideological education. To them, it is better to try to change than to sit idle and cry in the darkness of the black hole of present education.

Whether Confucianism could be effective in solving the present crisis seems irrelevant to our bureaucrats because they believe in it as certainly as they believed in Marxism or in The Three Principles of the People of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Their main concern is how to get it done, and as quickly as possible.

Our doubt concerning Confucian education comes not from its obsolescence which is visible in our history, but from its ideological, dogmatic and reactionary character. Our point in this chapter is that the illusion of the effectiveness of Confucian education is born rather from an unfortunate misunderstanding of the nature of education, which is mistakenly identified with the method used by our educators. Thus, as long as the objective of education is still unclear, any diagnosis or remedy proposed for its problems must be futile. Moreover, we would insist that the methods of diagnosing and solving the problems themselves are insufficient so long as the problem or the concept of the illness remains wrongly understood.¹ The symptoms of educational crisis, discovered and analyzed by our specialists, would be of little use if these symptoms themselves are falsely conceived.² Aware of this fact, we will be content with an elaboration of the problem of understanding the so-called crisis of education. We avoid, though do not shy away from, the question of a remedial solution which we consider as premature and outside our capacity.

The misunderstanding of our educational crisis comes first from a misunderstanding of the objective of education, and secondly from a misuse of, or better an overconfidence, in a certain method. Such misunderstanding and over-confidence in the method are the product of what we identify as ideology. Hence, in order to deal with the problem adequately we shall adopt the radical reduction of Edmund Husserl³ in doubting any kind of definition of education or its methods. To be more precise, we are not allowed to take for granted:

- A simple analysis or description of the symptom of the illness in education. The data provided from experience or natural facts need to be understood; they are not neutral as the empiricists believe. Human experiences are not transcendental in the Kantian sense, but relative and historical.

- A subjective, ideological interpretation of the cause of the illness because such an interpretation is motivated rather by fixed, a-historical ideas, class sentiment, or class interests. The Confucianist explanation of the crisis in terms of non-congruence to their moral codes, and the nationalist interpretation of the illness in terms of failure to fulfil the required patriotic codes, are both prototypes of subjective and ideological education.

- The myth of mechanical organism (of the behaviorists), according to which the crisis in education is a biological fact as natural as action and reaction, stimulus and response.

Such a misunderstanding is notoriously embraced by empiricists and idealists respectively. We challenge their views by arguing that such methods are insufficient to cope with an education which deals primarily with human development in a changing and growing society, namely with the cognitive and the practical, pragmatic and the teleological, the self-conscious and the communicative. This means that here we opt for an integral education by not resting on a certain facet of being human. The mistakes of both empiricist and idealist, as Hegel and especially Marx, as their followers have rightly noted, lie precisely in their concentration upon a certain facet and on a certain stage of being human. Their diagnosis is thus not quite false if the human person is conceived as a thing, external and immobile, a-historical and a-social, which, like a stone, could be objectively observed and analyzed. Consequently, their remedial proposals may be effective for the education of such a static man. The fact, however, of an historical and social, sentimental and rational, developing and utopian person contradicts their understanding of the human person, and consequently reveals their solutions to human problems to be incomplete and dangerous.

Thus, the main theme of this chapter will be centered on the crisis of understanding itself. Tentatively, we adopt critical theory, not as a unique method, but as a guideline to throw more light upon the crisis of education.⁴

Of course, we do not naively reject the empirical analysis or the impact of ideology. We are aware of its function and its limit in understanding the problem. This chapter consists of three main sections: the first and the second are a condensed review of some prevalent modes of understanding in education, tacitly accepted as the standard by empiricist and idealist respectively, while the final section will deal precisely with the problematics of what our educators call educational crisis from the point of view of critical theory.

EMPIRICISM AND EDUCATION

Dealing with the problematics of understanding demands a treatment of both the scope and the method of understanding. Hence, to understand the crisis of education, we must examine its objective and methods.

Here, we begin with some prevalent definitions of education adopted by most of our educators. We treat them as hypotheses which need to be carefully and analytically reexamined. We will then single out the main mistakes that may be responsible for what we understand as the crisis.

If education is understood as a right method to transform children into a kind of model predetermined by the adult society, by the state or the Church, then the question would be for which kind of method and which sort of model are we searching. Consequently, the crisis of education could be seen from two aspects: that of method and that of objectives. In the first case one comes from the belief that the right method determines the right path of education; in the second case it is the objective of education which dictates its method. Thus, the aim of the educators who believe in the first solution is to work out an adequate method, which could be empirical or rational. To those who happen to take the second solution, the task is to refine the objective of education.

Let us take the example of Confucian education to clarify our point. The objective of Confucian education is Chun-tzu, i.e. a man who possesses virtues of loyalty, fidelity, sincerity, frugality, benevolence, filial piety, etc.⁵ (Analects, 1:2, 8, 14; 2:11, 13; 4:5, 24). For Confucian educators, its method ought be the right way to educate the children in these virtues. The methods of "learning by heart", "obedience" and even such forceful means as laws and punishment are those most praised. Thus, for them, the educational crisis is synonymous with a crisis of method and a lack of the above virtues.

If, in contrast, education is understood as a simple tool or instrument which the children need to develop themselves into whatever they want to become, and if the objective of education is optional rather than conventional, then the crisis of education is limited to the mere aspect of technique. Liberal education opts for such an understanding of education: it is meaningless to set an objective for education; we should concentrate rather on the work of refining the technique than on responding to an ideal objective for education.

We may produce a litany of similar definitions of education based either on its objective or method,⁶ or on both. They will be of little use for our purpose for such definitions are insufficient or biased from the very outset because they are constructed (or mentally constituted) on a misconception of human nature or on false ideology. To prove our thesis, we will examine first the objectives of education implicit in the first definition to see whether such objectives could be regarded as true, and how they are constructed. We will discover first a dangerous confusion in the object and the objective of education in such definitions, and secondly that there is an artificial identity of its method and objective.

The Object of Education

Actually, the object of education is educated children: students rather than ideals. As often as not, the one to be educated is bypassed or simply ignored; he or she is regarded as a simple object instead of being the real subject. Consequently, the one being educated is denied an active role in shaping his or her life, and is destined or forced to accept the ideal or model predetermined by society. In a word, the educated is no longer the object and subject of education, but plays only an auxiliary role in the game of education by going along to reach the objective, i.e. the ideal model. In both definitions, nowhere do we find an active role for the educated. Mistakenly we take either the ideal or the method to be the objective of education, and lapse into confusion between its object and objective. Such a mistake comes from a rather feudal or patriarchal ideology, according to which it is the absolute power of the father (the clan chief, the king) which determines the fate of the subordinate. The subordinate, the sons, are simply the product, existing at the whim of the father or the chief.

The Objective of Education

As we have observed in both definitions of education, our educators have take either the ideal or the method to be the objective of education.⁷ In order to avoid unnecessary ambiguity, we will replace the word "objective" with the word "goal" or "scope". In the first definition it is the goal which dictates the course of education, while in the second it is the method which is the ultimate objective in the mind of educators.

The Goal of Education: In Confucian education, the model of Chun-tzu (superior man) is the ultimate goal of education, while in the present education of Taiwan it is the patriotic heroes. Of course, we discover similar ideas in other educational systems: the model of the saint in Christianity, the ideal of the socialist in socialism, or of the free man in liberalism, etc.

In all these models, one observes a common character: they are a priori or predetermined; their specific characteristics are artificially, externally constructed. Tacitly, or often forcefully and violently, we accept them without comprehension or consent. In the case of Confucian education, we are taught to be loyal, blindly obedient to the king or the superior without an understanding why we should do so. In the case of liberal education, one demands that children have the right of self-development without considering the scope of development. In both cases, the demand of an ideal is often unrealistic, if not illusory. This unreality or at least impracticality has not yet been subjected to critique.

The Method of Education: The liberal, in order to avoid the absurd demand of an unreal model, has proposed either a vague idea of freedom and self-development, or in most cases has chosen method as the objective of education. Examples of such a view are found in policies in Taiwan reflecting belief that an improvement in the method either of examinations or of teaching could solve the crisis of present education. In Singapore, the commission of education, nominated directly by the government with plenipotentiary power to decide the policy and plan the future of education, has opted for method as the legitimate goal of education. Education means education for correct thinking, for science, and recently, for good behaviour or moral living. Curiously, hardly any effort is directed toward redefining education. In acknowledging the obsolescence of the present method of teaching and learning (didactics), the government chooses an easy path of shifting all mistakes to the problem of method, and thereby reduces the business of education to simply training in method. Again, the method of education is reduced to a mere aspect of technique.

Before we deal directly with their mistakes in the next section, we think, it is necessary to make some remarks on the unreality of both conservatives and liberals regarding the objective of education.

First, if the goal of education is predetermined, one has to justify the reason for such a determination. The educator may resort to the authority of God, of Nature, or simply of the King; he may prove that such a goal is historically or scientifically constructed, or he may simply take it for granted. To rely on authority is to find shelter in ideology, whatever it may be. In such a case, the ideology has to be proven to be the right and not the wrong one, but the difficulty lies exactly in the dogmatism of ideology which makes any test impossible. A theistic ideology can be as rigid and authoritative as its naturalistic or scientific counterpart, and justification means confirmation rather than proof.

Second, due to the untestability of such a goal, it would be nonsense to talk about crisis in terms of conformity to the goal. The educational crisis has to be located in other aspects, namely, the ability, capacity and willingness of the educated to follow the goal. One explains the educational crisis in terms of lack of will or incapacity of the educated. Actually, the educator is partly right, but in most cases he simply begs the question. The point is whether as a limited and still immature human being the one being educated could have the capacity to perform the noble, ideal rules set by an absolute agent (God) or by an utopian (absolute) ruler, or whether he could be measured in the terms of a natural event as seen by a scientifically-minded educator. The answer seems to be in the negative, exactly because such standards for education are external, neutral and, in most aspects, impractical.

Third, if one carefully examines the goal of education, one may discover a hidden interest in its process of construction. The virtues of obedience, loyalty and fidelity benefit primarily the rulers and not necessarily the educated or the subordinated. Love of the leader is intended to increase the power of the leader; it is not for the benefit of the ruled.

Fourth, even if the goal of education is noble, and for the educated, as seen in Confucianism and Christianity, one still can doubt its effectiveness. The contrast between the invariable goal and the changing man indicates clearly some alienation between the goal and human beings: how can an invariable standard dictate to a changing subject?

Fifth, with regard to the problematics of method, one may simply raise a question concerning the relation between ends and means: could one develop method without setting a goal? How could we know the right method without a calculation of the effectiveness of the method on the goal? Max Weber's excellent treatment of the inseparable relation between means and ends proves that a belief merely in method is rather naive, if not dangerous.⁸

IDEALISM AND EDUCATION

In this section, we shall take a step further in examining two prevalent views and methods of education: those of empiricists and idealists, respectively. We will not, however, delve into the details of the problematics of methodology as have many educators from normal universities.⁹ We have brought up this issue elsewhere¹⁰ and do not need to repeat it here. The main point in this section will be by means of critique to reveal the deterministic and ideological nature of the educational views held by both empiricists and idealists alike.

The Myth of Objectivism in Education

There are two main tenets of empiricism: first, everyone being educated is primarily an object which can be observed, studied and tested; second, the law of education, generated from the general law of nature, has to be constructed on an objective and causal foundation. Consequently, a successful policy of education has to be built on what we name objectivity. We will go through their arguments and see whether the myth of objectivism could save us from crisis.

In blaming present education as unscientific, and in severely criticizing conservative education as purely subjective, empirical educators seek a scientific, objective education. Their main points and arguments are based on the concept of science and objectivity which in their mind are identical. To be scientific, one needs first to treat the educated not as a single, particular subject, but as an object, which, like other objects, can be observed. Second, what we can study from the object is not the object itself but its phenomena, or external appearances such as behaviors and reactions. Third, in locating the most frequent and least frequent phenomena, one could divide the "regular" from the "nonregular" and the "irregular" phenomena. Fourth, one observes among the "regulars" some common traits which can explain the difference between the "regular" and others, and which can explain the existence of the "regular". Fifth, one goes a further step to establish the law of relationship among the "regulars" based on these common traits. Such laws are objective in the sense that they can satisfactorily explain and predict behavior (phenomena) in most cases. Finally, the empiricist educator will apply the above steps to study the "object" (i.e. the educated), and to work out laws of education.

Actually, in treating man as an external, neutral object like a stone, in reducing human activities to simple actions and reactions (when they collide), and consequently in believing that one can establish causal laws explaining human actions and can educate by such laws, the empiricist educator has committed a double mistake: that of ideological objectivism, and that of a naive understanding of science.

To take human beings as external, physical objects which could be studied with the help of natural science, the empiricists have taken scientism or objectivism as their ideology. Such an ideology claims that:

- knowledge is synthetic and that synthetic knowledge is constructed upon sensory experiences;

- all sensory experiences are observed and repeated;

- meaning is grounded in observation;

- concepts and their generation only represent the particulars from which they are abstracted; consequently, conceptual entities do not exist in themselves, but are mere concepts;

- sciences are unified according to the methodology of the natural sciences; and

- values are not facts, and hence cannot be given as such in sensory experiences.¹¹

Deduced from the premise of scientism, any theory of education which claims to be objective or scientific must be built on these tenets. To educators who take objectivism for granted and follow its regulations, all is restricted to the area of methodology. They adopt the Wittgensteinian dictum "About that which one cannot speak, one must remain silent" (Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, daruber muss man schweigen),¹² and apply it to education:

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science, namely, something that has nothing to do with philosophy; then, whenever someone wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.¹³

One just needs to replace the word "philosophy" with that of "education" to understand what the empiricist educator thinks of and does with education. In this context, the method employed in education is empirical and the business of the educator is to teach the educated the proper use of such a method. One refuses to discuss the problematic of the purpose of education which appears nonsensical, metaphysical. In a stroke, this reduces all educational objectives to the single one of methodology.

It is not difficult to point out the mistake of the empiricist. We agree with Karl Popper who would have rejected such an understanding of education, which he called the myth of objectivism.¹⁴ Though we regard Popper's critique as being of great help to dismiss the myth of objectivism, and though such a problem is appropriate in a study of education, we will leave it, together with the problem of application of neutral standards to human beings, for further discussion. Here, we would like to concentrate on the extravagant claim that the business of education is restricted to methodological training.

Our very first question about our knowledge of appropriateness in methodology raises not only the complexity of the process of intellect construction, but also the relation between means and ends. First, the empiricist may claim that the rightness of a method is measured by its conformity to the standards of natural science, and that the right method would produce desirable results. Such a claim is in fact based on a metavalidity of the criteria of natural science. The scientific criteria are transcendental in the sense of being beyond space and time. They are always correct.

However, our question is not directed to the rightness or wrongness of scientific criteria, but to the role of the agent who recognizes and uses them. He is supposed to possess them prior to constructing some method. Immanuel Kant explains the human experiences of such knowledge in terms of a synthetic a priori process,¹⁵ while David Hume and the rest of empiricists explain them in terms of psychological association.¹⁶ Both explanations are insufficient in the sense that they simplify and objectify human experiences. Both Kant and Hume treat experiences as simple facts or data which one can isolate in a single unit, and which could be accumulated. They forget that experiences reveal only what has happened or not happened; as such, what they take as internal or scientific knowledge is only historical knowledge. The difference between data (given existents), facta (phenomena which have happened) and happening phenomena has not been explored by them; as a result their explanation is restrictively based on data (existents), and as such is misguided or onesided.

Second, both Kant and Hume are convinced of a kind of universal experience that they identify as mathematical or physical. To them, such experiences are certain; they provide a solid basis for constructing other knowledge.

Here, both Kant and Hume leave aside an important fact of the subjective role in experiencing. Experience is "experienced" by a certain subject. Thus, one has to properly deal with the subject as E. Husserl has rightly proposed in The Cartesian Meditations. Here, experience is constructed in terms of Erlebniss, and the solipsistic ego is understood in terms of transcendental subject. We follow Husserl, and especially Heidegger of Sein und Zeit in insisting on an ontological analysis of the existential subject.

We would begin with a radical doubt about Kant's construction of the transcendental ego. We would enquire not only into the appearances (facta) of the subject, but also into the state of appearing by posing questions and reducing (epoche) its nonessential features. This is what happens if the subject is falsely observed, or if it is in a state of illusion, or if it is determined by a certain ideological belief or education? How could we warrant that man is not influenced by his milieu or by his feelings? Similarly, we know a great deal about the fact that any experience is primarily particular and atomistic. To construct universal and regular experiences is both possible and impossible. It is possible in the case of data (suppose that all experiences are like stones, chairs, i.e. invariable, unrelated things). It is, however, impossible in the case of facta and especially happening phenomena. Any fact (factum) is a fact because it happened, or was done, or constructed. Of course, it could not happen by itself, and so the role of the subject comes to the fore. Thus, we can say that an experience (from facta) is rather subjective, and it thus cannot be detached from one's life-world. We cannot think of individuals in terms of general laws only if we leave unanswered the question of the impossibility or possibility of universalization of individual experiences.

Third, as a consequence, experiences understood as Erlebniss always point to certain relationships (between the subject and the object, the subject and other subjects, the subject and his physical and intellectual world). We understand someone or something in terms of his or its relationship to us. We experience love, fear or loss, not from the object alone, but from the subject-object relationship. The experience of love comes precisely from this relationship. The language of "we love and are loved" expresses an intersubjective experience which is born in the act of love of the agents (subject and object). The empiricist prefers to put aside this important aspect of relationship in his genetic construction of experience.

The impossibility of having absolute experiences points to the problem of absolute criteria of human science, and consequently the collapse of the myth of objectivity in human science. The positivist tries to correct the idea of the empiricist by taking a more radical stand. To him, only criteria of natural science could serve as the foundation deciding the rightness of method. We have no doubt about the quasi-universal characteristics of natural science, but we have reservations about its claim of absolute correctness and especially its extravagant claim of universal application in human life.

On the one hand, the birth of quantum physics does not wipe out Newton's mechanism. It rather shows its insufficiency in explaining the phenomenon of quantification, and more interestingly, the impact of milieu on quantity. Similarly, we witness the fact that modern mathematics has relativised the Euclidian system.¹⁷ On the other hand, the naive belief in a universal application of the criteria of natural science has crumbled even at the first stage of rationalism. Kant's skepticism regarding the practicality of his categorical imperatives is no longer a secret.

Our point is simple; as long as we cannot transform ourselves into a kind of robot, any dream of having absolute criteria remains a dream. This claim is solidified by human objections to being disformed into robots. It would be the end of humanity.

Now we proceed directly to the second part of our question about knowledge of a method by discussing the means/ends relation. The empiricist claims the monopoly of method or the means, and bypasses the end which he considers metaphysical, or nonsensical, just because of its unprovable existence. It is true to some extent that the goal does not concretely exist. The ideal of Chun-tzu in the Analects, or sainthood in Christianity remains mostly ideal and is not necessarily existential; the model person in idealist education remains both vague and unrealisable.

However, not all purposes are unrealisable or abstract. In daily life, our action is always oriented toward a certain purpose: we eat not simply because of mechanistic reaction from our stomach, and we speak to friends not because of organistic demand but for a certain purpose, say, to communicate something, to be understood, etc. In most cases observed from our actions, we discover that it is not the means that exist beforehand, but the purpose or the ends which stimulate the birth of method. Let us take the example of eating to clarify our point: Suppose that we are hungry and there is available only some raw food. In order to satisfy our need, we have to discover one or other way to transform the uneatable into the eatable. We discover here culinary method. In the first stage, the empiricist may explain the act of eating as a simple reaction to the stimulus of stomach, but he is unable to explain why and how man discovers fire, instruments of cooking, and cooking methods. Here, we follow Weber's excellent critique of R. Stammler's empirical approach.¹⁸ In the Postscript to the Essay on Stammler's "Refutation" of the Materialist Conception of History, Weber dismisses Stammler's claim that there is "only one kind of scientific knowledge of concrete phenomena", namely causal knowledge (which is empirical object).¹⁹

It is quite obvious that this sleight of hand is made possible in the following way. The unsuspecting reader learns that "the rule presents itself as independent of the motive, which the person has for following it." However this point remains obscure. In one kind of case, we--the inquirers--are engaged in a "dogmatic" inquiry. Therefore we regard the "rule" as having ideal axiological validity, and we bracket or abstract the actual motivation of the actor. In the other kind of case, however, we are concerned with empirical knowledge. Actual men are included among the objects of our knowledge. By instituting a rule, they attempt to achieve an actual "goal". And in general, with varying degrees of certainty, they really succeed. Stammler, in order to insure that his scholastic obscurities will remain utterly impenetrable, personifies the "law of nature" and represents it as parallel to the "precept" (Stammler, p. 100). They are distinguished in the following way. The purpose of the "precept" is to "constitute" a certain collective life. The purpose of the "law of nature", therefore, is to "cognitively (sic!) constitute" empirical regularity as "the unity of phenomena". The idea of a rule which "wants, means, or intends" something is at least a logically possible metaphor. In this context, of course, it is absolutely impermissible. However the idea of a rule that "thinks" or performs" acts of cognition" is utterly absurd.

Actually, Weber does not object to empirical science which he takes as the model for sociology. He insists on the inseparability of ends and means. In his view, to understand a fact, one needs to go beyond its mere appearance; one needs to grasp its meaning. And to understand the meaning (which man gives to his act) is to understand his intention.²⁰ Similarly, and developed from Weber's idea, Alfred Schutz describes human action in terms of the agent's intention: "The project is the intended act imagined as already accomplished, the in-order-to motive is the future state of affairs to be realized by the projected action."²¹

We take up the issue brought up by Weber and Schutz and insist that, the concept of method is neither a priori nor independent from human interest, and therefore, from the ends. We measure method by calculating its effectiveness in reaching the purpose or the set goal. We rationalize method not only by taking the criteria of natural science, but much more by upgrading the effectiveness of the set goal. Applying this to education, we may judge the scientific character of a method from its effectiveness: a successful education is an education which fulfills the set-purpose (set either by educator, parents or society). Of course, the nobility, or the soundness of such a purpose is still in debate. But, the fact is that, without a set purpose, it is almost impossible to determine the soundness of method.

Another fatal mistake of the empiricist educator should to be mentioned, though briefly; namely, a misunderstanding of human nature. First, conceiving the one to be educated as an external object, is to regard one as a static, i.e. non developing, thing. As a corollary, a static method is designed in order to deal with such a static thing. If the person is nondeveloping, then the method of handling him or her should be invariable. The educator commits a further mistake of regarding whatever is universal to be unchanging, and therefore, scientific. Thus, the scientific claim of method is built basically on a misunderstanding of human nature.

The studies of Jean Piaget²² and Lawrence Kohlberg on human psychology, and the genetic studies by biologists all show the person to be developing, either in stages as Piaget demonstrated or interruptedly as Darwin showed. Actually, we know that, not only that the human person is developing, but even that our interests are in an accumulating and transforming process. That is to say, the purpose of our action is not fixed but increasing, and consequently so is the discovery of new method.

Second, by taking method as the sole criterion to judge the effectiveness of education, the educator lapses into a fundamental mistake of logic: how can he know the effectiveness without a knowledge of the purpose of education. The effectiveness of education is seen not in method, but in the agent who responds to such a method. The mechanism of method does violate the free will of the educated.

The Myth of Idealism and Subjectivism

In opposition to the empiricist educator, the idealist tends to understand education as a mere business of training subordinates, employees, i.e. to transform them into exactly what he has designed. The idealist could be objective (in the sense that he follows positivist, logical thinking) or subjective. But, at bottom, he is as much dogmatic as ideological. Let us look at the basic doctrine of idealist education.

First, there exists some a priori or transcendental model or standard which is an absolute and perfect essence. Such a model could be created either by God or by society. The model of Christian education is man-god, free of sin and bearing the image of God himself; the Confucian model is Chun-tzu, a super and perfect product of feudal society.

Second, such a model is the ultimate purpose of man and society, and therefore the aim of education.

Third, the model must be universal in the sense that it is invariable. It presupposes the common and noble desire of mankind: to become perfect.

Therefore, the main duty of the educator consists first in discovering the virtues found in the model man which are sanctified as moral principles, and then in educating in all these virtues. Success or failure of education is measured from the degree of response of the educated and from his performance of these virtues. To be more precise, the educator has to work out a table of moral principles or cognitive virtues that he may call categorical imperatives (Kant), or golden rules (Confucius). Such a work is not quite easy because he has to deduce or extract from the model the essential features which determine the model person. In the case of Confucius, he has to examine various prominent figures in different states and history, from Kings Yao and Schwen to national heroes, to find their common traits such as loyalty, benevolence, fidelity, obedience, righteousness, that can be identified as virtues. In Christian education, these virtues are built after the model of God. Thus, sainthood (innocence, sinlessness), belief, trustworthiness, charity and justice are its main virtues.

Only after having built these virtues and regarding them as the objectives of education, does the educator begin to think of the methodological problem. He will try different methods, and change them as long as the virtues are not fully acquired and practiced by the educated. Thus, to him, method serves no more or no less than as an instrument or a technique to obtain the set, fixed goal. As such, method plays only an auxiliary, and not the decisive role as noted with empirical educators. The method of the idealist could be scientific, objective, subjective, or even illusory. He may take the stick and carrot policy as his method. He may follow the art of love, or he may use various methods at the same time. Only his objectives are invariable.

In this context, he understands the crisis of education in terms of effectiveness of method, and more importantly, of the human factor. We will seriously take the second view that regards the human factor as the decisive factor explaining the education crisis: The idealist educator tries to explain the failure of education in the weakness or stupidity of the one to be educated. He blames the environment (society) for weakening the will of the educated. He shifts all mistakes on the shoulders of others, but not on his own. More interestingly, he never questions the correctness or validity of moral principles and pays little attention to the real object of education, i.e. the one being educated.

Our main argument against such a view is based on the very human reality of the human inability and incapacity to fully follow such noble and perfect principles.

It is true that people are weak and limited; it is also true that they are easily influenced by their environment; and it is very true that they are motivated by interests. As such, people need to be, as the educator argues, transformed into strong, independent, and social persons. Such an argument is based on a metaphysical claim that the objective of education is the ideal man and of a misreading of human nature as static. Consequently, all we need are the noble principles which we take as the objectives of our education. In this sense, it is quite plausible to identify the objective with the object itself.

It seems that such an argument looks very promising if we take the premise to be true, and if we take the object (the one to be educated) to be the objective of education. The point is, such a premise has to be proven, and such an identification should be justified. It is quite easy to prove the falseness of such a premise as well as the confusion of such an artificial identification. By posing here the question of human capacity for following ideal principles we have in our mind a more basic question of human nature, and consequently, of human problems. What would a man be were he stripped of all his human characteristics, or became a sort of god? As a man, could he match the divine, the ideal, the perfect?

The difference between man and God, the normal and the ideal, the finite and the infinite is so great that man could never perform the duty of the absolute, ideal God. Such an argument is neither apologetic, not purely Nietzschean. In no case is it a defense of weakness, but rather a matter of fact of humanity. Let us take Piaget's study to prove our point. Piaget's study of the psychological and mental development of the child gives some clues to human nature: it is neither determined a priori, nor externally or automatically constructed. It is developing, and the factors explaining its development are so complex and total that we cannot reduce them to a single metaphysical principle.²³ One may doubt Piaget's explication of human development in stages, but one cannot refute the fact of the development of mankind. One need not be an Hegelian to discover the permanence of change in human history.

Since in the next section we will return to the thesis of both the empiricists and the idealists in our treatment of the crisis of education (by using critical theory), a few words are in order here with regard to their understanding of the education crisis. We share their view that our present education is in crisis, from the most visible aspects such as the crisis of method, to the most invisible facets such as that of human nature. However, we understand crisis not in a single aspect of education, but in its total relational (communicative) aspect. We do not consider crisis as something abnormal in the sense of decadence or failure or sin, but as a necessary step in human development.

Moreover, we conceive development both in terms of horizontal and vertical, quantitative and qualitative growth. To be more clear, crisis is possible only in and from human contact with different worlds and their paradigms in human intercourse. Thus, crisis is most visible in human dealings with the interests of classes, races, or individuals, and in our struggle to solve problems. Such crisis takes the form of conflict among ideologies, between the real and the ideal, the profane and the sacred.

CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CRISIS OF EDUCATION

Critical Theory and Crisis-Understanding

Critical theory is the oldest and the most sought after method by scientist and philosopher. The Greek mathematicians and philosophers discovered it as the most useful tool for sharpening thinking and for seeking truth. The Chinese sages employed it to work out a primitive form of pragmatism, and the Indians refined it to develop metaphysical systems. It is however developed fully only with Hegel and especially with Marx; finally, it became a kind of ideology with the Frankfurt School.²⁴

In order to grasp the incompleteness of empirical and rational method, we need to look back at the critical method used in these theories, and then at Hegel's contribution, and finally at Marx's revision of Hegel's idea.

To empiricists what we can observe is the external object. But to distinguish the true from the false object, one has to develop criteria which do not come from the subject but from the object itself. Critical method consists in the work of observing phenomena, of distinguishing the regular from irregular, and from the work of constructing causal laws which can satisfactorily explain phenomena.

To idealists, critical method is synonymous with reflection. The thinking subject is subjected to rigorous critique. To him, the untruth comes rather from the unconscious, or alienated subject.

Kant might be the first philosopher who did not agree with either the empiricist or the idealist. To him, to remain on either subject or object alone is insufficient to discover truth. Thus, he worked out a model of categories with which, he believed, one can discover truth from untruth. The necessary conditions, as he claimed, are based on the model of arithmetic which is not conditioned by either subject or object. Thus, critical method centers on the work of applying these categories in judgment.²⁵ Unfortunately, these necessary conditions are transcendental in the sense that they are external and beyond our normal reach. As such, they can hardly deal with flexible and developing human activities.

It was Hegel who saw the impracticality of Kantianism. To Hegel, Kant failed to discover the Archimedean point and thus did not push through the promised Copernican revolution.²⁶ The Archimedean point is neither the subject, nor the object, nor the external necessary conditions. It is the point of relation between the subject and the object. To Hegel, it is the work of elaborating the law of relation which occupies the most important place. He claimed to have found such a law, i.e. the logic of history, with which he could explain and predict each historical stage.

In Marx's eyes, Hegel regretfully did not know the importance of his discovery of the point of relation.²⁷ He saw only a logical and abstract relation, and not the real one. Marx promoted critique as a sacred duty, and declared the need to transform critique into praxis.²⁸ To be more precise, one has to look at the relation between subject and object, subject and subject, subject and nature, subject and idea just to see whether such relation is normal or correct. More important, Marx proposed to understand human nature from basic economic interests from which one can judge what is normal in an alienated relation.

The members of the Frankfurt School developed further Marx's arts of critique, but with the exception of Jürgen Habermas, they remain in the first stage of critique that Marx himself wanted to overcome. It is true that Marx saw in the relation built by capitalist, feudal society a certain abnormality, but he did not rest in critique like those fellows of the Frankfurt School.²⁹ He wanted to build a normal (or "scientific", in Louis Althusser's version) relation, that is, an equal and just relation based on the principle: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs".³⁰

The difficulty which Marx did not foresee is that there is no measure or criteria to determine human needs and capacity. But Marx's miscalculation of human needs and capacity comes from his misunderstanding of human nature: man is social, and as such, is measured by the totality of society. Actually, Marx did not go through the most obvious consequence of his logic: if one is known by one's relation to others (to nature, to other fellow-humans) and by one's own power (labor), then in accordance with one's creative labor one's relations must be increasing. Thus, Marx contradicted his view of developing man and his critique appears hypocritical. Habermas appears to have found such a mistake in Marx when Habermas proposes to drop Marx's utopian principle of communism, and replaces it with the principle of communication based on a linguistic model. The point that we find helpful in this for an understanding of the educational crisis is that the communicative, linguistic model can be used to study the abnormality of relations,³¹ and consequently, of our education. We can also approach Marx's interpretation of human conflicts from the point of view of human interests.

Thus, the strong point of Marx's and Habermas' critical theory which surpasses that of previous philosophers appears first in their emphasis on human relations, which are constructed mostly from human interests (economic in Marx and total in Habermas), and then in their effort to work out a certain law of relation (equality of needs and capacity in Marx, communicative rules in Habermas). There follow further explanations of the genetic process of human relations, and with this of human interests their problems, that are necessary for an understanding of human nature.

First, suppose that, like Robinson Crusoe, one is alone, living on an isolated island with no relation to other human beings. In this case, there is a double relationship: to the subject and to nature (environment). The relationship to the subject is relatively simple in the sense that it is less in terms of quantity and quality than between the subject (conscious or unconscious) and one's body which is expressed in physical and biological needs. The second relation is between subject and subject (oneself in the case of a conscious subject) and is expressed in the act of reflection upon the subject him or herself (though, in Marx's view, such a relation is difficult for an isolated, a-social person). The third and one more visible relation is between the subject and his or her environment which is seen in one's feelings of fear, respect, wonder, hate, dominating and love or in one's actions of worshiping, cultivating or running away from, or destroying nature.

Second, supposing that one lives in a small rural, family-oriented and primitive society, one's relation is more complex; his needs as well as his capacity increase in proportion to the increasing level of relationships. Now, he has not only a certain relation to himself (his body, his soul), or to nature (his environment), but to others (parents, children, spouse, friends, and superiors, both political, cultural and religious). One has to follow certain norms to preserve each relation; he has developed certain feelings and he has needs to sustain such relations. One can easily detect that such relations determine his social status and even his nature.

Third, if one lives in a global, super-technical and rich cultural society the relations are so complex that one can hardly know how they work and what is its kind. We can say that toward different objects and different subjects, or at different levels of the same subject, one develops different relations. One cannot reduce all these relations to a single spiritual relation as did Hegel, or economic relation as Marx believed.³²

The Genesis of Relation and Human Interests

In analyzing the forms of relation, one discovers beneath the surface of each relation certain kind of activities which are oriented toward certain kind of interests (in Habermas' division, there are at least three general kinds of interests: the cognitive, the practical and the emancipatory).³³

In our sketch of three different men who live in different milieus and histories, we discover a manifoldness of relation. Each person possesses many relations depending on their objects, interests and activities. Thus, we may formulate the relation in accordance with its objects, human interests, and activities:

- relations vary according to different objects (or subjects in the case of self-consciousness).

- relations take their different forms depending on its ends (cognitive, practical, aesthetical, emancipatory etc).

- relations have different structures in accordance with human activities (problem-solving, satisfaction, enjoyment, control, fear, love).

Let us take Robinson Crusoe, the a-social man, as an example in order to clarify our point. Crusoe first faces his body, and discovers that he is cold, hungry, thirsty, menaced. Such phenomena are conscious to him because he has a need to satisfy and to protect his body; and more clearly, because his body urges him to do so. Thus, we can say that Crusoe discovers his body not because of an idea of body, but because of his relation to his own body through its needs and their satisfaction. The discovery of the relation to body is mutual and reciprocal. He discovers his body because of the body's needs, and at the same time the body's needs make one conscious of the presence of his body. Such a relation is not single in the sense that the subject may face many objects at the same time.

The expression "Robinson Crusoe feels menaced, lonely, exhausted, thirsty and hungry" says that Crusoe faces many objects at the same time, and therefore has as many relations as he has encountered with objects. He feels menaced because of his relation to the outer world (nature, event, catastrophe), lonely because he has no subject to communicate with, thirsty because of a physical need of water.

To satisfy his needs, he has to resort to a certain activity: drinking to satisfy thirst, eating to still hunger, looking for a partner in order to suppress loneliness, or even violence to eliminate fear.

The manifoldness of relation is thus implicit in the manifoldness of objects (or subjects) and activities. However, not all activities, not all human needs and therefore not all relations are normal. Some relations tend to distort human nature, some just hinder human development. Some are artificial while others fulfil only a part of human nature. The task of critical theory is to distinguish the normal from the abnormal, the right from the wrong. But how could we do so without some prior knowledge of wrongness and correctness. Should we rely on some metaphysical criteria that the idealist has adopted. The critical theoretician would not commit the mistake of either the idealist or the empiricist. He has to work out some criteria which do not bear any metaphysical traits, and which do not rest on simple empirical data. Before we expose the main criteria which most critical theoreticians have taken, we wish to make our point clearer by taking the cosmopolitan person as an example.

The cosmopolitan is much more complicated than Robinson Crusoe. He or she has a great deal of activities (present, or developing) because of his or her multidimensional relations to a nonspecific number of objects. The complexity of relations is due not only to the manifoldness of encountered objects, but also to one's background, spoken languages, and unlimited interests (which are born during the process of encounter or relation). Among these relations, one could find some that are normal (in the sense of the common practice in a cultural milieu), and others that are not normal (new, or uncommon to such a society), some that are acceptable and others unacceptable, some that are comprehensible and others incomprehensible, etc.

On the one hand, from one's relations, we can discover a certain number of encountered objects, activities and interests. On the other hand, we can also know or predict one's newly developing relations from one's actual activities in dealing with certain objects or in satisfying interests. In this sense, we can say that the degree of complexity of the relation of the cosmopolitan could be measured or predicted if we knew his or her activities and encountered objects; further, we may foresee his or her activities if we are sure of his or her interests. In this context, we can say, what we understand from human beings is from their relations to certain objects, and what we discover from relations is human activities.

Taking a step further, we can understand human activities only if we grasp human interests. Interests, however, are not a priori; they are born from human encounter with other objects or with man himself. The genesis of interests, relations, and activities lies in a reciprocal process, as mutatis mutandis they act upon each other.

We would go a further step to claim that human crises can be seen primarily in human relations. We understand crisis as something abnormal, unacceptable, or a defect in an abnormal relation. The main point to be discussed is how we know or judge normal relations, and how we can establish a causal law which links normal activities with normal relations. Only if this point is cleared up can we talk about a crisis, or the educational crisis in particular. Thus, we return to the primary question of how we know, i.e. how could we have some criteria to make a judgment on normality or abnormality.

Suppose that Robinson Crusoe feels hungry; the first thing that comes to his mind is to seize upon something to still his hunger. Such an action is called normal in the sense that everyone would do the same thing if he or she is involved in the same hunger. Thus, we may say that a man is sick if he does not react the same way as do others in the same case. In this case, to still hunger is a normal act springing up from normal relations between body needs and the subject.

Let us replace Robinson Crusoe with a certain Mr. Schmidt, who happens to occupy an important place in the British House of Commons. Mr. Schmidt is hungry too, but he is sitting now in the House. Would he take out some bread to still his hunger in such a case? He would certainly think twice before doing so. He may take a sharp look to be sure if there is someone about, say, a journalist, television cameraman, colleague. In each case, he would act differently: he would eat the bread comfortably if no one were there: he would rather suffer hunger when the media world is watching him; or he would discretely crunch it without disturbing his colleagues because he is sure that they would do the same. We may judge him as a wise man, a normal man because he performs the normal or required thing that everyone, in a normal situation, would do.

In the case of Mr. Schmidt, one observes that he has more relations, and more activities than did Robinson Crusoe; and that it is the relation (to the media world, to his colleagues or to himself) that determines the normalcy of his action. Here, normalcy refers to whatever is taken as common by both the subject and other subjects, or by the subject and the object, as seen in Robinson Crusoe. Crisis arises when this normal relation is distorted.

Let us return to the case of Mr. Schmidt. One discovers in him at least three visible kinds of reaction which result from three different relations: the relation between the subject and the subject (himself), the relation between the subject and objects (his body, his needs, bread), and the relation between the subject and other subjects (colleagues, media world, observers). In each relation, a certain act is normal or legal; other acts may be a normal or illegal. It could be normal but illegal, or legal but abnormal.

We have carefully to examine each act in each relation. The first act of stilling hunger is quite normal in the first and second relations: satisfying the need of body, of the subject. However, it could offend others in the House and thus be "abnormal" or in some cases illegal (as in a sub-way). This means that normalcy in certain relations is not automatically implicit in other relations, or normalcy in other relations is not translated into normalcy in certain relations. But to accept that there would be different standards of normalcy in different relations is to admit a certain relativism in norms and standards of behaviors. As such, norms would be meaningless for the business of critique, because each relation has its own standards which other relations cannot criticize. We are plunged into chaos.

Let us examine the three relations of Mr. Schmidt to see whether there is some common value or standard among them which can dissolve their conflicts. One discovers that, stilling hunger is the most fundamental activity; it could be temporarily suppressed but not completely abolished. Mr. Schmidt, due to required etiquettes of the House and consequently for fear of being exposed to scandal if he violates them, would choose an insignificant physical suffering. But what if he could no longer stand the hunger during an hour of voting which required his presence? In this case, he would prefer a less grave or minor offense (eating) over the major one (not voting), and he has reasons to justify his act. The House and journalists would not blame him for such an insignificant offense, because it has no political consequence. This example points out an interesting order of needs and, consequently, a scale of values: the most needed weigh more in value than the less needed, and, therefore, a response is more justified. Deductively, from such an analysis one could state that the most important relation, i.e. the one directly and vitally linked to human survival, has legitimacy and establishes criteria of normalcy.

However, suppose that, it is during the election period, and suppose that the British lay much more emphasis on moral values and etiquette (as seen among the Chinese); and suppose that the election is vital for Mr. Schmidt. In this case, he has to think twice before taking a piece of bread in the House. He would rather suffer hunger, content with sipping water, than offend the public. He would prefer to be carried into the hospital than to leave the House. Here, one finds that the relation between the subject and other subjects (voters) dictates his behaviors. Again, such a relation is justified by a certain ideology. Could we say that such a relation is normal because it is important to Mr. Schmidt, and that every politician like him would do the same in such a case? We confront now the dilemma of orders: which kind of orders, the biological or the ideological (ethical, religious, political) prevails? Could we take the ethical standard to judge the biological, the subjective to criticize the objective or vice-versa?

Critical theory does not claim to possess a table of absolute criteria or categories like Kant, nor (with the exception of Habermas) does it want to build one because such a claim contradicts human nature. However, it proposes to study human nature from the point of view of human relational, mediating activities. It wants to examine the forms of human relation to see if they are properly constructed and whether they function. It claims to contribute something to human understanding by eliminating the alienated forms of relations born in inauthentic activities and influenced by reified ideologies or cultures.

In a word, it limits itself in the work of critique. It follows Marx's intention (which was abandoned by orthodox Marxism): "We do not anticipate the world dogmatically, but rather wish to find the new world through the criticism of the old."³⁴ For our purpose, we will sort out its main tenets and apply them in our critique of present education. Like Marx, we wish to deepen our understanding of the education crisis through criticism, though we will not stop short on it. As seen in our above presentation, one could draw a picture of critical theory by tracing the following characteristics:

- Critical theory demands a throughout examination of what we take for granted (i.e. what we regard as normal relations).

- It urges radical reflection on the world of objects which influences relations.

- It concentrates on the mediating point or relation between the subject and the world, not on the object (empiricism) or the subject (idealism) alone.

- It explores the possible consequences of human activities based on human relations, with which it tries to reconstruct morals, laws, etc.

- It warns us of the danger of any kind of ideology, including technology, arts or mass culture.³⁵

In other words, critical theory contests the view of both empiricists and idealists which it dismisses as ideological. But what it could offer is only a litany of critiques, which most observers, including Habermas, view as too negative.³⁶

- It criticizes any false view of human nature.

- It unmasks and criticizes the hidden ideologies which dictate or dominate our understanding of human nature.

- It objects to the methodological domination in natural science which distorts an authentic understanding of human science.

- It rejects any kind of structure which may help to reorganize or reconstruct some form of domination such as Nazism, Communism or Fascism.

- It opposes all kinds of alienated culture, which it suspects as ideology, such as mass culture or instrumental culture.

In a word, it tries to reveal the hidden danger of any form of activities or structures which may cause human beings a certain alienation or reification.

Since our aim is restricted to the application of critical theory to education, we will refrain from further explanation or any comment irrelevant to our task. It is sufficient to say that critical theory is far from perfect, and its negative performance would encourage other forms of ideology, the worse being anarchism or nihilism. Habermas himself feels that he has to build another version of critical theory, one that could be called scientific or quasi-scientific and could contribute to human understanding. The model he seeks is based on a linguistic model with language games as the transcendental rules established by human beings themselves.³⁷

Let us take critical theory at its best, namely its critique of ideology, and examine the crisis of our present education.

Our present education is constructed on our understanding of human nature, which understanding often, if not always, is dictated by our culture. Of course, culture is the crystallized quintessence of a long tradition and history which expresses the spirit or the commonality of a folk. Such a spirit is known through accepted values, or through the means that protect values (laws, morals). Thus, we recognize a certain culture in its expressive forms (arts, music, poetry, language, morals, customs).

However, the spirit of a folk may be in change due to the ups and downs of history, contact with external or foreign values, or revolution. Thus, with change, cultures vary, take different forms, or transform themselves. Because our education is often dictated by a certain form, in a certain historical period and by a certain class, it is our duty to examine whether our education is built in accordance with our culture understood in terms of human commonality.

As regards Chinese culture, one thinks immediately of its three most powerful currents of thought: Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, which quite rightly are described and accepted as the most expressive forms of Chinese culture. Hence, it seems fully justified to build our education on this foundation.

To critical theoreticians such a justification is in question. One needs to rethink it and, more radically, one has to think even of its authenticity, fruitfulness, validity and legitimacy. One has to go beyond its superficial form and structure to the most fundamental, ontological question of how its fruitfulness, validity, legitimacy come into being, and how they disappear or are transformed in the historical current. The following is our attempt to delve into the problematics of culture and consequently of education.

First, one discovers a very disturbing thing in our education: it is mostly based on Confucianism, and not on all three Chinese currents as the logic of culture would require; most of the disciplines, doctrines and even methods are Confucian. Second, though there are many Confucian schools (with different outlooks and methods such as neo-Confucianism and modern Confucianism), our education has taken only the orthodox school's doctrines and method and left other schools out of consideration. Third, though orthodox Confucianism was chosen to be the backbone of education, not all but only the doctrines which were compatible to the ruling class or the regime were selected. Fourth, against the wish of Confucius, and the spirit of Confucianism, our education prefers violence over the principle of Jen or benevolence as its method.

Our critique will focus on the abnormal, i.e. on the uncommon traits in education, to dig up the hidden ideology. The disturbing phenomena of our education being based fundamentally on orthodox Confucianism and not on all three main currents or on neo-Confucianism could be better explained in the context of human interests and power: the need of education (for the sake of which) and the power of dictating its policy are primarily guided by the interests of the ruling class (monarchy). That means, the problematics, or the abnormal of education can be grasped when the question of class interests and of power come to fore and is fully investigated. Thus, one needs only to take a critical look in historical records to see how education was designed and executed.

History reveals that education came to its bureaucratic form not under Confucius (who preferred private education with a strong emphasis on experiments and practical life, and who understood education as a kind of art helping the educated to become a sage), but under the rulers of the Han-dynasty who conceived of it as an instrument to consolidate power (or to seize power), and to protect their own interests. In the Great Learning, Confucius advocated a study, free of selfish interests³⁸: "The Way of learning to be great consists in manifesting clear character, loving the people and abiding in the highest good"). In contrast, our present education, coming down from that of the Han lays great importance on serving the state, loyalty to the ruler, and loving the "nation".³⁹

Chinese history clearly records that with the Han dynasty, Confucianism was taken to be the sole backbone of education at the expense of other schools of thought. This was done with a certain purpose, namely, to train bureaucrats. It follows logically that only those who were trained as Confucians could become officials, i.e. could be within reach of power. It was also evident that education is nothing but a method for protecting the ruling monarchy. Hence, there was no doubt about their reason for choosing Confucianism as the ideology of education: they were not for its humanism, but rather for its dogmatism and authoritarianism as Han Feitzu candidly and proudly admitted. Here, we can understand the rulers' preference of orthodox Confucianism over neo-Confucianism, their insistence on its legal power rather than upon its moral effectiveness.

The second, no less disturbing, enigma is that if culture is understood as the common expression of a folk, and if it is their spirit, then why is our culture monopolized by orthodox Confucianism and by the rulers, i.e. the minority who live in indifference to, if not seclusively far from, the people? Particularly, if education is based on such a culture, is it helpful for the ordinary people? The fact that our culture is often identified with certain forms of thought (Confucianism), of arts (of the noble, aristocrats, monarchs) or of morals (of Confucianism) shows that it is born in and from the world of the rulers. We may ask, how such a culture could represent the spirit of those who are ruled, oppressed?

It is more stranger to note, however, that the ruled, the oppressed, the abandoned have embraced such a culture without a second thought. They regard it as their soul, of which they are proud. Such a culture is now stimulating the folk; it is, as Marx observed, the preferred or loved opium of the people.⁴⁰

We would not follow Marx to reject such a culture, but pose instead a more serious question: if it is not from the people, how could it be loved by them? Our question applies also to the problematic of education: could an education based on class ideology be taken by other classes for granted? How could Confucianism be taken as the sole education ideology without opposition from ordinary people?

It is with this point that we take a position distant from Marx and critical theoreticians. The ordinary people take Confucian education for granted not because of partisanship, but because of its seductive promise in solving their problems. Therefore, like the rulers, they conceive of education as an effective instrument, but unlike the former (who want to protect their own interests), they want to be within reach of power by means of education. They consider it as the best means for problem solving. It is wished for not as pure knowledge, but precisely for its "power knowledge".

Since culture is dictated by the rulers, and since education is the only instrument that is available and within the reach of ordinary people, it is taken to be the criteria to measure success, to solve social problems. It becomes de facto a social value which serves as the yard stick of life. At the same time, it plays the role of a necessary condition determining human fate, to free man from poverty, humiliation and oppression. Education thus deforms itself into a kind of ideology.

The education promoted by orthodox Confucianism has its merits and failures depending on which purposes it takes, on which methods it adopts, and on the kind of ideology with which it identifies.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As stated at the very beginning of this chapter, our aim is restricted to the problematics of understanding the crisis of education. Though this chapter does not point out a guideline (as did Habermas), it has shown that the crisis of education could be seen neither from the point of view of method, nor from idealist speculation alone. It proposed to tackle the problem from the perspective of human relations and from mediating activities as is done by critical theory. However, it does not claim that such a way of dealing with the problem is adequate. Indeed, we confess that such an extravagant claim would be as short-sighted as those advocated by the empiricists and idealists, and attacked by critical theory. Actually, we see empirical method as well as speculative reasoning as helpful and complementary to critical theory. Not consenting to critical theory's radical objection to any form of ideology, we demand a full awareness of the danger of any kind or form of ideology, be it scientism, positivism, Marxism, empiricism, idealism, or rationalism. It is necessary to be aware of their seductive effects which, even with ears plugged and eyes blindfolded, we can hardly resist.

Hence, while against critical theory, we venture to claim that the problematics of present education, are born in and from: (1) the conflict of interests which are symbolized by, and abstracted from, in the conflict of ideologies by the classes; (2) the conflict between existing values and newly emerging values which are expressed in new activities, new needs and new relations; (3) the conflict of newly adopted methods of understanding and solving problems; and (4) the conflict between the ideal and the real or the practical in understanding problems and effectively dealing with human problems.

Consequently, the main focus of education would be: (1) a thorough understanding of human relations and human activities; (2) a genuine search for possible solutions to the problems arising from the conflict of, in, and from such relations; (3) flexible methods helping the educated to be conscious of human relations, conflicts, and possible solutions; and finally, (4) helping the educated to develop the capacity to discover and deal with emerging problems.

1. Cf. Lynn Payer, Medicine Culture (New York: Holt, l988). See also Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. Th. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), pp. 22-49. John S. Brubacher, A History of the Problems of Education, (1947). William Boyd, The History of Western Education (London: Black, 1954).

2. Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon, 1975), p. 1-2.

3. Edmund Husserl, Ideen, vol. 1 (1913), in Husserliana III, ed. Walter Biemel, pp. 33, 56.; vol. 2 (1952)--in Husserliana IV, ed. Karl Schuhmann, p. 245

4. Tran Van Doan, " Devaluation and Evaluation: The Case of Confucian Values", in The World of Community in Post-Industrial Society, vol. 3, (Seoul Olympiad, 1988; Seoul: Wooseok, l989), chapter IV, pp.216-228, chap. 4.

5. The Analects, l:2,8,14; 2:ll,13; 4:5,24 ff).

6. See, e.g., The Contemporary Currents in Education, ed. Institut of Education, Nat. Taiwan Normal University (Taipei, 1988).

7. Cf. Albert Chao, "On Education", in Proceedings, Philosophical Foundation for Moral Education, (Taipei: Fujen U.P., 1985), pp. 44-48. For further reading: R. Muhlbauer, Der Begriff "Bildung" in der Gegenwartspadagogik (1965).

8. Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), vol. l, chap. l.

9. See the series on Education published by the Institut of Education, Nat. Taiwan Normal University (Taipei: Normal University Press, 1983 ff.); also Yang Shen-keng, Theory, Hermeneutics and Praxis (Taipei: Normal U.P., l988), pp. 5-14.

10. Tran van Doan, "Philosophical Education in Taiwan", in Towards the Education in XXI Century (Taipei: Tamkang University, 1990).

11. Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia: P.U.P., 1983), p. 32. Mary Hesse: In Defense of Objectivity (London: Oxford, 1973), p. 170-71 (cited by Bernstein, op. cit). See also Karl Popper, "The Logic of the Social Sciences", in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (London, 1977), pp. 90-91. Max Horkheimer, Kritische Theorie, II, p. 280. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon, 1971), p. 117. Albrect Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp. 15-30. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy, (London: Routledge and Paul, 1958).

12. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus (New York: Harcourt, 1922), 7:17.

13. Ludwig Wittgenstein, ibidem, 6.53a.

14. Karl Popper, "The Logic of the Social Sciences", p. 91.

15. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1974), part 2.

16. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), part l, p. 13ff.

17. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 100-101.

18. Max Weber, Critique of Stammler (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 50. Rudolf Stammler, The Historical Materialist Conception of Economy and Law: A Socio-philosophical Investigation (1906), p. 368.

19. M. Weber, op. cit., p. 100.

20. M. Weber, The Interpretation of Social Reality, ed. J.E.T. Eldridge (New York: Scribner, 1980), p. 28.

21. M. Weber,"The Social World and the Theory of Action", in D. Braybrooke, p. 60; quoted by Eldridge, op. cit., p. 30.

22. Cf. Jean Piaget, The Child and Reality: Problems of Genetic Psychology (New York: Grossman, 1973). Lawrence Kohlberg, The Psychology of Moral Development (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984).

23. Jean Piaget, Introduction à l'epistemologie genetique, 3 vols. (Paris: P.U.F., 1960 ff).

24. Cf. Tran Van Doan, "A Critico-historical Analysis of Critical Theory", unpublished paper, London, 1990. To be sure, the Frankfurt School is not the but discoverers innovators of critical theory. The medial or relational point always has been the proud discovery of geometricians. Hegel, Marx, and prior to Hegel, J.J. Rousseau (1712-78) had advocated a similar idea. In Emile, Rousseau was pushing for an education based on learning-by-doing, and on motivation through interests rather than coercion. Similarly, John Dewey (1859-1952), shortly before the birth of the Frankfurt School, believed that all fruitful thinking rises from a problem situation in which man must choose from among a number of alternatives. Cf. John Donohue, "Pedagogy", in Sacramentum Mundi (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968-1970), vol. II, p. 221.

25. See for example Kant's Third Critique, Kritik der Urteilskraft, (Hamburg, 1924/1968).

26. F.W. Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, in Hegels Werke (Frankfurt, 1970 ff.), vol. 3.

27. Karl Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie, in Marx-Engels Werke (Berlin, 1956 ff) vol. 3, 31.

28. Karl Marx, Thesen uber Feuerbach, MEW, vol. 3.

29. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklarung (1944; Frankfurt, 1969). Jurgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans. Th. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), p. 119 ff. See also Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, op. cit., p. 43

30. Karl Marx, Manifest der kommunistischen Partei (1847-48), MEW, vol. 4, p. 475.

31. See for example Habermas' reappraisal of Marxism: Zur Rekonstruktion deshistorischen Materialismus (Frankfurt, 1976).

32. See Popper's critique of Hegel and Marx in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1944); (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), chaps. 12 and 13 respectively.

33. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (1968), Appendix (1971).

34. Marx in a letter to Ruge, in The Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 212.

35. Max Horkheimer, Kritische Theorie (Engl. version) Selected Essays, trans. J. O'Connell (New York, 1972).

36. Cf. Gunther Rohrmoser, Das Elend der kritischen Theorie (Freiburg, 1970).

37. J. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action or earlier in Knowledge and Human Interests, op. cit., part 2, chap. 5, 6 and 7.

38. The Great Learning, chap. l.

39. Tong K.M., Educational Ideas of Confucius (Youth Books, 1970); also Douglas C. Smith, "The Confucian Legacy in Taiwan Pedagogics" in Proceedings of the International Symposium on Confucianism and The Modern World (Taipei, 1987), p. 1401.

40. Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.