CHAPTER I

APARAA VIDHYAA:

THE PHENOMENAL STATE OF MAN

This chapter looks into the nature, consequences and charac-teristics of aparaa vidhyaa. The phenomenal state of man is charac-terized by superimposed knowledge. The cause of such a knowledge is maayaa, which has two aspects, viz., the cosmic and the in-dividual. With the help of these aspects, the maayaa brings about significant changes in man’s perception of himself and his ex-perience of the world. Besides, we will also consider some of the fun-damental characteristics of aparaa vidhyaa in this chapter.

1.1. NATURE OF APARAA VIDHYAA

This section elaborates the nature of aparaa vidhyaa. It is a state that is characterized by superimposition. Besides analyzing the nature of superimposition, the section looks into its cause, viz., maayaa.

1.1.1. SUPERIMPOSITION

Superimposition literally means the mistaken ascription or imputation of one thing for the other. By superimposing, one attri-butes to a thing qualities of an essential nature which do not belong to it. In his introduction of the Vedaanta-Suutras, Shankara defines superimposition as "the apparent presentation (to the consciousness), by way of remembrance, of something previously observed, in some other thing."1 In other words, superimposition takes place, when the qualities of one thing which are not immediately present to the consciousness, through memory are given to or projected upon another thing that is present to the consciousness and identified with it.2 In the example of the snake being superimposed on the rope, or a man being superimposed on a tree stump in semi-darkness, the rope and the tree stump, which are presented to the consciousness are in fact taken as a snake and as a man respectively, through the mistaken attributions of what is known and remembered in some previous perception. Thus, the judgments ‘this is a snake’ and ‘this is a man’ are the results of a positive identification between what was experienced from the previous experience (snake and man) and what is perceived right now (rope and tree stump).3

The idea of superimposition (adhyaropa) has been interpreted differently by four branches of Advaitic School. The so-called Anyathakhyatvaadins define it as the superimposition of attributes of one thing on another thing. For example in the act of superim-position, the attributes of one thing, snake for instance, are superim-posed upon the rope, even though snake does not exist at all at the place where one perceives the rope. The Atmakhyativaadins main-tain that in superimposition the modification of the qualities in the thing perceived is brought about by internal organs. In the above-mentioned example, the form of the snake is superimposed on the external thing, namely, rope, by the internal organs. Thus the form of the snake appears externally even though it is not in fact there. The Akhyativaadins define superimposition as the error founded on the non-apprehension of the difference between the superimposed (unreal) and something which is superimposed (real). Others define adhyaropa as the fictitious assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is superimposed.4

Though all these views differ in one or the other point, they all converge in the central idea of superimposition as mistakenly con-sidering one thing as the other. Advaitins illustrate this theory by the examples of the desert which in a mirage appears to contain water, and shells scattered on a beach which on a moonlit night appear like silver pieces.5 According to Shankara the attributes of non-self (anaatman), i.e., the world of thought and matter (maayaa) which has only phenomenal and relative existence, are falsely superim-posed on Brahman. Thus the ultimate reality, the absolute and changeless Brahman, appears as the multiplicity of the world of phenomena due to false superimposition of the unreal on the real. "The obstruction that prevents the recognition of the self (Brahman) . . . is the superimposition of what does not really exist and is not self-evident in the self (Brahman)."6 Thus, as long as one remains in the spell of adhyaropa or superimposition, one will consider the world of multiplicity and of names and forms (nama-rupa) as the ultimate and absolute reality.

After describing the nature of superimposition, Shankara raises a question which could possibly be raised by a critic, namely, whether this theory of superimposition is applicable to absolute and changeless Brahman? We can superimpose something or an attri-bute of something on another object only when we perceive the object on which we superimpose the quality in question. For in-stance, one can superimpose the idea of the snake on a rope only if the rope is presented to one’s perception. Therefore, in order that there take place superimposition, understood in the sense of mis-takenly attributing one thing for the other, the presence of the object on which something is superimposed is necessary. This being so, how can one superimpose the phenomenal world on Brahman who is absolute, infinite and not apparent to our senses? In other words, the knowledge of Brahman belongs to the level of transcendental knowledge (Paaraa vidhyaa), and how can one who has not known the reality of Brahman, still being in the level of phenomenal knowledge (apaaraa vidhyaa), superimpose the world of pheno-mena on Brahman?

To this contention Shankara replies that Brahman is not non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the ego, and the interior self is well-known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) presentation. Nor is it an exception to the rule that objects can be superimposed only on other objects before us, i.e., in contact with our senses, for ordinary people superimpose on the sky, which is not the object of sense perception, the dark-blue color.7 Thus, Shankara does not deny the possibility of one superim-posing an object which is not an object of his sense perception, on some other thing. But his main argument for the superimposition of the phenomenal world on Brahman, is based on the ‘ego-idea’ which is the object of everyone’s experience.

Here Shankara seems to point to two stages of superim-position. Firstly, the ‘ego-idea’ is superimposed upon the inner self, which is absolute existence and reality. As a result of this first super-imposition one loses the universal idea of Aatman being the absolute existence, and considers oneself as an individual. Secondly the ‘ego-idea’ reaches outward as it were, and identifies itself with the body, physical and mental attributes and actions, without ever being aware of the true nature of the ‘I’. Thus, by attributing individuality and other qualities to oneself, he sees multiplicity everywhere and super-imposes on Brahman the multiple world of names and forms (maayaa) which is constituted of individuals like himself and different from himself. One identifies everything in the world of maayaa with oneself. The inner self, which is the absolute principle, looks on as if it is a witness (saakshin). It is completely unaffected by these false attributes, yet makes them all possible, for without it maayaa cannot exist. Thus, the world of appearance, basically depends on the ‘ego-idea’ and once the ‘ego-idea’ is removed from the consciousness the maayaa also disappears.8

1.1.2. MAAYAA: THE CAUSE

Maayaa is the cause of superimposition. It is maayaa which causes different modes of thinking, projections of worldly appear-ance and various conflicting ideas. It is antagonistic to knowledge and is the source of all the contradictions, relativities, dichotomies and polarities of human existence. There is a touch of mystery to the reality of maayaa, and the human intellect cannot attempt to exhaust its manifold forms, modes and possibilities. If not for maayaa, human existence, would not have any novelty and sense of wonder. Maayaa is not an empty concept that attempts to explain the passing nature of reality; it has a scriptural foundation. Starting from the Vedas, the Upanishads and the Giita give an account of maayaa, as affecting the human world and existence. We could elaborate briefly the meaning of maayaa as understood in the scriptures.

We find the beginnings of the doctrine of maayaa in the Rig Veda. Here the term ‘maayaa’ is used for supernatural powers that belong to gods. The god Indra is said to assume many forms through maayaa.9 Thus, maayaa means a power to transform oneself and assume various forms. Besides, it also indicates the names, forms and multiplicity of the visible universe. Thus, the diversity we experience in daily life is maayaa. In the Upanishads, we find an indirect reference to maayaa as that which ‘covers’ or ‘veils’ the truth.10 The Upanishads also give direct statements about maayaa. In Svetaasvatara Upanishad we find a direct reference to the term ‘maayaa’, and the Lord who possesses it is called Maayin.11 The Lord Maayin is said to be the maker of the whole world, who creates the world with the help of maaya.12 Brihdaaranyaka Upanishad associates maayaa with god Indra, who takes many forms because of it. Thus, in these two instances maaya refers to what is within a person or to a quality peculiar to him rather than something that exists outside. Thus, the word ‘maayaa’, derived from the root ‘ma’ which means ‘to form’ or ‘to build’, is taken in the Upanishads as the creative power of God by which he fashions the universe. The Upa-nishads do not suggest that the world built by using the power of maayaa is illusory. In the Giita, maayaa is associated with Iishvara. It is the power which enables Iishvara to produce multiple natures. It is an energy (shakti) of Iishvara, i.e., the power of self-becoming (aatmavibhuuti). This power is called maayin. 13 Thus Iishvara and maayaa are dependent and beginningless. At a later stage of the Giita thought maayaa gradually comes to have a delusive character as it hides the real from our experience. 14

Thus, the doctrine of maayaa has its foundation in the scrip-tures. Shankara takes up this doctrine and interprets it from the perspective of Advaita Vedaanta. For him the question -- when and how superimposition occurred or the ‘ego-idea’ brought about the phenomenal world -- is not something we can intellectually grasp. That is why Shankara maintains an enlightened agnosticism with regard to the origin of maayaa and its relationship to Brahman. We could proceed with our discussion as did Shankara himself, noting that maayaa is both a statement of fact and a principle.15 As a statement of fact it is the present, the past and all possible worlds. "It is a domain of antithetical situations, subject-object distinctions, paradoxes and antinomies,"16 that characterize the world of our everyday perception. As a principle, like Brahman, maayaa is eternal and beginningless. "Maayaa is beginningless (anaadhi), for time arises only within it; it is unthinkable (acintya), for all thought is subject to it; it is indescribable (anirvacaniya), for all language results from it."17 In this sense maayaa has been described by Vedaantins as the inexplicable power of the supreme Lord, by which all the changes in this world are brought about.18 As the phenomenal world, it cannot be considered either a being (sat) or a non-being (asat). Though the world of appearance is unreal (asat) in the sense that it does not exist to the one who has attained the true and the highest knowledge, it is real (sat) in the sense that it appears to exist as long as ignorance persists. Maayaa is known to the con-sciousness, the witnessing agent and therefore is taken as real. But, at the same time it cannot be regarded as real as the absolute reality (Brahman). Nor can it be viewed as co-existent with Brahman, as it loses its existence as soon as knowledge is attained. It can be compared to a fog that covers the sun from our view, but when the sun is in full view the fog vanishes. Maayaa is real in the sense that it presents objects to our perception, but unreal in that it is not transcendentally existing as Brahman. Thus, maayaa is something mysterious. It seems to have no definite beginning in the sense of having a definite cause. At the same time it produces something that has the appearance of reality; and this appearance loses itself, when the truth of knowledge dawns. So, we could say that maayaa is a principle that cannot fully be explained, and which is the source of the fact that there are plurality and diversities in the universe.19

To the question -- how maayaa causes these dichotomies, contradictions, plurality and subject-object distinctions -- Shankara replies that it is due to the nature of maayaa that is made up of three qualities (gunas), namely sattva, rajas, and tamas. It is by the presence or the absence of these three gunas in varying degrees that different stages in the cosmic cycle take place.20 When sattvaguna is predominant there is produced the jnaanashakti, which is responsible for the working of the whole cognitive process. With preponderance of rajas and tamas, there is produced the kriya-shakti, which has two powers, namely, the concealing power (avaranashakti) and the power of projection (vikshepashakti).21 It is by the power of concealment that maayaa veils the true nature of Brahman and Aatman. A small cloud by obstructing the vision of the observer conceals, as it were, the solar disc which extends over many miles. Similarly, maayaa enshrouds man’s spiritual intelli-gence and conceals the self (Aatman) which is unlimited and not subject to transmigration, thereby preventing our realization of its identity with Brahman. Avernashakti, therefore, is the negative aspect of concealment. It is that force which enables maayaa, so to enshroud Aatman that he becomes the subject of pleasure, pain and misery.22 The projecting power of maayaa is always present with the concealing power. It is the positive aspect of maayaa that brings manifold realities into the world; it constitutes the world of names and forms. Vikshepashakti is identical with the power of creating. With this power, maaya creates the appearance (vivartha), superim-poses (adhyaasa) the unreal on the real and leads one to error (bhranti), like that of a ‘rope-snake’ or a ‘shell-silver’. Therefore, that power of maayaa which creates the illusion or mistaken impres-sion on the self (Aatman) is called vikshepashakti.23 Thus, by the simultaneous interplay of the concealing and the projecting powers, maayaa veils the true and real nature of the absolute reality, and at the same time ‘forms’ or ‘creates’ the world of appearance, just as ignorance conceals the nature of the rope and creates the illusion of a snake.24

Maayaa appears in two different modes, namely, the collec-tive or cosmic (samasti) and the individual (vyasti). From the collective point of view it is seen as one; whereas from the individual point of view it is many. Advaitins explain the two modes using the illustrations of the trees and the lake. From the collective point of view a group of trees is considered as a forest or a grove, while at the same time a grove can be seen as many individual trees. Again, water in a lake can be considered as one from the collective mode, yet from the individual aspect it can be seen as different quantities of water. Similarly, maayaa can be considered as aggregate and individual. The individual Maayaa is called avidhyaa.25 Maayaa, in its cosmic aspect is the principle of individuation. It is Brahman’s power of becoming or appearing as many. Therefore, the origin of the world-process and the changes that take place in the world are attributed to cosmic maayaa. It is the capacity to bring the entire existence appearing as objective to the finite consciousness. Thus, in cosmic maayaa, the idea of origination, which implies power and will, is more apparent. But it denies the objectively real and manifests the objectively false. Collective maayaa is the mysterious primeval ignorance that exists eternally in relation to consciousness and which is free from all forms of differentiation. Here the sattvaguna predominates. The individual maayaa (avidhyaa) is the principle of ignorance that intercepts things from view. Thus, in it, the idea of obscuration is more prominent. Avidhyaa brings about such obscurations by misinterpretation of one thing for another, like a rope for a snake. It denies knowledge of identity and projects sub-jectively false ideas. In it rajasguna and tamasguna dominate.26

1.2. CONSEQUENCES OF APARAA VIDHYAA

According to Shankara whether it be in its cosmic or indi-vidual aspect, maayaa veils the true nature of Brahman, the absolute reality. It serves as the limiting adjunct (upaadhi) for Brahman, just as the sun’s rays are veiled by the clouds. Now, we shall elaborate the effects of maayaa in both of these aspects.

1.2.1. EFFECTS OF COSMIC MAAYAA

The cosmic maayaa leads to the appearance of the world of names and forms. In the cosmic absorption of everything in Brah-man, there comes about a sudden change, when Brahman wills to evolve from within and express itself. This, in turn, disturbs the indeterminate maayaa and its constituent elements, viz., the sattva, rajas and tamas. When Brahman accepts maayaa in its sattvic element, it becomes Iishvara. Brahman, in association with sattva is the all-knower, because everything is reflected in its intelligence. As veiled by cosmic ignorance Brahman is called Iishvara or sagunaa Brahman. Iishvara is the supreme Lord, who is worshipped by the ordinary people as their personal god in the form of different deities. According to Shankara, Brahman with qualities is a step lower than Brahman with out any qualities (nirgunaa Brahman). Iishvara is the highest manifestation of the absolute Brahman in the pheno-menal world. Besides he is the highest reality the human mind can grasp and the human heart can love. Shankara also holds that the Iishvara is omniscient, omnipotent and has ultimate power over inferior limiting adjuncts. The limiting adjuncts that are charac-teristic of Iishvara with sattvic element are superior limiting adjuncts (niratisayoopaadhi). Iishvara, in association with the tamasic element, acquires lower limiting adjuncts (nihinoopaadi). Iishvara’s superior limiting adjuncts direct the inferior limiting adjuncts by rajasic elements of maayaa; thereby there originate the elements of nature. To quote Shankara: "The Lord (Iishvara) endowed with superior limiting adjuncts", 27 "rules the souls with inferior adjuncts".28 Thus, Iishvara, in association with maayaa and the constituent gunas form the material and efficient cause of the cosmic order. The lower limiting adjunct of Iishvara lies at the root of the evolution of the five subtle elements (suukshmabhuutas), viz., the ether (aakashaa), the air (vaayu), the fire (teejas), the water (aap) and the earth. These elements do not intermix as they are pure and simple elements. They have distinctive qualities: aakashaa -- sound, vaayu -- energy, teejas -- heat and light, aap -- taste and the earth with the potency of affecting smell.29

From the subtle matter originates the gross matter (mahaab-huutas) by a process of five-fold combination (panciikarana). It consists in the combination of parts of every subtle element in differ-ent proportions to form the gross matter. Since mahaabhuutas are combinations of all subtle elements, the former imbibes the qualities of the latter. As a result, the mahaabhuutas are not entirely different from suukshmabhuutas, as the latter is the cause of the former, just as a piece of cloth is not different from the threads that make the cloth.30 From the mahaabhuutas and their various compounds of integration and differentiation, there arises the cosmic system of fourteen worlds: three in the higher region, four in the middle region and seven in the lower region, viz. the satyalokas, the jnaanalokas and tapalokas, respectively. The satyalokaa is formed out the of combinations of elements, in which the sattvaguna is dominant. In this loka, the souls enjoy an expansive life. In virtue of the rhythmic vibrations of life-current passing through, it is possible for the souls in the satyaloka to move progressively, enjoy a better life and understand a wider vision of truth. Those who live here are full of life, their knowledge is intuitive, their delight serene and their lives easy. Jnaanaloka evolves when the various combinations of ele-ments are dominated by rajasguna. It is an intermediate state that is characterized by coarse matter, life and mind. Though there is coarse matter in this state, there is order and coherence so that life can grow and mind can function progressively. The life here is freer; there is clarity of vision, freedom and delight. The tapaloka evolves when the combinations of elements in tamasguna predominate. Due to the activity of tamas, this state is full of darkness and is not conducive to the development of higher life and mental activity. In this sphere, darkness, ignorance, contradictions, perplexities and confusions prevail. Since it is far removed from the center of life, one cannot have life and bliss in this state. Besides, as tamas dominates, the life-force cannot make itself felt.31

Apart from the evolution of suukshmabhuutas, mahaabhuutas and the three lokas, by the combination of elements with the three gunas, the cosmic maayaa also brings about the three cosmic stages of existence and three cosmic orders of existence: the cosmic waking-consciousness (Virat), which is conscious of the totality of concrete existences inhabiting the threefold regions and in which Brahman is limited by the cosmic gross body; the cosmic dream-consciousness (Hiranyagarba), in which Brahman has the totality of cosmic subtle body as its limiting adjuncts (upaadhi); and the cosmic sleep-consciousness (Iishvara), in which the Brahman has for its upaadhi the cosmic causal or bliss body.32

Cosmic maayaa also gives rise to the conception of Iishvara, as the creator (Brahma), the sustainer (Vishnu) and the destroyer (Siva). These three gods are nothing other than Iishvara with reference to different gunas. When Iishvara is limited by maayaa in its sattvic aspect, i.e., sattva as the predominating upaadhi, it is called Vishnu. He sustains and preserves the cosmic order. When Iishvara has maayaa with rajas as the dominant upaadhi, it is called Brahma. He is the creator of the cosmic order. When maayaa with tamas predominates Iishvara, it is called Siva or Rudhra. He is the destroyer of the universe. Thus, Iishvara with the help of sattva preserves, rajas creates and tamas destroys.33 In this manner, cosmic maayaa brings in the illusion of the plurality of the material world, plurality of gods, plurality of kingdoms of beings, plurality of cosmic order and the plurality of the stages of existence. Thus, the cosmic maayaa is the source of our perception of multiplicity in the universe.

1.2.2. EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL MAAYAA

The individual maayaa (avidhyaa) makes one perceive his true self (Aatman) as jiiva. The unit of existence conscious of its physical covering is called jiiva. It does not possess knowledge of its identity with Brahman. Jiiva is bound by good or bad actions which determine its existence in the higher or lower regions. It enjoys the physical and gross things, as it has a body which, with its appetites, originates out of the mahaabhuutas and their various combinations. Because of the physical body and its appetites jiiva experiences hunger, thirst, sleep, anger and all such states.34 The physical body which jiiva possesses is the fleshy covering, which it casts off at its death.35

Other than the physical body, the jiiva has what is called a subtle-body. It survives death and accompanies the individual jiiva beyond death. This includes a number of elements. Firstly, the praana, which is the individual vivifying principle in jiiva. It con-sists of all the vital currents that support and preserve the organic existence of jiiva. Praana "preserves the physical frames in existence, regulates the entire physiological process and makes the performance of higher functions possible in the physical frame."36 It is present in every part of the physical body and makes each part alive and working. There are five types of praana, each of which guides different life-systems and their functions. When praana regulates the respiratory system, it is called mukhya praana; praana as related to the digestive system is known as samaana; when praana helps the functioning of lower organs, it is called apaana; while guiding higher organs, it is called udaana; and as a principle helping the circulatory system, praana is vyaana.37 Secondly, the sense organs are outlets through which mind can perceive objects and objects can give themselves to the mind. There are five sense organs, viz., the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose. These are evolved from the sattvic aspect of the five subtle elements (suukshmabhuutas). Each of the senses have a corresponding perception, viz., sound, touch, sight, taste and smell respectively.38 Thirdly, there are the five organs of action, with the help of which jiiva as a bodily and conscious organism can move about. They include the tongue, the hands, the feet, the organs of generation and the organs of evacuation.39

Fourthly, there is what is called the central organ (antah-karana). It is sometimes called the eleventh sense, as antahkarana is different from organs of sense and organs of action. Its main function is to make jiiva experience manifold things one by one in succession. It is capable of experiencing all types of sensations. Antahkarana is the inner organ of knowledge and that of volition. It is passive in that it gives knowledge, while it is impulsive as it excites action. Antahkarana, as the faculty of reflection and the faculty of desire, deliberation and will, is called the manas (mind). The manas has a number of modifications (vritti) relating to the intellectual and volitional states. The modifications of the intellec-tual state are doubt (vicikitsa), cognition (dhi), belief (sraddha) and retention (dhiriti). The modifications corresponding to the volitional state are desire (kaama), decision (samkalpa), deliberation (vikal-pa), fear (vi), shame (hri), pleasure (sukha) and pain (dukha).40 These vrittis are classified into three classes depending on the predominance of sattva, rajas and tamas.41 When antahkarana reflects the things truly, it is called buddhi (intelligence). Buddhi is the faculty of right apperception or discriminating knowledge. While manas gives jiiva knowledge, weighs reasons for and against, and deliberates, buddhi helps jiiva to apprehend and perceive rightly.42 Other than manas and buddhi, antahkarana has another faculty called the faculty of retention (ahankaara), which is the ‘I-sense’ or the sense of individuality, which makes the jiiva experience itself as the ‘I’ and say ‘I exist’ (asmi).43

Besides the gross and the subtle bodies, there is a third type of body jiiva experiences as a result of avidhyaa, viz., the causal body or the bliss body. It is the innermost level of avidhyaa. This body comes about owing to the predominance of sattvaguna, as it is purely composed of the sattvic aspect of maayaa.44

Avidhyaa makes jiiva experience three states of experience (avasthaa), viz., the individual waking-consciousness (visva), the individual dream-consciousness (taijasa) and the individual sleep-consciousness (pragna). In the state of individual waking-con-sciousness, the jiiva is characterized by the individual gross body. In this state, jiiva experiences the world of external objects through the senses and the mind. The perceptual world becomes its field of knowledge and enjoyment. The objects are known and enjoyed as real existing things outside the mind. The world is also perceived by the jiiva as a series of states and it is understood in relation to jiiva itself, as the subject (knowing I). The cognitive process, in this state, also involves three aspects, viz., instrumental (pramaana), the objective (premeya) and the consequent (phala). The visva state of jiiva is identical with the virat, the cosmic waking-consciousness. Jiiva’s individual state of dream-consciousness is known as taijasa, which has the subtle body as its object. In this state, jiiva is con-scious of what is within and enjoys subtle objects. In taijasa the consciousness is withdrawn from external objects and rests on the impressions (vaasanas) of the waking state that remain within the mind. Thus, the senses are fully at rest in taijasa. In the dream-state, there is no body consciousness and no space-time restrictions as in the waking state. Even though the content of dreams is traces left from the waking state, it flows with freedom and proper sequence. Taijasa is identical with the cosmic dream-consciousness, Hiranya-garba. Jiiva’s individual deep sleep-consciousness is characteristic of the bliss body. In this state, the jiiva enjoys bliss. Behind the bliss body, the innermost of all beings, exists the Brahman. Thus, in this state, there is no duality that characterizes the other states. In it, neither the subject that knows nor the object is known, as it is an undifferentiated consciousness in which the contents of waking and dream states come together. It is the state of highest serenity (sam-prasaada). But it is not a state of unconsciousness, for after jiiva awakes from a state of deep sleep it knows that "I slept soundly and that I did not know anything". Thus, jiiva, in this state also has the ‘I-consciousness’ after it awakes.45

Besides, due to the influence of the individual maayaa, the jiiva is seen as having five sheaths (koshas). They are the sheath of body (annamaayaakosha), the sheath of vital force (pranamaayaa-kosha), the sheath of mind (manomaayaakosha), the sheath of knowledge (vijnaanamaayaakosha) and the sheath of bliss (anan-damaayaakosha). The sheath of body is the covering of coarse body that is purely flesh. It is a dense cover. The next three sheaths are related to the subtle body: the sheath of vital force is the life currents supporting the preservation of organic existence; the sheath of mind includes mind and the organs of action; and the sheath of knowledge consists in buddhi and five organs of sense. Finally there is the sheath of bliss, which is the innermost of sheath of avidhyaa.46

All these koshas serve as upaadhis that individuate jiiva, making it forget its true nature and condition. Shankara notes that the jiiva is to be considered as a mere appearance of the highest self, like the reflection of the sun on water. It is neither directly the highest self, nor a different thing. Just as when one reflected image of the sun trembles another reflected image does not on that account, tremble also, so when one soul is connected with actions and results of actions another soul on that account is not connected likewise. Thus, jiva appears to be numerous due to ignorance, yet one soul’s actions do not affect the other.47 In consequence the jiiva is not aware of its divine reality and becomes the worshiper of Iishvara, the Lord of maayaa. In fact, jiiva and Iishvara are the result of maayaa and disappear as true knowledge is attained.

The cosmic maayaa and avidhyaa individualize Brahman as Iishvara and jiiva, besides giving the illusion of the plurality of existence. To the question "why must there be an emergence of the infinite process of becoming from Brahman through maayaa?", often the answer given is that it is the liila of Brahman. The term ‘liila’ means a sport or a playful activity. Liila lies in ignorance and it can never reveal the true nature of reality. We cannot ascribe any specific reason why the liila of Brahman takes place, except saying that it is an appearance suitable to the capacity and understanding of the one to whom it does appear. Liila, therefore, is real to the one, whom it appears, but does not mean anything to Brahman, who sportily assumes the appearance.48 In other words, liila is a self-imposed limitation on the part of Brahman, which does not impair the integrity of the absolute. But it satisfies our volitional and emotional nature by making us conceive the absolute as a personal existence that can fulfill our pragmatic need for love and devotion.49

1.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF APARAA VIDHYAA

In the preceding sections of this chapter, we have looked into the nature and consequences of aparaa vidhyaa. Now, in order to clarify this notion further, we could take up briefly the issue of its characteristics. According to Shankara aparaa vidhyaa has four significant characteristics, viz., it involves subject-object distinction, it is mediate and indirect, it is knowable by pramaanas (means of knowledge), and it is a caused knowledge. In the following section, we shall analyze these characteristics of aparaa vidhyaa.

1.3.1. SUBJECT-OBJECT DISTINCTION

Empirical experience, as we well know, is the everyday human experience which involves the subject-object duality. For example, in perceiving an object such as a table or a book the perceptual knowledge comes about as a result of someone seeing or touching the table or the book in question. Thus, empirical experience always involves the distinction between the ‘experiencer’ and the ‘ex-perienced’, the ‘knower’ and the ‘known’. In his introduction to Shankara’s Aatmaboodha, Swami Nihilananda writes of empirical experience as follows:

Empirical experience involves the distinction be-tween the ‘seer’ (drig) and the ‘seen’ (drysa), the subject (vishayi) and the object (vishaya), the ‘ego’ (aham) and the ‘non-ego’ (idem). The seer is the perceiver, identical with the subject and the ego, and is of the nature of consciousness and intelligence. The seen is the thing perceived, identical with the object and the non-ego, and is insentient by nature. Therefore, the seer and the seen, the subject and the object, the ego and the non-ego are mutually op-posed and must never be identified with each other.50

Both the subject and the object are essential to, and inse-parable from, empirical experience. Without one of them, an em-pirical experience is not possible. Though an object might exist outside, there is no actual empirical experience unless there is a knower who by his intellect makes possible the experience of the particular object. "An object may exist independently of a knower; and the knower becomes self-conscious while revealing something which may be an external object or an internal idea."51 Thus, the basic element that characterizes every empirical experience is the presence of the duality of the subject and the object.

All the means of empirical knowledge (pramaanas) pre-suppose the subject-object distinction and operate in the realm of duality. Even scriptural knowledge is empirical in the sense that it is intended for an agent who is able to know. For Shankara says, "The meditation taught in the Vedaanta texts, whose aim is the realization of the self, represented by the Upanishads, is possible only if the self is the agent."52 Thus, without a subject or a knower, the purpose of the scripture cannot be realized. In other words, if there is no one to know what is revealed in the scriptures, scriptural knowledge is not possible. But, though scriptural testimony is empirical, confined to the realm of phenomena and involves duality, it is superior to other means of knowledge since scripture reveals the highest reality and helps one to remove ignorance (avidhyaa).53

1.3.2. MEDIATE AND INDIRECT

Empirical knowledge is obtained by the use of senses, manas and buddhi, in the actual presence of the object sensed and under-stood. In other words, when one comes into contact with an object, with the help of the external senses and internal faculties of knowing, the knowledge of that object is obtained. But if it happens that one lacks the senses or other faculties of knowing, the empirical know-ledge of objects is not possible. Therefore, the mediums like senses, mind and intellect are equally essential to empirical experience as are the subject and the object.

Since empirical knowledge is attained by means of external and internal mediums, such as senses, mind and the intellect, it is a mediate and indirect knowledge. In other words, it is a representative knowledge. One comes to know the objects not directly and imme-diately, but the object is known as the senses, mind and intellect represent it. Thus, it is with the help of the representative idea of the object that the object is known. Empirical knowledge, therefore, is different from direct and immediate knowledge. Here one experi-ences knowledge about a reality intuitively and directly, without the help of any medium of knowledge. In such a knowledge, the acti-vities of the senses, mind and the intellect are suspended, and one is open to the knowledge without any mediation of these external and internal faculties of knowing. On the other hand, as empirical know-ledge fundamentally and essentially is dependent on physical and mental faculties of knowledge, it is basically mediate and direct knowledge.

1.3.3. KNOWABLE BY PRAMAANAS

Empirical knowledge is known by various means of knowl-edge (pramaanas). Vedaanta recognizes six parmesan, which can be divided into two groups, based on the subject-matter each group is dealing with. The first group attempts to give knowledge of em-pirical realities, while the second group is the source of knowledge of the transcendental reality. The former are five, viz., perception (pratyaksha), inference (anumaana), comparison (anumaana), supposition (arthaapatti) and non-perception (anupalabdhi). The latter group consists of one pramaana, viz., sabda.54 We could give a brief consideration of each of these pramaanas.

Perception is an important means of empirical knowledge. Its value consists in presenting to our consciousness the manifold reality of this world, even though it does not prove its validity. Ac-cording to Vedaantic thinkers, perception gives us the knowledge of reality, but fails to explain the difference. In other words, perception has the cognitive element as it reports or gives information about the mere existence of realities, but does not have the recognitive ele-ment, as it does not have such characteristics as assimilation and clarification of difference. It can be held as a source of valid know-ledge, if it is not contradicted by subsequent experience or by any other pramaanas. The process of perception takes place in this manner. The manas comes in contact with the senses, the senses with the object and the manas with the consciousness immanent in it. As the result of these contacts, the mind is modified in the form of the object, which, in turn, leads to an identity between the perceiving-consciousness and the object-consciousness. The modification of the mind (vritti), in taking the form of the object, destroys the ignorance, and the object is revealed to the perceiving consciousness. Thus, perception involves the conformity of the mental order to the given objective order.55

Inference is a process of acquiring knowledge of a particular thing with the help of a mark it possesses, even though there is no way of directly perceiving it. Vedaantins basically follow the Nyaaya doctrine of inference, with some minor modifications. In in-ference, the invariable concomitance (vyaapti), between the middle term (heetu) and the major term (saadhya), is established by fre-quent experience. For example, the concomitance of fire and smoke is presumed from their existing in the kitchen. vyaapti, i.e., the concomitant relationship between heetu and saadhya is not an inference, but a permanent impression (samskaara) left upon the consciousness by the observation of positive instances and non-observation of negative instances. Once vyaapti is established, then one can proceed to make an inference by linking the heetu and the minor term. For example, by linking smoke to fire in vyaapti, one can conclude that there would be fire in the mountain if one finds smoke there. In order to present the inference one has made in this manner to others, a five-member syllogism is proposed. The mem-bers of the syllogism are:

There is fire in the mountain.

Because there is smoke in the mountain.

Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen.

This mountain has smoke.

Therefore, it has fire.

The first premise of the syllogism states the conclusion to be proved. The second gives the reason (heetu), while the third is the major premise, in which we have an illustration of the concomitance of heat and saadhya. The fourth premise links the middle term and the minor term. The fifth restates the proved conclusion.56

Comparison, as a pramaana, is based on similarity (sadris-ya) between two objects. In it, a particular thing is felt to be like another thing. For example, a gavaya is experienced as an animal similar to a cow. The cause of such an experience is the functional activity of consciousness of similarity between the things compared. Upamaana is not perception, as the similarity experienced is not presented to the senses, but rather it is directly given to the per-ceiving consciousness. Neither is it a remembrance or a recognition, as the similarity experienced is not what we had already been known, forgotten and now remembered or recognized. Rather, the similarity is presented to the consciousness as something completely new. Comparison is also not an inference; knowledge of similarity is attained by direct experience and not inferred through the function of vyaapti.57

Supposition consist in presuming the cause of a thing from its effect, which presumption is based on a negative mark (vyatireeki linga). The usual example given to illustrate arthaapatti is: the earth differs from other elements because of its smell. Arthaapatti is not an inference, but an implication or a hypothesis. It is the supposition of the cause. In other words, arthaapatti suggests the cause from the given effect. For example, when one is told that Devadatta is not at home, one presumes that he must be out of station. In other words, the fact of Devadatta’s not being at home is caused by his being out of station. This presumption of the cause of Devadatta’s being not at home is based on arthaapatti.58

Non-perception is the source of knowledge of non-existence (abhaava). For Vedaantins, non-existence is not a mere negation of being, but it is something that has a real existence and it is perceived by a pramaana called anupabdhi. Abhaava is an existence, which is identified with its locus, but in it we do not experience any objects. In other words, abhaava implies the existence of the locus without any object. Though, the object of abhaava is absent, it is capable of being perceived as absent. Therefore, abhaava has a reality. In order to apprehend the nature of abhaava we require a specific pramaana which would give us the knowledge not only of the locus of abhaava, but also the absence of the object. That pramaana that gives us knowledge of abhaava is anupalabdhi. It helps us to experience the absence directly in relation to its locus.59

Other than the above-mentioned pramaanas, Vedaantins accept testimony (sabda) as a valid source of knowledge. This is of two kinds, based on the source of sabda. It is personal, if the source of information is a person, whereas it is impersonal if the informa-tion is based on the authority of the Sruti. The former cannot be accepted unconditionally, because it is possible that the person, the source of authority, can either deliberately misrepresent the truth or in good faith can present falsity as truth. The latter can be accepted unconditionally, as it is based on the authority of the Sruti. It is eternal. Sabda (word) is understood in relation to its artha (meaning). The word and its meaning are inseparably related to things, as they directly refer to things and express things. The denotative potency of the sabda is co-eternal with itself. All words are endowed with an inherent denotative potency from eternity. Therefore, the relationship between language and thought, words and things are a priori, and the system of names is not created, but manifested from all eternity. Thus, according to Vedaantins, sabda as scriptural testimony has an eternal dimension and so it can be accepted unconditionally as a true pramaana.60

According to the Vedaanta school of thought, all these pra-maanas are valid means of knowledge, as they give us knowledge of this phenomenal world. But we cannot hold them as absolute be-cause their scope is limited to the empirical order. When considered in relation to the Paraa-vidhyaa their reality and the truth they give cease to exist. As a result we cannot make use of them in the transcendental order. This does not mean that these pramaanas are useless. They are useful, valid and necessary as long as we are under the hold and sway of empirical consciousness or the jiiva.61

1.3.4. CAUSED KNOWLEDGE

An empirical experience is transient and of a passing nature; it does take place in time. Thus empirical experience has a beginning, i.e., when an object is presented to the individual consciousness through the medium of senses and grasped by the intellect one begins to have an empirical experience. Likewise, if the subject or the object of that particular experience exists no longer, then empirical experience no longer exists. Experience of a particular person does not exist when the person is dead or if the object of experience is destroyed. Thus, empirical knowledge is a caused knowledge. Since it is a caused knowledge, the individual can gain more of it by his own effort. By study, hard work, listening to others who know better and research, empirical knowledge can be attained and developed. Again, one can attain this type of knowledge by use of many modern techniques and technologies. For example, the knowledge of a language and its best use can be achieved by using new techniques of language learning and the modern technological inventions, such as, computer and audio-systems. Therefore, the acquisition of empirical knowledge, depends on each individual, especially on the effort he makes and the facilities available for him.

NOTES

1. BSB, I, i, pp. 11-12.

2. Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Recon-struction, 2nd ed., (Honolulu: The University Press Hawaii, 1962), p. 33.

3. Cf. ibid., p. 34.

4. Cf. BSB, I, i, pp. 2-3.

5. Cf. Shankara, Self-knowledge (Aatmabhooda), trans. Swami Nihilananda (New York: Ramakrishna Vivekananda Center, 1980), Introduction, p. 42 (hereafter: AB).

6. Shankara, Panchaadasi, trans. Hari Prasad Shastri (Lon-don: Shanthi Sadan, 1956), I, 13 (hereafter: PI).

7. Cf. BSB, I, i, pp. 3-4.

8. Cf. VC, pp. 13-16

9. Cf. Shankara, Brihdaaranyaka Upanishad Bhaasya, trans. Swami Madhvananda, 5th ed. (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1975), II, v, 19 (hereafter: BUB).

10. Cf. F. Max Mueller, trans., "Kaatha Upanishad", SBE, Vol. XV, part II, I, ii, 4-5 (hereafter: KU).

11. Cf. F. Max Mueller, trans., "Svetaasvatara Upanishad", SBE, Vol. XV, part II, IV, 10 (hereafter: SU).

12. Cf. BUB., II, v, 19.

13. Cf. Radhakrishnan S., trans., Bagavad Giita (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1949), XVIII, 61 (hereafter: BG).

14. Cf. ibid., VII, 25, 14.

15. Cf. VC, p. 12.

16. Ramkant A. Sinari, The Structure of Indian Thought (Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1970), p. 134.

17. Eliot Deutsch, p. 29.

18. AB, Introduction, p. 52.

19. Cf. Dasgupta S., vol. I, p. 443.

20. Cf. AB, Introduction, p. 52.

21. Cf. ibid., p. 57.

22. Cf. Swami Nihilananda (trans.) Vedaantasaara or The Essence of Vedaanta of Sadaananta Gogindra, 3rd. ed. (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1968), II, 52, p. 42 ( hereafter: VSS).

23. Cf. ibid., II, 54, p. 58.

24. Cf. ibid.

25. Cf. AB, Introduction, p. 58.

26. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1987), pp. 106-109. Cf. also PI, I, 15-17.

27. BSB, II, iii, 45, p. 509.

28. Ibid., II, iii, 43, pp. 507-508.

29. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture, pp. 129-130.

30. Cf. ibid., pp. 130-133.

31. Cf. ibid., pp. 133-135.

32. Cf. ibid., pp. 135, 152-153.

33. Cf. ibid., p. 128. Cf. AB, Introduction, p. 59.

34. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture, pp. 135-136.

35. Cf. ibid., p. 150.

36. Cf. ibid., pp. 137-138.

37. Cf. ibid., pp. 137-141.

38. Cf. ibid., p. 142.

39. Cf. ibid., p. 150.

40. Cf. ibid., pp. 145-146. Cf. also BUB I, v, 3.

41. Cf. PI., II, 12, 14, 15.

42. Cf. Swahanenda Swami, Chaandogya Upanishad (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1975), VII, 17-20 (hereafter: CU).

43. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture, pp. 146-148.

44. Cf. ibid., p. 152.

45. The Upanishads postulate a fourth state, viz., the tuuriya as distinct from the other three states. It is an absolute self-tran-scending state which bypasses the limitations of time, space and causality. This state is completely free from avidhyaa and its products which vitiate the other three states. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, p. 152-153. Cf. also E.I. Warrier, Sri Aaurobindo’s Integral Yoga and Shankara’s Advaita (India: Vohra Publishers and Distributors, 1990), pp. 116-118. Cf. also BUB, IV, iii, 15.

46. Cf. AB, p. 131. Cf. also Mahendranath Sircar, The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture, pp. 150-153.

47. Cf. BSB, II, iii, 50, pp. 515-516.

48. Cf. ibid., II, i, 33.

49. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture, pp. 45-46.

50. AB, Introduction, p. 43.

51. A. Ramamurthi, Advaitic Mysticism of Shankara (West Bengal: The Center of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Vishvab-harati, Shantiniketan, 1947), p. 15.

52. BSB, II, iii, 39, p. 497.

53. Cf. Shankara, "Taittiiriya Upanishad Bhaasya", Upahi-shad Bhaasyas (Aitareeya, Iisha, Kaatha, Keena, Mundaka, Pra-sana and Taittiiriya Upanishads), trans. Swami Gambhirananda, Vol. II (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1957), II, viii, 5 (hereafter: TUB).

54. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture, p. 175.

55. Cf. ibid., pp. 176-184.

56. Cf. ibid., pp. 192-202. Vedaantins make use of inference to establish the unreality of the empirical existence and the reality of trans-empirical existence. The inference is stated as follows: "The manifold existence is false, because of its being different from Brahman. All that is not Brahman is false, like the silver in the mother-of-pearl." Ibid., p. 202.

57. Cf. ibid., p. 203.

58. Cf. ibid., pp. 204 -205.

59. Cf. ibid., pp. 214 -217.

60. Cf. ibid., pp. 205-208.

61. Cf. Eliot Deutsch, p. 69.